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Abstract 
 The	   recent	   financial	   crisis	   beginning	   In	   August	   2007	   depressed	   the	   world	  economies	   and	   disrupted	   the	   operation	   of	   conventional	   monetary	   policy	  instruments.	   Dramatic	   increases	   of	   three-­‐month	   LIBOR	   rate	   in	   different	  currencies	  were	  observed	  and	  the	  spread	  between	  three-­‐month	  LIBOR	  and	  OIS	  widened.	   	   These	   phenomena	   implied	   a	   broken	   transmission	   mechanism	   of	  monetary	   policy.	   The	   central	   banks	   of	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   US	   launched	  unconventional	   monetary	   policy	   tools	   i.e.	   liquidity	   provision	   and	   quantitative	  easing	   to	   stimulate	   domestic	   economies	   bypassing	   the	   banking	   systems.	   The	  European	   Central	   Bank	   implemented	   the	   Enhanced	   Credit	   Support	   scheme	   to	  provide	   liquidity	   to	   the	   banking	   system	   as	   well	   as	   fixing	   the	   monetary	  transmission	  mechanism.	  	  As	  a	  consequence,	  much	  research	  has	  been	  undertaken	  to	  study	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  unconventional	   monetary	   policies	   on	   economies.	   Most	   of	   the	   literature	   has	  studied	  the	  effect	  on	  long-­‐term	  variables	  e.g.	  GDP,	  inflation	  and	  unemployment.	  But,	   our	   study	   here	   focuses	   on	   the	   impact	   of	   those	   policies	   on	   the	   credit	   and	  liquidity	   premia	   in	   the	  money	  market	   as	   represented	  by	   interest	   rate	   spreads.	  This	  aspect	   is	   important	  because	   the	   transmission	  of	  quantitative	  easing	   in	   the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	   to	  ultimate	   targets	  relies	   intermediately	  on	  reducing	   the	  cost	  of	  borrowing	  and	  interbank	  lending	  rates	  are	  the	  foundation	  for	  many	  market	  rates.	  In	   the	   EMU,	   to	   fix	   the	   monetary	   transmission	   mechanism,	   restoring	   the	  communication	  between	  EURIBOR	  and	  OIS	  is	  the	  primary	  step.	  	  Our	   results	   show	   that	  both	   credit	   and	   liquidity	  premia	  were	   the	  drivers	  of	   the	  widening	  LIBOR	  and	  OIS	  spreads.	  The	  quantitative	  easing	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	  and	   Enhanced	   Credit	   Support	   in	   the	   EMU	   reduced	   credit	   risks	   and	   liquidity	  premia	   significantly,	   relying	   on	   the	   causality	   between	   the	   two	   premia,	  respectively.	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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 On	  August	  09,	  2007,	  BNP	  Paribas	  froze	  three	  of	  their	  hedge	  funds	  thus	  signaling	  to	   other	   market	   participants	   the	   complexity	   and	   difficulty	   of	   valuing	  collateralized	  debt	  obligations	  (CDOs).	  This	  resulted	   in	   the	  close	  down	  of	  some	  credit	  markets	  e.g.	  mortgage-­‐backed	  security	  market,	  and	  liquidity	  quickly	  dried	  up.	  Banks’	  off-­‐balance	  sheet	  vehicles	  that	  held	  securitized	  financial	   instruments	  found	   it	  hard	   to	   finance	   their	  holdings	  by	  borrowing	   (in	   the	  commercial	  paper	  market)	  (King,	  2007).	  Banks	  were	  reluctant	  to	  borrow	  at	   longer	  maturities	  and	  hoarded	  reserves	  on	  their	  balance	  sheets	  in	  order	  to	  cope	  with	  the	  possible	  and	  unforeseeable	   funding	   requirement	   from	   their	   vehicles	   (ibid.).	   The	   rate	   on	  unsecured	  interbank	  lending	  (LIBOR)	  therefore	  increased	  dramatically	  resulting	  in	   a	   break	   between	   interbank	   rate	   and	   central	   bank	   policy	   rate.	   This	   further	  resulted	  in	  broken	  monetary	  transmission	  mechanism	  	  The	   BoE	   and	   the	   Fed	   started	   large-­‐scale	   asset	   purchases	   (LSAP)	   from	   the	  secondary	   market.	   The	   approach	   is	   referred	   as	   quantitative	   easing	   (QE).	   The	  benefit	   of	   quantitative	   easing	   is	   to	   bypass	   the	   interbank	   market,	   transiting	  monetary	  policy	   through	  different	  channels	   to	   influence	  asset	  prices,	  aggregate	  demand	   and	   boost	   GDP.	   The	   first	   round	   of	   quantitative	   easing	   in	   the	   US	   was	  officially	   announced	   on	   November	   25,	   2008	   with	   amount	   of	   $600	   billion	  purchase	   of	   housing	   agency	   debt	   and	   related	   securities.	   In	   the	   UK,	   QE	   started	  later	  than	  in	  the	  US	  on	  February	  09,	  2009.	  Instead	  of	  fixing	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  purchase	  on	  the	  announcement	  day,	  BoE	  released	  their	  target	  subsequently.	  The	  initial	   amount	  was	   £75	  billion	   announced	  on	  March	  05,	   2009	   followed	  by	   two	  £50	  billion	  on	  May	  07	  and	  August	  06,	  respectively,	  and	  £25	  billion	  on	  November	  05	  bringing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  first	  round	  QE	  to	  £200	  billion.	  Within	  the	  £200	  billion	  purchase,	  98%	  were	  government	  bonds	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  maturities.	   	  	  The	  situation	  is	  a	  bit	  different	  in	  the	  EMU.	  The	  ECB	  has	  not	  so	  aggressively,	  as	  the	  BoE	   and	   the	   Fed,	   stepped	   into	   asset	   purchases.	   They	   launched	   Covered	   Bond	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Purchase	   Programme	   on	   June	   04,	   2009	   with	   only	   €60	   billion	   to	   purchase	  covered	  bonds.	  However,	   they	  announced	  fixed	  rate	  tender	  procedure	  with	   full	  allotment	   on	   October	   10,	   2008	   and	   further	   extended	   long-­‐term	   refinancing	  operation	   (LTROs)	   to	   twelve	  months	   on	  May	   07,	   2009.	   The	  main	   focus	   of	   the	  ECB’s	  strategy	  lay	  with	  the	  injection	  of	  liquidity	  to	  the	  banking	  system.	  Given	  the	  institutional	  set-­‐up	  of	  the	  EMU,	  the	  ability	  of	  ECB	  to	  purchase	  government	  bonds	  on	   secondary	   market	   is	   limited1	   and	   the	   issue	   of	   moral	   hazard	   may	   be	   more	  important	  to	  consider	  compared	  with	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US,	  because	  it	  is	  a	  union.	  Purchasing	  government	  debt	  may	  reduce	  sovereigns’	  incentive	  to	  address	  fiscal	  deficits,	  debt	  levels	  and	  structural	  reform	  issues.	  	  In	  the	  context,	  Sarkar	  (2009)	  points	  out	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  prevailing	  risk	  environment	  may	  facilitate	  the	  evaluation	  of	  effectiveness	  of	  central	  banks’	  unconventional	  policies.	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  unconventional	  monetary	  policies	  has	  been	  well	  studied	  by	  scholars.	  Prior	  to	  QE,	  literatures	  tend	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  effect	  of	   liquidity	   provisions	   to	   influence	   money	   market	   spread	   (see	   Michaud	   and	  Upper,	  2008,	  Taylor	  and	  Williams,	  2008	  and	  2009,	  Poskitt,	  2011	  and	  Lenza	  et	  al,	  2010).	  Since	  the	  onset	  of	  QE,	  the	  research	  focus	  has	  shifted	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  QE	  on	  government	  bond	  yield,	  other	  asset	  prices	  and	  on	  the	  real	  economy	  indicators	  (see	   Joyce	   et	   al,	   2011,	  Meier,	   2009,	   Neely,	   2011,	   Baumeister	   and	   Benati,	   2010	  and	  Kapetanios	  et	  al,	   2012).	  However,	   fewer	   literatures	  have	  been	  done	   in	   the	  area	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  QE	  on	  money	  market	  spreads	  and	  how	  QE	  would	  affect	  the	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  risk	  nested	  in	  the	  interbank	  market.	   	  	  This	   possible	   impact	   of	   QE	   is	   vital	   with	   respect	   to	   restoring	   central	   banks’	  control	   of	   the	   market	   because	   the	   BoE,	   the	   Fed	   and	   the	   ECB	   relied	   on	  manipulation	  of	  overnight	  interest	  rate	  to	  pursue	  their	  monetary	  target.	  A	  break	  between	  the	  overnight	  interest	  rate	  and	  the	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rate	  reduces	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   Cour-­‐Thimann	  and	  Winkler	  (2012)	  discuss	  the	  institutional	  set-­‐up	  of	  ECB	  that	  prevents	  ECB	  to	  purchase	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strength	   of	   interest	   rate	   as	   a	  monetary	   tool.	   Remarkably,	   the	   spread	   between	  bank	  base	  rate	  and	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  widened	  to	  a	  point	  that	  was	  around	  100	  basis	  points	  before	   the	  operation	  of	  QE.	  This	  market	  data	   implies	   that	   the	  transmission	  mechanism	   of	   a	   conventional	   monetary	   policy	   regime	   failed	   and	  required	   the	   innovation	   of	   unconventional	   measures.	   The	   reason	   behind	   the	  failure	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  pricing	  of	  the	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rate.	  As	   suggested	  by	   the	  non-­‐Arbitrage	  Model2,	   the	   short-­‐term	   interest	   rate	   is	  not	  only	  hooked	  with	  the	  overnight	  interest	  rate	  but	  also	  the	  price	  of	  market	  risk	  i.e.	   risk	  premia.	   Suddenly	   the	   increased	  uncertainty	  of	   asset	  prices	  and	  market	  liquidity	   pushed	   up	   the	   risk	   premia	   in	   the	   money	   market,	   so	   the	   break	   of	  communication	  between	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rate	  and	  overnight	  rate	  resulted	  in	  the	   failure	   of	   transmission	   of	   monetary	   control.	   Therefore,	   understanding	   the	  effect	   of	   QE	   on	   the	   market	   risks	   provides	   the	   primary	   evidence	   of	   how	   QE	  improves	   the	   communication	   between	   official	   overnight	   interest	   rate	   and	  short-­‐term	  market	  rates	  as	  well	  as	  the	  recovery	  of	  the	  transmission	  mechanism.	   	  	  In	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   US,	   asset-­‐purchases	   took	   a	  major	   role	   in	   the	   central	   banks’	  measures	  to	  control	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  recent	   financial	  crisis	  on	  money	  markets	  and	   the	   economy.	   The	   QE	   has	   been	   written	   in	   the	   Red	   Book	   of	   the	   BoE3	  indicating	  its	  important	  role	  in	  stimulating	  the	  transmission	  of	  monetary	  policy.	  In	  the	  US,	  the	  acquisition	  of	  long-­‐term	  securities	  is	  named	  the	  ‘Large	  Scale	  Asset	  Purchase	   (LSAP)’.	   It	   is	   recognized	  as	   just	   one	  balance	   sheet	   tool.	  The	   expected	  impact	  of	  LSAP	  on	   financial	  markets	   is	   to	  re-­‐active	   the	   trading	  activity	   in	  some	  severely	   affected	   asset	   market	   e.g.	   corporate	   bond	   market	   through	   portfolio	  rebalance	   channel.	   Under	   the	   framework	   of	   CAPM,	   investors’	   activities	   are	  driven	   by	   the	   relationship	   between	   risk	   and	   return.	   Therefore,	   learning	   the	  impact	   of	   QE	   to	   change	   the	   risk	   premia	   i.e.	   interest	   rate	   spread	   in	   the	  money	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   More	  details	  of	  the	  model	  is	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  4.2.	  3	   The	  latest	  update	  of	  the	  Red	  Book	  at	  the	  time	  of	  writing	  the	  thesis	  is	  January	  2014.	  The	  link	  provides	  the	  PDF	  version	  of	  Part	  2	  of	  the	  Red	  Book	  and	  point	  55	  –	  59	  describes	  the	  QE	  in	  the	  UK.	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/publications/redbookpart2.pdf	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market	   gives	   the	   inside	   view	   of	   the	   movement	   of	   financial	   market	   under	   QE	  policies.	  	  In	   the	  Euro	  zone,	   the	  ECB	  has	  operated	  the	   ‘Enhanced	  Credit	  Support’	   (ECS)	   to	  combat	   the	   liquidity	   shortage	   during	   the	   financial	   crisis.	   LTROs	   is	   part	   of	   the	  ECB’s	   ECS	   and	   the	   operations	   have	   run	   on	   a	   daily	   basis	   providing	   long-­‐term	  liquidity	  to	  the	  banking	  system.	  The	  main	  distinction	  of	  LTROs	  during	  the	  crisis	  is	   frequency	   and	   maturity.	   In	   normal	   market	   condition,	   ECB	   operated	   their	  refinancing	   operations	   on	   a	   weekly	   basis	   to	   fund	   the	   structural	   shortage	   of	  liquidity	  rising	  by	  the	  demand	  of	  central	  bank	  money	  i.e.	  note	  and	  coins	  and	  the	  requirement	   of	   bank	   reserves	   and	   the	   term	   of	   refinancing	   was	   shorter	   e.g.	  three-­‐month	   compared	   with	   operations	   during	   the	   crisis	   e.g.	   twelve-­‐month.	  González-­‐Páramo	   (2010)4	   identified	   the	   broken	   link	   between	   the	   ECB	   policy	  rate	   and	   money	   market	   rate	   which	   affected	   negatively	   the	   ECB’s	   ability	   to	  precisely	   steer	   the	   short-­‐term	  money	  market	   rate	   by	   setting	   the	  minimum	  bid	  rate	   in	   the	   refinancing	   operations,	   so	   the	   change	  of	   interest	   rate	   impulse	   from	  the	  ECB	  failed	  to	  transmit	  to	  the	  real	  economy.	  Moreover,	  one	  of	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  ECB’s	  ECS	  is	  to	  restore	  the	  transmission	  mechanism	  of	  monetary	  policy	  so	  it	  is	   important	  to	  examine	  the	  purpose	  from	  the	  first	   link	  in	  the	  mechanism	  –	  the	  overnight	  official	  rate	  and	  the	  short-­‐term	  money	  market.	   	  	   	  Our	  research	  fills	  the	  gap	  by	  investigating	  the	  effect	  of	  quantitative	  easing	  in	  the	  UK	   and	   the	   US	   on	   changing	   the	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   in	   the	  money	  markets	  in	  the	  two	  countries.	  As	  stated	  previously,	  the	  short-­‐term	  money	  market	  rates	   are	   priced	   against	   risk	   premia	   and	   agents’	   expectation	   of	   future	   interest	  rate	  movements.	   For	   the	   EMU,	   the	   research	   adapts	   the	   difference	   of	   the	   ECB’s	  policy	  approach	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  LTROs	  on	  the	  risk	  premia	  contained	  in	  the	  short-­‐term	  Euribor	  rates.	  Also,	  it	  looks	  at	  how	  the	  interaction	  between	  credit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   Speech	  ‘The	  European	  Central	  Bank	  and	  the	  policy	  of	  enhanced	  credit	  support’	  available	  at	  link	  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100618_2.en.html	  
	   11	  
risk	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   changing	  during	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   unconventional	  policies	  works.	  	  The	   research	   takes	   the	   risk-­‐decomposing	  model	   that	   has	   been	   developed	   and	  employed	  in	  the	  literature.	  The	  dataset	  is	  at	  daily	  frequency.	  For	  each	  market,	  the	  sample	   covers	   the	   first	   round	   of	   QE	   (The	   EMU	   data	   stops	   before	   the	   SMP	  operation	  because	  the	  facility	  aids	  sovereign	  crisis,	  which	  is	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  EMU	  only).	   One	   of	   the	   novelties	   of	   the	   study	   is	   that	   pre-­‐QE	   and	   QE	   periods	   are	  distinguished	   during	   the	   crisis	   period.	   This	   is	   important	   because	   it	   helps	   to	  reveal	   how	   the	   central	   banks’	   interventions	   change	   the	   role	   of	   credit	   and	  liquidity	   components	   in	   determining	   the	   interbank	   spread,	   which	   in	   turn	  provides	   the	   ground	   for	   better	   understanding	   of	   the	   risk	   environment	   in	   the	  interbank	  market	   and	  would	  help	   central	   banks	   to	   conduct	   effective	  monetary	  policy.	   The	   transmission	   mechanism	   of	   monetary	   policy	   relies	   on	   the	   central	  bank’s	  ability	   to	  manipulate	  money	  market	  rates	  and	   the	  risk	  premia	   influence	  money	   market	   rates	   significantly,	   as	   seen	   in	   the	   non-­‐arbitrage	   model	   that	   is	  applied	  by	  Taylor	  and	  Williams	  (2008,	  2009)	  to	  analyze	  the	  risk	  premium	  in	  the	  money	  market	   in	   the	   US.	   But,	   they	   looked	   at	   the	   Term	  Auction	   Facility	   (TAF),	  which	   is	   a	   facility	   that	   operated	   at	   the	   earlier	   stage	   of	   the	   crisis	   with	   smaller	  scale	  and	  focus	  on	  supply	  of	  liquidity.	  They	  found	  there	  was	  little	  effect	  of	  TAF	  to	  reduce	   the	  money	  market	   spread	  because	   the	  main	  driver	   of	   the	   elevated	   risk	  premium	  was	   credit	   risk	   and	   expectation	   of	   future	   interest	   movement,	   which	  TAF	  was	  not	  designed	  to	  affect,	  and	  Angelini	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  support	  these	  findings.	  Controversially,	  later	  studies	  found	  that	  TAF	  has	  successfully	  reduced	  the	  spread	  on	  money	  market,	  that	  is,	  the	  unconventional	  liquidity	  support	  reduced	  the	  risk	  premia	  in	  money	  market	  e.g.	  McAndrew	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  Wu	  (2008),	  Christensen	  et	  
al.	   (2009),	  Hesse	  and	  Frank	  (2009)	  and	  Nobili	   (2009).	  But,	  again,	   there	   is	   little	  work	  that	  looks	  at	  the	  effect	  of	  QE	  on	  the	  money	  market,	  so	  the	  discussion	  of	  this	  aspect	  remains	  unfolded.	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Another	  contribution	  of	  our	  research	  is	  that	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  QE	  is	  measured	  by	  the	  ratio	  of	  cumulated	  government	  bond	  purchase	  (or	   liquidity	  provided	  to	  the	  banking	  system,	  where	  applicable)	  to	  total	  bank	  assets.	  The idea is original and it 
is one of the major contributions of the study. Compared to the conventional dummy 
measures that can only capture the occurrence of intervention, these ratios represent 
the increasing likelihood of meeting the liquidity needed in the interbank market. In	  the	   EMU,	   the	   non-­‐standard	   provision	   LTROs	   and	   CBPP	   are	   together	  measured	  ratio	   of	   total	   of	   open	  market	   operation	   (OMO)	   and	   CBPP	   to	   total	   bank	   assets,	  because	  LTROs	  have	  been	  operated	  under	  OMO.	  Compared	  to	   the	  conventional	  dummy	  measures	   that	   can	   only	   capture	   the	   occurrence	   of	   intervention,	   these	  ratios	  represent	  the	  increasing	  likelihood	  of	  meeting	  the	  liquidity	  needed	  in	  the	  interbank	  market.	  This	  is	  particularly	  helpful	  while	  interpreting	  the	  EMU	  result	  because	   the	   target	   of	   ECB’s	   non-­‐standard	  measure	   largely	   is	   to	   work	   through	  banking	  system	  and	  repair	  the	  transmission	  mechanism	  by	  meeting	  the	  liquidity	  need	  of	  banks	   in	  the	  EMU.	  The	  coefficient	  on	  EMU	  Ratio	  provides	  reference	  for	  the	  ECB	  to	  set	  the	  amount	  of	  liquidity	  they	  offer	  to	  banks	  to	  achieve	  a	  prevailing	  effect	  on	  money	  market	  spreads.	  	  The	   empirical	   improvement	   of	   our	   research	   compared	   with	   others	   is	   to	   fully	  consider	   the	   feature	   of	   non-­‐stationary	   of	   variables.	   Given	   the	   existence	   of	   unit	  roots	  in	  the	  data,	  the	  simple	  OLS	  approach	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  correctly	  capture	  the	   relationship	   between	   risk	   measures	   and	   QE	   intervention	   variable.	   The	  non-­‐stationarity	  has	  been	   ignored	   in	  Taylor	  and	  Williams	   (2009).	  To	  deal	  with	  the	   issue,	  McAndrew	   et	   al	   (2008)	   used	   the	   first	   difference	   of	   variable	   for	   risk	  premium	   and	   applied	   autoregression	   distributed	   lag	   model	   (ARDL).	   But,	   this	  loses	   the	   long	   run	   effect.	   Therefore,	   our	   research	   has	   employed	   the	   error	  correction	   model	   (ECM)	   because	   cointegration	   has	   been	   found	   between	  variables.	   In	   addition	   to	   ARDL	   model,	   the	   ECM	   model	   shows	   the	   long	   run	  relationship	  and	  causality	  between	  variables.	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Moreover,	   the	   study	   investigates	   the	   relationships	   between	   credit	   risk	   and	  liquidity	  premia,	  respectively,	   in	  the	  three	  markets,	  UK,	  US	  and	  EMU.	  The	  UK	  is	  the	  representative	  of	  small	  open	  economy	  countries.	  During	  the	  crisis	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  heavily	   and	  actively	   implemented	  a	   series	  of	   liquidity	  provisions	   in	  the	  banking	   system	  and	  had	  been	   running	  quantitative	   easing	   to	  boost	  market	  liquidity	  and	  maintain	  financial	  stability.	  The	  US	  is	  the	  major	  economy	  and	  it	   is	  where	   the	   crisis	   originated.	   The	   Fed	   was	   one	   of	   the	   central	   banks	   that	   first	  reduced	  the	  interest	  rate	  during	  the	  crisis	  and	  its	  liquidity	  provisions	  targeted	  on	  different	  asset	  markets	  and	  different	  types	  of	  financial	  institutions.	  For	  instance,	  the	   Term	   Auction	   Facility	   provided	   term-­‐liquidity	   to	   depository	   banks	   and	  Commercial	   Paper	   Funding	   Facility	   targeted	   the	   commercial	   paper	  market.	   As	  the	  crisis	  developed,	  the	  Fed	  started	  Large-­‐Scale	  Asset	  Purchase	  programme	  on	  December	  2008	  in	  order	  to	  put	  downward	  pressure	  on	  long-­‐term	  yields	  and	  to	  stimulate	  recovery	  of	  economy.	  Differently	  from	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US,	  the	  European	  interbank	  market	   is	  being	  operated	  in	  monetary	  union.	  The	  institutional	  set-­‐up	  of	  EMU	  constraints	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  ECB	  to	  run	  large-­‐scale	  asset	  purchase	  as	  it	  happened	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US.	  For	   	   instance,	  the	  proceeding	  from	  purchase	  of	  sovereign	  bonds	  on	  secondary	  market	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  going	  into	  private	  investors	  and	  it	  would	  also	  cause	  the	  problem	  of	  moral	  hazard	  on	  the	  country	  basis	  so	  the	  sovereigns	   may	   have	   little	   incentive	   to	   improve/reform	   their	   fiscal	   structure.	  Moral	   hazard	   still	   exists	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   US,	   but	   it	   is	   a	   concern	   within	   the	  country.	  Moreover,	  firms	  in	  the	  EMU	  largely	  rely	  on	  bank	  finance,	  so	  that	  the	  ECB	  the	   unconventional	   policies	   primarily	   targeted	   on	   the	   banking	   system	   by	  providing	   full	   allotment	   longer-­‐term	   liquidity.	   Therefore,	   the	   relationships	   of	  credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   in	   the	   three	   markets,	   respectively,	   should	  provide	  a	  good	  overall	   image	  of	   the	  risk	  premia	  changing	  during	   the	  crisis	  and	  the	  effectiveness	  of	   liquidity	  provision	  and	  quantitative	  easing	   in	   the	   interbank	  market.	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Chapter 2 Unconventional Monetary Policy During the 
2007 Financial Crisis 	  In	  the	  recent	  financial	  crisis,	  central	  banks	  in	  the	  UK,	  US	  and	  EMU	  cut	  their	  policy	  rates	   to	   the	   lowest	   boundary	   in	   order	   to	   counteract	   the	   worsening	   money	  market	   conditions	   as	   well	   as	   to	   prevent	   any	   further	   impacts	   on	   economies.	  However,	   these	   reductions	  were	   not	  wholly	   successful	   and	   credit	   condition	   in	  money	  markets	   worsened	   and	   slower	   growth	   of	   GDPs	  were	   recorded.	   To	   this	  extent,	   it	   revealed	   that	   the	   monetary	   regimes	   with	   interest	   rate	   as	   primary	  instrument	  to	  influence	  economy	  have	  failed	  under	  the	  unprecedented	  financial	  crisis.	   Therefore,	   Bank	   of	   England	   (BoE),	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   (the	   Fed)	   and	  European	  Central	  Bank	  (ECB)	  have	  created	  and	  implemented	  a	  series	  of	  so-­‐called	  unconventional	  monetary	  policies	  to	  ease	  market	  conditions	  as	  well	  as	  boost	  the	  growth	  of	  economies.	  	  In	   this	   chapter,	   we	   first	   briefly	   reveal	   the	   reasons	   that	   interest	   rate	   as	   an	  instrument	   failed	   to	   transfer	   central	  banks’	   intention	   to	  markets.	   Secondly,	   the	  definition	   and	   origins	   of	   unconventional	  monetary	   policy	   is	   discussed.	   Finally,	  the	  chapter	  compares	  the	  innovative	  monetary	  facilities	  in	  the	  three	  markets.	  	  
2.1 Reason for Failure of Interest Rate to Ease Market Conditions 	  It	   has	   been	   widely	   recognized	   that	   money	   supply	   is	   an	   endogenous	   process	  whereas	  interest	  rate	  is	  an	  exogenous	  variable	  that	  is	  employed	  by	  central	  banks	  in	   the	   UK,	   the	   US	   and	   EMU	   to	   implement	   their	   monetary	   policy	   (Bain	   and	  Howells,	  2009).	  In	  normal	  circumstances,	  a	  reduction	  e.g.	   in	  the	  policy	  rate	  will	  lower	   borrowing	   cost	  with	   consequence	   of	   an	   enlarged	   demand	   for	   loans	   that	  banks	   will	   seek	   to	   satisfy.	   The	   increased	   amount	   of	   loans	   enlarges	   the	   broad	  money	   supply	  M	   endogenously	   (‘loans	   create	   deposits’)	   and	   expand	  monetary	  base	   B,	   eventually	   as	   central	   banks	   meet	   banks’	   demand	   for	   the	   additional	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liquidity	   in	  order	   to	  maintain	  short-­‐term	   interest	  rates.	  Under	   the	   interest	  rate	  regime,	   the	   transmission	   mechanism	   of	   monetary	   policy	   turns	   out	   to	   be	  ultimately	  relying	  on	  the	  communication	  between	  official	  and	  market	  rates,	  since	  it	  is	  market	  rates	  (containing	  a	  variety	  of	  mark-­‐ups	  and	  premia)	  that	  borrowers	  actually	  pay.	   	   In	  order	   to	  emphasis	   the	  role	  of	  market	  rates,	  Bain	  and	  Howells	  (2009,	  p123)	  modified	  the	  diagram	  below	  (from	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Quarterly	  Bulletin,	   May	   1999)	   by	   placing	   the	   ‘market	   rates’	   box	   immediately	   after	   the	  ‘official	   rate’	   and	   before	   everything	   else.	   Interestingly,	   the	   corresponding	  diagram	  from	  the	  ECB	  (2010)	  does	  the	  same.	  	  
Figure	  2.1	  Illustration	  of	  the	  Transmission	  Mechanism	  from	  Official	  Rate	  to	  
Price5	   in	  the	  UK,	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EMU	  	  
	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	   Each	  individual	  transmission	  mechanism	  can	  be	  found	  on	  the	  following	  resources:	  for	  the	  UK	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/other/monetary/montrans.pdf	  ;	  for	  EMU	  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/transmission/html/index.en.html;	  for	  the	  US,	  Kenneth	  N.	  Kuttner	  and	  Patricia	  C.	  Mosser	  (2002)	  Economic	  Policy	  Review,	  May,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  New	  York,	  pp.	  15-­‐26	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Figure	  2.1	  shows	  the	  way	   in	  which	  the	  policy	  rate	  affects	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  macro	  economy	  as	  visualized	  by,	  respectively,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  the	  US	  Fed	  and	  the	  ECB.	  The	  first	  most	  striking	  feature	  is,	  ignoring	  the	  differing	  levels	  of	  detail,	  the	  similarity	  of	  the	  links	  between	  the	  policy	  rate	  and	  the	  level	  of	  aggregate	  demand.	  In	  all	  three	  cases,	  the	  policy	  rate	  must	  first	  affect	  market	  rates	  and,	  from	  there,	  it	  is	  the	  effect	  on	  asset	  prices,	  bank	  lending	  and	  the	  exchange	  rate	  that	  influences	  the	   level	  of	  demand.	  The	  second	  striking	   feature	  concerns	   the	  US	  Fed	  diagram,	  which	  stops	  short	  of	  linking	  aggregate	  demand	  explicitly	  to	  the	  price	  level.	  This	  may	  well	   be	   the	   result	   of	   the	  US	  Fed’s	   ‘dual	  mandate’	   that	   requires	   the	  Fed	   to	  steer	   the	   economy	   with	   respect	   to	   both	   the	   rate	   of	   inflation	   and	   the	   level	   of	  unemployment.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  ECB	  are	  both	  charged	  with	  giving	  overwhelming	  priority	  to	  an	  inflation	  target.	  	  Set	  out	  in	  this	  way,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  monetary	  policy	  must	  act	  with	  a	  considerable	  time	  lag.	  It	  takes	  time	  for	  a	  change	  in	  policy	  rate	  to	  affect	  spending	  and	  then,	  in	  world	  where	   fixed	   term	   contracts	   are	   commonplace,	   it	   takes	   time	   for	   firms	   to	  respond	  to	  changes	  in	  demand	  by	  revising	  their	  output	  and	  pricing	  decisions.	  In	  Bain	   and	   Howells	   (2009,	   p124)	   the	   authors	   draw	   a	   vertical	   line	   in	   the	   BoE	  diagram	  immediately	  to	  the	  right	  of	  the	  ‘total	  demand’	  box	  in	  order	  to	  emphasis	  the	   view,	   commonly	   expressed	   by	   policy-­‐makers,	   that	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   policy	  (policy	  change	  to	  demand)	  takes	  about	  one	  year	  and	  the	  second	  phase	  (demand	  to	  prices)	  takes	  about	  the	  same.	  	  Phase	  1	  starts	  with	  a	  pass-­‐through	  effect	  from	  official	  rate	  to	  market	  rates	  then	  to	  transit	  the	  effect	  through	  four	  channels	  	  
! The	  behavior	  on	  borrowing/saving	  
! Asset	  prices	  
! Agents’	  expectations	  
! Exchange	  rate	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The	   effect	   is	   intermediately	   transferred	   through	   the	   channels	   to	   domestic	  demand	   and	   external	   demand	   and	   eventually	   reaches	   total	   demand	   that	   is	   the	  medium-­‐	  to	  long-­‐term	  target.	  Any	  change	  in	  total	  demand	  will	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  domestic	   inflation,	   which	   is	   the	   final	   target	   of	   central	   banks	   (shared	   with	   full	  employment	  for	  the	  Fed).	  Moreover,	  the	  exchange	  rate	  channel	  will	  have	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  import	  prices	  apart	  from	  any	  effect	  on	  aggregate	  demand.	  Therefore,	  in	  Phase	  2	  the	  change	  in	  both	  aggregate	  demand	  and	  import	  prices	  will	  result	  in	  a	  change	  in	  domestic	  inflation,	  despite	  the	  effect	  from	  import	  price	  being	  relatively	  small	  (Biefang-­‐Frisancho	  Mariscal	  and	  Howells,	  2002).	  Once	  domestic	  inflation	  is	  moving	  towards	  the	  target,	  maintaining	  the	  official	  interest	  rate	  at	  a	  given	  level	  can	  stable	  inflation	  at	  desire	  rate	  if	  there	  is	  no	  shock.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  mainly	  focus	   on	   the	   beginning	   of	   transmission	   i.e.	   the	   link	   between	   official	   rate	   and	  market	   rate	   because	   the	   transmission	   from	   official	   rate	   to	  market	   rates	   is	   the	  first	  link	  in	  transmission	  mechanism	  of	  monetary	  policy	  in	  all	  monetary	  regimes	  (Biefang-­‐Frisancho	  Mariscal	  and	  Howells,	  2002).	   	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  ability	  of	  central	  banks	  to	  affect,	  total	  demand	  and	  eventually	  inflation	   primarily	   depends	   on	   their	   power	   to	   change	  market	   rates.	  Moreover,	  one	  of	   the	  operational	   targets	  of	  central	  banks	   is	   to	  control	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rate	   in	   conjunction	   with	   other	   monetary	   instrument	   of	   implementation	   i.e.	  standing	   facility,	   open	   market	   operation	   and	   reserve	   requirement	   (Bindseil,	  2004	  p77;	  BIS,	  1997;	  Borio,	  1997;	   Iris	  Biefang-­‐Frisancho	  Mariscal	  and	  Howells,	  2002	  and	  2011).	  The	  three-­‐month	  interbank	  lending	  rates	  LIBOR	  in	  the	  UK,	  US	  and	  EMU,	  respectively	   is	  a	  good	  proxy	  for	  short	   term	  market	  rates	  as	   it	  acts	  as	  reference	   rate	   for	   a	  wide	   range	  of	   financial	   products	   in	   the	  markets	   (Dale	   and	  Haldane,	   1993;	   Heffernan,	   1993;	   Iris	   Biefang-­‐Frisancho	   Mariscal	   and	   Howells,	  2002	   and	   2011;	   Bank	   of	   England,	   2007Q4,	   p498).	   	   Hence	   the	   transmission	   of	  interest	  rates	  in	  the	  first	  link	  can	  be	  separated	  into	  two	  stages,	  the	  official	  rate	  to	  money	   market	   rates,	   and	   money	   market	   rates	   to	   wider	   financial	   service	   and	  products	  rates	  (de	  Bondt,	  2005;	  Becker	  et	  al,	  2012)	  despite	  the	  pass-­‐through	  is	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asymmetric	  due	   to	   time	   lag	  of	  banks’	   responses	   to	  change	  of	  official	   rate	   (Dale	  and	   Haldane,	   1993	   and	   Heffernan,	   1993).	   ECB	   (2010)	   also	   agreed	   that	   the	  transmission	  mechanism	  in	  EMU	  depends	  critically	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	  banks	  and	  on	  their	  willingness	  to	  entertain	  smooth	  exchanges	  of	  liquidity	  in	  the	  interbank	  market.	   It	   is	   therefore	   very	   important	   for	   money	   market	   rates	   to	   track	   the	  movement	   of	   base	   rate	   closely	   and	   tightly	   on	   the	   same	   direction	   in	   order	   for	  monetary	   policy	   to	   get	   a	   successful	   launch	   into	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   the	  transmission	  mechanism.	  	  We	   have	   explained	   that	   a	   close	   relationship	   between	  money	  market	   rates	   and	  the	  official	  rate	  is	  fundamental	  for	  monetary	  operations	  to	  influence	  the	  general	  economy.	   In	   the	   following	   paragraphs,	   we	   will	   show	   what	   happened	   in	   the	  interbank	  markets	  during	  the	  financial	  crisis	  period.	  	  The	   recent	   financial	   crises	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   December	   2006	   with	   the	  bankruptcy	   of	   American	   company,	   Ownit	   Mortgage	   Solutions	   (Gorton,	   2008).	  Arguments	   about	   the	   trigger	   of	   this	   crisis	   identified	   an	   innovative	   financial	  product,	   subprime	  mortgage-­‐	   and	  mortgage-­‐	   backed	   security	   in	   the	  US,	  whose	  value	   was	   closely	   tied	   to	   housing	   market	   and	   whose	   risk	   was	   not	   correctly	  assessed	   (Mizen,	   2008).	   The	   main	   buyers	   of	   these	   securities	   were	   special	  purpose	  vehicles	  (SPVs)	  and	  hedge	  funds.	  In	  some	  cases,	  those	  SPVs	  were	  banks’	  off	   balance	   sheet	   vehicles	   so	   banks	   may	   have	   lent	   to	   them	   and	   accept	   ed	  collateralized	  debt	  obligations	  (CDOs)	  as	  guarantee.	  However,	  these	  CDOs	  were	  rarely	  traded	  so	  the	  value	  and	  risk	  of	  them	  remained	  unclear	  (Bain	  and	  Howells,	  2009	  p138).	  When	  the	  default	  of	  subprime	  borrowers	  accumulated	  to	  the	   level	  that	   repayments	   in	   the	   security	   pool	   cannot	   cover	   interest	   on	   securities,	   the	  crisis	  emerged.	  Bain	  and	  Howells	  (2009,	  p139)	  pointed	  out	  two	  ‘novel’	  problems	  of	  the	  crisis.	  The	  first	  was	  the	  implicit	  ownership	  of	  the	  loans	  since	  the	  subprime	  loans	   and	   other	   prime	   loans	  were	  mixed	   in	   one	   pool	   and	   the	   new	   issuance	   of	  securities	   was	   backed	   by	   these	   loans	   without	   clear	   alignment	   of	   underlying	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assets.	  The	  second	  was	  down	  to	  the	  recognition	  and	  diagnosis	  of	  risk	  containing	  in	  those	  securities.	  Based	  on	  the	  two	  problems,	  we	  start	  to	  reach	  the	  core	  of	  the	  failure	   of	   interest	   rate	   as	   an	   instrument	   to	   ease	  market	   condition	   –	   the	   break	  between	  official	  rate	  and	  money	  market	  rate.	   	  	  As	  we	   have	   discussed,	   the	   transmission	   of	  monetary	   policy	  within	   an	   interest	  rate	   regime	   relies	   on	   the	   close	   and	   prompt	   response	   of	  money	  market	   rate	   to	  official	  rate.	  On	  August	  06,	  2007,	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  of	  three-­‐month	  LIBOR	  rate	  in	  different	  currencies	  were	  observed	  even	  though	  there	  was	  no	  announcement	  of	   increase	   of	   official	   rates	   and	   the	   rate	   remained	   elevated	   for	   a	   considerable	  long	   time	   until	   central	   banks	   intervened.	   These	   phenomena	   implied	   a	   broken	  connection	   between	   official	   rate	   and	   market	   rate.	   According	   to	   BoE	   (2007),	  LIBOR	   rate	   is	   benchmark	   rate	   for	   short-­‐term	   market	   interest	   rates	   in	   major	  currencies	   worldwide.	   LIBOR	   rates	   in	   general	   reflect	   1)	   current	   and	   expected	  future	  overnight	  risk-­‐free	  interest	  rates	  –	  the	  expected	  path	  of	  monetary	  policy	  and	  2)	  a	  wedge	  between	  unsecured	  and	  secured	  interest	  rates,	  which	  may	  reflect	  liquidity	   premia	   or	   perceived	   credit	   risk	   (Bank	   of	   England,	  Quarterly	   Bulletin,	  2007Q3).	   In	   turn,	   these	   elements	   connect	   market	   rates	   with	   official	   rate.	  Moreover,	  the	  BoE	  (Bank	  of	  England,	  Quarterly	  Bulletin,	  2007Q4)	  admits	  that	  the	  impact	   of	   monetary	   policy	   expectations	   differs	   across	   monetary	   regimes.	  Therefore,	  to	  study	  the	  drivers	  of	  the	  increased	  LIBOR	  rates	  across	  regimes,	  BoE	  (2007Q4)	  compared	  three-­‐month	  LIBOR	  rates	  with	  the	  corresponding	  overnight	  index	   swap	   (OIS).	  They	  used	  OIS	  as	  proxy	  of	   expectations	  of	   future	  policy	   rate	  because	  OIS	   is	  overnight	  transaction	  so	   it	   is	   less	  affected	  by	   interbank	   liquidity	  and	  credit	  conditions.	  Moreover,	  OISs	  are	  financial	  derivatives	  so	  the	  margining	  agreements	   reduce	   counterparty	   credit	   risk.	   For	   the	   liquidity	   aspect,	   OIS	  transactions	  do	  not	  involve	  an	  exchange	  of	  principle	  at	  the	  beginning,	  so	  they	  are	  not	  used	  for	  funding	  purposes	  in	  practice.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  spread	  between	  three-­‐month	  LIBOR	  and	  OIS	  in	  the	  corresponding	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term	  should	  reflect	  the	   level	  of	  credit	  risk	  and/or	   liquidity	  premia	  in	   interbank	  markets	   in	   the	   three	   regimes	  without	   the	   influence	   of	   difference	   on	   impact	   of	  monetary	   policies.	   Figure	   2.2	   reveals	   the	   spreads	   from	   January	   02,	   2004	   to	  February	  04,	  2011	  including	  pre-­‐crisis,	  crisis	  and	  post-­‐crisis	  periods	  in	  the	  three	  regimes,	   the	  UK,	  EMU	  and	  the	  Fed.	  Since	  the	  recorded	  date	  of	  crisis	  August	  06,	  2007,	   the	   spreads	   jumped	  by	  over	  one	  percent	   i.e.	   100	  basis	  points	   from	   their	  pre-­‐crisis	  level	  about	  0.05	  percent	  i.e.	  5	  basis	  points,	  especially	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US.	  While	  the	  crisis	  intensified	  after	  a	  series	  of	  market	  events	  e.g.	  the	  collapse	  of	  Bear	  Stearns	  and	  Lehman	  Brothers	  in	  September	  2008,	  the	  spread	  climbed	  to	  its	  peak	  of	  3.6	  percent	  in	  the	  US	  and	  2	  percent	  in	  the	  EMU	  on	  October	  10,	  2008	  and	  3	  percent	  in	  the	  UK	  on	  October	  20,	  2008.	  The	  wider	  spreads	  indicated	  a	  dramatic	  increase	  of	  risk	  premia	  in	  the	  interbank	  markets.	  The	  reason	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  large	  amount	  of	  losses	  of	  financial	  institutions	  in	  the	  capital	  market	  as	  well	  as	  the	  unclear	  credit	  interconnection	  between	  banks	  and	  non-­‐bank	  financial	  entities	  e.g.	  Special	  Purpose	  Vehicles.	  For	  example,	  Hesse	  et	  al	   (2008)	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	  difficulties	  for	  banks	  to	  understand	  their	  liquidity	  position	  included	  uncertainty	  of	   their	   own	   funding	   liquidity	   demand	   that	   was	   raised	   by	   moving	  off-­‐balance-­‐sheet	  positions	  onto	  their	  balance	  sheets	  and	  uncertainty	  about	  asset	  valuation.	  	  These	   wider	   spreads	   had	   the	   equivalent	   effect	   of	   tightening	   monetary	   policy	  because	  for	  example,	  with	  100-­‐basis-­‐point	  spread	  (the	  spread	  stayed	  around	  ten	  basis	  points	  before	  the	  crisis.),	   it	  can	  pass	  an	  increase	  of	  around	  one	  percent	  to	  rates	  of	  other	  financial	  instruments	  and	  products	  even	  though	  the	  official	  rate	  is	  unchanged.	  Furthermore,	  given	  the	  widened	  spread,	  a	  100-­‐basis-­‐point	  reduction	  in	  official	  rate	  would	  only	  offset	  the	  increase	  rather	  than	  ease	  market	  conditions.	  In	  addition,	  tighten	  monetary	  policy	  will	  reduce	  the	  quantity	  of	  money	  supply	  in	  circulation.	   Joyce	   et	   al	   (2012)	   stated	   that	   the	   loose	   communication	   between	  official	  and	  market	  rate	  indicated	  that	  monetary	  policy	  became	  more	  than	  setting	  a	  base	  price	  of	  lending	  and	  that	  a	  quantitative	  approach	  should	  be	  adopted	  with	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consequences	  for	  the	  size	  of	  the	  central	  banks’	  balance	  sheet.	  	  
Figure	  2.2	  Three-­‐month	  LIBOR	  –	  OIS	  in	  the	  UK	  (£),	  in	  the	  US	  ($)	  and	  in	  the	  
EMU	  (€)	  in	  Percentage	  02/01/2004	   － 	   04/02/20116	  
	  
	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   credit	   position	   of	   banks	   became	   a	   serious	   problem	   for	   their	  counterparties	   because	   of	   the	   widespread	   error	   in	   assessing	   the	   risk	   of	  mortgage-­‐backed	   securities.	   Banks	   themselves	   began	   to	   worry	   about	   their	  liquidity	   because	   they	   need	   to	   meet	   the	   liquidity	   demand	   from	   their	  off-­‐balance-­‐sheet	  vehicles	  rising	  from	  loss	  of	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities.	  That	  is,	  the	  uncertainty	  about	   liquidity	  position	  resulted	   in	  unwillingness	   to	   lend	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  hoard	  cash	  on	  balance	  sheets.	  Heider	  et	  al	  (2009)	  tried	  to	  establish	  the	  process	   of	   liquidity	   hoarding	   leading	   to	   breakdown	   of	   interbank	  market.	   They	  found	  liquidity	  hoarding	  started	  when	  the	  safer	  banks	  with	  a	  liquidity	  shortage	  drop	  out	  of	   the	   interbank	  market.	  That	   is,	   the	  root	  of	   liquidity	  hoarding	   is	   that	  some	  banks	  are	  insolvent	  (Heider	  et	  al,	  2009).	  This	  can	  be	  further	  explained	  by	  asymmetric	   information	   and	   adverse	   selection.	   Mishkin	   (1990)	   attempted	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	   In	  the	  EMU,	  LIBOR	  –	  OIS	  is	  substituted	  as	  Euribor	  –	  OIS	  because	  Euribor	  may	  more	  specifically	  reflect	  condition	  in	  European	  interbank	  market.	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explain	   financial	   crisis	   in	   respect	   of	   Lemon	   Problem	   that	   was	   advocated	   by	  Ackerloff	   (1970)	   i.e.	   asymmetric	   information	   together	   with	   credit	   rationing	   of	  lenders	   by	   Stiglitz	   and	   Weiss	   (1981)	   i.e.	   adverse	   selection.	   Mishkin	   (1990)	  named	  the	  analysis	  as	  adverse	  selection-­‐anaylsis.	  	  Due	   to	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   a	   counterparty’s	   creditworthiness,	   banks	   could	   not	  correctly	   calculate	   the	   risk	   premium	   on	   loans	   made	   in	   the	   interbank	   market.	  They	  ignored	  any	  reduction	  in	  official	  rate	  preferring	  to	  quote	  an	  extraordinary	  high	  interbank	  lending	  rate	  for	  protection.	  In	  context	  of	  asymmetric	  information	  and	   adverse	   selection,	   bank	  A	  may	  be	  willing	   to	   lend	   in	   interbank	  market	   at	   a	  high	   interest	   rate.	  A	  potential	   counterparty	  B	  may	  be	  willing	   to	   take	   the	  price,	  but	   then	  asymmetric	   information	  and	  adverse	  selection	  start	   to	  step	   in.	  On	   the	  assumption	  that	  bank	  B	  has	  superior	   information	  about	   its	  credit	  position	  than	  bank	   A,	   bank	   A	   is	   very	   likely	   to	   believe	   that	   the	   counterparty	   is	   having	   big	  trouble	  with	  a	  high	  risk	  to	  default.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  bank	  A	  will	  not	  lend	  to	  bank	  B	  at	  any	  rate.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   in	  order	  to	  protect	   its	  reputation,	  bank	  B	  will	  not	  accept	  and	  borrow	  at	  a	  higher	  rate.	  As	  a	  result,	  liquidity	  in	  interbank	  market	  was	   quickly	   dried	   up.	   Banks	   have	   been	   observed	   to	   an	   increased	   amount	   of	  deposit	  on	  their	  balance	  sheets.	   	  	  As	   shown	   on	   Figure	   2.3,	   prior	   to	   the	  middle	   of	   2006,	   the	   level	   of	   reserves	   of	  banks	  in	  BoE	  (red	  area)	  was	  very	  low.	  The	  level	  suddenly	  jumped	  to	  about	  £70	  billions	  and	   increased	  gradually	   since	   June	  2006	  until	  September	  2008.	   	   Since	  Lehman	  Brothers	  filed	  bankruptcy,	  the	  level	  of	  banks’	  reserves	  jumped	  again	  and	  remained	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  until	  the	  operation	  of	  QE.	  Firstly,	  the	  increase	  of	  banks’	  reserves	   started	   about	   one	   year	   earlier	   than	   the	   widely	   recognized	   date	   of	  beginning	   of	   financial	   crisis,	   August	   09,	   2007,	   possibly	   indicating	   reduced	  amount	  of	  liquidity	  available	  to	  banks.	  ECB	  (Press	  Release,	  01/06/2006)	  warned	  investors	   about	   the	  possibility	   of	   underestimated	   risk	  or	   taking	   excess	   level	   of	  risk	  in	  the	  Euro	  area.	  Moreover,	  BoE	  (Annual	  Report,	  2006)	  also	  mentioned	  the	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phenomenon	   of	   low	   risk	   premia.	   The	   statements	   from	   ECB	   and	   BoE	   with	  observed	  increased	  banks’	  reserves	  prior	  to	  the	  crisis	  may	  imply	  that	  banks	  had	  felt	  the	  possible	  liquidity	  constraints.	  Secondly,	  the	  first	  liquidity	  provision	  in	  the	  UK	  was	   launched	  on	  December	  18,	  2007	  and	  a	   series	  of	   liquidity	  boosters	  had	  followed	  during	  2008	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  2009	  prior	  to	  the	  direct	  asset	  purchase.	  The	   intention	   of	   those	   liquidity	   provisions	   was	   to	   ease	   banks’	   refinancing	  position	  so	  they	  can	  continue	  on	  their	  role	  to	  supply	  credit	  to	  private	  sector	  i.e.	  transfer	  excess	   liquidity	   into	  credit.	  However,	   it	   is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  the	  case	  given	  the	  elevated	  level	  of	  banks’	  reserves.	  Due	  to	  the	  great	  uncertainties	  in	  interbank	  market	  and	  other	  credit	  markets,	  banks	  had	  to	  hoard	  excessive	  liquidity	  on	  their	  balance	  sheet	  in	  order	  to	  fight	  with	  unexpected	  cash	  demand	  e.g.	  rescue	  for	  their	  off-­‐balance-­‐sheet	   vehicles	   or	   cover	   potential	   capital	   loss	   due	   to	   uncertainty	   of	  asset	   valuation.	   Thirdly,	   the	   increase	   of	   banks’	   reserves	   after	   QE	   is	   not	  considered	  at	  this	  stage	  because	  QE	  involves	  expansion	  of	  size	  of	  central	  bank’s	  balance	  sheet	  so	  the	  increase	  of	  banks’	  reserves	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  hoard	  of	  liquidity.	   	  	  Other	   financial	   institutions	   screamed	   for	   cash	   to	   fulfill	   their	   credit	   lines,	  make	  payments	   or	   hoard	   liquidity	   for	   uncertainty	   of	   their	   exposure	   to	   the	   crisis	  (Gordon,	   2008;	   Mizen,	   2008).	   There	   may	   be	   more	   reasons	   for	   dysfunction	   of	  interbank	   market	   e.g.	   Bain	   and	   Howells	   (2009,	   p424)	   also	   pointed	   out	   that	  capital	   adequacy	   can	   lead	   to	   unwillingness/reduced-­‐ability	   to	   generate	   new	  loans	   because	   banks	   are	   highly	   leveraged	   so	   the	  withdrawal	   of	   capital,	   due	   to	  reduced	   profitability	   and	   loss	   of	   confidence	   on	   banking	   industry	   from	  shareholders,	   may	   be	   magnified	   and	   expressed	   as	   reduction	   of	   assets.	   But	   all	  these	  explanations	  lead	  to	  the	  fact	  that	   interbank	  market	  became	  dysfunctional	  and	  it	  failed	  to	  fulfill	  the	  transit	  of	  monetary	  policy.	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Figure	  2.3	  Bank	  of	  England	  Balance	  Sheet	  –	  Liabilities	  
	  
 	  Source:	  modified	  from	  Cross	  et	  al	  (Bank	  of	  England,	  Quarterly	  Bulletin,	  2010Q1,	  p35).	  Used	  with	  permission	  of	  the	  publisher	  	  As	   a	   consequence	   of	   this	   breakdown,	   the	   interest	   rate	   as	   an	   instrument	   of	  monetary	   policy	   is	   largely	   compromised.	   In	   addition,	   given	   the	  wider	   spreads,	  the	  power	  of	  official	  rate	  to	   influence	  market	  rates	  was	  eliminated	  significantly	  as	  we	  have	  shown	   in	   the	  example.	  The	  BoE,	   the	  Fed	  and	  ECB	  all	   reduced	   their	  base	  rates	  several	  times	  to	  virtually	  zero	  between	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis	  on	  2007	  to	  mid-­‐2008	  but	  the	  spreads	  were	  still	  large	  despite	  dropping	  slightly	  from	  their	  peaks.	   	  	  In	   addition	   to	   these	   difficulties,	   Joyce	   et	   al	   (2012)	   argued	   that	   central	   banks	  would	   need	   N	   instruments	   if	   they	   have	   N	   policy	   objectives.	   As	   the	   crisis	  developed,	  the	  focus	  of	  central	  banks	  shifted	  to	  financial	  stability	  in	  addition	  to	  inflation	   targeting.	  Therefore,	  central	  banks	  needed	  to	  seek	   for	  other	  measures	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to	  implement	  their	  monetary	  targets	  and	  tackle	  the	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  issues	  in	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  That	  gives	  the	  role	  of	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy.	  
 
2.2 Unconventional Monetary Policy 	  In	   the	   section,	   we	   will	   first	   discuss	   the	   situation	   when	   central	   banks	   should	  consider	  unconventional	  measures.	  Secondly,	  the	  unconventional	  measures	  that	  have	  been	  adapted	  by	  the	  three	  central	  banks	  will	  be	  analyzed	  in	  a	  timely	  order.	  Finally,	  a	  comparison	  between	  each	  central	  bank’s	  policies	  is	  carried	  out.	  Due	  to	  the	   different	   institutional	   structure	   of	   ECB,	   they	   have	   limited	   power	   to	   adapt	  quantitative	   easing	   policies.	   Therefore,	   we	   see	   there	   are	   fewer	   innovative	  unconventional	   policies	   that	   have	   been	   implemented	   by	   ECB.	   Indeed,	   the	  non-­‐standard	   monetary	   policy	   as	   ECB	   named	   themselves	   mainly	   consists	   of	  extension	  of	  collateral	  and	  term	  of	  refinancing	  operations	  in	  open	  market,	  which	  is	   conventionally	   applied	   approach	   under	   severe	  market	   condition.	   In	   spite	   of	  this,	  we	  use	  the	  term	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy	  across	  the	  section,	  aware	  limits	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  EMU.	  	  Unconventional	   monetary	   policy	   by	   its	   name	   encompasses	   non-­‐price	   based	  approaches	  for	  central	  banks	  to	  manipulate	  the	  size	  and/or	  composition	  of	  their	  balance	   sheets	   in	  order	   to	   restore	   and	   stimulate	   total	  demand	   so	   conventional	  monetary	   policy	   can	   be	   reinstated	   (Bernanke	   and	   Reinhart,	   2004;	   Sharpe	   and	  Watts,	   2013;	   Joyce	   et	   al,	   2012).	   Unconventional	   policy	   is	   sometimes	   divided	  between	  quantitative	  easing	  and	  credit	  easing.	  For	  example,	   the	  BoE	  refers	   the	  unconventional	   measures	   as	   quantitative	   easing	   whereas	   ECB	   use	   the	   term	  non-­‐standard	   measures	   and	   the	   name	   ‘Enhanced	   Credit	   Support’	   for	   such	  facilities	   (Trichet,	   2009).	   Sharpe	   and	  Watts	   (2013	   quoted	   Klyuev	   et	   al,	   2009)	  argued	  that	  credit	  easing	  mainly	  involves	  interventions	  into	  specific	  segments	  of	  credit	  markets	  to	  purchase	  assets	  (that	  are	  less	  liquid	  under	  market	  disorder	  e.g.	  commercial	  paper	  and	  asset-­‐backed	  securities)	  so	  to	  extend	  credit.	  For	  example,	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before	  embarking	  on	  QE,	  the	  BoE	  sought	  to	  help	  banks	  buying	  illiquid	  assets	  in	  exchange	   for	   treasury	   bills.	   There	   is	   a	   change	   in	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   BoE	  balance	  sheet	  i.e.	  fewer	  treasury	  bills	  but	  more	  lower	  quality	  illiquid	  assets,	  but	  the	  size	  of	  the	  BoE	  balance	  sheet	  did	  not	  expand	  (John	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  In	   addition	   to	  providing	   liquidity,	   quantitative	   easing	  may	   contain	   implicit	   and	  explicit	  commitment	  of	  central	  banks	  to	  reduce	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  through	  large	  scale	  of	  purchase	  of	  long-­‐term	  government	  bonds	  (example	  from	  BoE	  Asset	  Purchase	   Facility)	   and/or	   supply	   of	   massive	   amount	   of	   long-­‐term	   credit	   at	  extremely	  low	  price	  (to	  banking	  system)(Meier,	  2009).	   	  	  However,	   those	   funds	   may	   not	   be	   transformed	   to	   ‘credit’	   in	   circulation	   for	  benefit	   of	   households	   and	   corporates	   if	   banks	   hoard	   them	   on	   their	   balance	  sheets	  because	  of	   credit	   and	   liquidity	  problems	  and	   capital	   adequacy	   concerns	  (see	   Bain	   and	  Howells	   (2009,	   p423-­‐p424)	   for	   details	   of	   how	   liquidity	   is	   being	  trapped	   in	   banking	   system.	   Also,	   see	   Figure	   2.3	   for	   largely	   increased	   banks’	  reserve	   in	  BoE).	  That	   is,	   the	   reduced	  price	  of	  borrowing	   for	  banking	   system	   is	  very	   unlikely	   to	   boost	   private	   lending	   and	   reduce	   market	   risk	   premium	   as	  ‘heightened	  risk	  aversion	  reduces	  the	  substitutability	  between	  government	  and	  private	  assets’	  (Sharpe	  and	  Watt,	  2013	  quoted	  Klyuev	  et	  al,	  2009).	   	  	  Bernanke	  (2009)	   tried	   to	  distinguish	  credit	  easing	  between	  quantitative	  easing	  by	  arguing	  that	  quantitative	  easing	  focuses	  explicitly	  (and	  solely)	  on	  the	  creation	  of	   bank	   reserves	  whereas	   the	   Fed	   has	   been	   concerned	  with	   the	   behavior	   of	   a	  complex	  range	  of	  spreads	  in	  the	  US.	  This	  has	  led	  it	  to	  be	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  purchases	  that	  it	  made.	  The	  result	  inevitably	  is	  an	  enlarged	  balance	  sheet	   (as	  with	  QE)	  but	  under	   the	  Bernanke	  definition	  of	   credit	   easing	   that	   is	   a	  side	  effect	  of	  the	  range	  of	  asset	  purchases,	  whose	  composition	  is	  the	  critical	  focus	  of	  policy.	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This	  argument	  tries	  to	  remove	  the	  effect	  of	  composition	  from	  definition	  of	  credit	  easing	   that	   has	   been	   summarized	   by	   Klyuey	   et	   al	   (2009).	   Bernanke	   (2009)	  pointed	  out	   that	   the	  policy	   that	  was	  run	  by	  Bank	  of	   Japan	  during	  year	  2001	   to	  2006	  was	  a	  typical	  example	  of	  quantitative	  easing	  whereas	  the	  policies	  that	  have	  been	   running	   by	   the	   Fed	   during	   the	   recent	   financial	   crisis	   was	   credit	   easing	  because	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   Fed	   of	   conducting	   those	   policies	   was	   to	   rescue	  dysfunctional	  credit	  markets	  and	  reduce	  the	  wider	  spreads.	  Blinder	  (2010,	  p475)	  commented	  on	  quantitative	  easing	  in	  Japan	  as	  ‘flooding	  the	  banking	  system	  with	  excess	  reserves’.	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  Japan’s	  case	  is	  slightly	  different	  because	  BoJ	  wanted	  to	   flatten	  yield	  curve	  rather	  than	  reducing	  risk	  spreads	  as	  BoE	  and	  the	  Fed.	   	  	  Trichet	  (2009),	  president	  of	  the	  ECB,	  also	  tried	  to	  separate	  BoJ’s	  unconventional	  measures	   from	   the	   Fed’s	   by	   labeling	   the	   BoJ’s	   approach	   ‘quantitative	   easing’.	  Also,	   Bordes	   and	   Clerc	   (2012)	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   measures	   that	   have	   been	  adopted	  by	  the	  Fed	  and	  BoE	  have	  been	  observed	  as	  quantitative	  easing	  so	  ECB’s,	  but	  ECB	  rejected	  to	  the	  term	  quantitative	  easing	  even	  though	  their	  measures	  had	  broadly	  similar	  effects	  as	  quantitative	  easing.	  Cobham	  (2012)	   tried	   to	  separate	  measures	   to	   supply	   liquidity	   from	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy.	  He	   treated	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy	  as	  measures	  that	  are	  beyond	  liquidity	  measures.	  The	   unconventional	  monetary	   policy	   he	   recognized	   narrows	   to	   asset	   purchase	  facilities.	  However,	  he	  did	  mention	  that	  the	  size	  of	  central	  banks’	  balance	  sheet	  expanded	   as	   the	   result	   of	   liquidity	   measures,	   which	   falls	   the	   feature	   of	  quantitative	  easing.	  Also,	  Breedon	  et	  al	  (2012)	  have	  not	  applied	  ‘unconventional’	  to	   quantitative	   easing.	   They	   treated	   quantitative	   easing	   as	   an	   extension	   of	  open-­‐market	  operation	  involving	  swap	  of	  central	  bank	  money	  for	  privately	  held	  assets	  with	  both	  long	  and	  uncertain	  length.	  	  This	   discussion	   shows	   that	   there	   is	   no	   universally	   accepted	   definition	   of	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy,	  quantitative	  easing	  and	  credit	  easing	   in	  terms	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of	   operation	   and	   effect.	   However,	   to	   summarize	   the	   above	   statements	   we	   can	  have	  the	  following	  features	  for	  policies	  that	  have	  been	  created	  especially	  during	  the	  crisis	  by	  the	  three	  central	  banks:	  	  
! Liquidity	  provision	  
! Large-­‐scale	  purchase	  of	  long	  term	  government	  bonds	  
! Target	  purchase	  of	  asset	  in	  credit	  market	  
! Lead	  to	  change	  of	  asset	  composition	  and	  expansion	  of	  central	  banks’	  balance	  sheet	  	  Despite	  they	  hold	  different	  views	  on	  how	  to	  describe	  those	  policies;	  they	  do	  not	  disagree	   with	   each	   other	   on	   the	   above	   features.	   Thus,	   in	   the	   study,	   we	   use	  quantitative	   easing	   in	   general	   to	   denote	   unconventional	   monetary	   policies	  because	  the	  fundamental	  for	  this	  study	  is	  to	  estimate	  and	  test	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  those	   policies	   to	   reduce	   risk	   premia	   in	   interbank	  market,	   so	   the	  way	   to	   name	  these	   policies	   does	   not	   matter	   that	   much.	   But,	   the	   difference	   between	   the	  markets	  will	  be	  considered	  and	  reflected	  in	  estimation.	  	  The	   following	   section	   first	   reviews	   the	   origins	   of	   unconventional	   monetary	  policy.	   Secondly,	   the	   implementation	   of	   measures	   in	   the	   three	   markets	   is	  presented	  with	  reference	  to	  design,	  operation	  and	  impact.	   	  	  
2.2.1	  Origins	  of	  Unconventional	  Monetary	  Policy	   	  
	  The	  unconventional	  measures	  that	  have	  been	  discussed	  is	  not	  as	  unconventional	  as	   they	   seem.	   King	   (2009)	   stated	   that	   when	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   interest	   rate	  instrument	   was	   impaired	   the	   conventional	   approach	   to	   cope	   with	  unconventional	   (market	   event)	   was	   to	   purchase	   (long-­‐term)	   assets	   such	   as	  government	  bond	  or	  Gilts	  in	  liquid	  markets	  to	  boost	  the	  supply	  of	  money	  given	  the	   assumption	   that	   banks	   do	   not	   hoard	   any	   additional	   reserves	   as	   examples	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from	   Japan	   (see	   also	   Bowdler	   and	   Radia,	   2012).	   Bean	   (2009)	   argued	   that	  quantitative	   easing	   only	   distinguished	   in	   its	   current	   operation	   by	   the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  it	  is	  taking	  place	  and	  the	  scale,	  which	  implies	  that	  the	  measures	  adapted	  by	  central	  banks	  are	  just	  with	  bigger	  size	  of	  operation.	  Also,	  as	  mentioned	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	   Bernanke	   (2009)	   classified	   the	  unconventional	   monetary	   policy	   in	   Japan	   during	   2001-­‐2006	   as	   quantitative	  easing	  because	   it	  had	   the	  objective	  of	  expanding	   the	  monetary	  base.	  Woodford	  (2012)	   followed	   that	   the	   action	   (purchase	   short-­‐term	   government	   securities)	  and	  the	  result	  (expanding	  the	  monetary	  base)	  of	  quantitative	  easing	   is	  same	  as	  when	  central	  banks	  conduct	  any	  open	  market	  operation.	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  unconventional	   measures	   we	   talked	   about	   are	   not	   as	   unconventional	   as	   they	  seem	  to	  be.	  	  Moreover,	  King	  (2009)	  pointed	  out	  that	  what	  has	  been	  described	  as	  credit	  easing	  by	  Bernanke	  (2009)	  really	  fits	  the	  term	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy.	  When	  the	  disorder	  of	  economy	  starts	  from	  dysfunction	  of	  credit	  market,	  central	  banks	  can	   do	   target	   purchase	   of	   assets	   on	   most	   affected	   credit	   markets	   to	   improve	  liquidity.	   It	   is	   very	   important	   for	   central	   banks	   to	  make	   the	  decision	  on	  which	  market	   they	   should	   start	   such	   intervention.	   Both	   Bernanke	   (2009)	   and	   King	  (2009)	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  selection.	  Bernanke	  (2009)	  advocated	  that	  central	   banks	   should	   consider	   markets	   that	   play	   major	   roles	   under	   normal	  condition.	  King	  (2009,	  p8)	  followed	  by	   	  	  ‘…	  (BoE)	  need	  to	  be	  satisfied	  that	  there	  is	  a	  genuine	  private	  demand	  for	  an	  asset	  in	  normal	  conditions	  before	  it	  would	  be	  eligible	  for	  the	  asset	  purchase	  facility	  …	  complement	  and	  stimulate	  private	  demand,	  not	  substitute	  for	  it.’	  
	  It	  clearly	  reveals	  that	  quantitative	  easing	  should	  be	  considered	  by	  central	  banks	  when	  malfunctioning	  of	  credit	  market	  has	  had	  an	   impact	  on	  total	  demand.	  The	  target	   asset	   to	   be	   purchased	   should	   be	   an	   asset	   that	   plays	   important	   role	   in	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private	  finance.	  Moreover,	  the	  aim	  of	  quantitative	  easing	  is	  to	  restore	  the	  role	  of	  intermediation	  of	  financial	  market	  so	  that	  total	  demand	  will	  be	  boosted.	  
	  Similarly,	  Trichet	  (2009)7	   described	  the	  ECB	  Enhanced	  Credit	  Support	  as	   	  	  ‘…	  primarily	  (focuses)	  on	  banks	  as	  they	  are	  the	  main	  source	  of	  credit	  in	  the	  euro	  area	  economy…	  seeks	  to	  provide	  enhanced	  support	  for	  credit	  provision	  through	  specific	   policies…	   constitutes	   the	   special	   and	   primarily	   bank-­‐based	   measures	  that	  are	  being	  taken	  to	  enhance	  the	  flow	  of	  credit	  above	  and	  beyond	  what	  could	  be	  achieved	  through	  policy	  interest	  rate	  reductions	  alone.’	   	  
	  Given	   the	   constraints	  on	  purchasing	  government	  bonds	  on	   secondary	  markets,	  ECB’s	   non-­‐standard	   measures	   focus	   on	   providing	   longer-­‐term	   refinancing	  options	  to	  banks	  in	  order	  to	  support	  credit	  circulation.	  	  Under	  the	  situation	  in	  the	  three	  markets,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  the	  intention	  for	  central	  banks	  to	  employ	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy	  originates	  from	  mainly	  two	  points.	   	  	  The	   first	   points	   converge	   to	   failure	   of	   interest	   rate	   as	   an	   instrument	   because	  there	  was	  no	  interest	  rate	  policy	  possible	  when	  the	  base	  rate	  is	  close	  to	  zero,	  the	  so-­‐called	   ‘zero	   lower	   bound	   problem’	   or	   ZLB.	   As	   we	   have	   explained,	   the	  transmission	   mechanism	   of	   monetary	   policy	   under	   an	   interest	   rate	   regime	  primarily	   depends	   on	   the	   link	   between	  market	   rates	   and	   the	   official	   rate.	   The	  link	   needs	   two	   conditions:	   close	   relationship	   and	   effective	   response.	   If	   the	  former	  term	  breaks,	  central	  banks	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  reduced	  power	  on	  influence	  market	  rates	  and	  total	  demand,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  In	  the	  extreme	  case,	   central	   banks	   can	   lose	   control	   of	   market	   rates	   if	   the	   spread	   widens	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	   http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2009/html/sp090220.en.html	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dramatically	   and	   eventually,	   the	   interbank	   market	   seizes	   up	   as	   the	   case	   after	  Lehman	  Brother	  collapsed.	  Moreover,	  Miles	  (2012)	  pointed	  out	  further	  potential	  problems	  as	  interest	  rates	  approached	  very	  low	  levels:	  1)	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  predict	  the	  impact	   on	   the	   supply	   of	   longer-­‐term	   credit	   which	   ultimately	   influences	  consumption	  and	   investment	   and	  2)	  profits	   of	   banks	   are	   likely	   to	  be	   squeezed	  when	  base	  rate	  lowers	  because	  mortgage	  rates	  are	  often	  contractually	  linked	  to	  base	   rate	   –	   not	   the	   cost	   of	   their	   funding.	   In	   this	   area	   of	   lending,	   banks	   were	  threatened	  with	  falling	  revenue	  while	  their	  financing	  costs	  increased.	   	  	  The	  second	  point	  is	  related	  to	  dysfunction	  of	  credit	  market.	  QE	  is	  likely	  to	  restore	  credit	  markets	  by	  increase	  broad	  money	  so	  to	  boost	  market	  liquidity	  and	  trading	  condition,	   and	   reactive	   capital	  markets.	   In	   the	   aspect	   of	   liquidity,	   King	   (2009)	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  objective	  of	  unconventional	  measures	  would	  be	  to	  boost	  the	  supply	   of	   broad	  money	   as	   well	   as	   to	   increase	   liquidity	   and	   trading	   activity	   in	  credit	  markets.	  King	  (2009)	  further	  explained	  that	  the	  effect	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  reduction	  on	  illiquidity	  premium	  in	  credit	  market	  where	  central	  banks	  have	  run	  the	  intervention.	  This	  may	  lead	  to	  restore	  of	  capital	  market	  and	  reduce	  reliance	  on	  bank	  lending.	  The	  intermediate	  result	  ideally	  should	  help	  the	  banking	  system	  restore	  its	  lending	  function	  so	  the	  flow	  of	  credit	  goes	  to	  business	  (King,	  2009).	   	  	  Certainly,	   the	   ECB	   has	   held	   the	   same	   view.	   Trichet	   (2009)	   summarized	   the	  policies	   in	   EMU	   under	   two	   headings,	   liquidity	   management	   measures	   and	  covered	  bond8	   purchase.	  Both	  of	   them	  aim	   to	  provide	   liquidity	   to	   the	  banking	  system	   and	   credit	   to	   households	   and	   business.	   Indeed,	  monetary	  measures	   by	  the	  three	  central	  banks	  during	  the	  earlier	  stage	  of	  the	  crisis	  have	  shown	  what	  the	  authorities	   committed	   –	   supply	   liquidity	   to	   banks	   and	   financial	   institutions	  (Banque	  de	  France,	  2010,	  No.3).	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	   Covered	  bonds	  are	  a	  type	  of	  asset-­‐backed	  securities	  with	  less	  credit	  risk	  compared	  with	  others	  in	  the	  category	  e.g.	  CDOs	  because	  coupon	  and	  redemption	  payments	  are	  agreed	  in	  advance.	  Covered	  bonds	  bear	  little	  moral	  hazard	  problems	  because	  the	  cover	  loans	  remain	  on	  the	  issuer’s	  balance	  sheet.	  Covered	  bonds	  are	  seen	  as	  substitutes	  for	  government	  bonds	  in	  the	  EMU	  i.e.	  market	  treats	  covered	  bonds	  as	  risk	  free	  asset.	  Details	  of	  credit	  risk	  contained	  in	  covered	  bond	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Prokopczuk	  et	  al	  (2013,	  p102-­‐120).	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  Apart	   from	  what	  we	  have	   seen	  above,	   it	   is	  worth	  mentioning	   those	   features	  of	  the	  ECB’s	  response	  that	  were	  due	  to	  its	  own	  institutional	  features.	  Since	  EMU	  is	  neither	   a	   federal	   union	   nor	   a	   nation,	   the	   target	   and	   approach	   for	   ECB	   to	  implement	   monetary	   policy	   differs	   from	   that	   of	   the	   BoE	   and	   the	   Fed.	  Cour-­‐Thimann	   and	   Winkler	   (2012)	   explain	   that	   the	   provision	   of	   monetary	  financing	  in	  the	  EMU	  does	  not	  allow	  ECB	  to	  purchase	  government	  bonds	  in	  the	  primary	  market	  and	   its	   intervention	   in	   the	   secondary	  market	   is	   also	   restricted	  because	  when	  ECB	  purchase	  government	  bond	   in	   the	  EMU,	   the	  money	  goes	   to	  investors	   not	   sovereigns	   (Cour-­‐Thimann	   and	   Winkler,	   2012).	   Moreover,	   ECB	  (2007)	  pointed	  out	  that	  banks	  as	  one	  of	  financial	  intermediaries	  particularly	  take	  the	   original	   feature	   of	   transit	   of	   money	   from	   depositors	   to	   borrowers.	   The	  statistics	  (European	  Central	  Bank,	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  2010Oct)	  shows	  that	  nearly	  80	   percent	   of	   financing	   demand	   outside	   financial	   sector	   has	   been	   fulfilled	   by	  banks	  whereas	  the	  figure	  is	  opposite	  in	  the	  US	  i.e.	  nearly	  80	  percent	  of	  financing	  is	   fulfilled	   by	   non-­‐bank	   financial	   institutions.	   	   This	   shows	   the	   fact	   that	   banks	  dominate	   in	   the	   EMU	   whereas	   financial	   markets	   play	   a	   significant	   role	   in	  financing	  firms	  in	  the	  US.	  The	  flexibility	  of	  substitution	  is	   limited	  in	  the	  EMU.	  If	  banks	   restrict	   credit,	   the	  problems	  are	  more	   serious.	   If	   banks	   fail	   to	  play	   their	  role	  of	  lending,	  large	  corporates	  can	  switch	  to	  other	  source	  of	  finance	  but	  SMEs	  are	   very	   unlikely	   to	   do	   so.	   Therefore,	   banks	   take	   extraordinary	   role	   in	  transmission	  mechanism	  of	  monetary	   policy	   in	   the	   EMU	   rather	   than	   in	   the	  US	  (Cour-­‐Thimann	   and	   Winkler,	   2012).	   It	   explains	   the	   reason	   that	   ECB’s	  non-­‐standard	   measures	   largely	   and	   primarily	   concentrate	   on	   banks	  (Cour-­‐Thimann	  and	  Winkler,	  2012).	  	  To	   summarize,	   the	   origins	   of	   unconventional	   monetary	   policy	   start	   with	   the	  failure	   of	   conventional	   interest	   rate	   policy.	   This	   could	   be	   observed	   either	   as	  widening	  spreads	  or	  the	  little	  response	  from	  total	  demand	  to	  low	  interest	  rate	  in	  long	  term.	  Moreover,	  the	  concern	  for	  stability	  of	  financial	  markets	  forms	  another	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incentive	  for	  central	  banks	  to	  employ	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy.	  As	  in	  the	  recent	  crisis,	  the	  increased	  concern	  of	  uncertainty	  has	  led	  to	  severe	  asymmetric	  information	   and	   adverse	   selection	   problems	   for	   banks,	   so	   the	   lending	   activity	  nearly	   halted	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   crisis.	   This	   may	   further	   affect	   financial	  stability	  since	  banks’	  activity	  in	  interbank	  market	  is	  the	  primary	  transit	  process	  for	   credit	   to	   the	   private	   sector.	   	   Thus,	   unconventional	   monetary	   policy	   may	  have	  three	  elements:	  1)	  massive	  supply	  of	  liquidity	  support	  to	  banks	  primarily;	  2)	  forward	   indication	  of	   lowest	  boundary	  of	  policy	  rates	  over	  extended	  period;	  3)	  large-­‐scale	  purchase	  of	   financial	  assets	  especially	   longer-­‐term’s	  (Pattipeilohy	  et	  
al,	  2013),	   so	   there	  are	  mainly	   two	  clusters	  of	  unconventional	  policies,	   liquidity	  provision	  tools	  and	   large-­‐scale	  purchase	  of	   long	  term	  asset	  mainly	  government	  bonds.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  these	  operations,	  the	  composition	  and	  size	  of	  central	  banks’	  balance	   sheet	   will	   be	   altered	   because	   the	   purchase	   is	   normally	   funded	   by	  issuance	   of	   Treasury	   bills	   and	   monetary	   base	   will	   expand	   accordingly	   to	  increased	   liquidity	   in	   credit	  market.	   	   Bain	   and	  Howells	   (2012)	  distinguish	   the	  effect	   of	   quantitative	   easing	   and	   qualitative	   easing	   on	   central	   banks’	   balance	  sheets.	  Quantitative	  easing	  expands	  the	  size	  of	  balance	  sheet	  of	  the	  central	  bank	  and	   changing	   composition	   of	   assets	   is	   associated	   with	   portfolio	   rebalancing	  process.	   Qualitative	   easing	   using	   to	   increase	   liquidity	   in	  market	   swaps	   central	  banks’	   liquidity	   and	   low	   risk	   assets	   for	   less	   liquidity	   and	   risker	   assets,	   so	   it	  results	  in	  changing	  of	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  assets.	  As	  a	  result,	  qualitative	  easing	  may	   increase	   central	   banks’	   exposure	   to	   all	   forms	  of	   risk	   including	   credit	   risk.	  The	  good	  example	  of	   qualitative	   easing	  would	  be	   the	   Special	   Liquidity	   Scheme	  (SLS)	  operated	  by	  BoE	  in	  the	  UK	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  The	   next	   section	   reviews	   the	   unconventional	   facilities	   in	   the	   three	   markets	  respectively	   by	   looking	   at	   design	   and	   implementation.	   Also,	   we	  will	   show	   the	  institutional	  set-­‐up	  of	  SLS	  by	  BoE	  to	  eliminate	  the	  credit	  risk	  that	  it	  may	  bring	  to	  their	   balance	   sheet.	   The	   impact	   of	   these	   facilities	   on	   money	   market	   will	   be	  discussed	  in	  the	  empirical	  chapter.	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2.2.2	  Unconventional	  Monetary	  Policy	  Tools	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  US	  and	  EMU	  	  The	  unconventional	  monetary	  facilities	  can	  be	  classified	  into	  liquidity	  provision	  and	  asset	  purchase	  programs	  (Trichet,	  2009).	  The	  timelines	  of	  monetary	  policy	  events	  at	  the	  BoE,	  the	  Fed	  and	  ECB	  websites,	  show	  that	  the	  liquidity	  provisions	  were	  mostly	   implemented	   during	   the	   first	   one	   and	   half	   years	   of	   the	   advent	   of	  crisis.	  Below	  are	  the	  links	  to	  timelines:	  	  BoE	   http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/sterlingoperations/timeline/timeline_no_flash.aspx	   	  ECB	   http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/crisis.en.html	  The	  Fed	   http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline	   and	  http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf	  	  A	  table	  summarizing	  those	  measures	  is	  also	  provided	  for	  each	  monetary	  regime	  in	  the	  following	  subsection.	  	  After	  the	  beginning	  of	  2009,	  central	  banks	  with	  governments	  support	   launched	  large-­‐scale	   asset	   purchases,	   despite	   some	   differences	   in	   the	   EMU	   because	   the	  size	   of	   the	   purchase	   of	   covered	   bonds	   is	   relatively	   small	   compared	   with	   the	  longer	  term	  refinancing	  scheme.	  The	  emphasis	  of	  policy	  shifts	  with	  movements	  of	   the	  crisis.	  The	  crisis	  was	  explored	  as	   liquidity	  shortage	   in	   interbank	  market.	  Here,	  liquidity	  refers	  to	  cash	  equivalent	  assets	  that	  can	  be	  easily	  converted	  in	  to	  cash	  to	  make	  payment.	  After	  a	  series	  of	  liquidity	  provisions,	  the	  problem	  moved	  to	   trading	   liquidity	   in	   certain	   credit	   markets,	   mainly	   commercial	   paper	   and	  corporate	   bond	   markets.	   This	   problem	   rises	   from	   the	   transfer	   of	   liquidity	   in	  banking	  system	  to	  credit.	  Thus,	  the	  focus	  of	  policy	  was	  targeted	  on	  the	  purchase	  of	   assets	   from	   specific	   markets	   at	   second	   stage.	   The	   section	   first	   reviews	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unconventional	   monetary	   policies	   in	   the	   three	   markets	   and	   a	   comparison	   of	  those	   policies	   will	   be	   discussed	   accordingly.	   It	   is	   also	   worth	   mentioning	   that	  there	   are	   currency	   swap	   lines	   operated	   among	   countries	   during	   the	   crisis	   in	  order	  for	  domestic	   firms	  to	  fulfill	   foreign	  currency	  liability,	  but	  these	  programs	  do	  not	  have	  interest	  on	  the	  study	  so	  they	  are	  not	  discussed.	   	  
	  
2.2.2.1	  Liquidity	  Provision	  
	  
Bank	  of	  England	  BoE	   launched	  the	   first	   term	  auction	   facility	  on	  September	  26,	  2007,	  which	  was	  just	   over	   a	  month	   after	   the	   crisis	   began	   on	   August	   06,	   2007.	   The	   BoE	   (2007)	  scheduled	   four	  auctions	  on	  September	  26,	  October	  02,	  10	  and	  17,	   respectively.	  Those	   auctions	  were	   repo	   transactions	  with	   a	   three-­‐month	   term.	   The	   amount	  was	   £10bn	   for	   each	   of	   the	   auctions.	   The	   key	   feature	   of	   the	   auction	   was	   the	  extended	   range	   of	   acceptable	   collateral	   (Bank	   of	   England,	   2007)9.	   Apart	   from	  securities	  that	  are	  normally	  eligible	  in	  the	  BoE’s	  OMOs,	  the	  collateral	  consisted	  of	  EEA	  and	  G10	  sovereign	  bonds	  down	  to	  BBB/Baa	  ratings	  and	  other	  high	  quality	  market	   securities	   including	   mortgage-­‐backed	   securities	   issued	   in	   the	   UK	   and	  EEA	   and	   commercial	   paper	   and	   senior	   corporate	   bonds	   with	   A+/A1	   ratings	  (Bank	  of	  England,	  2007a).	  The	  added	  collaterals	  are	  assets	  that	  are	  concerned	  in	  the	   crisis	   due	   to	   the	   unclear	   credit	   risk	   contained.	   This	   term	   auction	   facility10	  has	  attracted	   little	  attention	  from	  researchers	  compared	  with	  US	  Term	  Auction	  Facility.	   The	   reason	   may	   be	   that	   BoE	   (2007a)	   received	   no	   bid	   on	   the	   four	  auctions.	  Banks	  may	  have	  feared	  that	  obtaining	  funds	  from	  such	  auctions	  would	  damage	   their	   reputation	  and	   raise	   adverse	   selection	  problems	   since	   it	  was	   the	  first	  additional	  facility	  with	  extraordinary	  tolerance	  that	  opened	  to	  all	  banks	  and	  building	  societies	  in	  general	  in	  the	  crisis.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	   Term	  Auction	  market	  notice	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/documentation/statement070921.pdf	   	  10	   The	  term	  auction	  is	  different	  from	  Extended	  Long-­‐term	  Repo	  Operation	  that	  BoE	  first	  introduced	  on	  December	  18,	  2007.	  The	  term	  auction	  had	  more	  tolerant	  acceptance	  of	  collaterals	  and	  it	  was	  not	  scheduled	  in	  OMOs.	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Table	  2.4	  Liquidity	  Measures	  during	  the	  Crisis	  
	  
Scheme	   Launch	  Date	   Finish	  Date	   Relevance	  to	  
Interbank	  
Spread	  First	  term	  auction	   26/09/2007	   17/10/2007	   No	  transactions	  Extended	  collateral	  three-­‐month	  long-­‐term	   repo	  operation	  (ELTR)	  
18/12/2007	   14/04/2009	   Yes	  
Special	   Liqidity	  Scheme	  (SLS)	   21/04/2008	   30/01/2009	   Yes	  Discount	   Window	  Facility	  (DWF)	   20/08/2008	   Permanent	   	   No	  data.	  Potentially	  no.	  Extended	  Collateral	   Term	  Repo	  (ECTR)	   06/12/2011	   BoE	  can	  activate	  whenever	  it	  is	  needed	   Potentially	  yes.	  	  On	   December	   18,	   2007,	   BoE	   held	   its	   first	   extended	   collateral	   three-­‐month	  long-­‐term	  repo	  operation	  (ELTR).	  Compared	  with	   the	  previous	  additional	   term	  auctions,	  ELTR	  is	  scheduled	  as	  an	  open	  market	  operation	  (OMO)	  operating	  on	  a	  monthly	  basis	  with	  an	  initial	  amount	  £10bn.	  ELTR	  offers	  funds	  of	  three,	  six,	  nine	  and	   twelve	   months	   maturity.	   The	   pricing	   mechanism	   uses	   a	   ‘uniform	   price’	  format	  –	  all	   successful	  bidders	  pay	   the	   lowest	  accepted	  spread	  on	  official	  bank	  rate	  (Bank	  of	  England,	  2013)11.	  BoE	  (2007b)12	   intends	  to	  absorb	  excess	  liquidity	  generated	  in	  ELTR	  by	  reducing	  the	  size	  of	  the	  weekly	  short-­‐term	  repo	  OMOs	  or	  the	   issuance	  of	  BoE	  sterling	  bills.	  Commercial	  paper	  and	  corporate	  bonds	  were	  dropped	   from	   eligible	   collaterals	   compared	   with	   the	   previous	   term	   auction.	  Moreover,	  the	  minimum	  rating	  of	  accepted	  sovereign	  bonds	  increased	  to	  AA-­‐	  or	  higher.	   On	   October	   03,	   2008,	   BoE	   introduced	   separate	  minimum	   bid	   rates	   for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	   Extract	  from	  the	  Red	  Book	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/publications/redbookectr.pdf	   	  12	   ELTR	  market	  notice	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/money/documentation/statement071214.pdf	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narrow	  and	  wider	  collateral,	   respectively.	  The	  narrow	  set	  of	  collateral	   includes	  only	   the	   securities	   that	   are	   likely	   to	   remain	   liquid	   in	   all	   but	   the	  most	   extreme	  circumstances,	  in	  BoE’s	  view,	  and	  the	  securities	  need	  to	  be	  issued	  by	  sovereigns	  with	  sufficiently	  deep	  debt	  markets	  to	  facilitate	  broad	  access	  to	  BoE’s	  operations	  while	  the	  rest	  of	  accepted	  sovereign	  bonds	  go	  into	  a	  wider	  set	  of	  collateral	  (Bank	  of	  England,	  2010)13.	  Cross	  et	  al	  (2010)	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  accumulated	  size	  of	   ELTR	   increased	   rapidly	   after	   July	   2008	   and	   peaked	   at	   £	   180bn	   on	   January	  2009.	  The	  expansion	  of	   the	  BoE’s	  balance	  sheet	  was	   largely	   the	   result	  of	   these	  ELTR	  operations	  during	  this	  time.	   	  	  The	  effect	  of	   the	  crisis	  became	  more	  visible	   in	  2008	   followed	  by	   the	  closure	  of	  some	  asset-­‐backed	  security	  markets	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  2007	  (John	  et	  al,	  2012).	  The	  fact	  was	  revealed	  by	  the	  collapse	  of	  Bear	  Stearns	  in	  early	  2008.	  It	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  very	  difficult	   for	  banks	   to	  use	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  as	  collateral	   to	  borrow	  in	  the	  market.	  Moreover,	  the	  large	  amount	  of	  mortgage-­‐related	  securities	  on	   banks’	   balance	   sheet	   reduced	   their	   willingness	   to	   lend	   in	   the	   interbank	  market	   due	   to	   uncertainty	   about	   the	   future	   value	   (ibid).	   This	   seemed	   likely	   to	  reduce	   credit	   available	   to	   economy.	  Therefore,	   it	   became	   important	   to	   remove	  those	  illiquid	  assets	  from	  banks’	  balance	  sheets	  (ibid).	   	  	  BoE	   announced	   special	   Liquidity	   Scheme	   (SLS)	   on	   April	   21,	   2008.	   Compared	  with	   the	   term	   auction,	   SLS	   had	   more	   innovative	   features	   that	   were	   specially	  designed	  to	  tackle	  liquidity	  issues	  in	  the	  crisis.	  Firstly,	  the	  concept	  of	  SLS	  was	  to	  swap	  high	  quality	  but	  less	  liquid	  assets	  e.g.	  mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  that	  were	  held	  on	  balance	  sheet	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2007	  for	  high	  quality	  and	  liquid	  assets	  e.g.	  UK	  Treasury	   Bills	   for	   up	   to	   three	   years	   (Bank	   of	   England,	   2012)14.	   That	   is,	   banks	  were	   given	   three-­‐year	   secured	   loans.	   The	   interest	   was	   reflected	   by	   ‘haircut’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	   Revisions	  to	  eligibility	  criteria	  for	  sovereign,	  central	  bank	  and	  supranational	  debt	  taken	  as	  collateral	  in	  the	  bank	  of	  England’s	  operations.	  Link:	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/marketnotice110211.pdf	   	  14	   http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/sls/default.aspx	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when	  taking	  the	  swap.	  SLS	  had	  recorded	  £185bn	  lending	  of	  Treasury	  Bills	  and	  32	  participants	  by	  its	  close	  date	  on	  January	  30,	  2009	  and	  BoE	  had	  received	  £287bn	  collaterals	  (Bank	  of	  England,	  2009)15.	  The	  statistics	  (Bank	  of	  England,	  Quarterly	  
Bulletin,	   2012Q1,	   p62)	   reveal	   that	   collateral	   was	   mainly	  residential-­‐mortgage-­‐backed	   securities,	   covered	   bonds	   backed	   by	   residential	  mortgages,	   and	  asset	  backed	  securities	  backed	  by	  credit	   cards	  as	  well	   as	   small	  amounts	   of	   UK	   government	   debt,	   UK	   government-­‐guaranteed	   bank	   debt,	  government	  guaranteed	  agency	  debt,	   and	  other	  government	  and	   supranational	  debt.	  
	  
Figure	  2.5	  Collateral	  Pledged	  in	  SLS	  
	  
	  Source:	  Bank	  of	  England	  Quarterly	  Bulletin,	  2012Q1,	  p62.	  Used	  with	  permission	  of	  the	  publisher.	  	  Despite	  the	  value	  of	  collateral	  dropping	  to	  £242bn	  at	  the	  close	  date	  of	  drawdown	  window,	   it	   still	   counts	   an	   effective	   haircut	   of	   around	   16%	   (Bank	   of	   England,	  2009).	   Moreover,	   there	   was	   a	   fee	   based	   on	   the	   spread	   between	   three-­‐month	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	   Special	  Liquidity	  Scheme	  market	  notice	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Documents/marketnotice090203c.pdf	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LIBOR	   and	   three-­‐month	   General	   Collateral	   (GC)	   gilt	   repo	   (Bank	   of	   England,	  2009),	   which	   represents	   the	   credit	   premium	   in	   the	   credit	   market	   (BIS,	   2008;	  Taylor	  and	  William,	  2009).	  This	  fee	  will	  be	  used	  as	  credit	  buffer	  to	  cover	  any	  loss	  in	   the	   unlikely	   case	   of	   counterparty	   defaults.	   Bowdler	   and	   Radia	   (2012)	  described	   SLS	   as	   an	   occasional	   operation	   to	   provide	   high	   quality	   and	   liquidity	  securities	  in	  exchange	  for	  lower	  quality	  collateral.	   	  	  According	  to	  John	  et	  al	  (2012,	  p57-­‐66),	  the	  target	  of	  SLS	  was	  to	  inject	  long-­‐term	  liquidity	  to	  banks	  as	  well	  as	  reducing	  concern	  of	  credit	  risk	  in	  interbank	  market.	  The	  targets	  were	  fulfilled	  by	  collateral	  swap	  structure.	   	  	  
Figure	  2.6	  Stylised	  SLS	  Collateral	  Swap	  Process	  
	  
	  Source:	  modified	   from	   John	   et	   al	   (Bank	   of	   England	  Quarterly	   Bulletin,	   2012Q1,	  p60).	  Used	  with	  permission	  of	  the	  publisher.	  	  Participant	   banks	   and	   building	   societies	   submit	   their	   collateral	   subject	   to	  acceptance	  and	   fee	   to	  BoE	   in	   exchange	   for	  Treasury	  Bills	   at	   a	   rate	  of	  discount.	  The	   BoE	   pays	   a	   fee	   to	   Debt	  Management	   Office	   (DMO)	   and	   borrows	   Treasury	  Bills	  to	  lend	  to	  participants	  under	  uncollateralized	  stock	  lending	  agreement.	  The	  Treasury	  Bills	  used	  in	  transactions	  were	  specially	   issued	  for	  SLS	  with	  extended	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maturity	   of	   nine	   months.	   Allen	   (2012)	   argued	   that	   SLS	   boosted	   direct	   bank	  funding,	  but	  it	  was	  impossible	  to	  distinguish	  the	  effect	  from	  that	  of	  quantitative	  easing.	   The	   effects	   that	   Allen	   (2012)	   pointed	   out	   were	   that	   the	   amount	   of	  repayment	  under	  SLS	   -­‐	  £	  60bn	   in	  2010,	  £	  160bn	   in	  2011,	  and	  £	  60bn	   in	  2012,	  would	  reduce	  the	  growth	  of	   liquid	  assets,	  apart	   from	  those	  positive	  effects	  that	  have	  been	  mentioned.	   	  	  Despite	   those	   illiquid	   residential-­‐mortgaged	   securities	   were	   removed	   from	  banks’	  balance	  sheet,	  the	  credit	  risk	  associated	  is	  still	  within	  banks’	  unless	  under	  circumstance	   of	   default.	   The	   temporary	   removal	   of	   illiquid	   assets	   from	   banks’	  balance	  sheet	  does	  not	  mean	  transferring	  credit	  risk	  associated	  with	  those	  assets	  to	   BoE’s	   balance	   sheet	   because	   BoE	   set	   prudent	   procedures	   to	   eliminate	   the	  chance	   of	   taking	   excessive	   risk	   on	   their	   balance	   sheet.	   Firstly,	   the	   ‘haircut’16	  approach	  to	   limit	  any	   loss	   that	  may	  have	  occurred	  when	  a	  participant	  defaults.	  The	  rate	  of	  haircut	  differs	  between	  assets	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  adjustment.	  That	   is,	  the	   value	   of	   collateral	   pledge	   has	   been	   discounted	   twice	   to	   get	   the	   borrowing	  value.	   The	   first	   discount	   is	   from	   nominal	   value	   to	   market	   value.	   The	   second	  discount	  is	  the	  haircut	  on	  market	  value.	  Secondly,	  HM	  Treasury	  indemnified	  the	  SLS.	  In	  case	  of	  a	  counterparty	  default,	  the	  transaction	  fees	  generated	  in	  SLS	  will	  first	  be	  applied	  to	  cover	  the	  loss	  as	  a	  buffer	  prior	  to	  HM	  Treasury’s	  indemnity.	  As	  to	  the	  worst	  case,	  the	  loss	  will	  need	  to	  satisfy	  three	  conditions	  all	  together	  before	  it	   has	   been	  passed	   to	  private	   sector,	   1)	   a	   counterparty	  defaults;	   2)	   the	  haircut	  value	  of	  the	  collateral	  pledged	  by	  the	  counterparty	  is	  smaller	  than	  the	  its	  market	  value	  after	  the	  counterparty	  defaults:	  3)	  the	  loss	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  buffer	  (John	  
et	   al,	   2012).	   Moreover,	   Fisher	   (2010)	   pointed	   out	   that	   SLS	   had	   no	   direct	  implications	  for	  monetary	  policy	  because	  the	  supply	  of	  central	  bank	  money	  was	  not	  affected	  by	  the	  swap	  of	  assets.	  In	   addition,	   BoE	   also	   launched	   other	   liquidity	   programs:	   Discount	   Window	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	   Haircut	  is	  a	  noun	  to	  describe	  the	  difference	  between	  market	  value	  of	  collateral	  and	  borrowed	  Treasure	  Bills	  (John	  et	  al,	  2012)	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Facility	   (DWF)	  and	  Extended	  Collateral	  Term	  Repo	  (ECTR).	  The	  DWF	   launched	  on	   August	   20,	   2008	   as	   a	   permanent	   on-­‐demand	   standing	   facility,	   aiming	   to	  provide	   shorter-­‐term	   liquidity	   to	   banks	   with	   a	   broader	   range	   of	   collateral	   at	  higher	   cost	   compared	  with	   SLS.	  On	  April	   01,	   2011,	   the	   range	   of	   collateral	  was	  extended.	   There	   are	   four	   levels	   of	   collaterals	   classified	  A	   –	  D.	   Similarly	   to	   SLS,	  DWF	  aims	  to	  help	  banks	  under	  firm-­‐specific	  or	  market-­‐wide	  shock	  (Fisher,	  2010)	  i.e.	  liquidity	  related	  insurance	  (Bank	  of	  England,	  2008)17	   through	  lending	  banks	  high	   quality	   and	   highly	   liquid	   asset	   with	   collateral	   pledged.	   The	   difference	  between	  them,	  apart	  from	  lending	  assets,	  is	  that	  DWF	  offers	  much	  shorter	  term	  (30	   days)	   with	   higher	   costs.	   Participants	   can	   roll	   over	   the	   loan	   subject	   to	  acceptance	  of	  BoE.	   	  	  BoE	  apparently	  want	  to	  use	  DWF	  as	  liquidity	  provision	  for	  banks	  when	  market	  is	  not	  under	  stress	  –	   liquidity	  shortage	   is	  not	  a	  problem	   for	  most	  of	  banks	   in	   the	  market.	  As	  role	  of	  liquidity	  insurance,	  BoE	  (2008)18	   described	  DWF	  as	  	   ‘…	   (L)iquidity	   risk	   is	  a	   standard	   feature	  of	  banking	  …	  but	   it	   is	   inefficient	   for	  banks	   to	   have	   to	   self-­‐insure	   against	   extreme	   liquidity	   risks	   by	   holding	  excessively	  large	  stocks	  of	  safe	  liquid	  assets	  …	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  central	  bank	   are	   well	   placed,	   as	   monopoly	   suppliers	   of	   the	   most	   liquid	   means	   of	  payment	  …	  to	  act	  as	  backstop	  providers	  of	  liquidity	  to	  solvent	  banks:	  so-­‐called	  liquidity	  insurance.’	  	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  DWF	  fundamentally	  focuses	  on	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  role	  of	  lender	  of	  last	   resort	   when	   there	   is	   turbulence	   in	   the	   market	   and	   an	   individual	   bank	   is	  affected,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  deal	  with	  credit	  risk	  so	  banks	  that	  want	  to	  borrow	  under	  DWF	   need	   to	   be	   solvent	   and	   viable	   (John	   et	   al,	   2012).	   Moreover,	   in	   order	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	   Sterling	  Operations	  –	  Liquidity	  Insurance	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/sterlingoperations/liquidityinsurance.aspx	  18	   Sterling	  Operations	  –	  Liquidity	  Insurance	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/markets/Pages/sterlingoperations/liquidityinsurance.aspx	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protect	   banks’	   reputation	   and	   avoid	   unnecessary	   credit	   risk	   concerns,	   the	  statistics	  of	  DWF	  are	  revealed	  with	  a	   time	   lag	   to	  ensure	  any	  drawing	  will	  have	  ended	  before	  information	  is	  revealed	  to	  pubic	  (John	  et	  al,	  2012	  and	  Fisher,	  2010).	  According	   to	   BoE	   Quarterly	   Bulletin	   from	   2008	   –	   2013,	   there	   has	   been	   no	  borrowing	  under	  DWF	  since	  it	  was	  introduced.	  Moreover,	  the	  institutional	  set	  up	  of	  DWF	  does	  not	  exactly	  fit	  in	  the	  concept	  unconventional	  we	  have	  discussed	  in	  the	   study	   but	   it	   was	   newly	   created	   during	   the	   crisis	   in	   the	   UK	   so	   we	   have	  mentioned	  it	  briefly.	  	  
Table	  2.7	  Collateral	  Accepted	  under	  Discount	  Window	  Facility	  
	  Level	  A	   High-­‐quality	  sovereign	  and	  supranational	  bonds	  Level	  B	   Other	  quality	  debt	  that	  is	  tradable	  in	  liquid	  markets	  Level	  C	   Debt,	   and	   other	   transferable	   instruments,	   that	   are	   not	   tradable	   in	  liquid	  markets	  Level	  D	   ‘Own	  name’	  instruments	   	  Source:	  Bank	  of	  England	  Quarterly	  Bulletin,	  2008Q4,	  p380	  	  ECTR	   is	   a	   contingency	   liquidity	   facility	   that	   BoE	   can	   activate	   in	   response	   to	  market	   turbulence.	   The	   aim	   of	   ECTR	   is	   to	   ‘mitigate	   risks	   to	   financial	   stability	  arising	   from	   a	  market-­‐wide	   shortage	   of	   short-­‐term	   sterling	   liquidity’	   (Bank	   of	  England,	  Quarterly	   Bulletin,	   2008Q4,	   p15).	   It	   launched	   on	   December	   06,	   2011	  carrying	  very	  similar	  features	  to	  SLS	  but	  the	  transaction	  is	  finished	  by	  term	  repo	  and	   with	   widest	   range	   of	   collaterals.	   BoE	   will	   activate	   the	   facility	   when	   they	  believe	  there	  is	  a	  market	  wide	  need	  for	  liquidity.	  The	  first	  operation	  was	  held	  on	  June	   15,	   2012	   and	   there	   were	   another	   three	   operations	   on	   July,	   August	   and	  September	  2012,	  respectively.	  The	  amount	  of	  each	  auction	  was	  £5bn.	  Amount	  of	  allocation	  was	  reduced	  subsequently	   from	  £5bn	  to	  £1.5bn.	  There	  were	  another	  three	  operations	  from	  October	  to	  December	  2012,	  but	  no	  amount	  was	  allocated.	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BoE	  deactivated	  ECTR	  since	  then	  indicating	  the	  quantity	  of	  liquidity	  was	  enough	  in	  the	  banking	  system	  (Bank	  of	  England,	  Quarterly	  Bulletin,	  2012Q3,	  p193).	  	  On	  February	  13,	  2009,	  BoE	  started	  Asset	  Purchase	  Facility	  (APF)	  by	  establishing	  the	   Commercial	   Paper	   Facility	   (CPF).	   Since	   then,	   the	   focus	   of	   unconventional	  policy	   has	   moved	   to	   large-­‐scale	   asset	   purchases,	   which	   will	   be	   discussed	  separately	  once	  we	  have	  finished	  with	  liquidity	  provision.	   	  
	  
The	  European	  Central	  Bank	  The	   ECB	   (Monthly	   Bulletin	   2010,	   October)	   summarized	   their	   response	   to	   the	  financial	   crisis	   in	   four	   stages,	   the	   advent,	   the	   intensification,	   the	   period	   of	  temporary	  improvements	  in	  financial	  market	  conditions,	  and	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis.	  At	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis,	  the	  ECB	  first	  accommodated	  the	  needs	  for	   banks	   to	   build	   up	   their	   liquidity	   buffers	   so	   as	   to	   reduce	   uncertainty	   about	  their	  liquidity	  position	  by	  providing	  €	  95bn	  on	  the	  first	  day	  (Cour-­‐Thimann	  and	  Winkler,	  2012).	  A	  few	  months	  later,	  the	  ECB	  added	  a	  six-­‐month	  maturity	  to	  their	  normal	   three-­‐month	   euro	   liquidity	   providing	   operation	   (‘longer-­‐term	  refinancing	  operation’,	  LTRO).	  The	  LTRO	  has	  similar	  operational	  features	  to	  the	  term	  auctions	  that	  were	  held	  by	  BoE	  and	  the	  Fed.	  It	  is	  an	  open	  market	  operation	  that	  can	  be	  used	  during	  normal	  market	  conditions,	  also.	  On	  February	  07,	  2008,	  the	  Governing	  Council	   renewed	  another	   two	   supplementary	  LTROs	  allotted	  on	  November	  23,	   and	  December	  12,	  2007	  with	  €	  60bn	  of	  each	   (European	  Central	  Bank,	   Press	   Release,	   07/02/2008).	   Despite	   ECB	   had	   not	   announced	   officially	  opening	   term	   lending,	   the	   extension	   under	   LTROs	   revealed	   explicitly	   the	  intention	  of	  ECB	  to	  meet	  liquidity	  requirement	  in	  the	  money	  market.	   	  	  The	   innovation	   of	   LTRO	   during	   the	   crisis	   was	   to	   add	   longer-­‐term	   maturities	  rather	  than	  three-­‐month	  and	  extend	  acceptable	  collaterals.	  The	  maturity	  of	  funds	  was	  three	  and	  six	  months	  initially	  and	  extended	  to	  twelve	  months	  in	  June	  2009	  and	   three	  years	   in	  December	  2011,	  eventually,	  when	   the	  crisis	   intensified.	  The	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size	   was	   over	   €1	   trillion	   for	   banks	   across	   Europe.	   However,	   the	   aim	   of	   LTRO	  differed	   from	   SLS	   since	   the	   ECB	   announced	   that	   LTRO	   aimed	   to	   reduce	   the	  spreads	  between	  risk-­‐free	  rates	  and	  the	  cost	  of	  funding	  to	  banks	  in	  order	  to	  fix	  the	   monetary	   transmission	   mechanism	   (Cour-­‐Thimann	   and	   Winkler,	   2012)	  whereas	  the	  effect	  of	  SLS	  tends	  to	  be	  short	  term	  focusing	  on	  liquidity	  provision	  of	  the	  banking	  system.	  	  Moreover,	   the	   ECB	   recognized	   that	   the	   extended	   LTRO	   was	   a	   complement	   to	  their	   interest	   rate	   instrument	   (European	   Central	   Bank,	  Monthly	   Bulletin	   2010,	  October),	  which	  means	  ECB	  can	  adjust	  rates	  charged	  on	  LTRO	  regardless	  of	  the	  prevailing	   level	   of	  base	   interest	   rate,	   and	  vice	  versa,	   because	   the	   indexation	  of	  interest	  rate	  in	  LTRO	  is	  on	  the	  future	  main	  refinancing	  rate	  over	  the	  lifetime	  of	  the	  operations	   (Cour-­‐Thimann	  and	  Winkler,	  2012).	  That	   is,	   any	   increase	   in	   the	  policy	   rate	   will	   be	   immediately	   passed	   to	   increase	   costs	   of	   the	   remaining	  outstanding	  operations.	  The	   feature	  of	   indexation	  was	   introduced	   in	  December	  2009.	   Before	   introduction	   of	   indexation,	   LTRO	   responded	   to	   the	   signaling	   of	  monetary	  policy	  stance	   through	   the	  key	  ECB	   interest	   rates	   (Cour-­‐Thimann	  and	  Winkler,	   2012).	   In	   addition,	   a	   fixed-­‐rate	   full	   allotment	   tender	   procedure	   was	  adopted	   for	   all	   refinancing	   operations	   during	   the	   crisis	   to	   ensure	   financial	  institutions	   in	  EMU	  have	  unlimited	  access	   to	  central	  bank	   liquidity	  at	   the	  main	  refinancing	   rate	   subject	   to	   collateral	   (European	   Central	   Bank,	  Monthly	   Bulletin	  2010,	  October).	   	  
Furthermore,	   together	  with	   the	  Fed,	   the	  ECB	  conducted	  two	  US	  dollar	   liquidity	  provision	   operations	   against	   ECB-­‐eligible	   collateral	   for	   terms,	   28	   days	   and	   35	  days,	   respectively	   (European	   Central	   Bank,	   Press	   Release,	   12/12/2007).	   The	  total	   amount	   of	   the	   two	   transactions	   was	   $20bn.	   Moreover,	   on	   November	   08,	  2007,	   the	   Governing	   Council	   extended	   two	   supplementary	   longer-­‐term	  refinancing	   operations	   (LTROs)	   made	   on	   August	   and	   September	   2007	   from	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November	   and	   December	   2007,	   respectively	   to	   February	   and	   March	   2008,	  respectively	  (European	  Central	  Bank,	  Press	  Release,	  08/11/2007).	   	  
Table	  2.8	  Measures	  taken	  by	  ECB	  during	  the	  Crisis	  
	  
Scheme	   Launch	  Date	   Finish	  Date	   Relevance	  to	  Interbank	  
Spread	  US	   dollar	  liquidity-­‐providing	  operations	  
12/12/2007	   20/12/2007	   Potentially	   yes	   because	   the	   two	  auctions	   were	   in	   line	   with	   US	  TAF	  Six-­‐month	   refinancing	  operations	   with	  longer	   maturities	  (LTROs)	  
28/03/2008	   	   Yes	  
Special	   term	  refinancing	  operation	   28/09/2008	   	   Yes	  Fixed	   rate	   tender	  procedure	   with	   full	  allotment	  
08/10/2008	   	   Yes	  
Twelve-­‐month	  LTRO	   07/05/2009	   	   Yes.	  Covered	   Bond	  Purchase	   Programme	  (CBPP)	  
04/06/2009	   30/06/2010	   No.	  The	  amount	  of	  CBPP	  is	  very	  small	  and	  its	  second	  version	  aims	  to	  fight	  with	  sovereign	  crisis.	   	  Sovereign	   crisis	  explores	   –	   aid	   to	  Greece	  
25/03/2010	   02/05/2010	   No	  
Securities	   Markets	  Programmes	   10/05/2010	   	   No.	  Sovereign	   crisis	   –	   aid	  to	  Ireland	   21/11/2010	   07/12/2010	   No.	  New	   mechanism	   for	  countries	   in	   financial	  stress	  
28/11/2010	   	   No.	  
Sovereign	   crisis	   –	   aid	  to	  Portugal	   06/04/2011	   17/05/2011	   No.	  Thirty-­‐six-­‐month	  LTROs	   22/12/2011	   	   Yes	  Sovereign	   crisis-­‐	  second	  aid	  for	  Greece	   21/02/2012	   	   No	  Sovereign	   crisis	   –	   aid	  to	  Spain	  and	  Cyprus	   27/06/2012	   NA	   No	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While	   the	   crisis	   moved	   to	   the	   third	   and	   fourth	   stage,	   the	   ECB	   adopted	   asset	  purchase	   schemes	   and	   particular	   rescue	   tools	   for	   sovereigns	  with	   debt	   issues.	  Those	  responses	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  subsection	  regarding	  asset	  purchase.	  	  
The	  Federal	  Reserve	  The	  Term	  Auction	  Facility	  (TAF)	  was	  announced	  December	  12,	  2007	  aiming	  to	  provide	   depository	   institutions	   with	   direct	   liquidity	   in	   order	   to	   suppress	   the	  elevated	   risk	   premium	   in	   term	   lending	   in	   interbank	   market.	   The	   Board	   of	  Governors	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve19	   (Press	  Release,	  12/12/2007)	  commented	  on	  TAF	  as	  
‘(Injecting)	  term	  funds	  through	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  counterparties	  and	  against	  a	  broader	  range	  of	  collateral	  than	  open	  market	  operations,	  this	  facility	  could	  help	   ensure	   that	   liquidity	   provisions	   can	   be	   disseminated	   efficiently	   even	  when	  the	  unsecured	  interbank	  markets	  are	  under	  stress.’	  
The	  TAF	  originally	  offered	  28-­‐day20	   lending	  to	  participants	  subject	  to	  a	  broader	  range	   of	   collateral	   than	   is	   used	   in	   the	   Fed’s	   normal	   standing	   facility	   Discount	  Window.	  The	  Board	  of	  Governors	  sets	  the	  amount	  that	  would	  be	  offered	  via	  TAF	  and	  the	  minimum	  interest	  rate	  accepted	  equals	  the	  OIS	  rate	  corresponding	  to	  the	  term	  of	  the	  loan	  (Taylor	  and	  William,	  2008).	  The	  Fed	  announced	  another	  term,	  84	  days,	  of	  TAF	  loans	  on	  August	  11,	  2008	  but	  the	  size	  of	  84-­‐day	  loan	  $	  25bn	  was	  smaller	   than	   28-­‐day	   loan	   $	   75bn	   (Board	   of	   Governors	   of	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	  System,	  Press	  Release,	  11/08/200821).	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	   http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20071212a.htm	   	  20	   From	  statistics	  that	  are	  published,	  some	  TAF	  loans	  had	  35	  days	  period	  e.g.	  the	  second	  transaction	  on	  December	  27,2012.	  21	   http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080811a.htm	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Table	  2.9	  Liquidity	  Measures	  by	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  during	  the	  Crisis	  
Scheme	   Launch	  Date	   Finish	  Date	   Relevance	  to	  
Interbank	  
Spread	  Term	   Auction	  Facility	  (TAF)	   17/12/2007	   08/03/2010	   Yes.	  Lender	  of	  last	  resort.	  Primary	   Dealer	  Credit	   Facility	  (PDCF)	   17/03/2008	   01/02/2010	   Yes.	  Term	   Securities	  Lending	   Facility	  (TSLF)	   11/03/2008	   01/02/2010	   Yes	  Commercial	  Paper	  Funding	   Facility	  (CPFF)	   07/10/2008	   01/02/2010	   Potentially	   yes	   if	  banks	   bidding	   in	  interbank	   market	  rely	   on	  commercial	   paper	  market	   to	   obtain	  credit.	   	  Asset-­‐Backed	  Commercial	  Paper	  Money	   Market	  Mutual	   Fund	  Liquidity	   Facility	  (AMLF)	  
19/09/2008	   01/02/2010	   Same	  as	  above	  
Money	   Market	  Investor	   Funding	  Facility	  (MMIFF)	   24/11/2008	   30/10/2009	   Potentially	   yes	   if	  those	   beneficial	  special	   purpose	  vehicles	   (SPVs)	  are	   banks	  off-­‐balance	   sheet	  vehicles.	   The	  facility	   would	  reduce	   the	  funding	   stress	   of	  banks.	  Term	  Asset-­‐Backed	  Securities	   Loan	  Facility	  (TALF)	  
25/11/2008	   30/06/2010	   Yes.	  
	  Apart	   from	  a	  general	   liquidity	   shortage,	   there	  were	   some	  credit	  markets	  made	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particularly	  dysfunctional	  by	  the	  crisis.	  It	   is	  important	  for	  central	  banks	  to	  help	  those	  markets	  restore	  their	  functions	  to	  prevent	  the	  wide	  spread	  of	  credit	  panic	  (King,	  2009).	  Despite	  central	  banks	  in	  the	  three	  markets	  have	  all	  taken	  actions	  in	  specific	  segmental	  market,	  only	   facilities	   that	  have	  been	  created	  by	  the	  Fed	   fall	  into	   ‘liquidity	   provision’.	   The	   programs	   that	   BoE	   and	   ECB	   operate	   in	   credit	  markets	   involve	  purchase	  of	  asset	   so	   they	  will	  be	  discussed	   in	   ‘asset-­‐purchase’	  section.	  	  There	   were	   five	   facilities	   in	   total	   that	   were	   created	   by	   the	   Fed	   as	   liquidity	  provision	  to	  specific	  credit	  markets,	  Primary	  Dealer	  Credit	  Facility	  (PDCF),	  Term	  Securities	   Lending	   Facility	   (TSLF),	   Commercial	   Paper	   Funding	   Facility	   (CPFF),	  Commercial	  Paper	  Money	  Market	  Mutual	  Fund	  Liquidity	  Facility	  (AMLF),	  Money	  Market	  Invest	  Funding	  Facility	  (MMIFF)	  and	  Term	  Asset-­‐Backed	  Securities	  Loan	  Facility	  (TALF).	  In	  addition	  to	  easing	  credit	  market,	  these	  facilities	  were	  offered	  to	  wider	  range	  of	  market	  participants	  than	  just	  depository	  institutions.	   	  	  PDCF	   and	   TSLF	   focused	   on	   primary	   dealers.	   Primary	   dealers	   are	   principal	  intermediaries	   that	   operate	   as	   the	   trading	   counterparties	   for	   the	   Fed’s	   open	  market	  operations	  and	  have	  a	  key	  role	  in	  offering	  liquidity	  in	  the	  market	  for	  US	  Treasury	  securities	  (see	  Arnone	  and	  Iden,	  2003).	  Primary	  dealers	  are	  mainly	  big	  financial	  institutions	  e.g.	  investment	  banks	  that	  do	  not	  have	  reserve	  account	  with	  the	   Fed	   so	   they	   can	   neither	   enjoy	   lender-­‐of-­‐last-­‐resort	   function	   through	   the	  discount	   window	   nor	   benefit	   from	   TAF.	   The	   Fed	   had	   lent	   $25bn	   and	   $112bn	  through	  PDCF	  and	  TSLF,	  respectively	  by	  February	  25,	  2009	  at	  subsidized	  rate	  i.e.	  rate	  that	  is	  lower	  than	  market	  rate	  (Baker	  and	  Sherman,	  2009).	   	  	  PDCF	  started	  operation	  on	  March	  17,	  2008	  in	  response	  to	  the	  liquidity	  pressure	  for	  primary	  dealers	  resulting	  from	  frozen	  triparty	  repurchase	  agreement	  market	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(Board	   of	   Governors	   of	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   System,	   2013a)22.	   The	   triparty	  repurchase	   agreement	   is	   a	   repurchase	   transaction	   that	   a	   sale	   of	   securities	  coupled	  with	  an	  agreement	   to	  repurchase	   the	  securities	  at	  a	  pre-­‐set	  price	  on	  a	  future	  date	   (Board	  of	  Governors	  of	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  System,	  2012)23.	  PDCF	  offered	  overnight	  liquidity	  to	  primary	  dealers,	  which	  takes	  similarity	  as	  discount	  window	  facility	  for	  depositary	  institutions.	   	  	  TSLF	   was	   announced	   on	   March	   11,	   2008	   focusing	   on	   promoting	   liquidity	   in	  Treasury	   and	   other	   collateral	   markets	   and	   so	   on	   boosting	   the	   functioning	   of	  financial	  markets	  in	  general	  because	  when	  the	  markets	  for	  the	  collateral	  became	  illiquid,	  primary	  dealers	  had	  increased	  difficulty	  obtaining	  funding	  and	  were	  less	  able	   to	   support	   broader	   markets	   (Board	   of	   Governors	   of	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	  System,	  2013b)24.	  TSLF	  offered	  longer,	  one-­‐month	  lending	  compared	  with	  PDCF.	  Both	  of	  them	  closed	  on	  February	  10,	  2010.	  	  CPFF	   began	   on	   October	   27,	   2008,	   one	   month	   after	   the	   collapse	   of	   Lehman	  Brothers,	   and	   finished	   on	   February	   1,	   2010	   targeting	   the	   three-­‐month	  commercial	   paper	   that	   was	   issued	   by	   US	   firms.	   Operations	   were	   done	   by	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  New	  York.	  CPFF	  facilitated	  issuers	  to	  participate	  in	  term	  lending	  financed	  by	  commercial	  paper	  issuance	  so	  to	  boost	  the	  ability	  of	  financial	  institutions	   to	   extend	   credit	   to	   public	   (Adrian	   et	   al,	   2010).	   A	   month	   later	   on	  September	   22,	   AMLF	   was	   launched	   with	   similar	   purpose	   but	   open	   to	   US	  depository	  institutions	  and	  bank	  holding	  companies.	   	  	  In	   order	   to	   meet	   demand	   for	   credit	   by	   households	   and	   small	   businesses,	   the	  Federal	   Reserve	   Bank	   of	  New	  York	   created	   TALF	   on	  November	   25,	   2008	  with	  size	   of	   $	   200bn	   on	   a	   non-­‐recourse	   basis	   to	   lend	   to	   holders	   of	   certain	   triple	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	   PDCF	  background	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_pdcf.htm	   	  23	   Glossary	  of	  instruments	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_glossary.htm#tripartyrepurchaseagreement	   	  24	   TSLF	  transaction	  data	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_tslf.htm	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A-­‐rated	  asset-­‐backed	  securities	  that	  are	  backed	  by	  newly	  and	  recently	  originated	  household	   and	   small	   business	   loans	   e.g.	   student	   loans,	  motor	   loans	   and	   credit	  cards	  (Board	  of	  Governors	  of	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  System,	  2008)25.	  The	  market	  value	   of	   collateral	   securities	   is	   fully	   considered	   but	   subject	   to	   a	   haircut.	   The	  context	   of	   the	   launch	   of	   the	   TALF	   was	   that	   new	   issuance	   of	   asset-­‐backed	  securities	  shrank	  dramatically	  in	  September	  and	  halting	  in	  October	  and	  the	  risk	  premium	   containing	   in	   AAA-­‐rated	   tranches	   increased	   quickly	   (ibid).	   This	  damaged	   credit	   resources	   fundamentally	   for	   households	   and	   small	   businesses	  since	   asset-­‐backed	   security	   markets	   funded	   a	   substantial	   proportion	   of	   credit	  demand	  in	  the	  past.	  The	  difference	  of	  TALF	  to	  the	  previous	  liquidity	  provisions	  was	   firstly	   the	   term	  of	   funding	   i.e.	   TALF	  offers	  much	   longer	  maturity,	   three	   to	  five	  years	  compared	  with	  TAF,	  for	  example.	  The	  size	  of	  TALF	  is	  also	  much	  bigger.	  It	  starts	  with	  $	  200bn	  with	  expansion	  of	   further	  $	  1	   trillion	   if	  market	  demands	  (Campell	  et	  al,	  2011).	  TALF	  so	  far	  is	  the	  only	  running	  liquidity	  provision	  by	  the	  Fed	  (2013).	   	  	  Moreover,	  according	   to	   the	  Fed	   (2013),	   the	  above	   facilities	   can	  be	  divided	   into	  two	   groups.	   The	   first	   group	   of	   facilities	   aims	   to	   fulfill	   the	   traditional	   role	   of	  central	   banks	   as	   lender	   of	   last	   resort.	   These	   facilities	   involve	   extended	   term	  auctions	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  EMU	  and	  DWF,	  SLS	  and	  ECTR	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  TAF,	  PDCF	  and	  TSLF	  in	  the	  US.	  They	  aimed	  to	  meet	  liquidity	  demand	  in	  the	  financial	  market	  by	  offering	  longer	  terms	  against	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  collaterals.	  The	  second	  group	  of	  facilities	   targeted	  major	  credit	  markets.	  These	  are	  CPFF,	  AMLF	  and	  MMIFF	  and	  TALF	  in	  the	  US.	  Both	  BoE	  and	  ECB	  have	  operations	  in	  specific	  credit	  markets,	  but	  it	  has	  been	  done	  by	  large	  scale	  of	  purchase.	  In	  addition	  to	  those	  facilities,	  central	  banks	   have	   also	   set	   up	   currency	   swap	   agreements	   with	   each	   other	   to	   keep	  liquidity	  demand	  of	  foreign	  currency	  in	  domestic	  markets.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	   TALF	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/talf.htm	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2.2.2.2	  Large-­‐scale	  Purchase	  of	  Assets	  
	  The	   crisis	   intensified	   in	  2009.	  Under	   the	  previous	  provision,	   large	   increases	   in	  banks’	  liquidity	  were	  observed	  on	  their	  balance	  sheets	  whereas	  the	  flow	  of	  credit	  to	   the	   private	   sector	   did	   not	   respond	   accordingly.	   Sharpe	   and	   Watts	   (2013)	  argued	   that	   increased	   liquidity	   in	   the	   banking	   system	   was	   not	   necessarily	  matched	  by	   increased	  credit	   in	  circulation	  because	   there	  are	  other	   factors	   that	  will	  influence	  banks’	  lending	  activity.	  In	  order	  to	  improve	  credit	  conditions	  in	  the	  economy,	   central	   banks	   started	   large-­‐scale	   of	   purchase	   of	   assets	   targeting	   the	  most	  affected	  credit	  markets	  and	   the	  quantitative	  easing	   starts.	   In	   this	   section,	  we	  do	  not	  discuss	   those	  purchases	  under	  different	   regions	  because	   they	   share	  very	   similar	   features	   and	   have	   virtually	   same	   target	   in	   the	   US	   and	   the	   UK.	  However,	  the	  purchase	  of	  covered	  bond	  and	  sovereign	  bonds	  in	  the	  EMU	  takes	  a	  different	  purpose	  and	  objective	  compared	  with	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK.	  It	  aims	  to	  help	  sovereigns	   in	   the	  EMU	  with	   their	  debt	  crisis.	  Also,	   the	  date	  when	   the	  purchase	  started	   is	   outside	   the	   period	   of	   this	   study,	   so	   we	   will	   just	   briefly	   refer	   to	   the	  purchase	  in	  the	  EMU.	  	  The	  Fed	  (2013)26	   described	  quantitative	  easing	  as	   	  	   ‘…	  (T)raditional	  tool	  of	  open	  market	  operations	  to	  support	  the	  functioning	  of	  credit	   markets,	   put	   downward	   pressure	   on	   longer-­‐term	   interest	   rates,	   and	  help	   to	  make	  broader	   financial	  conditions	  more	  accommodative	   through	  the	  purchase	  of	  longer-­‐term	  securities…’	  	  In	  the	  UK,	  the	  phase	  ‘quantitative	  easing’	  was	  formally	  introduced	  on	  March	  05,	  2009	  whereas	  the	  concept	  and	  operation	  to	  purchase	  commercial	  paper	  started	  one	  month	  earlier	  on	  February	  13,	  2009	  through	  Asset	  Purchase	  Facility	  (APF).	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	   http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_crisisresponse.htm	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  27	   Quantitative	  easing	  explained	  http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/pages/qe/default.aspx	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Figure	  2.10	  Stylised	  Transmission	  Channels	  of	  Quantitative	  Easing	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Source:	  Bowdler	  and	  Radia	  (2012,	  p608)	  adapted	  from	  Joyce	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  	  According	   to	   Joyce	   et	   al	   (2011),	   the	   effect	   of	   quantitative	   easing	   to	   stimulate	  spending	  and	  influence	  inflation	  relies	  on	  agents’	  activities	  through	  five	  channels.	  Particularly,	   portfolio	   rebalancing,	   market	   liquidity	   and	   policy	   signaling	   take	  majority	  function	  (Bowdler	  and	  Radia,	  2012),	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2.6.	  The	  other	  two	   are	   confidence	   and	   money	   channels.	   The	   effect	   of	   portfolio	   rebalancing	  channel	   relies	   fundamentally	   on	   the	   imperfect	   substitutability	   of	   assets	   as	  suggested	   by	   Tobin	   (1969)	   and	   Brunner	   and	   Meltzer	   (1972).	   The	   degree	   of	  substitutability	   between	   assets	   can	   be	   influenced	   by	   duration,	   credit	   risk	   and	  liquidity	   (Joyce	  et	  al,	   2011).	  Therefore,	  by	  purchasing	   long-­‐term28	   government	  bond	   from	   the	   private	   sector,	   the	   BoE	   expected	   the	   proceeds	   i.e.	   cash	   will	   be	  used	   to	   purchase	   other	   assets	  which	   are	   substitutes	   to	   long-­‐term	   government	  bond	   –	   rebalancing	   their	   portfolio	   until	   reaching	   an	   accepted	   level	   of	   return	  (Joyce	  et	  al,	  2011).	  For	  example,	  the	  Fed	  under	  their	  large-­‐scale	  asset	  purchases	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	   Woodford	  (2012)	  emphasized	  that	  purchase	  of	  short-­‐term	  gilt	  is	  equivalent	  to	  open	  market	  operation.	  However,	  the	  assets	  that	  have	  been	  purchased	  under	  quantitative	  easing	  facilities	  are	  mainly	  long-­‐term	  gilts.	  This	  made	  quantitative	  easing	  distinctive	  between	  normal	  open	  market	  operations.	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(LSAPs)	  bought	  $600bn	  mortgage-­‐back	  securities	  and	  agency	  debt	  because	  they	  are	   less	  similar	   to	  money	  (Foerster	  and	  Cao,	  2013)	  so	   that	   investors	  will	   likely	  get	  rid	  of	  money	  quickly	  by	  purchasing	  assets	  with	  similar	  maturity	  and	  return	  such	   as	   corporate	   bonds	   (Bowdler	   and	  Radia,	   2012).	  Moreover,	   pension	   funds	  are	  likely	  to	  hold	  long-­‐term	  assets	  to	  match	  maturity	  of	  their	  liabilities.	  The	  swap	  of	   gilts	   for	   cash	   is	  unfavorable	   to	   the	  maturity	   structure,	   so	   they	  will	   probably	  seek	  for	  other	  assets	  to	  replace	  cash	  on	  their	  balance	  sheet	  (Bowdler	  and	  Radia,	  2012).	  Given	  the	  restricted	  supply	  of	  gilts	  as	  a	  result	  of	  quantitative	  easing,	  the	  price	  increases	  and	  yield	  curve	  flattens.	  Moreover,	  since	  policy	  signaling	  channel	  aims	   to	   influence	   agents’	   expectation	   of	   policy	   rate,	   portfolio	   balance	   effects	  work	  by	  reducing	  the	  spreads	  of	  longer-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  over	  expected	  policy	  rates	  (term	  premia)	  and	  risk	  premia	  –	  the	  mark	  up	  of	  return	  on	  risky	  assets	  to	  risk	  free	  assets	  (Joyce	  et	  al,	  2011).	  	  Moreover,	   the	   large-­‐scale	   purchase	   of	   long-­‐term	   assets	   is	   likely	   to	   reduce	  duration	   on	   long-­‐term	   assets	   i.e.	   future	   movements	   in	   interest	   rates.	   Hence,	  investors	  would	  require	  lower	  risk	  premia	  reducing	  the	  pressure	  on	  longer-­‐term	  real	   interest	   rates	   (Bowdler	   and	   Radia,	   2012).	   They	   argued	   that	   the	  characteristic	   of	   investors’	   portfolios	   is	   altered,	   as	   a	   consequence.	   Therefore,	  investors	   would	   probably	   rebalance	   their	   portfolio	   by	   investing	   in	   riskier	   but	  cheaper	   assets	   e.g.	   corporate	   bonds	   or	   foreign	   government	   bonds	   etc.	   The	  process	  will	  be	  repeated	  until	  every	  investor	  holds	  satisfied	  portfolio	  (Joyce	  et	  al,	  2011)	  	  The	   effect	   of	   market	   liquidity	   premia	   can	   be	   explained	   by	   the	   example	   of	  commercial	   paper	   market.	   Commercial	   paper	   markets	   were	   severely	   affected	  during	   the	   crisis.	   Investors	  were	   concerned	  about	  market	   liquidity	   i.e.	   ease	   for	  them	   to	   sell	   and	   the	   amount	   of	   discount	   needed	   to	   be	   added	   on	  market	   price	  (Benford	  et	  al,	  2009;	  Bowdler	  and	  Radia,	  2012).	  That	  is,	  increased	  liquidity	  risk	  premia	  were	  demanded.	  This	  would	  push	  up	  the	  price	   for	  companies	   to	  obtain	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finance	   in	   capital	   market	   (Bendford	   et	   al,	   2009).	   The	   purchase	   of	   commercial	  paper	   that	   BoE	   and	   the	   Fed	   conducted	  would	   provide	   confidence	   to	   investors	  that	  their	  holding	  assets	  can	  be	  easily	  sold	  as	  there	  is	  a	  ready	  buyer	  –	  the	  central	  bank.	  Hence,	   lower	   risk	  premia	  would	  be	   required.	  Consequently,	   there	  should	  be	  more	   investors	   entering	   the	  market	   and	   the	   amount	   of	   capital	   available	   to	  companies	  should	  increase	  (Benford	  et	  al,	  2009),	  accordingly.	   	  	  Moreover,	  Joyce	  et	  al	  (2011)	  described	  the	  liquidity	  premia	  effects	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  asset	  price.	  Appreciation	  of	  asset	  prices	  is	  expected	  when	  central	  banks	  conduct	  large	  scale	  purchases	  as	  well	  as	  the	  increase	  of	  trading	  activities	  of	  other	  investors	  due	  to	  the	  asset	  purchase	  of	  central	  banks.	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  will	  lower	  premia	   for	   illiquidity.	   They	   also	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   transmission	   effect	   of	  quantitative	   easing	   should	   exist	   only	  when	   purchase	   is	   running.	   However,	   the	  reduction	   of	   illiquidity	   should	   be	   reduced	   permanently	   by	   increased	   trading	  activities	   in	   the	   market.	   However,	   they	   also	   pointed	   out	   the	   effect	   to	   reduce	  liquidity	  premia	  was	  not	  very	  important	  as	  expected	  by	  BoE	  in	  the	  gilt	  purchase.	  The	  effect	  would	  be	  more	  important	  in	  the	  design	  of	  purchases	  of	  private	  sector	  assets.	  	  ECB	  has	  also	  run	  an	  asset	  purchase	  programme	  during	  the	  crisis.	  However,	  as	  we	  mentioned	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  chapter,	  those	  purchases	  are	  unlikely	  to	  fit	  the	  term	   large-­‐scale	   purchase	   of	   asset	   i.e.	   quantitative	   easing	   because	   the	   size	   of	  purchase	   is	  very	  small	  compared	  with	  LTROs	  as	  well	  as	  size	  of	  purchase	   in	  the	  UK	   and	   the	   US.	   Moreover,	   the	   covered	   bond	   market	   is	   not	   as	   functional	   as	  government	   bond	   market	   because	   the	   size	   is	   smaller	   and	   the	   acceptance	   as	  collateral	   is	   limited	   when	   borrowing	   securely.	   We	   therefore	   discuss	   the	   two	  programmes,	  covered	  bond	  purchase	  programme	  and	  security	  market	  purchases	  only	  to	  keep	  the	  information	  complete.	  	  The	   ECB	   operated	   a	   Covered	  Bond	  Purchase	   Programme	   (CBPP)	   from	   July	   06,	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2009,	  after	  the	  stage	  of	  temporary	  improvements	  in	  financial	  market	  conditions.	  CBPP	  finished	  in	  June	  2010	  and	  by	  the	  end	  involved	  €60bn	  three-­‐	  to	  seven-­‐year	  maturity	  euro-­‐denominated	  covered	  bonds	  with	  27%	  in	  the	  primary	  market	  and	  73%	   in	   the	   secondary	  market.	  The	  Beirne	  et	   al	   (2011)	  noted	   that	   a	   significant	  increase	  in	  number	  of	  issuers	  and	  outstanding	  amounts	  was	  experienced	  in	  some	  national	  markets,	  despite	  the	  amount	  was	  relatively	  small.	  The	  second	  round	  of	  covered	  bond	  purchase	  programme	  (CBPP2)	  was	  launched	  in	  November	  2011.	   	  	  In	   early	   2010,	   the	   EMU	   moved	   to	   the	   last	   stage	   –	   the	   sovereign	   debt	   crisis	  starting	  with	  Greece	  and	  spreading	  to	  Ireland,	  Portugal,	  Spain	  and	  Italy	  later	  on.	  The	  prices	  of	  government	  bonds	  for	  the	  stressed	  countries	  dropped	  significantly	  and	  yields	  moved	  upward,	  signaling	  negative	  market	  expectation.	  For	  example,	  in	   early	   2010,	   the	   spread	   between	   Greek	   bonds	   to	   German	   bonds	   peaked	   at	  around	   ten	  percent	  due	   to	   the	   increased	  concern	  of	   the	  sustainability	  of	  public	  finances	   in	  view	  of	   rising	  government	  deficits	  and	  debt	   (ibid).	   Some	  secondary	  markets	   for	   government	   bonds	   started	   to	   dry	   up	   from	   May	   2010	   because	  sovereigns	  cannot	  afford	  the	  required	  high	  return	  (Cour-­‐Thimann	  and	  Winkler,	  2012).	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  ECB	  established	  the	  Security	  Markets	  Programme	  (SMP)	   to	  support	  market	   liquidity	  and	   the	   transmission	  mechanism.	  Since	  May	  10,	  2010	  CBPP	  was	  conducted	  under	  SMP.	  As	  discussed	  before,	  unlike	   the	  BoE	  and	  the	  Fed,	  the	  ECB	  had	  limited	  power	  to	  purchase	  government	  bonds.	  The	  ECB	  conducted	   purchase	   of	   government	   bonds	   in	   secondary	   markets	   in	   line	   with	  provisions	  of	  the	  Treaty	  on	  the	  Functioning	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (Beirne	  et	  al,	  2011).	   These	   purchases	   are	   fully	   sterilized	   by	   conducting	   liquidity-­‐absorbing	  operations	  (ECB,	  2010).	   	  	  On	  August	  02,	  2012,	  the	  ECB	  announced	  Outright	  Monetary	  Transactions	  (OMT)	  to	   replace	   SMP.	   Transactions	   under	   OMT	   focus	   on	   the	   shorter	   part	   of	   one	   to	  three-­‐year	   yield	   curve	   of	   sovereign	   bonds.	   Given	   the	   credit	   and	   liquidity	   risks	  that	   have	   been	   produced	   by	   the	   crisis	   as	   mentioned	   above,	   the	   EMU	   faces	   a	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unique	  risk	  –	  redenomination	  risk	  particularly	  in	  sovereign	  bond	  market	  (Cœuré,	  2013).	  Cœuré	  (2013,	  p3)	  stated	  that	  redenomination	  risk	  rises	  when	  ‘investors	  perceived	   the	   monetary	   union	   as	   having	   turned	   from	   a	   single	   currency	  area	   into	   a	   fixed	   nominal	   exchange	   rate	   system	   cursed	  with	   the	   classic	   “peso	  problem”’.	  The	  example	  of	  redenomination	  risk	  is	  the	  spread	  of	  sovereign	  bond.	  The	  spread	  is	  wider	  when	  there	  is	  more	  redenomination	  risk,	  given	  all	  else	  being	  held	  constantly.	  For	  instance,	  the	  spread	  between	  Spanish	  and	  Germany	  ten-­‐year	  government	   bonds	   increased	   by	   2.5	   percent	   in	   July	   2012	   compared	   with	   one	  year	  before.	  Therefore,	  Cœuré	  (2013,	  p6)29	   stated	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  OMT	  is	  to	  	  ‘Eliminate	   the	   unwarranted	   and	   self-­‐reinforcing	   fears	   of	   a	   euro	   area	   break-­‐up	  that	  have	  undermined	   (ECB’s	   ability)	   to	   effectively	   conduct	  monetary	  policy	   in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  price	  stability.’	  	  It	   shows	   that	   the	   aim	  of	  OMTs	   is	   consistent	  with	  ECB’s	  previous	  non-­‐standard	  measures	  –	  maintain	  soundness	  of	  transmission	  mechanism	  of	  monetary	  policy.	  OMT	   will	   fulfill	   the	   purpose	   by	   eliminate	   fears	   of	   disasters	   and	   remove	  denomination	  risk	  from	  market	  by	  purchase	  of	  government	  bonds	  on	  secondary	  markets.	  The	  difference	  between	  SMP	  and	  OMT	  is	  that	  OMT	  is	  strict	  and	  effective	  conditionality	   attached	   to	   an	   appropriate	   EFSF/ESM	   programme	   in	   order	   to	  preserve	   the	   primacy	   of	   the	   ECB’s	   price	   stability	   mandate	   (European	   Central	  Bank,	   2013)30.	   Moreover,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   retain	   the	   incentive	   for	   national	  governments	   to	   operate	   required	   fiscal	   adjustments	   and	   structural	   reforms.	  Another	  difference	   is	   that	  OMTs	  are	  unlimited	  ex	  ante.	   The	  ECB	  will	  withdraw	  the	   programme	   once	   they	   believe	   the	   objectives	   have	   been	   achieved	   or	   when	  there	  is	  a	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	  a	  programme.	  The	  latter	  provides	  incentive	  for	  nations	  to	  keep	  their	  fiscal	  policy	  in	  line	  with	  monetary	  union’s	  monetary	  stance.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	   Speech	  by	  Benoît	  Cœuré,	  “The	  ECB	  and	  its	  OMT	  programme”,	  2	  September	  2013	  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130902.en.html	   	  30	   Monetary	  Policy	  Slide	  10	  http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/educational/facts/monpol/html/mp_011.en.html	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  By	  now,	  we	  have	  discussed	  the	  design	  and	  purpose	  of	  unconventional	  monetary	  policies	  operated	  by	  BoE,	  the	  Fed	  and	  ECB.	   	   In	  the	  next	  section,	  comparison	  of	  aims	  and	  effects	  between	  the	  three	  markets	  is	  carried	  out.	   	  	  
2.3 Comparison between Unconventional Policy in the UK, the US 
and The EMU 
 As	  we	   have	   shown,	   the	   immediate	   difference	   between	   ECB’s	   action	   and	   BoE’s	  and	   the	   Fed’s	   is	   the	   way	   they	   name	   their	   policies.	   The	   ECB	   named	   those	  unconventional	   policies	   as	   non-­‐standard	  measures	   under	   their	   Enhance	   Credit	  Support	   (ECS)	  whereas	  both	  BoE	  and	   the	  Fed	  were	  more	  aggressively	   labeling	  the	  policies	  as	  quantitative	  easing.	  Indeed,	  the	  ECB	  has	  limited	  power	  to	  conduct	  large-­‐scale	  purchases	  compared	  with	  the	  BoE	  and	  the	  Fed	  due	  to	  its	  institutional	  set	  up.	  Moreover,	  the	  purpose	  of	  policies	  differs	  between	  the	  three	  central	  banks.	  As	  mentioned	   in	  ECB	  October	  Monthly	  Bulletin	   (2010,	  p62),	  ECS	  aims	  to	   fix	   the	  broken	   transmission	   mechanism	   in	   the	   EMU.	   Quantitative	   easing	   in	   the	   UK	  focuses	   on	   providing	   liquidity	   directly	   into	   the	   economy	   in	   order	   to	   boost	  nominal	  demand	  (Joyce	  et	  al,	  2011)	  so	  it	  is	  in	  the	  US.	   	  	  Apparently,	   the	   purpose	   of	   those	   liquidity	   provisions	   was	   to	   offer	   liquidity	   to	  financial	  institutions	  by	  lending	  longer-­‐term	  liquid	  assets	  and	  to	  reduce	  liquidity	  premia	   and	   concern	   in	   the	  money	  market	   so	   that	   the	   flow	   of	   funds	   can	   reach	  ultimate	  borrowers	  in	  the	  general	  economy.	  In	  the	  UK,	  the	  representative	  of	  such	  policies	   is	   Special	   Liquidity	   Scheme	   (SLS).	   In	   the	   EMU,	   it	   is	   longer-­‐term	  refinancing	   operations	   (LTROs).	   In	   the	   US,	   there	   were	   in	   total	   five	   liquidity	  provision	   facilities	   running	   since	   the	   advent	   of	   crisis	   and	   it	  was	  hard	   to	   find	   a	  representative	  since	  the	  target	  and	  purpose	  between	  them	  was	  different.	  Given	  the	   important	   role	   of	   interbank	  market	   in	  monetary	   transmission	  mechanism,	  the	   central	   banks	   reacted	   immediately	   after	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   crisis	   by	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offering	   term	   lending	   to	   banks	  with	   extended	   collateral	   and	   term	   to	   fulfill	   the	  role	   of	   lender-­‐of-­‐last-­‐resort.	   For	   example,	   the	   Fed	   had	   launched	   TAF	   in	  December	   2007	   offering	   28-­‐day	   and	  84-­‐day	   funds.	   ECB	   announced	   to	  meet	   all	  banks	  liquidity	  at	  the	  first	  instance	  when	  the	  crisis	  explored	  and	  offered	  LTROs	  on	  March	  28,	  2008.	  The	  BoE	  scheduled	  four	  term	  auctions	  for	  banks	  right	  after	  the	  spread	  on	  three-­‐month	  LIBOR	  and	  three-­‐month	  OIS	  shot	  up	  on	  August	  2007,	  despite	   no	   take	   up	   for	   the	   four	   auctions.	   Later	   on,	   the	   BoE	   established	   SLS	   to	  supply	   large	   scale	   of	   liquidity	   to	   banks	   by	   allowing	   them	   to	   temporarily	   swap	  quality	  but	  illiquid	  assets	  for	  Treasury	  Bills.	   	  	  However,	  apart	  from	  liquidity	  provision	  to	  banks,	  the	  eligible	  institutions	  in	  the	  US	  were	  broader	  than	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  EMU	  because	  the	  Fed	  had	  designed	  different	  facilities	   to	   target	   primary	   dealers	   and	   different	   stressed	   credit	   market.	  Especially	   in	   the	   EMU,	   the	   ECB’s	   policies	   showed	   a	   great	   favor	   to	   the	   banking	  industry.	   The	   reason	   for	   the	   deviation	   of	   policy	   focus	   was	   attributed	   to	   the	  different	  financial	  structure	  in	  the	  US.	  According	  to	  statistics	  from	  Eurostat,	  ECB	  and	   the	   Fed	   by	   the	   first	   quarter	   of	   2012,	   nearly	   80	   percent	   of	   funding	   for	  corporate	  sector	  i.e.	  non-­‐financial	  institutions	  in	  the	  euro	  area	  fulfilled	  by	  banks	  whereas	   only	   about	   40	   percent	   of	   funding	   is	   provided	   by	   banks	   in	   the	   US.	  Therefore,	   the	   ECB	   excessively	   focused	   on	   banking	   industry	   in	   their	  non-­‐standard	  measures	  (European	  Central	  Bank,	  Monthly	  Bulletin,	  2010,	  October	  and	  Cour-­‐Thimann	  and	  Winkler,	  2012).	   	  	  Furthermore,	   the	   large-­‐scale	   purchase	   of	   financial	   instruments	   operates	   also	  differently	  in	  the	  EMU	  compared	  with	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US.	  The	  asset	  purchase	  in	  the	   EMU	   has	   been	   operated	   through	   SMP.	   As	   mentioned,	   SMP	   focuses	   on	  stabilizing	  malfunctioning	  of	  securities	  market	  as	  a	  result	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  whereas	  the	  purpose	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  is	  to	  go	  around	  banking	  system	  injecting	  liquidity	  directly	  to	  investors	  and	  economy,	  thus,	  the	  action	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  is	  referred	   as	   quantitative	   easing.	   Eser	   and	   Schwaab	   (2013)	   argued	   that	   SMP	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differs	  from	  quantitative	  easing	  in	  three	  ways.	  Firstly,	  the	  effect	  of	  SMP	  will	  have	  little	  impact	  on	  private	  sector	  demand	  because	  the	  purchases	  focused	  on	  easing	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  and	  the	  markets	   that	  had	  been	  affected.	  Secondly,	   the	  process	   of	   purchase	   of	   SMP	   e.g.	   total	   amount,	   duration	   of	   the	   program	   and	  targeted	  securities	  was	  not	  as	  transparent	  as	  in	  quantitative	  easing	  and	  LSAP	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  in	  the	  US,	  respectively	  because	  it	  contains	  resemble	  foreign	  exchange	  intervention.	   Thirdly,	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   SMP	   was	   subject	   to	   significant	  controversy	   within	   the	   Eurosystem.	   This	   might	   be	   due	   to	   the	   institutional	  features	  of	  monetary	  union.	  Each	  member	   country	  will	   have	   its	  own	  preferred	  policy,	   which	   may	   not	   be	   consistent	   with	   such	   large-­‐scale	   of	   purchase	   of	  sovereign	  debts.	  Foreseeably,	  the	  size	  of	  SMP	  should	  be	  smaller	  compared	  with	  quantitative	  easing	  and	  LSAP	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US,	  respectively.	  By	  early	  2012,	  the	  amount	  acquired	  under	  SMP	  was	  €220bn	  (Eser	  and	  Schwaab,	  2013).	  In	  the	  UK,	  BoE	  announced	   total	   accumulated	  amount	  £	  275bn	  by	  November	  2011.	   In	  the	  US,	  the	  Fed	  announced	  total	  $	  2,650bn	  purchase	  by	  September	  2011.	   	  	  Moreover,	   both	   the	   BoE	   and	   the	   Fed	   had	   purchased	   wider	   assets	   rather	   than	  government	  bonds.	   For	   example,	  APF	   started	  with	   commercial	  paper	  purchase	  and	   the	   first	   round	   of	   LSAP	   announced	   $600bn	   purchase	   in	   mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	   and	   agency	   debts	   and	   the	   Fed’s	   liquidity	   provision	   tackled	   the	  commercial	  paper	  market.	  By	  contrast,	  apart	  from	  covered	  bond,	  which	  is	  a	  close	  substitute	   to	   government	   bonds	   in	   the	   EMU,	   ECB	   did	   not	   purchase	   any	   assets	  other	  than	  sovereign	  bonds.	  	  Despite	  central	  banks	  holding	  different	  views	  of	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy,	  one	  of	  the	  fundamentals	  of	  those	  policies	   is	  to	  temporarily	   increase	  liquidity	  to	  the	   banking	   system	   to	   keep	   stability	   of	   interbank	   lending.	   The	   financial	   crisis	  raised	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  premia,	  which	  are	  both	  tackled	  by	  those	  policies,	  as	  central	  banks	  suggested.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  we	  will	  review	  empirical	  works	  regarding	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   those	   policies	   to	   achieve	   their	   objectives,	  
	   63	  
respectively.	  	   	  
	   64	  
Chapter 3 Empirical Literature Review of Impact of 
Unconventional Policy Measures 	  
 In	  Chapter	  2,	  we	  reviewed	  the	  unconventional	  monetary	  policies	  that	  have	  been	  implemented	  by	  the	  BoE,	  the	  Fed	  and	  the	  ECB.	  Given	  that	  the	  interest	  rate	  as	  the	  primary	  instrument	  of	  monetary	  policy	  had	  nearly	  reached	  the	  zero	  lower	  bound,	  any	  further	  monetary	  stimulus	  would	  be	  limited	  because	  holding	  cash	  becomes	  a	  close	  alternative	  for	  bank	  deposits	  resulting	  in	  draining	  bank	  deposit	  as	  well	  as	  credit	   supply	   (Meier,	  2009	  and	  Mortimer-­‐Lee,	  2012).	   In	  addition,	   the	  widening	  spread	  between	  LIBOR	  and	  OIS	  weakened	   central	   banks’	   power	   to	  manipulate	  market	   rates	   anyway.	   That	   is,	   monetary	   policy	   fails	   to	   transmit	   through	   its	  interest	  rate	  channel	  during	  the	  crisis.	  Moreover,	  reducing	  and	  keeping	  interest	  rate	  at	  as	   low	  boundary	  as	  possible	  would	  cut	  down	  banks	  profit	   (because	   the	  spread	   between	   interest	   rates	   on	   banks’	   assets	   and	   banks’	   liabilities	   is	  narrowed).	   If	   monetary	   conditions	   still	   remain	   unfavorable	   in	   these	  circumstances,	   central	   banks	   are	   bound	   to	   consider	   using	   unconventional	  monetary	  policy	  tools	  (Mortimer-­‐Lee,	  2012).	  	  Meier	   (2009)	   argues	   that	   unconventional	   monetary	   policy	   can	   work	   in	   three	  ways.	   The	   first	   option	   is	   to	   influence	   expectations	   of	  market	   participants.	   This	  might	  be	  called	  the	  ‘signaling’	  effect.	  Central	  banks	  can	  form	  agent’s	  expectation	  of	  low	  interest	  rate	  in	  the	  future	  by	  making	  announcements	  backed	  by	  concrete	  policy	  action.	  For	  example,	  the	  Fed	  announced	  it	  would	  keep	  interest	  rate	  low	  for	  at	   least	  two	  more	  years	   in	   June	  28,	  2011	  (Reuters,	  2011).	   Indeed,	   the	  Fed	  fund	  rate	  was	   still	   low	   at	   less	   than	   one	   percent	   in	   the	   spring	   of	   2014.	   The	   effect	   of	  these	  announcements	  with	  commitment	  has	  been	  studied.	  For	  an	  earlier	  period,	  Bernanke	  et	  al	  (2004)	  using	  event	  analysis	  and	  an	  arbitrage-­‐free	  term	  structure	  model	   find	   that	   the	   Fed’s	   statements	   have	   had	   significant	   effect	   on	   market	  expectation	  of	  future	  policy	  rates.	  Furthermore,	  Biefang-­‐Frisancho	  Mariscal	  and	  Howells	   (2010)	   used	   an	   exponential	   GARCH	   model	   to	   show	   that	   Fed	  announcements	   affected	   both	   interest	   rate	   expectations	   and	   the	   volatility	   of	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actual	  short-­‐rates.	  	  The	  second	  way	  is	  described	  as	  fixed-­‐rate	  refinancing	  operations	  with	  extended	  maturity.	   This	   is	   a	   step	   further	   from	   the	   first	   option	   and	   is	   derived	   from	   the	  lender-­‐of-­‐last-­‐resort	   function	   of	   central	   banks.	   The	   ECB’s	   policy	   responses	  during	   the	   crisis	   provide	   a	   good	   example	   of	   this	   approach.	   The	   ECB	   offered	  fixed-­‐rate	   full	   allotment	   subject	   to	   collateral	   to	  banks	   in	   the	   euro	  area	   and	   the	  LTROs.	   The	   former	   aims	   to	  meet	   banks’	   liquidity	   requirement	   unlimited	   at	   its	  main	   refinancing	   rate	   and	   the	   latter	   extends	   the	   maturity	   of	   long-­‐term	   repo	  operations	   to	   a	   maximum	   of	   three	   years	   (Cour-­‐Thimann	   and	   Winkler,	   2012).	  Meier	   (2009)	   states	   that	   the	   likely	   outcome	   of	   such	   policies	   is	   to	   ease	   term	  premia	  in	  the	  interbank	  market	  so	  as	  to	  lower	  the	  interbank	  market	  yield	  curve.	  The	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  approach	  arises	  when	  the	  central	  bank	  breaks	  the	  commitment	  to	  a	  low	  interest	  rate	  in	  the	  first	  option	  because	  they	  will	  pay	  higher	  interest	  rate	  on	  its	  short-­‐term	  liabilities	  than	  they	  earn	  on	  longer-­‐term	  assets	  i.e.	  the	  lending	  made	  to	  banks.	  But,	  this	  risk	  in	  turn	  can	  convince	  banks	  of	  the	  central	  bank’s	  commitment	  to	  keep	  interest	  rates	  low	  at	  long-­‐term	  horizons.	  Orphanides	  (2004)	  warns	   that	   central	   banks	   should	   not	   extend	   lending	   to	   truly	   long-­‐term	  horizons	  due	  to	  unforeseen	  market	  movements	  and	  the	  exit	  strategy	  should	  be	  carefully	  considered	  prior	  to	  pursuing	  such	  a	  policy.	  	  The	   third	   possible	   option	   is	   asset	   purchase,	   which	   is	   normally	   referred	   as	  quantitative	   easing	   (QE).	   The	   assets	   being	   purchased	   are	   normally	   long-­‐term	  government	   bonds,	   although	   the	   Fed	   purchased	   some	   Treasury	   Bills	   at	   the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis.	  QE	  is	  financed	  by	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  monetary	  base,	  so	  the	  direct	  result	  is	  to	  increase	  the	  narrow	  money	  supply.	  The	  focus	  of	  QE	  moves	  beyond	   the	   interbank	  market	   to	   the	   general	   private	   sector	   since	   it	   affects	   the	  price	   and	   yields	   on	   government	   bonds	   for	   which	   there	   are	   numerous	   close	  substitutes.	   During	   the	   crisis,	   the	   ECB	   has	   not	   engaged	   in	   asset	   purchase	   as	  heavily	   as	   the	   other	   two	   central	   banks	   in	   our	   study.	   The	   reasons	   summarized	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from	   Cour-­‐Thimann	   and	  Winkler	   (2012)	   and	   Mortimer-­‐Lee	   (2012)	   are	   1)	   the	  institutional	  set-­‐up	  of	  ECB	  constrains	  its	  ability	  to	  purchase	  government	  bonds;	  312)	   bank	   finance	   takes	   80%	   of	   lending	   from	   private	   sector	   so	   it	   seems	  unnecessary	   for	   ECB	   to	   go	   beyond	   the	   interbank	  market;	   3)	   the	   fear	   of	  moral	  hazard	   because	   sovereigns	   may	   engage	   less	   in	   addressing	   fiscal	   deficits,	   debt	  levels	  and	  structural	  reform	  issues32.	   	  	  Moreover,	  Bernanke	  (2009)	  classifies	  the	  unconventional	  responses	  from	  central	  banks	  into	  two	  broad	  groups,	  liquidity	  provision	  and	  asset	  purchase.	  Indeed,	  the	  first	  two	  options	  advocated	  by	  Meier	  (2009)	  mainly	  focus	  on	  restoring	  liquidity	  in	  interbank	  markets	  and	  the	  last	  option	  is	  asset	  purchase.	  	  Not	   surprisingly,	   there	   is	   a	   substantial	   literature	   investigating	   the	   effect	   of	  central	  banks’	  unconventional	  monetary	  stimulus	  in	  the	  recent	  crisis.	  Martin	  and	  Milas	  (2012)	  reviewed	  some	  remarkable	  empirical	  works	  that	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  quantitative	  easing	  on	  government	  bond	  rate,	  other	  asset	  prices	  and	  the	  real	  economy.	   For	   example,	   they	   report	   that	   Gagnon	   et	   al	   (2011),	   Glick	   and	   Leduc	  (2011),	   Krishnamurthy	   and	   Vissing-­‐Jorgensen	   (2011),	   and	   Meaning	   and	   Zhu	  (2011),	  used	  event	   study	  analysis	   to	   find	   that	  QE	  successfully	  and	  significantly	  reduced	   ten-­‐year	   US	   government	   bond	   rates	   by	   80	   to	   107	   basis	   points.33	   But,	  there	  was	   little	  evidence	  of	   impact	  of	  QE	  on	  money	  market	   rates	  and	  on	  other	  financial	  assets	  (see	  Neely,	  2011).	  Baumeister	  and	  Benati	  (2010)	  using	  quarterly	  US	  and	  UK	  data	  in	  a	  VAR	  model	  found	  that	  QE	  saved	  both	  economies	  from	  much	  worse	  outcomes	  during	  late	  2008	  and	  2009.	   	  	  Martin	   and	  Milas	   (2012)	  provided	   a	   useful	   summary	  of	   empirical	  work	  on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	   See	  discussion	  in	  Chapter	  2.2.1	  for	  details.	  32	   Purchase	  of	  government	  bond	  will	  lower	  long-­‐term	  yield	  curve	  so	  reducing	  the	  interest	  payment	  on	  new	  issues	  of	  government	  debt.	   	  33	   Gagnon	  et	  al	  (2011)	  estimated	  91	  basis	  point	  decrease.	  Glick	  and	  Leduc	  (2011)	  and	  Krishnamurthy	  found	  100	  basis	  point	  and	  Vissing-­‐Jorgensen	  (2011)	  found	  around	  107	  basis	  point	  reduction	  and	  Meaning	  and	  Zhu	  (2011)	  found	  80	  basis	  point	  reduction	  on	  ten-­‐year	  bond	  and	  85	  basis	  point	  drop	  on	  five-­‐year	  bond.	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impact	  of	  QE,	  but	  QE	  is	  only	  part	  of	  unconventional	  monetary	  policies	  during	  the	  crisis.	   There	   are	   still	   liquidity	   provisions	   that	   operated	   prior	   to	  QE.	  Moreover,	  when	  we	  use	   the	   phrase	   ‘QE’,	   the	  ECB’s	   ECS	   tends	   to	   be	   excluded	  because	   the	  focus	   of	   ECS	   is	   largely	   on	   providing	   liquidity	   to	   the	   banking	   system	   and	   the	  amount	   of	   asset	   purchase	   of	   covered	   bonds	   and	   sovereign	   bonds	   is	   relatively	  small.	   Indeed,	   Martin	   and	   Milas	   did	   not	   include	   the	   literature	   on	   the	   ECB’s	  response	   in	   their	   review.	   Moreover,	   they	   argued	   that	   QE	   should	   have	  insignificant	   impact	   on	  money	  market	   spreads,	  which	   is	   just	   the	   question	   that	  our	   study	   tries	   to	   address.	   If	   QE	   does	   not	   have	   a	   direct	   significant	   impact	   on	  money	  market	  spreads,	  the	  question	  will	  shift	  to	  how	  else	  can	  central	  banks	  fix	  the	  break	   in	  communication	  between	  official	   rate	  and	  market	  rate	  as	  shown	   in	  Chapter	   2	   to	   restore	   the	   transmission	   mechanism	   of	   monetary	   policy.	  Fortunately,	  our	  study	  in	  Chapter	  5	  shows	  that	  QE	  does	  significantly	  reduce	  the	  risk	  premia	  in	  interbank	  markets	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  EMU.	  	  Therefore,	   this	   chapter	   looks	   next	   at	   the	   limited	   empirical	   literature	   that	  investigates	   interest	   rate	   behavior	   in	   interbank	   markets	   during	   the	   crisis.	   	  Those	  works	  tend	  to	  fall	   into	  two	  broad	  groups.	  The	  first	  group	  identifies	   itself	  with	  variation	  of	  data	  e.g.	  Michaud	  and	  Upper	  (2008)	  applied	  trading	  volume	  in	  the	   money	   market	   from	   eMid	   that	   is	   a	   system	   that	   is	   not	   widely	   available	   to	  researchers	  and	  innovative	  measure	  of	  credit/liquidity	  risks.	  Their	  results	  draw	  on	  how	  credit	  risk	  and/or	  liquidity	  risk	  contained	  in	  risk	  premia	  shift	  during	  the	  crisis	   in	   interbank	   markets	   without	   saying	   much	   about	   the	   impact	   on	   policy.	  They	   provide	   preliminary	   evidence	   to	   evaluate	   efficacy	   of	   unconventional	  monetary	  policy	  to	   influence	  money	  market.	  The	  second	  group	  investigates	  the	  communication	  between	   central	   banks’	   interventions	   and	   interbank	  market	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  change	  in	  risk	  premia.	  The	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  proceeds	  as	  follow.	  Firstly,	   section	  3.1	  reviews	  work	  on	   the	  movement	  of	   interbank	  market	  before	   the	   interventions.	   Then,	   section	   3.2	   looks	   at	   literatures	   investigating	  impact	  of	  interventions	  in	  interbank	  market.	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3.1 The behavior of risk premia components during the crisis 
 We	   showed	   in	   Chapter	   2	   that	   the	   crisis	   started	   with	   an	   obvious	   and	   sudden	  increased	   LIBOR	   rate.	   The	   obvious	   interpretation	   was	   the	   increased	   risk	  premium	  in	  interbank	  markets.	  Sarkar	  (2009)	  points	  out	  that	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  prevailing	  risk	  environment	  may	  facilitate	  the	  evaluation	  of	  effectiveness	  of	   central	   banks’	   unconventional	   policies.	   BoE	   (2007)	   firstly	   attempted	   to	  decompose	   the	   LIBOR	   spread	   into	   credit	   risk	   and	   non-­‐credit	   risk	   premia.	   The	  LIBOR	   spread	   refers	   to	   the	   difference	   between	   LIBOR	   rate	   and	   the	   rate	   on	  overnight	  index	  swaps	  (OIS),	  which	  is	  used	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  the	  risk-­‐free	  rate.	   	  	  According	   to	  Hull	   and	  White	   (2013)	   and	   Sengupta	   and	  Tam	   (2008),	  Overnight	  Index	   Swaps	   (OIS)	   are	   interest	   rate	   swaps	   that	   entitle	   a	   bank	   to	   receive	   fixed	  interest	  rate	  from	  the	  counter	  party	  i.e.	  OIS	  rate	  and	  in	  exchange,	  the	  other	  bank	  in	  the	  swap	  is	  getting	  a	  floating	  rate	  of	   interest	  that	   is	  the	  geometric	  mean	  of	  a	  daily	  overnight	   rate,	   based	  on	  a	  notional	   amount.	  That	   is,	  OIS	   is	   a	   contract	   (or	  agreement)	   between	   two	   parties	   (normally,	   the	   two	   parties	   are	   banks.)	   who	  want	  to	  exchange	  fixed	  and	  floating	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rates.	  The	  floating	  rate	  is	  also	  called	  reference	  rate.	  In	  the	  US,	  the	  overnight	  effective	  Federal	  funds	  rate	  is	  used	   as	   the	   floating	   rate.	   The	   reference	   rates	   are	   the	   Euro	   Overnight	   Index	  Average	  (EONIA)	  and	  Sterling	  Overnight	  Index	  Average	  (SONIA)	  in	  the	  EMU	  and	  the	  UK,	  respectively.	  As	  seen	  below,	  the	  party,	  the	  OIS	  payer,	  pays	  fixed	  OIS	  rate	  that	  is	  agreed	  in	  the	  contract	  to	  the	  counterparty,	  the	  OIS	  receiver,	   in	  exchange	  for	   a	   floating	   rate	   on	   daily	   compounded	   and	   based	   on	   the	   agreed	   notional	  amount.	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   Pay	  floating	  overnight	  Index	  rate	  (daily	  compound)	  $X	   	  
	   	   	  	   Pay	  fixed	  OIS	  rate	  $Y	   	  	  OIS	  has	  very	  little	  exposure	  to	  credit	  risk	  and	  it	  is	  used	  as	  a	  proxy	  of	  risk	  free	  rate	  as	  well	   as	   agents’	   expectations	   of	   the	   future	   interest	   rate	   (Sengupta	   and	   Tam,	  2008;	  Hull	   and	  White,	  2013;	  Michaud	  and	  Upper,	  2008;	  BoE,	  2007;	  Taylor	  and	  Williams,	  2009;	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  Australia,	  Bulletin	  June,	  2002	  and	  Poskitt,	  2011).	  Firstly,	   the	   credit	   risk	   in	   the	  overnight	  borrowing	   is	   very	   small	   (Fabozzi,	   2012	  p.1473).	   For	   example,	   by	   mid	   of	   2007,	   the	   spread	   between	   overnight	   rate	   of	  repos	  that	  are	  backed	  by	  U.S.	  Federal	  government	  securities	  (secured	  overnight	  lending	   rate)	   were	   only	   5	   to	   10	   basis	   points	   below	   the	   federal	   funds	   rate	  (unsecured	  lending	  rate	  and	  it	  is	  used	  as	  the	  reference	  for	  floating	  rate	  in	  the	  US	  OIS.)	  (Hull	  and	  White,	  2013).	  During	  the	  crisis,	   the	  gilt	  repo	  rate	   fell	  relative	  to	  the	   federal	   funds	  rate,	  but	   for	  other	  repos	   that	   rate	  rose	  relative	   to	   the	   federal	  funds	   rate	   (ibid).	   These	   cross-­‐sectional	   variations	   indicate	   that	   market	  microstructure	   may	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   spread	   between	   unsecured	   and	  secured	  overnight	  lending	  rates	  more	  than	  the	  credit	  risk	  factor	  in	  the	  US	  (ibid),	  because	   if	   the	  credit	  risk	   factor	  mainly	  explains	   the	  spread	  between	  unsecured	  and	  secured	  lending,	  the	  spread	  should	  perform	  the	  same	  way	  during	  the	  crisis.	  Secondly,	  given	  the	  structure	  of	  OIS,	  there	  is	  no	  exchange	  of	  principal	  (notational	  amount)	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  and	  the	  final	  payment	  is	  the	  net	  interest	  e.g.	  $X	  -­‐	  $Y	  to	  OIS	  Payer	  from	  OIS	  receiver	  if	  $X	  is	  greater	  than	  $Y,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Also,	  OIS	   contracts	   have	   short	  maturity	   i.e.	   1	  week	   to	  12	  months	  normally	   although	  there	   are	   2-­‐year	   SONIAs.	   In	   our	   study,	  we	   use	   short	  maturity	  OIS	   in	   the	   three	  markets	   i.e.	   three-­‐month	   OIS.	   Therefore,	   the	   net	   interest	   i.e.	   the	   difference	  between	   the	   fixed	   (the	  OIS	   payer	   pays)	   and	   floating	   interest	   (the	  OIS	   receiver	  pays)	   is	   very	   small	   leaving	   little	   credit	   and	   liquidity	   risks,	   respectively,	   in	   the	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swap.	   	  	  OIS	   also	   reflects	   agents’	   expectation	   of	   the	   future	   policy	   rate.	   Firstly,	   the	  calculation	  of	  floating	  interest	  rate	  assumes	  rolling	  over	  a	  sequence	  of	  daily	  loans	  at	   the	   overnight	   rate	   until	   the	   maturity	   of	   OIS,	   which	   reflects	   the	   forward	  overnight	   interest	   rate	   (Hull	   and	  White,	  2013).	   Secondly,	   the	   calculation	  of	   the	  fixed	  rate	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  government	  bond	  yield	  representing	  an	  average	  of	  the	  forward	  rates	  (Fabozzi,	  2012,	  p1473).	  Therefore,	  we	  employ	  OIS	  as	  the	  proxy	  of	  risk	  free	  rate	  in	  our	  risk	  decomposing	  model	  by	  taking	  the	  difference	  between	  three-­‐month	   LIBOR	   and	   three-­‐month	  OIS.	   The	   spread	   should	  mainly	   show	   the	  risk	  premium	  contained	  in	  the	  LIBOR	  rates.	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  previous	  discussion,	  we	  have	  not	  distinguished	  the	  three	  interbank	  markets	  for	  the	  US,	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  EMU	  because	  these	  markets	  are	  similar.	  	  Using	  CDS	  as	  proxy	   for	  measure	  of	  default	   risk	  of	  banks	   they	  abstracted	  credit	  risk	   from	   the	   LIBOR	   and	   OIS	   spread	   because	   credit	   risk	   mainly	   arises	   in	  unsecured	  interbank	  lending	  activity	  so	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  be	  captured	  compared	  with	  non-­‐credit	   premia,	   which	   may	   include	   various	   structural	   factors.	   Using	   event	  study	  analysis,	  BoE	  assumed	  that	  any	  deviation	  between	  LIBOR	  –	  OIS	  spread	  and	  CDS	   (credit	   default	   swap)	  price	   should	   reflect	   non-­‐credit	   premia.	  The	  problem	  associated	  with	   this	   assumption	   is	   that	   credit	   risk	   and	   non-­‐credit	   risk	   premia	  tend	  not	  to	  be	  independent.	  For	  example,	  a	  bank	  that	  finds	  it	  difficult	  to	  borrow	  in	  the	  interbank	  market	  (and	  thus	  faces	  raised	  liquidity	  risk)	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  more	  likely	  to	  default	  and	  therefore	  experience	  greater	  credit	  risk.	  Figure	  3.1	  is	  a	  set	  of	  plots	  that	  BoE	  represented	  based	  on	  the	  above	  statement.	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Figure	  3.1	  Bank	  of	  England	  Decomposition	  of	  12-­‐month	  LIBOR-­‐OIS	  Spread	  
a. Sterling	  Pound	  
	  
b. US	  Dollar	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c. Euro	  
	  Source:	  Bank	  of	  England	  Quarterly	  Bulletin,	  2007Q4,	  p498.	  Used	  with	  permission	  of	  the	  publisher.	  	  The	  BoE’s	  results,	  published	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis,	  provided	  preliminary	  evidence	   for	   researchers	   to	   develop	   the	   topic.	   Their	   findings	   were	   mixed.	   It	  seems	  that	  they	  tried	  to	  express	  the	  change	  of	  credit	  factor	  and	  non-­‐credit	  factor	  contained	   in	   the	  risk	  premium	  spread	  are	  highly	  related	  to	  market	  events.	  BoE	  broadly	  decomposed	  risk	  premium	  into	  credit	  and	  non-­‐credit	  factors.	  The	  vague	  definition	  of	  non-­‐credit	  factor	  ignores	  the	  possible	  reaction	  between	  elements	  in	  the	   credit	   factor	   and	   non-­‐credit	   factor.	   There	   may	   be	   various	   components	  included	  in	  the	  non-­‐credit	  risk	  factor	  e.g.	  liquidity	  risk,	  microstructure	  of	  market	  and	  term	  premium	  etc.	  These	  components	  may	  have	  positive	  effect	  on	  elements	  that	  influence	  credit	  risk	  i.e.	  elements	  contained	  in	  the	  credit	  factor	  may	  depend	  on	  the	  elements	  in	  non-­‐credit	  factor.	  Particularly,	  BoE	  used	  twelve-­‐month	  LIBOR	  in	  the	  research	  so	  the	  term	  premium	  might	  not	  be	  too	  small	  to	  be	  ignored.	  Thus,	  the	  vague	  definition	  of	  non-­‐credit	  component	  may	  lead	  to	  over	  estimation	  on	  the	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effect	  of	  credit	  risk	  component	  in	  risk	  premium.	  Following	   the	   BoE	   study,	   Michaud	   and	   Upper	   (2008)	   made	   a	   similar	  decomposition	   of	   the	   LIBOR	   –	   OIS	   spreads	   for	   G10	   countries.	   Firstly,	   the	  contribution	   of	   their	   work	   was	   to	   clearly	   label	   spread	   of	   LIBOR	   –	   OIS	   as	   risk	  premium.	  Secondly,	  they	  argued	  that	  risk	  premium	  in	  the	  interbank	  particularly	  may	   be	   affected	   by	   two	   sets	   of	   variables,	   bank-­‐specific	   variables	   and	   market	  variables	   which	   should	   reflect	   market	   condition	   and	   structure.	   The	  banking-­‐specific	   variables	   contain	   risk	   of	   default	   i.e.	   credit	   risk	   and	   funding	  liquidity	   of	   the	   borrowing	   bank.	   The	   market	   variable	   include	   term	   premium	  which	  reflects	  the	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  path	  of	  expected	  overnight	  rates,	  market	  liquidity	  i.e.	  the	  ease	  of	  trading,	  and	  factors	  in	  the	  LIBOR	  fixing	  process	  and	  the	  microstructure	  of	   the	  market.	   In	   other	  words,	  Michaud	   and	  Upper	   argued	   that	  there	  are	  mainly	  two	  components	  in	  the	  risk	  premium,	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  component.	   The	   liquidity	   component	   includes	   the	   funding	   liquidity	   of	   the	  borrowing	  bank	  and	  market	  liquidity.	  The	  other	  elements	  that	  may	  influence	  risk	  premium	  are	  treated	  as	  residuals.	  	  Thirdly,	   they	   introduced	  additional	  measures	   to	  proxy	   credit	   and	   liquidity	   risk	  components.	  For	  the	  credit	  risk,	  apart	  from	  CDS,	  they	  used	  the	  spread	  between	  secured	  and	  unsecured	  loans.	  The	  rationale	  underlying	  the	  measures	  is	  that	  both	  of	   them	   can	   represent	   risk	   of	   default	   as	  well	   as	   the	   compensation	   for	   bearing	  credit	  risk.	  The	  most	  significant	  development	  since	  BoE	  (2007)	  is	  the	  attempt	  to	  measure	   the	   liquidity	  component.	  Market	   liquidity	  was	  measured	  by	  quantities	  and	  prices	  observed	  on	  the	  electronic	  trading	  platform	  e-­‐MID.	  They	  collected	  the	  number	   of	   trades,	   trading	   volume,	   bid/ask	   spreads	   and	   the	   price	   impacts	   of	  trades.	   	  	  Other	  influencing	  components	  were	  treated	  as	  residuals	  because	  there	  is	  hardly	  financial	   data	   that	   can	   measure	   them.	   Moreover,	   Michaud	   and	   Upper	   applied	  both	  an	  econometric	  approach,	  using	  panel	  data,	  and	  event	  study	  analysis	  to	  the	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data	  and	  found	  at	  higher	  frequencies	  that	  liquidity	  has	  played	  a	  more	  important	  role	  while	  credit	  risk	  factors	  were	  traceable	  at	  lower	  frequencies.	   	  	  Based	  on	  their	  investigations,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  risk	  comes	  in	  many	  forms	  and	  from	  many	  sources.	  There	  may	  be	  a	  range	  of	  labels	  to	  denote	  these	  risks.	  In	  the	  interbank	  market,	  however,	  these	  risks	  are	  unlikely	  to	  be	  strictly	  separable.	  The	  risk-­‐decomposing	   model	   is	   quite	   well	   defined	   theoretically,	   but	   the	   empirical	  evidence	  to	  address	  the	  problem	  –	  if	  credit	  risk	  or	  liquidity	  component	  or	  both	  of	  them	  played	  major	   role	   in	  pushing	  up	   risk	  premium	   in	   interbank	  market,	  may	  depend	   on	   selection	   of	   measurement	   of	   these	   risks	   as	   well	   as	   application	   of	  econometrics	  models.	   This	  may	   be	   one	   of	   the	   reasons	   that	  many	   later	   studies	  used	  different	   financial	   instruments	   for	  measuring	  of	   these	  risks	  with	  different	  econometric	  approaches.	   	  	  Poskitt	  (2011)	  developed	  a	  system	  that	  contains	  a	  structural	  model	  of	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  component,	  respectively,	  and	  applied	  OLS	  regression	  on	  the	  mean	  equations	   with	   data	   from	   the	   US	   interbank	   and	   financial	   market.	   The	   system	  starts	   with	   the	   risk-­‐decomposing	   model	   by	   labeling	   credit	   risk	   by	   CDS.	   The	  framework	  of	  the	  structural	  model	  is	  applied	  to	  establish	  a	  relationship	  between	  CDS/liquidity	   component	   and	   underlying	   elements	   that	   explains	   CDS	   and	  liquidity	  component.	  Poskitt	  found	  four	  explanatory	  structural	  variables	  for	  CDS,	  the	   value	   of	   an	   equally-­‐weighted	   portfolio	   of	   stocks	   of	   the	   LIBOR	   panel,	   stock	  price	   volatility,	   the	   yield	   on	   five-­‐year	   Treasury	   bonds	   and	   the	   slope	   of	  yield-­‐curve	  of	  which	  is	  from	  Collin-­‐Dufresne	  et	  al,	  2001.	  The	  structural	  model	  of	  the	   liquidity	   component	   is	   constructed	   in	   a	   similar	   approach	   as	   Michaud	   and	  Upper	   (2008)	   by	   looking	   at	   observed	   interbank	   trading	   data,	   which	   are	  equally-­‐weighted	  bid/ask	  spread	  of	  nineteen	  dealers	  and	  the	  number	  of	  dealers	  active	   on	   the	   day.	   In	   addition,	   the	   amount	   of	   outstanding	   commercial	   paper	  issued	  by	  financial	  institutions	  in	  the	  US	  commercial	  paper	  market	  is	  also	  used	  as	  an	  explanatory	  variable	  to	  identify	  the	  liquidity	  component.	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  The	   advantages	   of	   this	   system	  are	  1)	   it	   allows	  diversified	   inputs	   from	  a	  wider	  range	   of	   financial	   markets	   e.g.	   commercial	   paper	   and	   stock	   market;	   2)	   it	  measures	   the	   term	   premium	   using	   the	   difference	   on	   slope	   of	   one-­‐year	   and	  ten-­‐year	  Treasury	  bond	  yield	  curve;	  3)	  it	  provides	  the	  opportunity	  to	  reveal	  how	  elements	   in	   CDS	   influence	   the	   risk	   premium;	   4)	   the	   interaction	   between	   each	  element	   in	   CDS	   and	   liquidity	   component,	   respectively,	   is	   also	   investigated.	  Poskitt	   (2011)	   applies	   static	   OLS	   as	   econometric	   model	   for	   regression	   in	   this	  system.	  However,	  OLS	  regression	  requires	  variables	  to	  be	  stationary	  and	  is	  very	  sensitive	  to	  assumptions	  of	  residuals.	  Without	  satisfied	  unit	  root	  test	  result,	  OLS	  may	   lead	   to	   spurious	   regression,	   which	   might	   be	   the	   case	   for	   Poskitt	   (2011)	  because	  CDS	  price	  has	  been	  very	  volatile	  since	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crisis.	   	  	  Poskitt’s	   results	   found	   that	   liquidity	   seems	   to	   be	   the	  major	   component	   of	   the	  LIBOR	  –	  OIS	  spread	  in	  the	  US	  market.	  The	  result	  also	  points	  out,	  as	  we	  suggested	  earlier,	   that	   a	   bank	   finding	   it	   difficult	   to	   raise	   funds	   is	   also	   in	   greater	   risk	   of	  default	  and	  the	  difficulty	  of	  raising	  funds	  will	  likely	  be	  factored	  into	  credit	  default	  swaps	  (CDS)	  premia	  and	  higher	   interbank	  rates.	  Similarly,	   the	  uncertainty	  over	  creditworthiness	   of	   banks	   could	   lead	   some	   banks	   to	   withdraw	   from	   the	  interbank	   market,	   thereby	   raising	   liquidity	   premia.	   The	   problem	   is	   widely	  recognised	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  (2007)	  warns	  that	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risks	  may	   not	   be	   independent	   and	   sometimes	   shies	   away	   from	   the	   specific	   term	  ‘liquidity	  risk’	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  vaguer	  ‘non-­‐credit	  risk’	  when	  referring	  to	  residual	  influences	   behind	   the	   LIBOR-­‐OIS	   spread.	   Interestingly,	   however,	   the	  Bank	   also	  uses	  its	  market	  contacts	  to	  corroborate	  the	  implications	  in	  the	  data	  and	  these	  do	  confirm,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  period	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  crisis,	  that	  market	  participants	  felt	   that	   the	   credit	   premium	   was	   driven	   by	   risk	   of	   default	   unconnected	   with	  liquidity	   and	   that	   the	   residual	   premium	  was	   accounted	   for	   largely	   by	   liquidity	  factors	  (Bank	  of	  England,	  2007).	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Figure	  3.2	  Illustration	  of	  Poskitt	  (2011)	  Framework	  of	  Structural	  Model	  	  
	  	  The	  Figure	  3.2	  represents	  the	  framework	  of	  Poskitt	  (2011)	  structural	  model	  that	  attempts	   to	   decompose	   risk	   premium	   i.e.	   the	   spread	   between	   LIBOR	   and	   OIS.	  The	   structural	  model	   starts	  with	   the	   same	   theoretical	   ground	  as	  our	  model	  by	  decomposing	   risk	   premium	   into	   two	   components,	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	  components.	   The	   distinctive	   contributions	   of	   Poskitt	   structural	  model	   are	   that	  the	   two	   components	   are	   explained	  by	   the	   underlying	   elements.	   Firstly,	   Poskitt	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applies	   the	   framework	  of	  a	  structural	  model	  of	  default	   to	   identify	   the	  variables	  that	  can	  influence	  the	  credit	  risk	  component	  that	  is	  denoted	  by	  the	  spread	  on	  the	  credit	   default	   swap	   (CDS).	   According	   to	   Ericcson	   et	   al	   (2009),	   the	   set	   of	  determinants	   that	   can	   change	   the	   CDS	   premium	   are	   financial	   leverage,	  firm-­‐specific	   volatility	   and	   the	   risk-­‐free	   rate.	   Therefore,	   Poskitt	   creates	   a	  structural	   model	   of	   CDS	   that	   identifies	   variables	   for	   the	   above	   three	  determinants,	  which	  are	  value	  of	  equally-­‐weighted	  portfolio	  of	  stocks	  of	  LIBOR	  banks34,	   stock	   price	   volatility	   that	   is	  measured	   by	   the	   implied	   volatility	   of	   put	  options	  written	  on	  the	  stocks	  of	  LIBOR	  panel	  banks35,	  yield	  on	  five-­‐year	  treasury	  bonds	  and	  slope	  of	  the	  yield	  curve.	  Similarly,	  the	  liquidity	  component	  is	  divided	  in	   two	   broad	   categories,	   trade-­‐based	   measures,	   amount	   of	   outstanding	  commercial	   paper	   and	   number	   of	   dealers	   active	   on	   the	   day,	   and	   order-­‐based	  measures,	  the	  equally-­‐weighted	  bid/ask	  spread.	  The	  three	  explanatory	  variables	  of	  liquidity	  component	  reflect	  the	  market	  liquidity	  of	  the	  interbank	  market	  in	  the	  US.	  	  Nobili	   (2009)	   studied	   liquidity	   risk	   in	  money	  market	   spreads	   using	   EMU	  data.	  The	  first	  approach	  to	  measuring	  liquidity	  risk	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  the	  BoE	  (2007).	  The	  second	  approach	  adopts	  a	  simultaneous	  model	  to	  estimate	  the	  variables	  that	  may	  influence	  the	  liquidity	  component.	  Those	  variables	  are	  unsecured	  interbank	  deposit	  rates,	  zero	  coupon	  yields	  on	  financial	  bonds	  and	  zero	  coupon	  yields	  on	  Treasury	  bonds.	  The	   result	   appears	   that	  both	   credit	   and	   liquidity	   risks	  pushed	  up	  the	  money	  market	  spread	  (Euribor)	  and	  credit	  risk	  becomes	  more	  influential	  on	  the	  spread	  whereas	  liquidity	  risk	  had	  the	  lion’s	  share	  initially.	   	  	  Supporting	   these	   views,	   Berrospide	   (2012)	   tests	   liquidity	   hoarding	   (which	   is	  believed	   to	   be	   one	   of	   the	   reasons	   for	   increased	   liquidity	   premia	   in	   the	  money	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	   The	  list	  of	  banks	  that	  bid	  in	  LIBOR	  market	  is	  provided	  in	  Appendix	  1.	  35	   Poskitt	  (2011)	  justified	  that	  according	  to	  Merton	  (1974),	  if	  the	  volatility	  of	  the	  firm’s	  assets	  increases,	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  probability	  of	  default.	  Also,	  the	  increases	  in	  implied	  volatility	  of	  put	  option	  reflect	  a	  higher	  volatility	  of	  firm	  value.	  Therefore,	  the	  implied	  volatility	  of	  put	  option	  is	  a	  measurement	  for	  firm-­‐specific	  volatility.	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market	   by	  Bank	  of	   England,	   2007)	   in	   the	  US,	   using	   a	   panel	   containing	  balance	  sheet	  data	  of	  approximately	  6,750	  financial	  institutions	  from	  the	  period	  between	  2005	   and	  2010.	   Liquidity	   risk	   is	   used	   to	  measure	   the	   precautionary	  motive	   to	  hoard	   liquidity.	   The	   results	   suggest	   that	   banks	   held	   more	   liquid	   assets	   in	  response	   to	   increased	   risks	   in	   their	   asset	   portfolios	   and	   liquidity	   hoarding	  occurred	  across	  all	  banking	  institutions	  regardless	  of	  their	  size.	  This	  implies	  that	  liquidity	   risk	   for	   banks	   tended	   to	   increase	   during	   the	   crisis	   due	   to	   the	  precautionary	  motive	  of	  liquidity	  hoarding	  –	  the	  result	  indicates	  a	  quarter	  of	  the	  contraction	  in	  lending	  is	  due	  to	  the	  precautionary	  motive.	   	  	  Schwarz	  (2010)	  employs	  microstructure	  measures	  of	  market	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	   in	  EMU	  data.	  Market	   liquidity	   is	  measured	  by	   the	  spread	  between	  German	  federal	   government	   bond	   rates	   and	   KfW	   (Kreditanstalt	   fur	   Wiederaufbau)	  agency	  bonds	  by	  assuming	  both	  types	  of	  bonds	  are	  equally	  high	  quality	  but	  KfW	  agency	  bond	  are	   less	   liquid.	  The	   credit	  measure,	   indicator	  of	   credit	   tier	  differs	  from	   the	   previous	   literature.	   It	   is	   defined	   as	   the	   difference	   between	   actual	  unsecured	  interbank	  borrowing	  rates	  paid	  by	  banks	  that	  have	  good	  credit	  rating	  versus	   that	   have	   low	   credit	   rating.	   The	   result	   supports	   that	   market	   liquidity	  effects	   explain	  more	  widening	   of	   one-­‐	   and	   three-­‐month	   LIBOR	   and	  OIS	   spread	  than	  credit	  risk.	   	  	  However,	   Angelini	   et	   al	   (2011)	   found	   that	   the	   elevated	   LIBOR-­‐OIS	   spread	  was	  mainly	   driven	   by	   aggregate	   factors	   e.g.	   risk	   aversion	   and	   accounting	   practices.	  Funding	   liquidity	   and	   capital	   shortage	   do	   not	   appear	   to	   be	   the	   main	  determinants.	  Prior	  to	  the	  crisis,	  the	  LIBOR-­‐OIS	  spread	  was	  not	  as	  sensitive	  as	  it	  reacted	  during	  the	  crisis	   to	  borrowers’	  creditworthiness.	  These	   findings	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  supportive	  evidence	  for	  the	  effect	  of	  credit	  risk	  on	  risk	  premium.	  	  Overall,	   most	   studies	   agree	   that	   the	   risk	   premium	   in	   money	   market	   can	   be	  represented	   by	   the	   spread	   between	   LIBOR	   and	   OIS	   (In	   the	   EMU,	   Euribor	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substitutes	   for	   LIBOR.).	   Although	   they	   attempt	   to	   label	   each	   component	  differently	  in	  the	  risk	  premium,	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  are	  agreed	  to	  be	  the	  two	  main	  components.	  Measures	  for	  the	  two	  components	  are	  not	  easy	  because	  there	  are	   different	   factors	   that	  may	   influence	   credit	   and	   liquidity	   risks	   and	   it	   is	   not	  possible	   to	   find	  a	   single	   financial	   instrument	   to	  measure	   them	  all.	  CDS	  and	   the	  difference	  between	  unsecured	  and	  secured	  interbank	  lending	  rates	  are	  generally	  the	   two	   measures	   for	   credit	   risk.	   Poskitt	   (2011)	   developed	   the	   framework	   of	  structural	  model	  of	  CDS,	  which	  includes	  elements	  that	  may	  influence	  CDS	  price,	  according	   to	   the	   previous	   literatures.	   Schwarz	   (2010)	   measures	   credit	   risk	  uniquely	   using	   credit	   tiering.	   For	   the	   liquidity	   component,	   researchers	   tend	   to	  agree	  that	  there	  are	  market	  liquidity	  funding	  risk	  and	  bank-­‐specific	  funding	  risk.	  There	   are	   mainly	   two	   approaches	   to	   measure	   liquidity	   component,	   residual	  approach	   and	   collection	   of	   market	   trading	   information.	   Schwarz	   (2010)	   used	  spread	   between	   German	   federal	   government	   bonds	   and	   KfW	   agency	   bonds	   to	  proxy	  liquidity.	  These	  different	  measures	  of	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  component	  lead	  to	  very	  similar	  conclusion	  that	  both	  of	  them	  contributed	  to	  increase	  of	  risk	  premium	  but	   the	   liquidity	   component	   tends	   to	  be	   the	  main	  driver	   initially	  and	  credit	  risk	  started	  to	  take	  over	  during	  the	  development	  of	  the	  crisis.	  	  Knowing	   the	   performance	   of	   credit	   and	   liquidity	   components,	   it	   would	   be	  interesting	   to	   see	  how	  central	   banks	  have	   changed	   them	  using	  unconventional	  policy	   tools	   because	   the	   disorder	   of	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   components	   have	  caused	   significant	   negative	   impact	   on	   trading	   activity	   in	   money	   markets	   and	  damaged	  the	  transmission	  mechanism	  of	  monetary	  policy.	  The	  next	  section	  looks	  at	   the	   studies	   that	   focus	   on	   how	   the	   unconventional	   monetary	   policies	   have	  changed	   the	   behavior	   and	   relationship	   between	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	  component	  during	  crisis.	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3.2 How Credit and Liquidity Components Respond to Central Banks 
Unconventional Intervention 
 As	  we	  explained	  earlier,	   central	  banks’	  unconventional	  monetary	   interventions	  consist	  of	  liquidity	  provision	  and	  asset	  purchases.	  We	  first	  look	  at	  the	  effects	  on	  liquidity	  provision;	  then,	  we	  move	  to	  the	  effects	  of	  asset	  purchase.	   	  
	  The	   sudden	   widening	   of	   the	   unsecured	   interbank	   lending	   rate	   had	   a	   severe	  impact	  on	  banks’	  liquidity	  position.	  Banks	  as	  a	  special	  type	  of	  firm,	  face	  liquidity	  problem	   regarding	   the	  moment	   of	   withdrawal	   of	   deposits	   or	   payments	   to	   the	  public	  sector.	  The	  existence	  of	  interbank	  liquidity	  reduces	  the	  banks’	  exposure	  to	  liquidity	   risk	   and	  prevents	  bank	   runs	   (Freixas	  et	   al,	   1999;	  Pablo,	   1999;	  Brighi,	  2002).	   The	   access	   to	   interbank	   credit	   lines	   not	   only	   helps	   bank	   cope	   with	  liquidity	  risk	  but	  also	  reduces	  maintenance	  cost	  of	  reserves	  (Freixas	  et	  al,	  1999).	  Aglietta	   (1996)	   argued	   that	   liquidity	   problems	   could	   entail	   systemic	   risk	   in	  banking	   system	   with	   spillover	   effect	   from	   the	   uncertainty	   about	   credit	   risk	  assessment	  and	  change	  of	  price	  under	  conditions	  of	  stress.	  The	  arguments	  from	  previous	   literature	  provide	  the	  rationale	   for	  central	  banks	  to	  start	   intervention	  with	  liquidity	  supply	  during	  the	  crisis.	  	  The	   study	   that	   is	   often	   cited	   by	   other	   researchers	   regarding	   this	   crisis	   is	   by	  Taylor	  and	  Williams	  (2008,	  2009).	  It	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  first	  econometric	  empirical	  paper	   published	   regarding	   the	   influence	   of	   a	   central	   bank’s	   unconventional	  policy	  on	  risk	  premia.	  They	  believed	  that	  there	  should	  be	  little	   liquidity	  premia	  contained	  in	  LIBOR	  -­‐	  OIS	  spread	  and	  they	  found	  that	  counterparty	  risk	  was	  the	  main	  driver	  of	  the	  widening	  of	  the	  LIBOR	  spread.	  They	  were	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  argument	   that	   liquidity	  had	  been	   reduced	   in	   the	  money	  markets	  by	   the	   rise	   in	  counterparty	   risk,	   but	   they	   could	  not	   find	   any	   convincing	   evidence	   of	   liquidity	  risk	  when	   they	  compared	   the	  LIBOR	  market	  with	   the	  market	   for	  certificates	  of	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deposit	  (CDs).	  They	  used	  the	  TAF	  facility	  to	  explore	  the	  liquidity	  factor	  because	  TAF	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  liquidity	  facility.	  The	  TAF	  impact	  is	  measured	  by	  dummy	  variables	   equal	   to	  one	   since	   the	   first	  day	  of	   a	  TAF	  auction	  until	   the	   settlement	  day.	  Their	  sample	  covers	  sixteen	  TAF	  auctions	  from	  December	  17,	  2007	  to	  July	  28,	   2008.	  Various	   efforts	   to	   find	   significant	   reductions	   of	   the	   LIBOR	   spread	  by	  the	   TAF	   proved	   futile.	   To	   this	   end,	   research	   that	   explored	   the	   effectiveness	   of	  extra	  liquidity	  provision	  by	  central	  banks	  to	  reduce	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  in	  the	  interbank	  market	  has	  provided	  controversial	  results.	  For	  example,	  Brunetti	  et	  al.	  (2009)	   used	   reported	   trades	   and	   quotes	   of	   the	   e-­‐MID	   regulated	   interbank	  market	   and,	   similar	   to	   Taylor	   and	   Williams,	   found	   that	   central	   bank	  interventions	   create	   greater	   volatility	   rather	   than	   enhance	   liquidity.	   Also,	   in	   a	  recent	   study	   Angelini	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   found	   supporting	   evidence	   for	   Taylor	   and	  Williams.	   	  	  Contrary	  to	  the	  above,	  several	  articles	  reached	  a	  different	  conclusion	  concerning	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  liquidity	  injections	  by	  central	  banks:	  McAndrew	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  Wu	  (2008),	  Christensen	  et	  al.	  (2009),	  Hesse	  and	  Frank	  (2009)	  and	  Nobili	  (2009)	  found	   that	   central	   bank	   intervention	   reduced	   liquidity	   risk	   on	   money	   market	  rates.	  Cecchetti	   (2009)	  points	  out	   that	  TAF,	  TSLF	  and	  PDCF	  helped	   in	  reducing	  the	   risk	   of	   a	   short-­‐run	   financial	   crisis,	   but	   the	   Fed	   did	   not	   prevent	   the	   crisis	  spreading	  to	  the	  real	  economy	  as	  they	  wished.	   	  
	  The	  more	   recent	   studies	   tend	   to	  develop	   the	  problem	  by	   considering	  different	  aspects.	  For	  example,	  In	  et	  al	  (2012)	  focused	  particularly	  on	  the	  spillover	  effect	  of	   TAF	   among	   different	   credit	   markets	   i.e.	   interbank,	   commercial	   paper	   and	  jumbo	  mortgage	  markets.	  The	  three	  markets	  used	  to	  be	  independent	  before	  the	  crisis,	   but	   they	   developed	  multidirectional	   lead-­‐lag	   relations	   during	   the	   crisis,	  which	  means,	   if	  policies	   focusing	  on	  money	  market	  have	  an	  effect,	   it	   should	  be	  transmitted	  to	  other	  credit	  markets.	  They	  find	  that	  TAF	  is	  successful	  as	  a	  signal	  policy	   tool	   rather	   than	   reducing	   three-­‐month	   LIBOR	   and	   OIS	   spread	   because	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there	   is	  no	  short-­‐term	  funding	  effect	  captured.	  Thornton	  (2011)	  also	   finds	  that	  the	  announcement	  of	  TAF	  did	  not	  reduce	  risk	  premium	  in	  LIBOR	  rates	  instead	  it	  increased	   the	   risk	   premium	   because	   the	   announcement	   was	   read	   by	   market	  participants	  as	  a	  negative	  signal	  for	  worsening	  market	  conditions.	  	  Abbassi	   and	   Linzert	   (2012)	   used	   the	   main	   refinancing	   operations	   (MRO)	   and	  LTROs	  as	  proxies	  for	  liquidity	  provision	  in	  the	  EMU	  to	  estimate	  the	  response	  of	  money	  market	  rates	  to	  such	  massive	  liquidity	  injection.	  They	  point	  out	  that	  the	  loss	  in	  effectiveness	  of	  monetary	  policy	  to	  influence	  interbank	  market	  rates	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  higher	  liquidity	  premia	  and	  increased	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  future	  interest	   rates.	   The	   results	   show	   that	   the	   non-­‐standard	   monetary	   operations	  reduced	  the	  Euribor	  rate	  by	  more	  than	  80bps.	  However,	  the	  econometric	  model	  employed	   is	  a	   short-­‐run	  dynamic	  model	  because	   the	  variables	   suffer	   from	  unit	  roots	  in	  levels.	  From	  these	  results,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  derive	  long	  run	  implications.	  	  Moving	   to	   review	   work	   that	   studies	   the	   responses	   of	   credit	   and	   liquidity	  components	   to	   central	   banks’	   asset	   purchase.	   Joyce	   et	   al	   (2011)	   depict	   the	  transmission	  channels	  of	  QE	  (see	  Figure	  2.10).	  One	  of	  the	  important	  channels	  is	  through	   portfolio	   rebalancing	   triggered	   by	   changes	   in	   asset	   prices.	   Portfolio	  rebalancing	   is	   indirectly	   influenced	   by	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   because	   they	  influence	  the	  degree	  of	  substitutability,	  which	  influences	  the	  process	  of	  portfolio	  rebalancing	  between	  assets,	  but	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  risk	  refer	  to	  specific	  assets,	  not	   the	   same	   as	   we	   have	   used	   previously.	   However,	   the	   normal	   transmission	  mechanism	   of	   monetary	   policy	   affects	   asset	   prices	   through	   an	   interest	   rate	  channel,	  which	  depends	  on	   the	  role	  of	  money	  markets	  because	   the	  official	   rate	  first	  communicates	  with	  money	  market	  rate	  in	  this	  channel	  (see	  Figure	  2.1).	  This	  difference	  makes	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  subsection	  hard	  to	  develop	  because	  the	  policy	  of	   QE	   is	   designed	   to	   bypass	   the	   role	   of	   money	   market	   in	   the	   transmission	  mechanism	   (Mortimer-­‐Lee,	   2012),	   so	   its	   impact	   on	  money	  markets	   is	   not	   the	  immediate	   concern	   of	   the	   policymaker.	   The	   Martin	   and	   Milas	   (2012)	   survey	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reviews	  twenty	  studies	  spanning	  the	  period	  2009	  to	  2011	  regarding	  the	  impact	  of	  QE	  but	  only	  two	  of	  them	  -­‐	  from	  Neely	  (2011),	  investigating	  the	  US	  and	  other	  eight	  advanced	  countries	  including	  UK,	  and	  Szczerbowicz	  (2011),	  concerning	  the	  effect	  of	  US	  LSAP	  on	  LIBOR	  and	  OIS,	  are	  concerned	  with	  money	  market	  impacts.	  Both	  suggest	  there	  is	  no	  significant	  impact	  of	  QE	  on	  LIBOR	  and	  OIS	  spread.	   	  	  Literatures	   researching	   the	   impact	   of	   QE	   on	   asset	   prices	   tend	   to	   focus	   on	  corporate	   bond	   rate,	   exchange	   rate	   and	   equity	   yields.	   Krishnamurthy	   and	  Vissing-­‐Jorgensen	   (2011)	   and	   Neely	   (2011)	   find	   QE	   significantly	   reduced	  interest	   rate	   of	   corporate	   bond	   from	   rating	   A	   to	   B.	   The	   amount	   of	   reduction	  becomes	   smaller	   with	   lower	   quality	   bonds.	   Glick	   and	   Leduc	   (2011)	   study	   the	  effect	  of	  US	  LSAP	  on	  exchange	   rate	   and	   find	  negative	   impact	  on	  USD	  exchange	  rate	  to	  other	  major	  currencies.	   	  	  However,	   literature	   focusing	   on	   the	   EMU	   market	   appears	   to	   have	   more	  discussion	   on	   our	   topic.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   ECB’s	   non-­‐standard	   monetary	  policy	  consists	  of	   liquidity	  provision	  and	  asset	  purchase	  and	  liquidity	  provision	  takes	  greater	  share	  of	  the	  policy	  tools.	  But,	  both	  of	  them	  are	  under	  OMO,	  so	  the	  estimation	  for	  the	  EMU	  cannot	  clearly	  be	  grouped	  in	  either	  liquidity	  provision	  or	  asset	  purchase,	  especially	  when	  the	  measure	  of	  non-­‐standard	  monetary	  policy	  is	  OMO.	   	  	  Cassola	  and	  Morana	  (2012)	  assess	  the	  Euribor	  –	  OIS	  by	  studying	  the	  persistence	  properties	   of	   the	   mean	   and	   variance	   of	   the	   spread	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   a	  FI-­‐HF-­‐VAR	   model36.	   This	   approach	   removes	   the	   imperfection	   on	   selection	   of	  measures	   for	   components	   in	   risk	   premium.	   They	   point	   out	   that	   there	   are	   two	  waves	   of	   stress	   and	   shocks	   in	   the	   interbank	  market	   following	  BNP	  Paribas	   on	  August	   09,	   2007	   and	   Lehman	   Brothers	   on	   September	   16,	   2008.	   This	   confirms	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	   Fractionally	  Integrated	  Heteroskedastic	  Factor	  Vector	  Autoregressive	  model	  is	  developed	  by	  Morana	  (2011).	  It	  deals	  with	  the	  persistent	  structural	  break	  that	  is	  observed	  during	  the	  crisis	  period	  in	  the	  OIS	  interest	  rate.	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our	   selection	   of	   a	   boundary	   for	   the	   EMU	   sample	   when	   we	   distinguish	  pre-­‐intervention	   and	   intervention	   period.	   Mortimer-­‐Lee	   (2012)	   also	   confirms	  the	  finding	  by	  mentioning	  that	  the	  ECB	  was	  the	  first	  central	  bank	  to	  announce	  an	  immense	  supply	  of	  liquidity	  into	  the	  banking	  system.	  These	  two	  waves	  of	  shocks	  produced	  permanent	  effects	  on	  changing	   level,	  volatility	  and	  persistence	  of	   the	  Euribor	  and	  OIS	   spread,	   implying	   the	   long	   lasting	  effect	  on	  credit	  and	   liquidity	  risks	  and	  confidence,	  which	  is	  the	  new	  term	  that	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  the	  previous	  literature.	  An	  error	  correction	  term	  on	  risk	  premium	  is	  captured	  but	  the	  value	  is	  very	  small.	  The	  interest	  rate	  cut	  and	  non-­‐standard	  measures	  together	  appear	  to	  have	   formed	   the	   path	   for	   credit	   and	   liquidity	   risk	   to	   decrease.	   They	   also	   find	  credit	   risk	   denoted	   by	   iTraxx	   index	   did	   not	   fall	   although	   the	   risk	   premium	  showed	   a	   downward	   trend,	   so	   they	   interpret	   that	   liquidity	   risk	   or	   confidence	  factors	  may	  also	  be	  relevant	  during	  the	  crisis.	  Their	  result	  is	  similar	  to	  our	  EMU	  result.	  	  Moreover,	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  knowledge,	  we	  review	  some	  literature	  regarding	  the	  impact	   on	   government	   bond	   rates	   because	   flattened	   long-­‐term	   yield	   will	  indirectly	   influence	   short-­‐term	   interest	   rate.	   There	   are	   many	   studies	   of	   the	  impact	   of	   QE	   on	   government	   bond	   rates	   by	   taking	   event	   studies	   and	  econometrics	  analysis.	  The	  results	  are	  very	  similar	  that	  QE	  reduced	  government	  bond	   rates	   but	   the	   amount	   of	   reduction	   depends	   on	   the	   data	   and	   empirical	  approach	   selected.	   For	   example,	   from	   event	   study	   analysis,	   Joyce	   et	   al	   (2011)	  found	  around	  100	  basis	  point	  drop	  in	  ten-­‐year	  UK	  government	  bond	  as	  the	  result	  of	   QE,	   whereas	   Meier	   (2009)	   finds	   a	   reduction	   of	   between	   40	   and	   100	   basis	  points.	  Neely	  (2011),	  taking	  the	  econometric	  approach,	  analyzes	  the	  effect	  of	  US	  LSAP	  on	  other	  five	  foreign	  ten-­‐year	  government	  bond	  yield	  and	  found	  significant	  negative	   impact	  e.g.	   the	  US	  LSAP	  reduced	  UK	   ten-­‐year	  government	  by	  65	  basis	  points.	  To	  finish	  this	  Chapter,	  we	  provide	  a	  summary	  table	  of	  literature	  reviewed	  in	  this	  chapter.	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Table	  3.3	  Summary	  of	  Literature	  
	  
Authors	   Objectives	   Methodology	   Findings	  
Abbassi	   and	  Linzert	  (2012)	  
To	   exam	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  LTROs	   on	  money	   market	  rates	   in	   the	  Euro	  area	   	  
First	  difference	  OLS	  
The	   ECB’s	   net	   increase	  in	   outstanding	   open	  market	   operations	  effectively	  reduced	  3-­‐,	  6-­‐	  and	   12-­‐month	   Euribor	  rates,	  respectively.	  
Angelini	   et	   al	  (2011)	   To	  examine	  the	  drivers	   of	   the	  LIBOR	   spread	  in	  the	  EMU	   Panel	  data	  
Aggregate	   factors	   e.g.	  risk	   aversion	   and	  accounting	   practices	  also	   mostly	   contributed	  to	   the	   elevated	   LIBOR	  spread.	  
Bank	   of	   England	  (2007)	  
Decomposition	  of	   LIBOR	  spread.	   US	  dollar,	   Sterling	  pound	   and	   Eur	  LIBOR	  data.	  
Spreads	   on	  LIBOR	   and	  Credit	   Default	  Swap	   (CDS)	  and	  charts	  
At	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	  crisis,	  non-­‐credit	  premia	  played	   major	   role	   and	  credit	   risk	   premia	  became	  more	  dominant.	  
Berrospide	  (2012)	  
To	   examine	  liquidity	  hoarding	  behavior	   of	   UK	  banks	   Panel	  data	  
Liquidity	   risk	   for	   banks	  tended	   to	   increase	  during	   the	   crisis	   due	   to	  the	   precautionary	  motive	   of	   liquidity	  hoarding.	  
Brunetti	   et	   al	  (2009)	  
To	   examine	  whether	   the	  ECB’s	  intervention	  improved	  interbank	  liquidity	  during	   the	  crisis.	   	  
Event	  study	  
Standard	   (and	   special)	  interventions	   that	   did	  not	   specifically	   tackle	  the	   issue	   of	   asymmetric	  information	   in	   the	  interbank	   market	   failed	  to	   improve	   market	  liquidity.	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Cassola	   and	  Morana	  (2012)	  
To	   find	  out	   the	  features	   of	  sudden	  increase	   of	  interbank	  lending	   rate	   in	  the	   euro	  money	   market	  during	   the	  financial	  crisis.	   	  
Vector	  Autoregressive	  model	   	  
The	   stress	   in	   the	  money	  market	   caused	   the	   non	  stationarity	   in	   the	   OIS	  spreads	   and	   led	   to	  permanent	   changes	   in	  levels	  of	  OIS	  spreads.	  
Cecchetti	  (2009)	  
To	   exam	   the	  Fed	  conventional	  and	  unconventional	  responses	   to	  the	  crisis.	  
Event	  study	   Conventional	  instrument	  was	   ineffective.	   The	  unconventional	   policies	  helped	   to	   ease	   market	  condition.	  
Christensen	   et	   al	  (2009)	  
To	   test	   the	  announcement	  effect	  of	  TAF	  in	  term	   interbank	  lending.	  
Kalman	   filter	  estimation	   TAF	   helped	   reduce	   the	  liquidity	   premium	   in	  term	  interbank	  rates.	  
Glick	   and	   Leduc	  (2011)	  
To	   investigate	  the	  effect	  of	  QE	  in	   the	   US	   and	  the	   UK	   to	  lower	  long-­‐term	  interest	   rates	  and	  commodity	  prices	  
Event	  study	   QE	   successfully	   reduced	  long-­‐term	   interest	   rates	  in	   both	   countries	   and	  markets.	   	  
Hesse	   and	   Frank	  (2009)	  
To	   exam	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  central	   bank	  interventions,	  LTROs	   in	   the	  EMU	   and	   TAF	  in	   the	   US,	   on	  interbank	  market.	  
VAR	  &	  GARCH	   LTROs	   and	   TAF	   eased	  stress	   in	   interbank	  markets,	   respectively	   in	  the	  two	  markets.	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In	  et	  al	  (2012)	   To	   find	   out	  impact	   of	   TAF	  on	   interbank	  and	   mortgage	  markets.	  
Error	  correction	  model	   with	  TAF	  dummy	  
TAF	   reduced	   the	   risk	  spreads	  in	  the	  interbank	  and	   mortgage	   markets	  and	   there	   were	  multidirectional	  relations	   between	   the	  markets.	   	  
Joyce	  et	  al	  (2011)	  
To	   explore	   the	  impact	  of	  QE	  in	  the	   UK	  economy	   and	  financial	  market.	  
Review	   QE	   successfully	   reduced	  the	  assets	  prices.	  
Krishnamurthy	  and	  Vissing-­‐Jorgensen	  (2011)	  
To	   exam	   the	  effect	   of	   QE	   on	  the	   US	   interest	  rates.	   	   Event	  study	  
QE	   worked	   through	  signaling	   and	   inflation	  channels.	   It	   lowered	  MBSs	   yields	   as	   well	   as	  credit	  risks.	  
Martin	   and	   Milas	  (2012)	   To	   review	   the	  effect	  of	  QEs	   in	  the	  UK,	  US	   and	  EMU	   Review	  
QE	  had	   significant	   effect	  on	   reducing	   long-­‐term	  yield	   and	   risks	   in	   the	  three	   markets,	  respectively.	  
McAndrew	   et	   al	  (2008)	  
To	  examine	  the	  announcement	  and	   operations	  effects	   of	   the	  TAF	   on	   the	   US	  LIBOR.	  
OLS	  regression	   TAF	   worked	   to	   reduce	  the	  US	  LIBOR.	  
Michaud	   and	  Upper	  (2008)	  
To	   exam	   the	  drivers	   of	   the	  increased	  spread	   of	   risk	  premium	  during	   the	  crisis.	   G10	  countries.	  
Event	  study	   Liquidity	   factors	   played	  a	   more	   significant	   role	  than	   the	   credit	   risk	  component.	  
Mortimer-­‐Lee	  (2012)	  
To	   identify	  risks	  associated	  with	  QE.	   The	   UK,	  EMU	   and	   US	  data.	  
Event	  study	   Numerous	   risks	  associated	   with	   QE,	  timing	   to	  entry	  and	  exit,	  conflict	   of	   interests	   and	  managing	  expectations.	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Neely	  (2011)	  
To	   exam	   the	  announcement	  effect	   of	   US	  large-­‐scale	  asset	   purchase	  (US	   QE)	   on	  international	  long	   bond	  yields	   and	  exchange	  rates.	  
Event	  study	   The	   US	   QE	   substantially	  reduced	   international	  long-­‐term	   bond	   yields	  and	  the	  spot	  value	  of	  the	  dollar.	   	  
Nobili	  (2009)	  
To	   find	   out	   if	  liquidity	  risk	  in	  the	   EMU	  money	   market	  had	   pushed	   up	  the	   risk	  premium	   i.e.	  EURIBOR	   –	  OIS.	  
Simultaneous	  equation	  model	  
Both	   liquidity	  and	  credit	  risks	   pushed	   up	   the	  EURIBOR	   spread	   and	  credit	   risk	   over	   took	  liquidity	   risk	   to	   be	   the	  more	   influential	  element.	  
Poskitt	  (2011)	  
To	   exam	   the	  major	  driver(s)	  of	   the	   US	  interbank	   risk	  premium	   i.e.	  LIBOR	   –	   OIS	  during	   the	  crisis.	  
OLS	  regression	  on	   structural	  model	  of	  credit	  risk	   and	  liquidity	  component	   	  
Liquidity	   seemed	   to	   be	  the	  major	   component	   of	  the	   risk	   premium	  spread.	   The	   liquidity	  component	   can	   have	   an	  impact	  on	  the	  credit	  risk	  component.	  
Sarkar	  (2009)	  
To	   test	   the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	   Fed’s	  innovative	  liquidity	  providing	  monetary	   tools	  (up	  to	  2009)	  to	  reduce	  liquidity	   and	  credit	   risks	   in	  the	  US.	  
Survey	   of	   the	  previous	  literatures	  
In	   the	   earlier	   stage,	  liquidity	   primarily	  contributed	   to	   the	   risk	  premium.	   Credit	   risk	  became	   increasingly	  prominent	  during	  2008.	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Schwarz	  (2010)	  
To	   measure	  microstructure	  that	   may	  influence	  market	  liquidity	   and	  credit	   risk	   and	  estimate	   the	  relationship	  between	  liquidity	   and	  credit	   risks	   in	  the	   risk	  premium	  spread.	   EMU	  data.	  
Time-­‐series	  regression	  
The	   market	   liquidity	  contributes	   to	   the	  widening	   one-­‐	   and	  three-­‐month	   risk	  premium	   spreads	  (LIBOR	   –	   OIS),	  respectively,	   more	   than	  the	  credit	  risk.	   	  
Szczerbowicz	  (2011)	  
To	   find	  out	   the	  effect	   of	  conventional	  and	  unconventional	  monetary	  policies	   on	   the	  risk	   premia	   in	  the	  US.	  
Event	  study	   The	   unconventional	  monetary	   policy	   was	  proved	  to	  be	  effective	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  premia.	  
Taylor	   and	  Williams	   (2008	  and	  2009)	  
To	   test	   if	  Term	  Auction	  Facility	   (TAF)	  effectively	  reduced	   the	  risk	   premium.	  US	  data	  
OLS	  regression	  based	   on	  non-­‐arbitrage	  model	  
No	   empirical	   evidence	  that	  the	  TAF	  has	  reduced	  the	   risk	   premium	  spreads	  (LIBOR	  –	  OIS).	  
Thornton	  (2010)	   To	   discuss	   the	  downside	   of	  quantitative	  easing.	  US	  data.	  
Economic	  Synopses	   from	  The	   Federal	  Reserve	   Bank	  of	  St.	  Louis	  
QE	   increased	   the	  liquidity	   in	   the	   money	  market.	  
Wu	  (2008)	  
To	  examine	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  liquidity	  provisions	   run	  by	   the	   Fed	   on	  reducing	   risk	  premium.	  
OLS	  regression	  on	  non-­‐arbitrage	  model	  
TAF	  had	  particular	  effect	  on	   reducing	   risk	  premium	   through	  relieving	   liquidity	  concerns	   of	   financial	  institutions	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Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
 As	   we	   saw	   in	   the	   literature	   review,	   the	   conventional	   links	   between	   official	  interest	   rates	   and	   market	   rates	   virtually	   broke	   in	   the	   UK,	   US	   and	   Euro	   zone,	  during	   the	   recent	   financial	   crisis.	  The	  demand	   for	  a	   risk	  premium	   in	   interbank	  lending	   increased	   dramatically	   due	   to	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   the	   credit	   position	   of	  counter	  parties.	  This	  resulted	  in	  excessive	  LIBOR	  rates,	  especially	  in	  the	  UK.	  This	  dried	   up	   the	   liquidity	   in	   the	   interbank	   market	   and	   resulted	   in	   a	   worsening	  lending	  environment	  to	  commercials.	  To	  ease	  liquidity	  conditions,	  central	  banks	  put	   into	   effect	   a	   series	   of	   unconventional	   operations	   aiming	   to	   inject	   money	  directly	  into	  the	  economy.	  To	  understand	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  these	  polices,	  BoE	  (2007)	  and	  BIS	  (2008)	  developed	  a	  risk	  decomposition	  model	  trying	  to	  study	  the	  balance	   of	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   risk	   in	   the	   risk	   premium.	   This	  risk-­‐decomposing	   model	   together	   with	   a	   non-­‐arbitrage	   model	   provides	   the	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  our	  research.	  	  Our	   research	   questions	   explore	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   those	   unconventional	  policies	  to	  reduce	  risk	  premium	  and	  how	  they	  affected	  the	  relationship	  between	  liquidity	   and	   credit	   risks	   during	   the	   crisis.	   This	   chapter	   presents	   the	   research	  plan	   of	   the	   study,	   definition	   of	   variables,	   the	   data	   collection	   process	   and	  econometrics	   approaches.	   Section	   4.1	   reviews	   the	   aspects	   that	   the	   research	  covers.	  Section	  4.2	  represents	   the	   theorectical	   framework.	  Section	  4.3	  presents	  definition	   of	   variables	   and	   the	   static	   model	   of	   the	   study	   that	   is	   derived	   from	  theorectical	   framework.	   Section	   4.4	   defines	   the	   sample	   period	   and	   section	   4.5	  shows	  the	  econometric	  approach.	  
 
4.1 Research Plan 
 The	   research	   focuses	   on	   the	   evaluation	   of	   effectiveness	   of	   central	   banks’	  innovative	   interventions	   to	   reduce	   LIBOR	   spreads	   and	   how	   the	   relationship	  between	   liquidity	   and	   credit	   risks	  were	   changed	   in	   the	   crisis.	   There	   are	   three	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main	  approaches.	  
	  The	   first	   is	   to	   study	   the	   factors(s)	   that	   drove	   up	   the	   spread.	   Current	   work	  regarding	  this	  question	  suggests	  that	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  risk	  were	  the	  two	  possible	   sources	   of	   this	   increase.	   However,	   there	   is	   no	   explicit	   and	   identical	  empirical	  evidence	  to	  support	  this	  hypothesis.	  For	  example,	  Michaud	  and	  Upper	  (2008)	   suggested	   that	   the	   liquidity	   premium	   contributed	   to	   the	   spread	   by	  decomposing	  the	  risk	  premium	  whereas	  Taylor	  and	  Williams	  (2009)	  argued	  that	  liquidity	  factors	  played	  no	  additional	  role,	  using	  a	  no-­‐arbitrage	  model.	  Moreover,	  as	  the	  crisis	  developed,	  some	  researchers	  e.g.	  Eisenschmidt	  and	  Tapking	  (2009)	  and	  McAndrews	  and	  Skere	  (2009)	  tended	  to	  agree	  that	  credit	  risk	  alone	  couldn’t	  drive	   up	   the	   spread	   dramatically.	   There	   should	   be	   a	   role	   for	   liquidity	   factor	   –	  banks	   funding	   liquidity	   or	   payment	   liquidity	   shocks.	   These	   conflicting	   results	  may	  largely	  be	  due	  to	  the	  continuing	  unfolding	  event	  and	  the	  consequent	  short	  period	  of	  available	  data,	  when	  those	  researches	  were	  carried	  out.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  worth	  further	  investigation	  in	  this	  question.	  	  The	  second	  aspect	  is	  to	  study	  the	  liquidity	  interventions	  that	  central	  banks	  used	  to	   save	   markets	   during	   the	   crisis.	   By	   investigating	   the	   nature	   and	   features	   of	  each	   facility,	   it	   will	   help	   on	   not	   only	   in	   identifying	   the	   type	   of	   risk	   premium	  contained	   in	  the	  spread	  but	  also	  give	  the	  opportunity	  to	  evaluate	  the	  strengths	  and	  weakness	   of	   the	   techniques	   for	   future	   use.	   Interventions	   can	   be	   split	   into	  conventional	  and	  unconventional.	  The	  conventional	  actions	  are	  those	  of	  reducing	  the	  official	  rate	  of	  interest	  and	  increasing	  the	  length	  and	  amount	  that	  banks	  can	  borrow	   from	   the	   discount	   window.	   The	   unconventional	   interventions	   are,	   for	  example,	   in	   the	   US,	   to	   establish	   new	   lending	   facilities	   both	   to	   inject	   massive	  liquidity	   to	   banking	   system	   (Term	   Auction	   Facility,	   TAF)	   and	   to	   provide	   high	  quality	   collateral	   for	   the	   markets	   (Term	   Securities	   Lending	   Facility,	   TSLF).	  Moreover,	  since	  investment	  banks	  and	  brokers	  are	  unable	  to	  access	  the	  discount	  window	   so	   to	   TAF,	   Fed	   created	   Primary	   Dealer	   Credit	   Facility	   (PDCF)	   for	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4.2 Theoretical Framework 
	  
4.2.1	  The	  Risk	  Decomposition	  Model	  
	  According	   to	   the	   expectations	   hypothesis	   of	   term	   structure	   of	   interest	   rate,	  overnight	  lending	  should	  be	  close	  substitute	  for	  term	  lending	  because	  the	  rate	  of	  interest	  paid	  on	  term	  lending	  should	  be	  same	  as	  rolling	  over	  overnight	   lending	  over	   the	   same	   period.	   However,	   Michaud	   and	   Upper	   (2008)	   pointed	   out	   that	  there	  are	  factors	  that	  may	  drive	  a	  wedge	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  lending	  and	  the	  corresponding	  rates.	  The	  factors	  are	  mainly	  nested	  in	  the	  term	  structure	  of	  interest.	   They	   include	   counterparty	   (credit)	   risk,	   liquidity	   factors	   and	   term	  premium	   that	   may	   be	   paid	   due	   to	   uncertainty	   about	   the	   future	   movement	   of	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rates.	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  under	  the	  normal	  market	  condition,	  a	  small	  spread	  between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  rates	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  observed.	  However,	  when	   market	   conditions	   worsen,	   the	   spread	   may	   widen	   due	   to	   the	   increased	  credit	  risk,	  worse	  liquidity	  condition	  or	  both.	   	  
	  BoE	  (2007)	  tried	  to	  decompose	  the	  spread	  between	  12-­‐month	  LIBOR	  and	  OIS	  in	  the	  pound,	  US	  dollar	  and	  Euro	  into	  credit	  premia	  and	  non-­‐credit	  premia	  using	  an	  adjusted	  ten-­‐day	  moving	  average	  during	  the	  period	  January	  2006	  to	  November	  2007.	   LIBOR	   is	   an	   unsecured	   lending	   rate	   because	   it	   is	   not	   collateralized.	   It	  reflects	   current	   and	  expected	   future	   interest	   rates,	   credit	  premia,	   and	   liquidity	  and	   other	   premia	   that	   have	   been	   created	   by	   market	   structure	   and	   trading	  procedures.	   Therefore,	   the	   spread	   LIBOR	   –	   OIS	   contains	   credit	   and	   non-­‐credit	  premia.	   The	   Bank	   used	   the	   CDS	   spreads	   for	   LIBOR	   banks	   as	   proxy	   of	   credit	  premia	   so	   the	  difference	  between	  CDS	   spread	  and	  LIBOR	  –	  OIS	  will	   reflect	   the	  non-­‐credit	   premia.	   The	   results	   indicated	   that	   across	   all	   currencies,	   non	  credit-­‐premia	  had	  contributed	  to	  the	  widening	  risk	  premium	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis	  i.e.	  end	  of	  August	  to	  September	  2007	  because	  the	  funding	  requirements	  for	  banks’	  off	  balance	  sheet	  vehicles	  were	  unclear	  so	  that	  banks	  were	  hoarding	  liquidity	   due	   to	   the	   uncertainty	   about	   both	   their	   own	   and	   counterparties’	  
	   94	  
funding	  position.	  However,	  since	  October	  2007,	  credit	  premia	  across	  currencies	  had	   increased	  alongside	   the	   increase	   in	  LIBOR	  –	  OIS	   spread37.	  The	  BoE	  argued	  that	   this	   movement	   appeared	   to	   be	   attributed	   to	   the	   large	   write-­‐down	   of	  mortgage-­‐backed	   securities	   and	   leveraged	   loan	   commitments	   for	  banks.	   It	  was	  also	  consistent	  with	  the	  market	  concerns	  about	  capital	  adequacy	  of	  banks	  after	  large	  write-­‐downs.	  	  Following	   BoE’s	   research,	   Michaud	   and	   Uppers	   (2008)	   decomposed	   interbank	  risk	   premium	   spread	   into	   bank	   specific	   and	  market	   factors.	   The	   bank	   specific	  factor	   contains	   risk	   of	   default	   i.e.	   credit	   risk	   and	   funding	   position/liquidity	  relating	   to	   the	   borrowing	   bank.	   It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   two	   elements	   in	   the	   bank	  specific	  factor	  are	  not	  completely	  independent	  because	  a	  bank	  with	  higher	  risk	  of	  default	   will	   find	   it	   more	   difficult	   to	   obtain	   funds	   in	   the	  market	   so	   its	   funding	  position	   tends	   to	   be	   worse.	   The	  market	   factor	   includes	   uncertainty	   about	   the	  path	   of	   expected	   overnight	   rates	   i.e.	   the	   term	   premium,	   trading	   conditions	   i.e.	  market	  liquidity	  and	  elements	  attached	  to	  the	  fixing	  process	  in	  interbank	  market	  and	  the	  microstructure	  of	  the	  market.	   	  	  
4.2.2	  The	  Non-­‐Arbitrage	  Model	  	  The	  model	  shows	  how	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  (here:	  Libor	  with	  maturity	  n	  and	  denoted	   as	   ( )nti 	   )	   are	   related	   to	   short-­‐term	   interest	   rates	   (here:	   the	   overnight	  rate	  denoted	  as	   (1)ti ).	  The	  model	  was	  developed	  by	  Ang	  and	  Piazzesi	  (2003)	  and	  was	   used	   by	   Taylor	   and	   Williams	   (2009)	   to	   model	   the	   effect	   of	   TAF	   on	   the	  interbank	  spread	  in	  the	  US.	  	  The	   model	   can	   conveniently	   be	   summarized	   by	   four	   equations	   which	   take	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	   BoE	  (2008)	  mentioned	  that	  the	  spread	  of	  LIBOR	  –	  OIS	  first	  observed	  decrease	  from	  its	  peak	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  October	  2007	  and	  then	  increased	  on	  November	  2007.	  However,	  the	  spread	  still	  remained	  elevated	  compared	  with	  pre	  crisis	  period.	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interest	   rate	   expectations	   and	   risk	   into	   account	   in	   the	   determination	   of	  long-­‐term	   yields.	   The	   continuously	   compounded	   yield	   (or	   spot	   rate)	   of	   an	  n-­‐period	  discount	   bond	   at	   date	   t	   is	   denoted	   as	   ( )nti and	  defined	  by	   equation	  1).	  The	   price	   of	   a	   discount	   bond	   in	   period	   t	   of	   maturity	   (n+1)	   is	   the	   expected	  discounted	  cash	  flow	  (which	  is	  here	  the	  discounted	  price)	  of	  the	  bond	  in	  t+1	  as	  shown	  in	  equation	  2).	  The	  stochastic	  discount	  factor38	   is	  denoted	  by	   1tm + 	   and	  is	  determined	   by	   equation	   3).	   	   This	   equation	   conveniently	   introduces	   the	  overnight	   interest	   rate	   (1)ti and	   the	   market	   price	   of	   risk	   tλ 	   into	   the	   discount	  factor	   and	   thus	   into	   long-­‐term	   yields.	   Furthermore,	   1tε + 	   is	   a	   random	   variable	  with	   mean	   zero	   and	   the	   market	   price	   of	   risk	   is	   associated	   with	   sources	   of	  uncertainty	  ( 1t tλε + 	   ).	  If	  the	  price	  of	  risk	  is	  zero,	  then	  the	  stochastic	  discount	  factor	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  overnight	  interest	  rate	   (1)ti .	  In	  this	  case,	  only	  expectations	  of	  future	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  matter	  for	  the	  current	  yield	  of	  long-­‐term	  bonds.	  When	   	  
tλ 	   is	  not	   equal	   to	   zero,	   then	   risk	   factors	   also	  determine	   the	  yield	  of	   long-­‐term	  assets.39	   Lastly,	  equation	  4)	  determines	   the	  price	  of	  risk	   in	  relation	  to	  a	  vector	  
tx 	   	   which	  contains	  variables	  that	  may	  influence	  risk.	  These	  four	  equations	  imply	  that	  LIBOR	  at	  maturity	  n	  depends	  on	  expectations	  of	  future	  overnight	  rates	  and	  risk	   factors.	  Following	  Taylor	  and	  Williams	  (2009),	  we	  use	   the	  overnight	   index	  swap	  (OIS)	  to	  measure	  the	  average	  of	  expected	  overnight	  interest	  rates.40	   Thus,	  the	  difference	  between	  Libor	  and	  OIS,	  the	  Libor	  spread,	  measures	  the	  risk	  in	  the	  Libor	  rate.	   	  	   1) 𝑖!! =   −𝑛!!𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃! ! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	   The	  stochastic	  discount	  factor	  is	  a	  random	  variable	  and	  depends	  on	  the	  state	  of	  the	  economy.	  For	  instance,	  the	  stochastic	  discount	  factor	  in	  state	  1	  of	  the	  economy	  equals	  the	  price	  of	  the	  asset	  in	  state	  1	  divided	  by	  the	  probability	  of	  state	  1.	  Thus,	  the	  price	  of	  an	  asset	  over	  all	  states	  is	  the	  expected	  product	  of	  the	  discount	  factor	  and	  the	  payoff	  of	  the	  asset	  across	  all	  states	  as	  described	  in	  equation	  2).	  39	   The	  functional	  form	  of	  this	  equation	  is	  assumed	  by	  Ang	  and	  Piazzesi	  (2003),	  page	  759.	  40	   The	  reasons	  for	  OIS	  to	  be	  used	  as	  proxy	  of	  risk-­‐free	  rate	  are	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3.1.	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2) 𝑃! !!! = 𝐸![𝑚!!!𝑃!!!! ]	  
3) 𝑚!!! = 𝑒𝑥𝑝  (−𝑖!! −   0.5𝜆!! −   𝜆!𝜀!!!)	  4) 𝜆! =   −𝛾! −   𝛾!𝑥!	  	  Having	   established	   that	   risk	   plays	   a	   role	   in	   determining	   the	   LIBOR	   spread	  (LIBOR	  –	  OIS),	  we	  follow	  Michaud	  and	  Upper	  (2008)	  in	  the	  risk	  decomposition	  of	  the	  LIBOR	  spread.	  So,	  the	  spread	  between	  three-­‐month	  LIBOR	  and	  OIS	  i.e.	  LIBOR	  –	  OIS	  (LMO)	  can	  be	  written	  as:	  	   5)	   𝐿𝑀𝑂 = 𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡  𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 + 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑎41 + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠	  	  The	   variable	   ‘𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠′ 	   represents	   elements	   that	   have	   impacts	   on	   the	   risk	  premium	   but	   are	   difficult	   to	   be	   quantified	   and	   proxied	   i.e.	   the	   bank-­‐specific	  funding	  liquidity	  and	  the	  market	  microstructure	  of	  LIBOR	  market	  (Michaud	  and	  Upper,	  2008)42.	  According	   to	  Michaud	  and	  Upper,	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	  quantify	  the	  above	  elements	  and	   literatures	  delegate	  this	  variable	  to	  the	  residuals	  (BoE,	  2007;	  Michaud	  and	  Upper,	  2008;	  Taylor	  and	  Williams,	  2009),	  so	  we	  follow	  this	  procedure.	  The	  Equation	  5)	  proves	  the	  BoE’s	  indicative	  risk	  decomposing	  model	  and	  links	  the	  two	  bodies	  of	  theories	  together.	  	  To	   facilitate	   the	   theoretical	   model	   i.e.	   Equation	   5),	   selection	   of	   proxy	   for	   the	  components	  is	  very	  important.	  For	  example,	  this	  model	  does	  not	  consider	  term	  premium	   (which	   is	   an	   element	   to	   influence	   LIBOR	   rate	   according	   to	   term	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	   The	  liquidity	  premia	  include	  both	  market	  liquidity	  and	  banks’	  themselves	  funding	  position.	  42	   Michaud	  and	  Upper	  (2008)	  further	  distinguish	  liquidity	  premia	  in	  terms	  of	  funding	  liquidity	  of	  banks	  and	  market	  liquidity	  of	  trading,	  but	  they	  adjust	  that	  banks-­‐specific	  funding	  liquidity	  is	  hard	  to	  measure	   	   (e.g.	  by	  liquidity	  ratios	  and	  the	  size	  of	  potential	  commitment)	  systematically	  at	  a	  relevant	  frequency,	  so	  they	  treat	  banks-­‐specific	   funding	   liquidity	   and	  microstructure	   effects	   as	   unobserved	   variables	  whose	   effects	  will	   be	  captured	  by	  the	  residuals	  in	  the	  regression.	  If	  the	  coefficients	  of	  regressors	  are	  significant,	  it	  implies	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  two	  elements	  should	  be	  very	  small.	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structure	   of	   interest	   rate)	   so	   instruments	   employed	   are	   ideally	   to	   have	   same	  term	  to	  maturity	   in	  order	  to	  offset	   term	  premium.	  The	  next	  section	  defines	  the	  variables	  to	  substitute	  the	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  components.	  	  
4.3 Definition of Variables 
 The	  theoretical	  model	  tells	  that	  the	  aggregate	  risk	  premium	  in	  interbank	  market	  is	   driven	   by	   credit	   risk	   associated	   with	   the	   participating	   banks,	   the	   liquidity	  condition	  of	  both	  the	  market	  and	  banks	  themselves,	  and	  market	  microstructure	  whose	   effect	   is	   included	   in	   the	   residuals.	   It	   is	   worth	  mentioning	   that	   the	   risk	  premium	  may	   also	   contain	   a	   term	   premium	   related	   to	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   the	  future	   path	   of	   short-­‐term	   interest	   rates.	   In	   our	   research,	   the	   term	   premium	  should	  be	  very	  little	  because	  we	  use	  short-­‐term	  instruments	  with	  same	  maturity.	  	  The	  risk	  premium	  is	  measured	  by	   the	  spread	  between	  three-­‐month	  LIBOR	  and	  three-­‐month	  OIS	  (LMO).43	   It	  is	  the	  indicator	  of	  the	  health	  of	  the	  banking	  system	  (Thornton,	   2009).	   The	   interbank	   lending	   rate,	   LIBOR,	   reflects	   both	   credit	   risk	  concern	  for	  the	  lending	  party	  and	  the	  liquidity	  factor	  effect	  e.g.	  the	  liquidity	  for	  the	   lending	   and	   borrowing	   bank	   and	   the	   liquidity	   of	   funding	   condition	   in	   the	  market.	  The	  LIBOR	  rate	  also	  contains	  agents’	  expectation	  of	  future	  interest	  rates.	  OIS	  is	  a	  financial	  derivative.	  It	  does	  not	  contain	  credit	  risk	  because	  the	  contract	  is	  collateralized.	   The	   liquidity	   premium	   underlying	   an	   OIS	   contract	   is	   also	   very	  slight	  because	  it	  does	  not	  require	  the	  exchange	  of	  principle	  at	  the	  beginning	  and	  only	  the	  amount	  of	   interest	  difference	  will	  be	  exchanged	  at	  the	  end	  of	  contract.	  The	  main	  determinant	  in	  OIS	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  agents’	  expectation	  of	  movement	  of	  future	  bank	  rate,	  which	  fits	  the	  terms	  from	  the	  non-­‐arbitrage	  model.	  Therefore,	  the	   difference	   between	   LIBOR	   and	   OIS	   is	   employed	   to	   represent	   the	   risk	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	   In	  the	  EMU	  sample,	  we	  take	  European	  interbank	  offered	  rate	  (Euribor)	  in	  Euro	  currency	  instead	  of	  using	  LIBOR	  in	  Euro	  panel,	  because	  banks	  bidding	  Euribor	  are	  very	  different	  from	  banks	  bidding	  in	  LIBOR	  Euro	  panel	   so	  Euribor	  will	   reveal	   specific	   information	  of	   the	  EMU	   interbank	  market.	  The	  symbol	   to	  denote	   the	  Euribor	  –	  OIS	  spread	  is	  EMO.	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premium	  in	  the	  money	  market	  in	  our	  research.	   	  	  There	   are	   two	   measurements	   for	   credit	   risk,	   Credit	   Default	   Swap	   (CDS)	   and	  LIBOR	  –	  Repo	  (LMR).44	   CDS	  is	  an	  insurance	  policy	  on	  corporate	  debt	  i.e.	  bond	  or	  loan	  where	  the	  buyer	  of	  CDS	  pays	  a	  quarterly	  premium	  and	  the	  seller	  promises	  to	  cover	  the	  loss	  in	  case	  of	  default.	  In	  the	  research,	  the	  data	  contains	  the	  median	  of	  5	  year	  CDS	  rates	   for	  LIBOR	  banks.	  Therefore,	   the	  CDS	   index	  of	  LIBOR	  banks	  used	  in	  this	  research	  is	  an	  indicator	  of	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk.	  However,	  CDS	  as	  a	  credit	   risk	   measurement	   has	   disadvantages	   when	   it	   comes	   to	   explaining	   the	  LIBOR	   and	   OIS	   spread.	   The	   first	   is	   due	   to	   the	  mismatch	   of	  maturity	  with	   risk	  premium,	  which	   is	  noted	   in	  Michaud	  and	  Uppers	   (2008).	  The	  second	   is	  mainly	  due	   to	   the	   rules	   of	   trading	   of	   CDS.	   To	   hold	   a	   company’s	   CDS,	   traders	   are	   not	  necessary	   required	   to	   hold	   the	   company’s	   debts.	   Therefore,	   speculators	   can	  purchase	   CDS	  without	   holding	   a	   company’s	   debt	  when	   they	   believe	   the	   credit	  concern	   for	   the	   company	   becomes	   an	   issue.	   Therefore,	   the	   price	   of	   CDS	   may	  augment	   the	   real	   level	   of	   credit	   risk	   of	   a	   company.	   We	   use	   CDS	   as	   a	  complimentary	  measure	  of	  credit	  risk.	  	  The	  other	  credit	  risk	  measurement	  LMR	  represents	  the	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  by	  selecting	   three-­‐month	   LIBOR	   and	   three-­‐month	   Repo.	   Repo	   rate	   is	   a	   rate	   of	  lending	  contract	  backed	  by	  government	  bonds.	  It	   is	  a	  representative	  of	   interest	  rates	   on	   high	   quality	   secured	   lending.	   The	   spread	   between	   LIBOR	   and	   Repo	  reflects	   the	   risk	   of	   default	   repayment	   on	   loans	   in	   the	   interbank	   market.	   It	   is	  therefore	  another	   type	  of	  measure	   for	  credit	  risk	  premia	  (Taylor	  and	  Williams,	  2009	   and	   Angelini	   et	   al.,	   2011)	   i.e.	   the	   difference	   between	   unsecured	   and	  secured	  lending	  rates.	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	   In	  the	  EMU	  sample,	  the	  measure	  is	  calculated	  as	  Euribor	  –	  Repo	  and	  both	  are	  European	  interbank	  instruments.	  The	  symbol	  to	  denote	  is	  EMR.	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We	   use	   Repo	   –	   OIS	   (RMO)	   as	   a	   proxy	   for	   liquidity	   risk.	   This	   measure	   is	   a	  market-­‐based	  measure	  and	  it	  need	  some	  justifications,	  because	  it	  is	  not	  used	  as	  proxy	  of	  liquidity	  premium	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  interbank	  lending	  spreads.	  	  Both	  Repo	  and	  OIS	  are	  secured	  lending.	  Like	  any	  other	  financial	  market,	  the	  repo	  market	   is	   subject	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   risks,	   such	   as	   credit	   risk,	   liquidity	   risk	   and	  operational	   risk 45 	   (BIS,	   1999).	   A	   major	   potential	   for	   the	   development	   of	  counterparty	  risk	  exposure	  is	  the	  volatility	  of	  the	  price	  of	  the	  collateral	  and	  the	  quality	   of	   the	   collateral.	   However,	   counterparty	   risk	   is	   minimised	   through	   a	  variety	   of	   risk	   management	   tools,	   including	   initial	   margins,	   daily	  marking-­‐to-­‐market	   of	   the	   collateral,	   position	   limits	   with	   counterparties	   and	  concentration	  limits	  for	  specific	  securities	  (Hördahl	  and	  King,	  2008).	  Therefore,	  the	   risk	   embedded	   in	   the	   repo	   spread	  may	   be	   regarded	   as	  mostly	   liquidity	   in	  nature.	   	  	  Liquidity	   risk	  affects	   the	   repo	  spread	   through	   the	   following	  channels.	  A	   typical	  repo	   trader	   is	   specialised	   and	   focused	   on	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   bonds	   in	   a	  particular	   segment	   of	   the	   yield	   curve.	   Therefore,	   traders	   may	   not	   be	   well	  diversified	  and	  their	  trading	  positions	  may	  be	  exposed	  to	  idiosyncratic	  liquidity	  shocks,	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  liquidity	  risk	  premium	  in	  the	  repo	  spread.	  Other	  types	  of	  liquidity	   risk	  may	   arise	   in	   the	   repo	  market.	   One	   type	   of	   liquidity	   risk	  may	   be	  related	   to	   re-­‐financing	   difficulties	   and	   can	   arise	   from	   over-­‐reliance	   on	   very	  short-­‐term	  funding	  resources	  and	  an	  institution	  may	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  roll	  over	  maturing	   repos.	   Another	   source	   of	   liquidity	   risk	   is	   associated	   with	   the	  liquidation	  of	  collateral,	  as	  for	  instance	  in	  the	  event	  of	  default	  of	  the	  counterparty.	  If	  markets	  become	  illiquid,	  for	  instance,	  due	  to	  market	  stress,	  the	  exposure	  may	  become	  under-­‐collateralised	  if	  the	  collateral	  can	  only	  be	  sold	  at	  a	  discount.	  Repo	  rates	  reflect	   these	   liquidity	  premia.	  Empirical	  evidence	   is	  provided	  by	  Buraschi	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	   Operational	  risk	  is	  related	  to	  the	  transaction	  structure	  and	  legal	  procedures.	  Operational	  risk	  will	  be	  incorporated	  in	  the	  repo	  rate,	  but	  due	  to	  its	  institutional	  character,	  we	  can	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  constant	  over	  the	  time	  period	  we	  are	  considering	  here.	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and	   Menini	   (2002),	   who	   show	   that	   the	   deviation	   from	   the	   expectations	  hypothesis	   is	  due	  to	  a	  time-­‐varying	  risk	  premium	  which	  they	  relate	  to	   liquidity	  risk	  being	  still	  embedded	  in	  the	  repo	  spread.	   	  	  Therefore,	   based	   on	   the	   above	   definitions	   of	   variables,	   the	   Equation	   5)	   can	   be	  proxied	  as	   	   𝐿𝑀𝑂 = 𝐿𝑀𝑅  (𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐶𝐷𝑆)+ 𝑅𝑀𝑂 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠	  	  where	   LMO	  =	   Total	   risk	   premium,	   LMR	  =	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	   and	  CDS	   =	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium,	   and	   RMO	   =	   liquidity	   premium.	  Note	  we	  have	  two	  measurements	  for	  credit	  risk	  premium,	  LMR	  (LIBOR	  –	  Repo)	  and	  CDS	  (5-­‐year	   LIBOR	   bank	   CDS	  median).	  We	   use	   the	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	  LMR	  as	  the	  main	  proxy	  of	  credit	  risk	  premium	  and	  use	  the	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  CDS	  as	  the	  complement.	   	  	  Ratio	  variable	  is	  used	  as	  the	  proxy	  for	  the	  QE	  operations.	  The	  Ratio	  variable	  for	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	  samples,	  respectively,	   is	  defined	  as	  the	  accumulated	  amount	  of	  purchase	  of	  QE	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  total	  bank	  assets.	  And,	  the	  Ratio	  variable	  for	  the	  EMU	  sample	  is	  calculated	   as	   the	   amount	   of	   liquidity	   that	   had	   been	   provided	   under	   Open	   Market	  Operation	  (OMO)	  and	  Covered	  Bond	  Purchase	  Programme	  (CBPP)	  with	  respect	  to	  total	  banks	   assets.	   The	   way	   that	   we	   construct	   the	   Ratio	   allows	   us	   to	   say	   by	   how	   much	  percentage	   liquidity	   to	   credit	   risk	   change	   in	   response	   to	   a	   one	   percent	   change	   in	   the	  Ratio.	   	  	  
4.4 Data Collection 	  Our	   sample	   of	   the	   three	   national	  markets	   starts	   from	   the	   first	   day	   on	   January	  2004	   for	   which	   data	   on	   all	   instruments	   are	   available.	   This	   provides	   sufficient	  data	  for	  pre-­‐crisis	  periods.	  The	  end	  date	  is	  different	  among	  markets	  because	  the	  operation	  of	  intervention	  varies	  in	  the	  three	  countries.	  The	  data	  in	  this	  study	  was	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collected	   from	  mixed	   sources.	   The	  LIBOR	  and	   repo	   rates	   and	  LIBOR	  bank	  CDS	  premia	   were	   collected	   from	   Datastream.	   The	   data	   of	   OIS	   was	   collected	   from	  Reuters	   3000	   Xtra.	   Both	   data	   bases	   are	   reliable	   and	   are	   widely	   used	   by	  researchers.	  The	  data	  are	  real	  historical	   trading	  data	  (not	   for	  LIBOR	  due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  LIBOR).	  We	  have	  used	  daily	  data	  in	  the	  study	  to	  allow	  for	  more	  degrees	  of	   freedom	  in	   the	  statistical	   tests	  as	  well	  as	  reflecting	   the	   fast	  moving	  speed	  of	  money	  market.	   	  	  For	   the	  UK,	   the	  data	  set	  ends	  on	  September	  30,	  2012.	  The	  sample	  was	  divided	  into	  three	  periods,	  pre-­‐crisis,	  crisis	  and	  post-­‐crisis	  periods.	  The	  crisis	  period	  was	  then	   split	   into	  pre-­‐QE	  period	  and	  QE	  period.	  The	  key	   is	   to	  determine	   the	   start	  date	  of	  2007	  financial	  crisis	  but	  it	  is	  not	  easy	  to	  define	  precisely	  when	  the	  exact	  start	   date	   of	   the	   financial	   crisis	   hit.	   The	   spread	   between	   term	   lending	   and	  overnight	   lending	   started	   to	  widen	   on	   July	   18,	   2007	   from	  11	   basis	   points	   and	  kept	   climbing	   rapidly	   to	  300	  basis	  points	  on	  November	  16,	  2008.	  Two	  months	  later	  after	  the	  observed	  break	  on	  term	  and	  overnight	  lending,	  Victoria	  Mortgage	  Funding	   became	   the	   first	   UK	   mortgage	   company	   that	   failed	   in	   the	   crisis	   on	  September	  10,	  2007.	  Then,	  Northern	  Rock	   requested	   lender	  of	   last	   resort	  help	  from	  BoE	  three	  days	   later.	  Moreover,	   the	  Credit	  Condition	  Survey	  published	  by	  the	  BoE	  on	  September	  26,	  2007	  pointed	  out	  that	  lenders	  reduced	  the	  funding	  to	  corporates	  over	  the	   last	  three	  months	  and	  they	  forecast	  that	  the	  recent	  market	  movements	   would	   significantly	   weaken	   banks’	   capacity	   to	   roll	   over	   corporate	  credit	   in	   the	   following	   three	  months.	  This	   tells	  us	   that	  severe	  credit	  conditions	  for	  corporates	  would	  be	  expected	  in	  the	  future.	  On	  the	  same	  day,	  BoE	  announced	  the	  first	  term	  auction.	  It	  was	  to	  lend	  cash	  against	  broader	  range	  of	  collaterals	  i.e.	  not	   only	   highest	   quality	   securities	   than	   those	   used	   in	   conventional	   market	  operations.	  Based	  on	  Moody’s	  scale	  the	  qualified	  securities	  extended	  to	  G10	  and	  EEA	   sovereign	   paper	   with	   rating	   down	   to	   BBB,	   the	   bond	   issued	   by	   the	  government	  guaranteed	  agencies	  with	  rating	  down	  to	  A3	  and	  other	  marketable	  senior	  corporate	  debt	  and	  commercial	  papers	  with	  rating	  A1	  or	  higher.	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  The	  onset	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  seemed	  to	  appear	  earlier	  in	  the	  US	  and	  Europe.	  On	  June	  22,	  2007	  the	  American	  investment	  bank	  Bear	  Stearns	  failed.	  On	  August	  09,	  2007,	  BNP	  Paribas	  suspended	  calculation	  of	   three	  of	   their	  assets	   that	  were	  exposed	   to	   subprime	  mortgage	   and	  halt	   the	   redemption.	  On	   the	   same	  day,	   the	  ECB	  provided	  €95	  billion	  of	  overnight	   liquidity,	  which	  was	  the	   first	  emergency	  injection	  in	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  	  However,	   alongside	   those	   market	   events	   and	   BoE’s	   special	   term	   auctions,	   the	  Monetary	   Policy	   Committee	   (MPC)	   voted	   to	   raise	   the	   Bank’s	   base	   rate	   by	   25	  basis	   points	   to	   575	   basis	   points	   on	   July	   05,	   2007	   and	   maintained	   it	   until	  December	  06,	  2007	  when	  it	  cut	  the	  base	  rate	  for	  the	  first	  time	  since	  August	  2005	  by	  25	  basis	  points	  to	  550.	  Following	  the	  first	  cut,	  the	  BoE	  gradually	  reduced	  the	  base	  rate	  during	  the	  whole	  of	  2008	  and	  beginning	  of	  2009	  when	  it	  reduced	  the	  rate	   to	  50	  basis	  points	   on	  March	  05,	   2009.	  The	   largest	   cut	   of	   150	  basis	  points	  happened	  on	  November	   06,	   2008,	   the	   same	  day	   as	   the	  widest	   spread	   on	   term	  and	  overnight	  lending	  happened.	  On	  March	  05,	  2009,	  BoE	  also	  announced	  a	  £75	  billion	  Asset	  Purchase	  Programme	   to	  directly	  purchase	  high	  quality	  public	  and	  private	  assets	   	  	  Therefore,	   there	  are	   four	  possibilities	   for	   the	  start	  date	  of	  2007	  financial	  crisis,	  July	  18,	  2007,	  August	  09,	  2007,	  September	  13,	  2007	  and	  December	  06,	  2007.	  In	  the	  research,	   the	  start	  date	  was	  chosen	  on	  August	  09,	  2007	  when	  BNP	  Paribas	  signal	   the	  sign	  of	   failure	  and	  ECB	   injected	   the	   first	   liquidity.	  The	  reason	   is	   that	  the	   break	   on	   term	   and	   overnight	   lending	   could	   be	   induced	   by	   a	   temporary	  exogenous	  or	  endogenous	  disturbance.	  Once	  the	  shock	  has	  been	  absorbed	  by	  the	  market	  the	  spread	  could	  go	  back	  to	  normal	  naturally	  without	  triggering	  further	  turbulence.	  Thus,	  the	  day	  July	  18,	  2007	  is	  not	  convincing	  as	  the	  start	  date	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  However,	   the	  day	  December	  06,	  2007	   is	   too	   late	   to	  be	   the	  start	  date	   because	   the	   BoE	   had	   already	   implemented	   operations	   to	   ease	   market	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conditions	  on	  September	  2007.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  one	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  financial	  crisis.	  Therefore,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  treat	  the	  day	  August	  09,	  2007	  as	  the	  start	  date	  of	  2007	  financial	  crisis	  in	  the	  UK	  because	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  trigger	  for	   BoE	   to	   implement	   unconventional	  market	   operations	   to	   prevent	   spread	   of	  bank	   run	   in	   the	   system	   and	   help	   ease	   funding	   conditions.	   The	   day	   August	   09,	  2007	  is	  also	  set	  to	  be	  start	  date	  of	  crisis	   in	  the	  US	  and	  Euro	  zone	  as	   literatures	  suggested	   (see	   Taylors	   and	   Williams,	   2009,	   Michaud	   and	   Upper,	   2008	   and	  Schwarz,	  2010).	  This	  conditions	  the	  comparison	  of	  results	  between	  countries.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  end	  date	  of	  the	  crisis	  period	  is	  arguable.	  For	  example,	  Trichet	  argued	  in	  his	  speech	  on	  December	  03,	  2010	  (Trichet,	  2010),	  since	  the	  sovereign	  debt	   crisis	   continued	   and	   government	   bonds	   acted	   as	   a	   benchmark	   for	   the	  pricing	  of	  other	  financial	  contracts	  and	  were	  an	  important	  and	  prime	  source	  of	  collateral	   in	   interbank	   secured	   lending.	   The	   increasing	  market	   concerns	   about	  the	   sustainability	   of	   the	   public	   finances	   in	   May	   2010	   implied	   deterioration	   of	  banks’	   funding	  position	  as	  well	  as	   the	   transmission	  process	  of	  monetary	  policy	  (ibid).	   The	   BoE	   quantitative	   easing	   programme	   was	   still	   running	   to	   relieve	  trading	  and	  credit	  condition	  in	  the	  UK	  in	  late-­‐2013.	  Therefore,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  residual	  effect	  of	   financial	  crisis	  has	  not	  yet	  gone,	  although	  the	  spread	  between	  term	  and	  overnight	  lending	  in	  the	  UK	  started	  to	  fall	  gradually	  since	  reaching	  its	  peak	   on	   November	   06,	   2008	   and	   eventually	   settled	   at	   20	   basis	   points	   on	  September	  29,	  2009	  and	  remains	  around	  20	  base	  points	  with	  small	  deviation,	  as	  in	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period.	  However,	  the	  first	  round	  quantitative	  easing	  finished	  on	  June	  24,	  2010	   in	   the	  UK.	  Therefore,	   the	  end	  day	  of	   financial	  crisis	   is	   set	  on	   the	  day	  for	  the	  UK	  leaving	  the	  rest	  of	  period	  in	  the	  sample	  as	  post-­‐crisis	  period.	   	  	  The	  EMU	  sample	  ends	  on	  May	  5,	  2010	  –	  before	  the	  introduction	  of	  SMP	  on	  May	  10,	  2010	  -­‐	  because	  the	  SMP	  was	  aimed	  at	  the	  sovereign	  crisis,	  which	  is	  not	  within	  the	  scale	  of	  our	  research.	  According	  to	  Trichet	  (2010),	  there	  are	  only	  two	  periods	  in	   the	   EMU	   sample,	   pre-­‐crisis	   and	   crisis	   period.	   The	   crisis	   period	   runs	   from	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August	  09,	  2007	  to	  May	  06,	  2010	  containing	   two	  sub	  periods,	  pre-­‐intervention	  period	  and	  intervention	  period.	  The	  boundary	  is	  set	  a	  day	  before	  the	  collapse	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  on	  September	  15,	  2008.	  After	  the	   failure	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  the	   ECB	   stepped	   further	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	  money	  market	   by	   providing	   extra	  non-­‐standard	  measures	   (see	  Mortimer-­‐Lee,	   2012).	  Moreover,	   the	   consensus	   is	  that	  the	  collapse	  of	  Lehman	  had	  a	  significant	  and	  persistent	  impact	  on	  European	  interbank	   markets	   (see	   Cassola	   and	   Morana,	   2012	   and	   Abbassi	   and	   Linzert,	  2012).	   Therefore,	   the	   pre-­‐intervention	   period	   runs	   from	   August	   09,	   2007	   to	  September	  12,	  2008	  and	  intervention	  period	  starts	  from	  September	  15,	  2008.	  	  
4.5 The Econometric Model 
 Therefore,	  we	  now	  turn	  to	  the	  econometric	  model	   	  	   6)	   𝑅𝑀𝑂 = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝐿𝑀𝑅  (+𝛼!𝐶𝐷𝑆)+ 𝜀!	  	  Note	  that	  instead	  of	  directly	  testing	  the	  equation	  	   𝐿𝑀𝑂 = 𝐿𝑀𝑅  (𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐶𝐷𝑆)+ 𝑅𝑀𝑂 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠	  	  we	  test	  the	  Equation	  6),	  which	  directly	  looks	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  components	   i.e.	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   risk	   premia	   contained	   in	   the	   risk	  premium.	  If	  they	  have	  a	  positive	  relationship,	  it	  implies	  the	  increase	  of	  the	  total	  risk	  premium	   (LMO)	   in	   the	   interbank	  market.	  Also,	   the	   (+𝛼!𝐶𝐷𝑆)	   means	   that	  we	  first	  test	  the	  relationship	  between	  liquidity	  premia	  and	  the	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  as	   	   𝑅𝑀𝑂 = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝐿𝑀𝑅  + 𝜀!	  	  Following,	  we	   include	  the	   long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  CDS	   in	  the	  regression	  as	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𝑅𝑀𝑂 = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝐿𝑀𝑅  + 𝛼!𝐶𝐷𝑆 + 𝜀!	  Moreover,	   we	   switch	   the	   position	   of	   RMO	   and	   LMR	   to	   test	   for	   the	   Granger	  causality.	  	  This	  approach	  is	  new	  and	  its	  advantages	  1)	  it	  allows	  the	  estimation	  of	  interaction	  between	   two	  main	   components	   in	   the	   risk	   premium;	   2)	   switching	   position	   of	  RMO	   and	   LMR/CDS	   does	   not	   destroy	   the	   theoretical	  model	   and	   facilitates	   the	  estimation	   of	   causality	   between	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   component;	   3)	   allow	  estimation	  of	  effect	  of	  QE	  on	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  components.	  	  At	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis,	  Taylor	  and	  Williams	  (2009)	  estimated	  and	  tried	  to	  establish	  the	  relationship	  between	  risk	  premium	  and	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	  by	  imposing	  a	  US	  TAF	  dummy	  as	  a	  liquidity	  proxy.	  They	  employed	  a	  simple	  OLS	  and	  AR(1)	   model.	   However,	   their	   approach	   has	   been	   criticised	   because	   the	  estimation	  had	  overlooked	  the	  unit	  root	  problems	  on	  variables	  (see	  McAndrews	  
et	   al,	   2008).	   Theoretically,	   interest	   rates	   should	   be	   stationary	   having	   the	  property	  of	  mean	  reversion	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  This	  was	  the	  case	  before	  the	  crisis.	  Since	  the	  crisis	  hit,	  interest	  rates	  became	  extremely	  turbulent.	  Interest	  rates	  could	  show	  evidence	  of	  non-­‐stationarity.	  Therefore,	   it	   is	  necessary	  to	  test	  for	  unit	   roots	  before	  proceeding	   to	  our	  estimation.	  This	  section	  shows	   the	  unit	  root	   test	   procedures.	   Then,	   the	   cointegration	   and	   error	   correction	  models	   are	  discussed.	  	  
4.5.1	  Unit	  Root	   	  
	  The	   assumptions	   of	   classical	   OLS	   regression	   require	   both	   dependent	   and	  independent	  variables	  are	  stationary,	  that	  is,	  the	  mean	  and	  variance	  are	  constant	  in	  the	  sample	  period	  and	  covariance	  between	  any	  two	  values	  is	  not	  time	  varying.	  Granger	  and	  Newbold	  (1974)	  proved	  that	  as	  a	  result	  of	  non-­‐stationary,	  the	  OLS	  regression	   result	   could	   be	   spurious,	   because	   the	   residuals	   of	   such	   regressions	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are	   non-­‐stationary	   and	   non-­‐stationary	   variables	   do	   not	   have	   the	   property	   of	  mean	  reversion	  (Hill	  et	  al,	  2007,	  p328).	  For	  example,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  stochastic	  trend,	  any	  deviation	  in	  period	  t	  is	  not	  going	  to	  eliminate	  so	  it	  becomes	  permanent	  and	  the	  estimated	  value	  shifts	  away	   from	  mean	  value	   in	   the	   long	  run.	  According	   to	  literatures,	  for	  example,	  Enders	  (2004,	  p158)	  showed	  that	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  interest	   rates	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   random	  walk	   variables	   because	   there	   is	   neither	  obvious	  tendency	  to	  increase	  or	  decrease	  nor	  the	  pronounced	  tendency	  to	  revert	  to	   their	   long-­‐run	  mean.	   Therefore,	   the	   characteristics	   of	   variables	   necessitates	  unit	  root	  test	  in	  the	  research.	   	   	  	  The	  following	  of	  this	  subsection	  reviews	  three	  unit	  root	  test	  procedures,	  Dickey	  Fuller	  (DF),	  Augmented	  Dickey	  Fuller	  (ADF)	  and	  Phillips-­‐Perron.	  ADF	  test	   is	  an	  extension	   of	   the	   DF	   and	   is	   robustness	  with	   the	   serial	   correlation	   in	   residuals.	  High	   frequency	   financial	   data	   show	   time-­‐varying	   volatility	   and	   therefore	  Phillips-­‐Perron	  test	  is	  also	  used.	  
	  
Dickey-­‐Fuller	  Test	  The	  procedure	  starts	  with	  an	  AR	  (1)	  process	  of	  a	  non-­‐stationary	  variable,	  y,	   i.e.	  the	  first-­‐order	  autoregressive	  of	  a	  stochastic	  or	  random	  process.	  The	  Equation	  7	  below	  represents	  that	  the	  value	  of	  y	  at	  the	  present	  period,	  t,	  depends	  on	  its	  value	  on	  the	  previous	  period,	  t-­‐1,	  and	  a	  white	  noise,	   𝜀! .	  	   7)  𝑦! =   𝑎!𝑦!!! +   𝜀!            𝜀!  ~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0,𝜎!)	  	  If	  variable	  y	  has	  unit	  root	  i.e.	  integrate	  to	  order	  1,	  the	  coefficient	   𝑎!	   will	  equal	  to	  one.	   To	   test	   the	   null	   hypothesis,	   the	   re-­‐arrangement	   is	   to	   subtract	   𝑦!!!	   from	  both	  sides	  of	  Equation	  7.	  	   8)  𝑦! −   𝑦!!! =   𝑎!𝑦!!! −   𝑦!!! +   𝜀!	  9)  ∆𝑦! = 𝑎! − 1 𝑦!!! +   𝜀!	  
	   107	  
	  Equation	   9	   is	   the	   simplest	   form	   of	   DF	   unit	   root	   test	  with	   no	   intercept	   and	   no	  trend.	  The	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  to	  assume	  that	  ‘there	  is	  unit	  root’.	  	   𝐻!:  𝛾 = 0	  𝐻!:  𝛾 < 0	  	  where	   𝛾 =    𝑎! − 1 .	  The	  critical	  value	  used	  in	  the	  hypothesis	  test	  is	   𝜏	   statistics.	  If	   the	   empirical	   t-­‐statistic	   is	   greater	   than	   the	   critical	   tau	   value,	   the	   null	  hypothesis	  cannot	  be	  rejected	  and	  that	  is,	  the	  variable	  is	  non-­‐stationary.	   	  	  Either	  a	  constant	  drift	  or	  a	  deterministic	  trend,	  or	  both	  can	  be	  included	  in	  the	  DF	  test.	   Therefore,	   DF	   test	   considers	   all	   the	   possibilities	   by	   adding	   in	   those	  deterministic	  elements,	  but	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  remains	  same.	  For	  instance,	  	   10)  ∆𝑦! =   𝑎! + 𝛾𝑦!!! +   𝜀!	  11)  ∆𝑦! =   𝑎! + 𝛾𝑦!!! +   𝑎!𝑡 + 𝜀!	  	  Equation	  10	  and	  11	  represent	  the	  constant	  drift	  and	  linear	  trend	  and	  intercept,	  respectively.	   𝑎!	   is	  an	  intercept	  or	  drift	  term.	   𝑡	   is	  a	  linear	  trend.	  The	  critical	  tau	  value	   changes	  with	   the	   inclusion	   of	   deterministic	   terms	   (Enders,	   2004,	   p182).	  The	   critical	   value	   applied	   is	   𝜏,	   with	   neither	   intercept	   nor	   linear	   trend,  𝑎! =  𝑎!𝑡 = 0.  With	  only	  intercept,	   𝑎! = 0,	  the	  critical	  value	   𝜏! 	   need	  to	  be	  used.	  With	  both	   intercept	   and	   linear	   trend,	   𝜏! 	   should	   be	   applied	   as	   the	   critical	   value	  (Enders,	  2004,	  p182).	   	  	  
Augmented	  Dickey-­‐Fuller	  Unit	  Root	  Test	  Despite	   the	   innovation	  of	   𝜏	   distribution,	  DF	   test	  has	  some	  problems.	  First,	   the	  models	  are	  the	  first-­‐order	  autoregressive	  process	  whereas	  time	  series	  variables	  are	  very	  likely	  to	  be	  integrating	  to	  higher	  orders.	  Secondly,	  the	  ignorance	  of	  the	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possibility	   of	   higher	   order	   integrating	   will	   produce	   the	   problem	   of	   serial	  correlation	  of	  residuals,	  which	  invalidates	  the	  DF	  distribution	  (Harris	  and	  Sollis,	  2005,	  p48).	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  an	  AR	  (p)	  process	  allowing	  the	  possibility	   of	   higher	   order	   integration.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   Equation	   7	   can	   be	  extended	  as	   	  	   12)  𝑦! =   𝑎! + 𝑎!𝑦!!! +   𝑎!𝑦!!! +   𝑎!𝑦!!! +⋯+ 𝑎!!!𝑦!!!!! +   𝑎!𝑦!!! + 𝜀!          	  𝜀!  ~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0,𝜎!)    	  	  Repeatedly	   add	   and	   subtract	   the	   element	   𝑎!𝑦!!!!!,	   it	   will	   reach	   the	   equation	  below	  
13)  ∆𝑦! =   𝑎! + 𝛾𝑦!!! +    𝛽!∆𝑦!!!!!!!!! + 𝜀!	  	  Equation	  13	  is	  the	  augmented	  Dickey-­‐Fuller	  model	  considering	  the	   𝑝!!	   order	  of	  autoregressive	   process	   with	   only	   intercept.	   Same	   as	   DF	   test	   discussed	   above,	  ADF	  model	  can	  also	  be	  added	  in	  a	  linear	  trend.	  The	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  same	  as	  DF	  test	  i.e.	   𝛾 = 0.	   	  	  Although	  ADF	  model	  attempts	  to	  remove	  the	  possible	  serial	  correlation	  problem	  in	   residuals	   that	   is	   produced	   by	   higher	   order	   of	   integration	   of	   variables,	   the	  components	  of	  moving	  average	  that	  may	  contain	  in	  the	  data	  generating	  process	  still	   remains	  untreated	   (Enders,	  2004,	  p190).	  To	  deal	  with	   the	  moving	  average	  process,	   the	   infinite-­‐order	   autoregressive	   model	   that	   is	   derived	   from	   mixed	  autoregressive/moving	  average,	  MA,	  process	  can	  be	  applied.	  	  
14)  ∆𝑦! =   𝛾𝑦!!! +    𝛽!∆𝑦!!!!!!!!! + 𝜀!  	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Despite	  Equation	  14	  requires	  an	  infinite	  sample	  so	  it	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  finite	  sample,	   Said	   and	   Dickey	   (1984)	   found	   that	   the	   infinite	   ARIMA	   model	   forms	  similarity	  to	  an	  ARIMA	  (n,	  1,	  0)	  model	  where	  n	  needs	  to	  be	  no	  greater	  than	   𝑇!/!.	  Therefore,	   samples	  bearing	  moving	  average	  process	  could	  employ	  Equation	  14	  as	  the	  model	  to	  test	  unit	  root.	  	  Moreover,	  both	  Harris	  and	  Sollis	  (2005)	  and	  Enders	  (2004)	  pointed	  out	  that	  it	  is	  very	  important	  to	  choose	  the	  right	  order	  of	  autoregressive	  process	  i.e.	  length	  of	  lags	  because	  the	  test	  statistics	  will	  be	  larger	  when	  fewer	  lags	  are	  involved,	  so	  the	  null	   hypothesis	   may	   be	   rejected	   mistakenly.	   If	   more	   lags	   are	   included,	   the	  presence	  of	  unnecessary	  nuisance	  variables	  weakens	  the	  power	  and	  efficiency	  of	  test	  (Banerjee	  et	  al,	  1993).	   	  	  In	  practice,	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  find	  the	  right	  lag	  length	  is	  based	  on	  the	  t-­‐	  and	  F-­‐	  tests	   and	   the	   information	   criterion	   of	   AIC	   and	   SBC.	   Enders	   (2004,	   p192)	  summarized	  a	  general-­‐to-­‐specific	  approach	  using	  t-­‐test	  and	  F-­‐test.	  The	  approach	  starts	  with	  a	  long	  lag	  length	  for	  Equation	  13	  i.e.	  the	  general	  model	  and	  use	  t-­‐test	  and	  F-­‐test	  to	  examine	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  coefficients.	  If	  the	  coefficient	  on	  the	  last	  variable	  is	  insignificant	  individually	  or	  jointly	  with	  the	  second	  last	  variable,	  the	   model	   should	   omit	   the	   insignificant	   variables	   until	   the	   coefficients	   on	  variables	  are	  significantly	  greater	  than	  zero.	  Additional,	  information	  criterion	  of	  AIC	  and	  SBC	  can	  be	  used	   to	  select	   the	  right	  model	  with	  appropriate	   lag	   length.	  Harris	  (1992)	  suggested	  a	  formula	  that	  was	  introduced	  by	  Schwert	  (1989,	  p151),	  𝑙!" = 𝑖𝑛𝑡  {12 !!"" !!}.	  Ng	  and	  Perron	  (1995)	  argued	  that	  the	  sequential	  t-­‐test	  for	  the	  significance	  of	  coefficient	  on	  the	  last	   lag	  in	  general-­‐to-­‐specific	  approach	  has	  the	  ability	   to	  yield	  higher	  values	  of	  p	   rather	   than	  standard	   lag	   length	   selection	  criteria	   (Harris	   and	   Sollis,	   2004,	   p51).	   Moreover,	   Weber	   (2001)	   advocated	   a	  specific-­‐to-­‐general	  approach	  by	  setting	  the	  value	  of	  p	  at	  a	  very	  low	  level.	  We	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Furthermore,	   the	   issue	   of	   structural	   break	   is	   not	   well	   treated	   in	   ADF	   model.	  Enders	   (2004)	   pointed	   out	   that	   structural	   breaks	   could	   be	   mis-­‐defined	   as	   a	  stochastic	   trend	   in	  ADF	  model.	  Perron	  (1989)	  also	  stated	   that	   the	   ignorance	  of	  consideration	   of	   structural	   break	   would	   weaken	   the	   power	   of	   unit	   root	   test	  because	   a	   permanent	   change	   of	   slope	   of	   a	   deterministic	   time	   trend	   could	   be	  treated	   as	   a	   constant	   innovation	   to	   a	   non-­‐stationary	   trend.	   For	   example,	   if	   a	  variable	  is	  stationary	  during	  the	  two-­‐subperiods	  around	  different	  means	  (let	  us	  simulate	  two	  diversified	  values	  of	  mean,	  0	  and	  10),	  respectively,	  in	  one	  sample,	  ADF	   test	   is	  very	   likely	   to	  conclude	   that	   the	  variable	  has	  unit	   root	  by	   forming	  a	  random	   walk	   process	   (possibly	   with	   a	   drift)	   because	   the	   intercept	   is	   biased	  towards	  1	  due	  to	  different	  value	  of	  mean.	  The	  solution	  to	  structural	  break	  is	  to	  add	  dummy	  variables.	  The	  number	  of	  dummy	  variables	  depends	  on	  the	  number	  of	  times	  that	  structure	  breaks.	  By	  adding	  in	  dummy	  variables,	  it	  makes	  sure	  that	  there	   are	   always	   same	   number	   of	   deterministic	   regressors	   and	   deterministic	  trends	   in	  the	  DGP	  (Harris	  and	  Sollis,	  2004,	  p57).	  By	  giving	  a	  value	  to	  a	  dummy	  variable	  when	  structure	  changes,	  the	  dummy	  will	  fix	  and	  control	  the	  permanent	  effect	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  variable	  due	  to	  change	  of	  mean.	  However,	  if	  the	  break	  of	  structure	   is	  not	  permanent,	   it	  would	  be	  useful	   to	  simply	  separate	  the	  period	  of	  sample.	  	  
Phillips-­‐Perron	  Unit	  Root	  Test	  Phillips	  (1987)	  and	  Perron	  (1988)	  and	  Phillips	  and	  Perron	  (1988)	  had	  developed	  Phillips-­‐Perron	   type	  unit	   root	   test	   by	  modifying	   the	   t-­‐statistics	   of	   coefficient	   𝛾	  in	  Equation	  9,	  10	  and	  11	  (Asteriou	  and	  Hall,	  2011,	  p344).	  The	  development	  was	  based	  on	  DF	  unit	  root.	  Due	  to	  the	  restrict	  assumption	  of	  residuals	  in	  DF	  test	  i.e.	  residuals	  have	  to	  be	  statistically	  independent	  and	  have	  a	  constant	  variance,	  any	  serial	   correlation	   may	   invalidate	   DF	   test.	   ADF	   test	   deals	   with	   the	   serial	  correlation	  problems	  by	  allowing	  more	  lags	  of	  dependent	  variables	  in	  the	  model	  while	   Phillips-­‐Perron	   (1988)	   made	   a	   non-­‐parametric	   correction	   by	   correcting	  the	  t-­‐statistics	  to	  count	  for	  bias	  that	  may	  be	  produced	  by	  serial	  correlation	  in	  the	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residuals	   (Harris	   and	   Sollis,	   2004,	   p50),	   but	   the	   asymptotic	   distribution	   of	   the	  Pillips-­‐Perron	   test	   follows	   the	   DF	   distribution.	   This	   correction	   weakens	   the	  assumption	  placed	  on	  distribution	  of	  residuals	  (Asteriou	  and	  Hall,	  2011,	  p344).	  Phillips	   and	   Perron	   defined	   the	   biased	   variance	   of	   the	   true	   population	   was	  𝜎! =    lim!→  ! 𝐸(𝑇!!𝑆!!) 	   and	   the	   variance	   of	   residuals	   in	   the	   AR	   (1)	  autoregressive	   equation	   was	   𝜎!! =    lim!  →  ! 𝑇!! 𝐸(𝑢!!)!!!! .	   The	   consistent	  estimators	  of	   𝜎!!	   and	   𝜎!	   were	   	  	  
15)  𝑆!! =   𝑇! (𝑢!!!!!! )                    𝑆!"! =   𝑇!! (𝑢!!!!!! )+ 2𝑇!! 𝑢!𝑢!!!!!!!!!!!!! 	  	  The	  parameter	   𝑙	   is	   the	   term	   to	   capture	   the	   serial	   correlation	   in	   residuals	   that	  are	  produced	  by	  misspecification	  of	  order	  of	  autoregressive	  process.	   If	   there	   is	  no	  serial	  correlation	  on	  residuals,	   the	  second	  element	   in	   𝑆!"! 	   will	  be	  zero,	   so	   it	  necessitates	   𝜎!! 	   =	   𝜎! .	   Therefore,	   when	   the	   variable	   is	   in	   higher	   order	   of	  integration	  than	  AR	  (1),	  the	  test	  of	  coefficient	   𝑎! = 1	   or	   𝛾 = 0	   in	  Equation	  9	  is	  computed	  by	  Phillips	  Z-­‐test.	  	  
4.5.2	  Cointegration	  and	  Error	  Correction	  Model	  
	  There	  are	  mainly	  two	  approaches	  to	  resolve	  the	  problem	  of	  spurious	  regression	  that	   is	   produced	   by	   non-­‐stationary	   time	   series,	   in	   practice	   (Asteriou	   and	  Hall,	  2011).	   The	   first	   approach	   is	   to	   difference	   a	   non-­‐stationary	   variable	   until	   it	  becomes	   stationary.	   The	   number	   of	   differences	   depends	   on	   the	   order	   of	  integration.	   The	   higher	   order	   of	   integration,	   the	   more	   times	   of	   difference	   are	  needed	  i.e.	  the	  number	  of	  times	  of	  difference	  before	  reaching	  stationary	  equals	  to	  the	  order	  of	  integration.	  The	  first	  potential	  problem	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  residuals	  that	  are	  obtained	  from	  regressions	  using	  differenced	  variables	  will	  also	  be	  differenced.	  This	  brings	  the	  problem	  of	  non-­‐invertible	  moving	  average	  error	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process	   in	   a	   regression	   (Asteriou	   and	   Hall,	   2011,	   p356),	   which	   is	   a	   serious	  estimation	  problem.	   	  	  Moreover,	   by	   regressing	   on	   differenced	   variables,	   the	   result	   is	   losing	   long	   run	  information,	   that	   is,	   the	   coefficients	  will	   not	   present	   the	   long	   run	   relationship	  between	   dependent	   and	   independent	   variables.	   If	   𝑦! 	   and	   𝑥! 	   are	   both	   I	   (1)	  variables,	  the	  first	  difference	  of	  them,	   (𝑦! − 𝑦!!!)	   and	   (𝑥! − 𝑥!!!)	   will	  be	  I	  (0)	  variables,	  respectively.	  Therefore,	   if	  assuming	  the	  relationship	  between	  y	  and	  x	  is	   𝑦 = 2𝑥,	   given	   any	   value	   of	   x,	   the	   value	   of	   y	   is	   computable	   and	   the	   value	   is	  unique.	  However,	   the	   situation	   is	   changed	   if	   y	  and	  x	  are	   replaced	  by	   their	   first	  difference,	   respectively	   i.e.	   𝑦! − 𝑦!!! =   2(𝑥! − 𝑥!!!) .	   Given	   a	   value	   of	   𝑥! ,	  without	  knowing	   the	  value	  of	   𝑥!!!	   and	   𝑦!!!,	   it	   is	  not	  possible	   to	  get	   a	  unique	  value	  of	  y.	   In	   the	   field	   of	   econometrics,	   it	   is	   very	   important	   to	   obtain	   long	   run	  equilibrium	   relationship	   between	   variables	   because	   economics	   theories	   are	  always	  presented	  to	  the	  long	  run	  relationship	  rather	  than	  short	  run	  (Gujarati	  and	  Porter,	  2009,	  p762).	   	  	  The	  second	  approach	  to	  estimate	  non-­‐stationary	  variables	   is	  cointegration.	  The	  concept	  of	  cointegration	  was	  introduced	  by	  Granger	  (1981)	  first	  and	  developed	  by	  Engle	  and	  Granger,	   and	  Engle	  and	  Yoo	  on	  1987,	   Johansen	   (1988,	  1991,	   and	  1995),	   Stock	   and	   Watson	   on	   1988,	   Phillips	   and	   Ouliaris	   (1995)	   and	   Phillips	  (1986	   and	   1987)	   (Asteriou	   and	   Hall,	   2011,	   p308).	   Cointegration	   describes	   a	  combined	  linear	  relationship	  between	  two	  or	  more	  I	  (1)	  variables	  that	  produce	  stationary	   residuals	   (cf.	  Enders,	  2004,	  Harris	  and	  Sollis,	  2004	  and	  Gujarati	   and	  Porter,	   2009).	   The	   advantage	   of	   cointegration	   approach	   is	   that	   it	   reveals	   both	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐run	  relationships	  between	  dependent	  and	  independent	  variables,	  which	  is	  in	  favor	  of	  economic	  models.	  Also,	  estimation	  of	  cointegrating	  equation	  is	   introducing	   simultaneous	   interactions	   without	   the	   condition	   of	   stationarity	  (Hill	  et	  al,	  2008,	  p348).	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The	  relationship	  of	  cointegration	  can	  be	  presented	  mathematically	  as	   	  	   16)  𝑦! =   𝛼! +   𝛼!𝑥! +   𝑒!	  	  where	  both	   𝑦!	   and	   𝑥!	   are	  I	  (1)	  variables	  and	   𝑒!	   is	  error	  term.	  So,	  equation	  16	  can	  be	  estimated	  and	  re-­‐arranged	  as	  a	  function	  for	   𝑒!	   as	  	   17)  𝑒! =   𝑦! −   𝛼! −   𝛼!𝑥!	  	  𝑦! 	   and	   𝑥! 	   are	   cointegrated	   if	   𝑒! 	   is	   stationary.	   The	   coefficient	   𝛼! 	   is	   the	  cointegrating	   parameter.	   If	   two	   variables	   are	   cointegrated,	   error	   correction	  model	  should	  be	  applied	  in	  order	  to	  obtain	  both	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐run	  relationship.	  	  There	  are	  variants	  of	  Equation	  16	  to	  test	  cointegration.	  For	  example,	  variable	  y	  and	   x	   can	   be	   replaced	   by	   two	   vectors	   that	   are	   conducted	   of	   a	   series	   of	   I	   (1)	  variables,	  respectively.	  Then,	   𝛼!	   is	  called	  cointegrating	  vector.	  Moreover,	  since	  test	  of	  cointegration	   is	  normally	   followed	  by	  error	  correction	  model,	   if	   there	   is	  cointegration	   relationship,	   the	   system	   of	   error	   correction	   model	   is	   often	  discussed	   with	   cointegration.	   In	   the	   following,	   we	   introduce	   Johansen	  cointegrating	   test,	   residual	   based	   Engle-­‐Granger	   procedure,	   Banerjee	  single-­‐equation	   cointegration	   and	   ECM	   and	   vector	   error	   correction	   model	  (VECM).	  	  
Johansen	  Cointegrating	  Test	  The	   Johansen	   cointegration	   test	   in	   EViews	   is	   a	   VAR-­‐based	   cointegration	   tests,	  which	  allows	  input	  options	  of	  a	  constant	  and	  a	  deterministic	  trend.	  If	  the	  VAR	  of	  order	  p	  is	  defined	  as	  follows	  	   18)  𝑦! =   𝐴!𝑦!!! +⋯+ 𝐴!𝑦!!! + 𝐵𝑥! +   𝜀!	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where	   𝑦! 	   is	   a	   k-­‐vector	   of	   non-­‐stationary	   I(1)	   variables,	   𝑥! 	   is	   a	   d-­‐vector	   of	  deterministic	   variables,	   and	   𝜀!	   is	   a	   vector	   of	   residuals.	   Equation	   18)	   can	   be	  re-­‐parameterised	  as	  an	  error	  correction	  model	  
19)  ∆𝑦! =   Π𝑦!!! +    Γ!Δ𝑦!!!!!!!!! + 𝐵𝑥! +   𝜀!	  	  where	   	  	   20)  Π =    𝐴!!!!! − 𝐼,	   Γ! =   −    𝐴!!!!!!! 	  	  Johansen’s	  cointegration	  test	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	   Π	   matrix	  from	  an	  unrestricted	  VAR	  and	  to	  test	  if	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  reject	  the	  restrictions	  implied	  by	  the	  reduced	  rank	   of  Π.	   This	   gives	   the	   number	   of	   cointegration	   relations	   r	   for	   variables	  conditional	   on	   the	   assumptions	   made	   about	   the	   trend	   and	   constant.	   The	  programme	  proceeds	  sequentially	  from	  r	  =	  0	  to	  r	  =	  k-­‐1	  (Π	   has	  reduced	  rank	  of	  r	  
<	  k	  )	  until	  it	  fails	  to	  reject.	   	  
	  
Residual	  Based	  Engle-­‐Granger	  Approach	  If	   variable	   𝑌!	   and	   𝑋!	   are	   integrated	   to	  order	  1,	   there	  may	  be	   a	   vector	   {𝜃!,𝜃!}	  that	  makes	  the	  linear	  combination	  of	   𝑌!	   and	   𝑋!	   to	  stationary.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  𝑌!	   and	   𝑋!	   are	  said	  to	  be	  cointegrated	  to	  order	  (1,	  1).	  It	   is	  possible	  for	  a	  higher	  order	  of	  cointegration	  to	  exist	  e.g.	  two	  I	  (2)	  variables	  may	  be	  cointegrated	  to	  of	  order	  (2,	  1),	  that	  is,	  there	  is	  one	  linear	  combination	  for	  the	  two	  I	  (2)	  variables	  to	  become	  stationary.	   In	  general,	   literatures	  using	   the	   term	  cointegration	   refer	   to	  order	   (1,	   1).	   According	   to	   Enders	   (2004,	   p322),	   Engle	   and	   Granger	   (1987)	  defined	  the	  model	  of	  cointegration	  as	  follow:	  If	  a)	  all	  elements	  of	  vector	   𝑥!	   are	  integrated	  to	  the	  same	  order,	  d;	  b)	  there	  are	  a	  vector	   𝛽 = (𝛽!,𝛽!,𝛽!,… ,𝛽!)that	  can	   form	   a	   linear	   combination	   of	   𝑥! 	   as	   𝛽𝑥! =   𝛽!𝑥!! +   𝛽!𝑥!! +   𝛽!𝑥!! +⋯+𝛽!𝛽!" ,	  a	  vector	  of	   𝑥!	   =	  {𝑥!! , 𝑥!! , 𝑥!! ,… , 𝑥!"}	   are	  cointegrated	  of	  order	  d,	  b,	  i.e.	  the	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𝑥!  ~  𝐶𝐼 𝑑, 𝑏 	   when	   b	   >	   0.	   The	   vector	   𝛽	   is	   the	   cointegration	   vector.	   The	  main	  problem	   remaining	   is	   to	   estimate	   the	   cointegrating	   vector	   that	   reveals	   the	  long-­‐run	  equilibrium.	  Engle	  and	  Granger	  (1987)	  proposed	  a	  three-­‐step	  approach	  to	  examine	  the	  relationship.	  Firstly,	  the	  order	  of	  integration	  of	  variables	  needs	  to	  be	   tested	   using	   unit	   root	   tests	   that	   were	   discussed.	   If	   both	   variables	   are	  integrated	  of	  the	  same	  order	  e.g.	  order	  1,	  the	  step	  moves	  to	  estimate	  the	  long	  run	  equilibrium	  between	  variables,	  which	  is	  represented	  by	  equation	  16.	   If	   the	  two	  variables	  are	  cointegrated,	  the	  coefficients	   𝑎!	   and	   𝑎!	   will	  converge	  faster	  than	  in	   OLS	   regression	   using	   stationary	   variables	   (Stock,	   1987).	   Thus,	   the	   OLS	  regression	  of	  the	  long	  run	  relationship	  will	  return	  a	  ‘super-­‐consistent’	  estimator	  of	   the	   cointegrating	   parameters	   𝑎! 	   and	   𝑎! 	   because	   the	   effect	   of	   stochastic	  trend	   on	   the	   two	   variables	  will	   dominate	   the	   stationary	   process	   (Ender,	   2004,	  p336).	   To	   conclude	   the	   cointegration	   relationship,	   the	   stationary	   process	   of	  residuals	   in	  equation	  16	  need	  be	  checked,	  normally,	  using	  DF	  or	  ADF	  unit	   root	  test.	   If	   the	   test	   statistic	   rejects	   the	   null	   hypothesis,	   the	   two	   variables	   are	  cointegrated.	  Engle	  and	  Granger	  (1987)	  suggested	  the	  ADF	  with	  the	  form	  	   21)  ∆𝑒! =   𝛽𝑒!!! +    𝛽!∆𝑒!!! +   𝜇!!!!!! +   𝛿𝑡 + 𝜔!                𝜔!  ~  𝐼𝐼𝐷  (0,𝜎!)	  	  to	  be	  applied	  on	  the	  residuals.	  The	  residuals	  are	  obtained	  from	  Equation	  16.	  It	  is	  worth	  to	  note	  that	  deterministic	  elements	  can	  be	  included	  in	  either	  Equation	  16	  or	   Equation	   21,	   but	   not	   to	   both	   (Harris	   and	   Sollis,	   2004,	   p80).	   Thirdly,	   once	  cointegration	   relationship	   is	   reached,	   an	   ECM	  model	   should	   be	   carried	   out	   to	  obtain	  both	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐run	  relationship.	   	  	  The	  core	  of	  ECM	  is	  the	  parameter	  of	  speed	  adjustment	  of	  the	  disequilibrium	  (𝛼!	  in	  Equation	  22))	  moving	  back	  to	   its	   long	  run	  mean.	  The	  process	  refers	  to	  error	  correction.	  The	  ECM	  takes	  form	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22)  ∆𝑦! =   𝛼! + 𝛼!!𝑒!!! +    𝛼!!!!! 𝑖 ∆𝑦!!! +    𝛼!"!!! 𝑖 ∆𝑥!!! +   𝜀!"	  23)  ∆𝑥! =   𝛼! + 𝛼!!𝑒!!! +    𝛼!"!!! 𝑖 ∆𝑦!!! +    𝛼!!!!! 𝑖 ∆𝑥!!! +   𝜀!"	  	  where	  the	  error	  correction	  term	   𝑒!!!	   is	  the	  lag	  of	  residual	  saved	  from	  Equation	  16.	  The	  coefficients	  on	   𝑒!!!	   are	  also	  the	  error	  correction	  parameters	  and	  reveal	  the	  long	  run	  relationship	  between	  y	  and	  x	  (Enders,	  2004,	  p337).	   	  	  Finally,	  procedures	   to	  assess	   if	  ECM	   is	  an	  adequate	  model	  need	  be	  carried	  out.	  There	   are	   three	   aspects	   to	   check	   (Enders,	   2004,	   p338).	   Firstly,	   the	   diagnostic	  check	   of	   residuals	   obtained	   from	   ECM	   equation	   should	   be	   carried	   out.	   The	  residuals	   𝜀!"	   and	   𝜀!"	   need	   to	   be	   white	   noise.	   Secondly,	   the	   error	   correction	  parameter	  i.e.	  the	  speed	  of	  adjustment	  coefficients	  should	  be	  carefully	  examined.	  The	  ECM	  model	  should	  also	  satisfy	  the	  feature	  of	  weak	  exogeneity.	  Thirdly,	   the	  issue	  of	  contemporaneous	  is	  also	  to	  be	  checked.	   	  	  Particularly	   referring	   to	   the	   second	  aspect,	  weakly	   exogenous	   variables	  do	  not	  respond	   to	   the	   deviation	   from	   the	   long-­‐run	   equilibrium	   relationship,	   so	   the	  speed	   of	   adjustment	   coefficient	   on	   weakly	   exogenous	   variables	   is	   zero.	   This	  feature	   facilitates	   the	   estimation	   of	   error	   correction	   models	   when	   using	   the	  reparameterized	   autoregressive	   distributed	   lag	   (ADL)	   model,	   which	   benefits	  Banerjee	   single	   equation	   ECM	   mechanism	   that	   is	   discussed	   in	   the	   following	  paragraphs.	  	  
Single	  Equation	  ECM	  Banerjee	  Approach	  The	  Banerjee	  ECM	  model	  for	  cointegration	  was	  introduced	  on	  1998	  based	  on	  the	  parameter	  of	  the	  lagged	  dependent	  variable	  in	  an	  autoregressive	  distributed	  lag	  model	   that	  was	  developed	  by	  Hendry	   and	  Richard	   (1982)	   and	  Hendry	   (1987).	  The	   advantage	   of	   Banerjee	   ECM	   model	   is	   that	   1)	   the	   parameters	   in	   the	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conditional	   ADL	   models	   are	   asymptotically	   efficiently	   estimated	   given	   weak	  exogeneity	   of	   regressors	   for	   the	   parameters	   of	   interest	   in	   an	   	   	   (Engle	   et	   al.,	  1983);	  2)	   in	  both	  normalized	  bias	  and	   t-­‐ratio	  versions,	   the	   limited	  distribution	  neither	  depends	  on	  nuisance	  parameters	  nor	  being	  dimension-­‐invariant	  because	  the	   limited	   distribution	   shifts	   with	   the	   increased	   number	   of	   regressors;	   3)	  Compared	   with	   EG	   single	   equation	   ECM	   model,	   the	   ECM	   does	   not	   bear	   the	  problem	   from	   imposing	  potentially	   invalid	   common-­‐factor	   restrictions	   in	   finite	  samples,	  which	  can	  result	  in	  poor	  power	  of	  properties	  if	  the	  restrictions	  are	  not	  satisfied	  (Banerjee	  et	  al.,	  1998).	  Moreover,	  Banerjee	  et	  al	  also	  point	  out	  the	  form	  of	   t-­‐ratio	   ECM	   may	   have	   better	   power	   properties	   than	   the	   normalized	   form	  especially	   when	   the	   common-­‐factor	   restrictions	   are	   grossly	   violated.	   In	   our	  research,	  we	  adapt	  the	  t-­‐ratio	  form	  of	  the	  ECM.	   	  	  Our	   discussion	   of	   Banerjee	   single	   equation	   ECM	   approach	   starts	   with	   how	   to	  pare	   a	   general	   ADL	   model	   down	   to	   a	   specific	   error	   correction	   model	   i.e.	  general-­‐to-­‐specific	   modeling	   process,	   because	   Banerjee	   ECM	   is	   nested	   in	   a	  general	  ADL	  model.	  	  The	   ADL	   model	   regresses	   a	   dependent	   variable	   against	   its	   own	   lags	   and	  independent	  variables	  and	  their	  corresponding	  lags.	  The	  two-­‐variable	  first-­‐order	  ADL	  provides	  a	  good	  example	  of	  the	  model:	  	   24)  𝑦! =   𝑏!!𝑦!!! +   𝑏!"𝑥! +   𝑏!"𝑥!!! +   𝑢!	  	  In	  the	  error	  correction	  model,	  variables	  concerned	  are	  I(1)	  variables	  and	  the	  first	  difference	  of	   𝑦!	   is	  used	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable,	  so	   it	   is	  helpful	   to	  transform	  Equation	  24)	  by	  subtract	   𝑦!!!	   on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  equation	  and	  subtract	   𝑏!"𝑥!	  on	  the	  left	  side	  as	  well	  as	  add	   𝑏!"𝑥!	   simultaneously	  to	  obtain	  first	  difference	  of	  variables.	  The	  Equation	  24)	  becomes	  (the	  bold	  terms	  are	  those	  newly	  added)	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𝑦! −   𝒚𝒕!𝟏 =   𝑏!!𝑦!!! −   𝒚𝒕!𝟏 +   𝑏!"𝑥! −   𝒃𝟏𝟐𝒙𝒕!𝟏 +   𝒃𝟏𝟐𝒙𝒕!𝟏 +   𝑏!"𝑥!!!   + 𝑢!	  	  To	  rearrange	  the	  above	  equation,	  it	  gives	   	  	   25)  ∆𝑦! =   𝛼(𝑦!!! −   𝛽𝑥!!!)+   𝜌Δ𝑥! +   𝑢!	  	  where	   𝛼 = (𝑏!! − 1),	   𝜌 =   𝑏!",	  and	   𝛽 =    !!"!  !!"!!  !!! .	  	  Equation	  25)	  is	  a	  general	  ADL	  model	  with	  two	  variables	  at	  their	  first-­‐order	  case.	  To	  get	   the	   specific	   error	   correction	  model,	  we	  need	   to	   impose	   the	   appropriate	  restriction.	   Assuming	   the	   two	   variables	   are	   cointegrated	   of	   order	   (1,	   1),	   the	  reduced	  form	  of	  error	  correction	  model	  can	  be	  written	  as	   	  	   26)  ∆𝑦! =   𝛼!(𝑦!!! −   𝛽𝑥!!!)+   𝑒!!	  27)  ∆𝑥! =   𝛼!(𝑦!!! −   𝛽𝑥!!!)+   𝑒!!	    𝛼!	   is	   the	   coefficient	   of	   long-­‐run	   deviation	   adjustment	   of	   𝑥! .	   If	     𝛼! = 0,	   𝑥!	   is	  said	   to	   be	   a	   weakly	   exogenous	   variable.	   That	   is,	   𝑥!	   does	   not	   respond	   to	   the	  disequilibrium	  from	  the	  long	  run	  relationship,	  which	  will	  benefit	  our	  discussion	  later.	   The	   variance	   and	   covariance	   matrix	   of	   error	   terms	   𝑒!!	   and	   𝑒!!	   can	   be	  denoted	  as	   	  	   Σ =    𝜎!! 𝜎!"𝜎!" 𝜎!! 	  	  If	   𝜎!" 	   does	   not	   equal	   to	   zero,	   the	   error	   terms	   are	   correlated.	   Then,	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  error	  terms	  could	  be	  written	  as	  	   28)  𝑒!! =   𝜌𝑒!! +   𝜀!	  	  where	   𝜌 =    !!"!!! 	   and	   𝜀! 	   is	   a	   white	   noise	   error	   term.	   If	   firstly	   substituting	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Equation	   28)	   then	   substituting	   Equation	   27)	   to	   Equation	   26),	   we	   can	   get	   (the	  bold	  term	  is	  the	  replacing	  term)	  	   ∆𝑦! =   𝛼!(𝑦!!! −   𝛽𝑥!!!)+   𝝆𝒆𝟐𝒕 +   𝜺𝒕	  	   ∆𝑦! =   𝛼!(𝑦!!! −   𝛽𝑥!!!)+   𝜌[∆𝒙𝒕 −   𝜶𝟐 𝒚𝒕!𝟏 −   𝜷𝒙𝒕!𝟏 ]+   𝜀!	  	   ∆𝑦! = 𝛼! − 𝜌𝛼! 𝑦!!! −   𝛽𝑥!!! + 𝜌∆𝑥! +   𝜀!	  	  Therefore,	  if	  we	  set	   𝛼 =    𝛼! − 𝜌𝛼! ,	  the	  above	  equation	  becomes	  	   29)  ∆𝑦! =   𝛼(𝑦!!! −   𝛽𝑥!!!)+   𝜌Δ𝑥! +   𝑢!	  	  Comparing	  Equation	  29)	  with	  Equation	  25),	  we	  can	  see	  that	  Equation	  29)	  is	  the	  reparameterized	  equation	  of	  Equation	  25)	  i.e.	  the	  error	  correction	  model	  defined	  in	  Equation	  26)	  and	  27)	  is	  a	  specific	  model	  of	  general	  ADL	  model	  by	  considering	  the	   restriction	   –	   the	   correlation	   between	   error	   terms	   in	   the	   error	   correction	  model	  i.e.	   𝐸𝑒!!𝑒!! .	  Therefore,	  testing	  Equation	  29)	  using	  OLS	  is	  same	  as	  testing	  the	  error	   correction	  model	   set	   in	  Equation	  26)	  and	  27).	   In	   the	  OLS	   regression,	  Equation	  29)	  needs	  to	  be	  written	  as	   	  	   30)  ∆𝑦! =   𝛽!𝑦!!! + 𝛽!𝑥!!! +   𝛽!∆𝑥! +   𝜀!	  	  where	   𝛽! =   𝛼 = 𝛼! − 𝜌𝛼! ,	   𝛽! =   −𝛼𝛽 =   − 𝛼! − 𝜌𝛼! 𝛽 	   and	   𝛽! =     𝜌 ,	  according	   to	   Equation	   29).	   In	   the	   error	   correction	   model,	   the	   coefficients	   of	  interest	   are	   𝛼! 	   and	   𝛽 .	   Knowing	   the	   value	   of	   𝛽! ,	   𝛽! 	   and	   𝛽! 	   by	   regressing	  Equation	   30)	   will	   not	   give	   value	   of	   𝛼! 	   and	   𝛽 .	   However,	   if	   𝑥! 	   is	   a	   weakly	  exogenous	  variable	  (𝛼! = 0),	  the	  value	  of	   𝛼!	   and	   𝛽	   can	  be	  easily	  obtained	  from	  regressing	   Equation	   30)	   i.e.	   𝛼! =   𝛽!	   and	   𝛽 =   − !!!!.	   Moreover,	   the	   feature	   of	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exogeneity	  makes	   the	   effect	   of	   contemporaneous	   correlation	   𝜌	   between	   error	  terms	  in	  the	  error	  correction	  model	  on	  coefficients	   𝛼!	   and	   𝛽	   irrelevant	   in	  the	  OLS	  for	  Equation	  29),	  so	  we	  can	  test	  the	  unrestricted	  ADL	  model	  using	  OLS	  to	  get	  the	   long-­‐run	   adjustment   𝛽 	   and	   the	   normal	   distribution	   can	   be	   applied	   to	  construct	   confidence	   intervals	   for	   coefficients	   of	   interest.	   However,	   the	   test	  statistics	  becomes	  non-­‐standard	  because	  variables	   𝑦!	   and	   𝑥!	   are	  I(1)	  variables	  in	  the	  ECM.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  that	  we	  use	  Banerjee	  critical	  values	  of	  the	  t-­‐ratio	  in	  our	  estimation.	  	  The	   data	   generation	   process	   (DGP)	   in	   the	   Banerjee	   ECM	   starts	   with	   the	   ADL	  model	   in	   Equation	   25)	   -­‐	   ∆𝑦! =   𝛼(𝑦!!! −   𝛽𝑥!!!)+   𝜌Δ𝑥! +   𝑢! .	   They	   define	   𝜌	  and	   𝛽	   are	  1	   ×	   k	  column	  vectors	  of	  parameters.	   𝛼	   is	  a	  scalar	  and	   𝑥!	   is	  a	  k	   ×	  1	   column	   vector	   of	   independent	   variables	   that	   are	   assumed	   to	   be	   strictly	  exogenous.	  T	  is	  the	  size	  of	  sample.	  In	  this	  DGP,	   𝑦!	   and	   𝑥!	   are	  I	  (1)	  variables	  and	  they	   are	   cointegrated,	   if	   −2 < 𝛼 < 0.	   When	   𝛼 = 0	   (the	   null	   hypothesis),	   they	  are	   not	   cointegrated.	   Given	   the	   assumption	   strictly	   exogenous,	   estimation	   of	  parameters	   𝜌,	   𝛼 	   and	   𝛽 	   can	   be	   obtained	   by	   regressing	   Equation	   25)	   using	  non-­‐linear	  least	  squares	  method.	  Alternatively,	  based	  on	  results	  from	  Kiviet	  and	  Phillips	   (1992),	  Banerjee	  et	   al	   (1993)	  prove	   that	   regressing	  Equation	  25)	  with	  inclusion	   of	   𝑥!!! by	   OLS	   can	   reach	   a	   parameter-­‐free	   distribution	   for	   the	  coefficient	  of	  interest,	   𝛼,	  because	  the	  alternative	  hypothesis	  of	  cointegration,	  the	  slope	   of	   𝛽	   is	   implicitly	   estimated.	   Therefore,	   the	   ECM	   equation	   that	   can	   be	  regressed	  by	  OLS	  is	   	  	   31)  ∆𝑦! =   𝜌∆𝑥! +   𝛼𝑦!!! +   𝜃!𝑥!!! +   𝑢! =   𝜌∆𝑥! +   𝜋!𝑤!!! + 𝑢!	  	  where	   𝑤!! = (𝑦! , 𝑥!!) 	   and	     𝜋! = 𝛼,𝜃! 	   (Banerjee	   et	   al,	   1998).	   The	   null	  hypothesis	   𝛼 = 0	   implies	   𝜋 = 0	   because	   𝛼 1,−𝛽 =   𝜋′46	   so	  the	  ECM	  test	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	   This	  is	  obtained	  when	  multiply	  out	  bracket	   𝛼(𝑦!!! −   𝛽𝑥!!!)	   in	  Equation	  25.	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rely	  on	  the	  OLS	  estimator	  of	   𝛼	   (ibid).	  	  However,	   the	   assumption	   of	   strictly	   exogenous	   variables	   is	   a	   very	   strong	  assumption.	   To	   make	   OLS	   an	   asymptotically	   efficient	   estimation	   method	   for	  Equation	   31),	   the	   assumption	   needed	   for	   variables	   is	   only	   weakly	   exogenous	  (Engle	   et	   al,	   1983).	   This	   allows	   for	   the	   inclusion	   of	   lags	   of	   first	   order	   of	   both	  independent	  and	  dependent	  variables.	  Thus,	  Equation	  25)	  can	  be	  extended	  as	   	  	   32)  𝛾(𝐿)∆𝑦! =   𝜌′(𝐿)′∆𝑥! +   𝛼(𝑦!!! −   𝛽𝑥!!!)+   𝑢!	  	  where	   𝛾(𝐿)	   and	   𝜌′(𝐿)′	   are	   polynominals	   in	   the	   lag	   operator	   L.	   According	   to	  Banerjee	  et	  al	  (1998),	  the	  Equation	  32)	  may	  suffer	  serial	  correlation	  because	  the	  assumption	   of	   weakly	   exogeneity	   will	   not	   guarantee	   the	   long-­‐run	  variance/covariance	  matrix	  of	  errors	  equals	  to	  zero.	  Therefore,	  they	  augment	  the	  Equation	  32)	  as	  suggested	  by	  Phillips	  and	  Loretan	  (1991)	  and	  Saikkonen	  (1991),	  so	  we	  get	  our	  econometric	  model	  
33)  ∆𝑦! =   𝑎!∆𝑥! +   𝛼𝑦!!! +   𝜃!𝑥!!! +    𝑎′!∆𝑥!!!!!!! +    𝑏′!!!!! ∆𝑦!!! + 𝑢!	  The	  coefficient	  of	  interest	  is	   𝛼.	  If	   𝛼 < 0,	  the	  two	  variables	  are	  cointegrated	  and	  𝑦! 	   error	   corrects	   in	   the	   long	   run.	   The	   sum	   of	   lags	   of	   first	   order	   of	   both	  independent	  and	  dependent	  variables	  are	  augmented	   term	   that	  helps	  on	  serial	  correlation	  problems	  that	  may	  produce	  by	  weak	  exogeneity	  of	   𝑥! .	  	  To	   summarize,	   Equation	   33)	   is	   the	   form	   of	   single	   equation	   cointegration	   and	  ECM	   system	   that	   is	   advocated	   by	   Banerjee	   et	   al	   (1998).	   It	   allows	   the	   weak	  exogenous	  of	  independent	  variable,	  which	  is	  not	  concerned	  by	  the	  Engle-­‐Granger	  model.	  The	  critical	  values	  of	  t-­‐ratio	  that	  are	  computed	  by	  Banerjee	  et	  al	  (1998)	  for	  the	  ECM	  test	  are	  represented	  in	  Appendix.	  For	  the	  ease	  of	  illustration,	  we	  do	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not	  add	  intercept	  and	  trend	  terms,	  but	  this	  model	  allows	  deterministic	  terms	  i.e.	  intercept	  and/or	  linear	  trend.	  	  The	  two	  systems	  that	  have	  been	  mentioned	  above	  are	  both	  single	  equation	  ECM	  for	   a	   pair	   of	   variables.	   It	   can	   be	   problematic	   e.g.	   contradictory	   problem	  when	  they	  are	  applied	  on	  more	  than	  two	  variables	  (Pesaran	  and	  Pesaran,	  1997,	  p291),	  because	  the	  number	  of	  cointegrating	  vector	  allowed	  in	  single	  equation	  is	  only	  1	  whereas	   when	   more	   than	   two	   variables	   are	   involved,	   there	   is	   possibility	   for	  more	  than	  1	  cointegrating	  vectors	  (Asteriou	  and	  Hall,	  2007,	  p319).	  The	  number	  of	   cointegrating	   vectors	   can	   be	   up	   to	   (n-­‐1)	   that	   n	   is	   the	   number	   of	   variables	  included.	   Therefore,	   vector	   error	   correction	   model	   is	   discussing	   in	   the	   next	  section	  to	  overcome	  the	  problems.	  	  
Vector	  Error	  Correction	  Model	  The	  Johansen	  cointegrating	  test	  discussed	  above	  investigates	  the	   Π	   matrix	  from	  an	  unrestricted	  VAR	  and	  to	  test	  if	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  reject	  the	  restrictions	  implied	  by	   the	   reduced	   rank	   of  Π.	   The	   vector	   error	   correction	   model	   (VECM)	   is	   a	  multivariate	   autoregressive	   model	   allowing	   more	   than	   two	   variables	   in	   an	  unrestricted	  vector	  autoregression	   (VAR)	  process	  and	  count	   for	   the	  number	  of	  cointegrating	  vectors.	   	  	   34)  𝑧! =   𝐴!𝑧!!! +   𝐴!𝑧!!! +⋯+   𝐴!𝑧!!! +   𝜇!                𝜇!  ~  𝐼𝑁  (0, Σ)	  	  where	   𝑧!	   is	  an	  m	  x	  1	  vector	  containing	  jointly	  determined	  endogenous	  variables	  and	   𝐴! 	   is	  an	  m	  x	  m	  matrix	  of	  parameters.	  The	  residual	   𝜇!	   have	  zero	  mean	  and	  a	  time-­‐invariant	   conditional	   variance	   matrix	   Σ .	   The	   latter	   necessitates	   the	  assumption	   of	   homoscedasticity	   (Pesaran	   and	   Pesaran,	   1997,	   p122).	   The	   DGP	  was	  first	  advocated	  by	  Sims	  (1980)	  and	  has	  been	  represented	  in	  many	  textbooks	  and	   literatures	   (cf.	   Harris	   and	   Sollis,	   2004,	   p110,	   Pesaran	   and	   Pesaran,	   1997,	  p121.).	   Allowing	   the	   impact	   from	   an	   intercept	   and/or	   a	   linear	   time	   trend,	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equation	  24	  can	  be	  extended	  as	  follow	  	   35)  𝑧! =   𝑎! +   𝑎!𝑡 + 𝐴!𝑧!!! +   𝐴!𝑧!!! +⋯+   𝐴!𝑧!!! +   Ψ𝑤! + 𝜇!      	  𝜇!  ~  𝐼𝑁  (0, Σ)	  	  Being	  others	  same,	  t	  is	  a	  linear	  time	  trend	  and	   𝑎!	   is	  the	  drift.	  The	  vector	   𝑤!	   has	  order	  q	  x	  1	  containing	  exogenous	  I	  (0)	  variables.	  Equation	  35	  is	  the	  augmented	  form	  of	  Equation	  34,	  so	  it	  is	  the	  augmented	  vector	  autoregressive	  model	  of	  order	  k	  i.e.	  AVAR(k).	   	  	  The	   cointegrating	   VAR	   (VECM)	   for	   a	   vector	   containing	   three	   variables	   is	  therefore	  written	  as	   	  
36)  ∆𝑧! =   𝑎! +   𝑎!𝑡 + Π𝑧!!! + 𝐴!∆𝑧!!!!!!!!!   +   𝛹!𝑤! + 𝜇!"	  where	   𝑧! =    𝑌!    𝑋!    𝑉! 	   and	   𝐴! 	   is	   an	   order	   of	   3	   ×	   3	   matrix	   of	   parameters.	  Π =   −(Ι− 𝐴! − 𝐴! −⋯− 𝐴!)	   is	   the	   cointegrating	   vector	   containing	   the	   speed	  of	  adjustment	  to	  disequilibrium	   𝛼	   and	  a	  matrix	  of	  long-­‐run	  relationships	   𝛽′,	  so	  Π	   can	  be	  expressed	  as	   𝛼𝛽!.	   Using	  the	  algebra	  of	  matrix	  to	  compute	   Π𝑧!!!,	   the	  term	   𝛽′𝑧!!! 	   can	   be	   obtained.	   It	   is	   the	   error-­‐correction	   element	   in	   VECM	  including	   up	   to	   (n-­‐1)	   vectors	   in	   a	   multivariate	   system.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   three	  variables,	   the	   term	   contains	   up	   to	   2	   cointegrating	   vectors.	   Moreover,	   as	   the	  ground	   of	   the	   relationship	   of	   cointegration	   to	   exist,	   Π	   needs	   to	   have	   reduced	  rank	  because	  the	  variables	  in	   𝑧!	   are	  stationary	  when	   Π	   has	  full	  rank,	  whereas	  when	   the	   rank	   of	   Π 	   equals	   to	   zero,	   it	   implies	   there	   is	   no	   cointegration	  relationship	  among	  variables.	  Therefore,	  the	  parameter	  of	  interest	  in	  VECM	  is	   Π.	  Johansen	   (1988)	   developed	   a	   system	   to	   find	   the	   rank	   of	   Π	   as	   well	   as	   the	  estimates	  of	   𝛼	   and	   𝛽.	   	  	  Similar	  to	  the	  single	  equation	  approach,	  Johansen	  VECM	  starts	  with	  test	  for	  order	  of	  integration	  of	  variables.	  Then,	  the	  lag	  length	  and	  deterministic	  elements	  needs	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to	  be	  decided.	  The	  distinctive	  of	  Johansen	  approach	  is	  to	  use	  maximal	  eigenvalue	  statistic	  and	  trace	  statistic	  to	  find	  the	  rank	  of	   Π.	  The	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  there	  are	   r	   cointegration	  vectors	  existing.	  The	  maximal	  eigenvalue	  statistic	  obtains	  n	  characteristic	  roots	   𝜆! >   𝜆! > ⋯ > 𝜆!.	   If	   there	   is	  no	  cointegrating	  relationship	  i.e.	  r	  =	  0,	  the	  rank	  of	   Π	   is	  zero	  and	  all	  the	  roots	  will	  be	  zero.	  Therefore,	  Johansen	  approach	  tests	  how	  many	  of	  the	  numbers	  of	  the	  roots	  are	  significantly	  different	  from	   zero	   us	   the	   statistic	   𝜆!"# 𝑟, 𝑟 + 1 =   −𝑇 ln 1− 𝜆!!!   (Asteriou	   and	  Hall,	  2007,	   p324).	   The	   second	   approach,	   trace	   statistic,	   is	   based	   on	   likelihood	   ratio	  test.	   The	   statistic	   is	   computed	   as	   𝜆!"#$% 𝑟 =   −𝑇 ln 1− 𝜆!!!!!!!!!   (Asteriou	  and	   Hall,	   2007,	   p325).	   Unlike	   the	   maximal	   eigenvalue	   statistic	   test,	   trace	  statistics	   tests	   the	   rank	   r	   by	   adding	   in	   more	   eigenvalues	   beyond	   the	   𝑟!!	  eigenvalue.	   Therefore,	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   is	   that	   there	   is	   up	   to	   r	   numbers	   of	  cointegrating	  vectors.	   	  	  Followed	   by	   test	   of	   rank,	   Johansen	   approach	   concerns	   weak	   exogeneity	   of	  variables	  because	  there	  should	  be	  at	  least	  (n	  –	  r)	  columns	  of	   𝛼	   equal	  to	  zero,	  if	  the	  value	  of	  r	  is	  smaller	  than	  n.	  Finally,	  Johansen	  approach	  allows	  the	  testing	  for	  linear	  restrictions	  in	  the	   Π.	  It	  is	  quite	  important	  feature	  because	  an	  econometric	  model	  need	  satisfy	  economic	  theory.	   	  	  In	  this	  chapter	  we	  have	  presented	  the	  DF,	  ADF	  and	  PP	  unit	  root	  test	  procedures	  and	   the	   Johansen	   cointegrating,	   Engle-­‐Granger	   and	   Banerjee	   single	   equation	  ECM	  and	  VECM	  econometric	  models.	  In	  our	  study,	  we	  reported	  the	  ADF	  statistic	  of	   the	   unit	   root	   test	   because	   it	   is	   widely	   used	   in	   applied	   studies	   and	   the	  augmented	  term	  helps	  deal	  with	  serial	  correlation,	  which	  is	  a	  common	  issue	  for	  high	   frequency	   financial	   data.	  We	   apply	   all	   the	   variations	   of	   cointegrating	   and	  ECM	  introduced	  in	  the	  chapter	  in	  our	  empirical	  analysis	  because	  data	  performs	  differently	  across	  countries.	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Chapter 5 Empirical Analysis of Credit Risk and Liquidity 
Premia during the Financial Crisis in the UK, the US and 
the EMU 	  	  The	  persistence	  of	  high	  interbank	  rates	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EMU	  signaled	  the	   prologue	   to	   the	   recent	   financial	   crisis.	   Medium-­‐	   and	   long-­‐term	   interbank	  lending	   and	   borrowing	   virtually	   stopped,	   resulting	   in	   distress	   of	   other	   credit	  markets	   e.g.	   the	   commercial	   paper	  market	   in	   the	   US.	   Asymmetric	   information	  resulted	   in	   great	   uncertainty	   of	   asset	   valuations,	   counterparties’	  creditworthiness	  and	  liquidity	  position.	  Given	  these	  uncertainties,	  risk	  premia	  in	  interbank	  lending	  increased	  dramatically	  and	  adverse	  selection	  problems	  made	  financing	   even	   more	   difficult	   for	   banks,	   other	   financial	   institutions	   and	   the	  private	  sector.	   In	  principle,	   the	  risk	  premia	  can	  be	  decomposed	   into	  credit	  risk	  and	   liquidity	   risk	   premia,	   respectively	   (Bank	   of	   England,	   2007).	   A	   temporary	  liquidity	  shortage	  can	  induce	  credit	  default,	  particularly	  for	  banks;	  this	  will	  cause	  collapse	   and	   threaten	   financial	   stability.	   So,	   there	   is	   interaction	   between	   the	  components	   in	   the	   risk	   premium	   although	   they	   can	   be	  measured	   individually.	  Moreover,	  monetary	  policy	  is	  nowadays	  largely	  transmitted	  through	  an	  interest	  rate	  channel.	  The	  elevated	  interbank	  rates	  weakened	  the	  power	  of	  central	  banks	  to	  stimulate	   the	  economy	  by	  reducing	   the	  policy	  rate.	  That	   is,	   the	   transmission	  mechanism	  of	  monetary	  policy	  is	  severely	  damaged.	  Central	  banks	  need	  recourse	  to	  other	  policy	  tools	  to	  implement	  their	  targets.	   	  	  Therefore,	   in	  order	   to	  boost	  market	   liquidity,	   reactivate	   credit	  markets	   and	   fix	  the	   transmission	   mechanism,	   central	   banks	   of	   major	   economies	   undertook	   a	  range	   of	   unconventional	   interventions	   during	   the	   crisis.	   These	   unconventional	  interventions	  firstly	  fulfilled	  the	  function	  of	  lender-­‐of-­‐last-­‐resort	  of	  central	  banks	  by	   providing	   liquidity	   to	   banks.	   For	   example,	   the	   BoE	   implemented	   a	   ‘Special	  Liquidity	   Scheme’	   (SLS),	   swapping	   high	   quality	   treasury	   bills	   for	   illiquid	  securities	  to	  ease	  uncertainty	  on	  banks’	  balance	  sheet	  and	  boost	  their	  ability	  to	  refinance.	   Secondly,	   the	   interventions	   involved	   direct	   purchase	   of	   long-­‐term	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assets,	  treasury	  bills	  and	  government	  bonds	  during	  the	  crisis.	  The	  interventions	  that	  purchase	   long-­‐term	  assets	  are	  referred	  as	  QE	   in	  general	   in	   this	  study.	  The	  label	  QE	  may	  not	  be	  an	  entirely	  accurate	  for	  the	  EMU	  sample	  because	  the	  size	  of	  asset	  purchase	  in	  the	  EMU	  is	  very	  small	  compared	  with	  the	  total	  easing	  amount.	  Most	   of	   monetary	   easing	   has	   been	   done	   under	   LTROs,	   which	   is	   under	   OMO.	  However,	  we	  believe	  the	  labeling	  of	   interventions	  is	  not	  very	  important	  for	  our	  purposes	   because	   the	  measure	   of	   interventions	   for	   each	   sample	   is	   considered	  subject	  to	  their	  policies	  and	  market	  operation.	   	  	  The	   aim	   and	   purpose	   of	   QE	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   US	   were	   to	   provide	   liquidity	  directly	  into	  economy	  so	  as	  to	  boost	  nominal	  demand	  whereas	  ECB	  set	  the	  aim	  of	  those	   unconventional	   interventions	   in	   the	   EMU	   to	   fix	   the	   broken	   transmission	  mechanism.	  However,	   fundamentally,	  QE	  should	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  reduction	  of	  credit	  and	   liquidity	  premia	  since	   they	  are	   the	  primary	  causes	  of	   increased	  risk	  premia	  and	  uncertainties,	  which	  were	   in	   turn	   the	   triggers	  of	   this	   crisis.	  Also,	   a	  restoration	  of	  the	  transmission	  mechanism	  was	  of	  interest	  to	  BoE	  and	  the	  Fed,	  as	  well.	  	  As	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   3,	   given	   the	   observed	   jump	   in	   risk	   premia	   and	   the	  implementation	  of	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy	  tools,	  earlier	  studies	  looked	  at	  the	  contribution	  of	  credit	  risk	  and/or	  liquidity	  premia	  in	  the	  risk	  premia	  and	  how	   central	   banks	   liquidity	   provisions	  worked	   on	   the	   risk	   premia	   (see	   Taylor	  and	   Williams,	   2009;	   Michaud	   and	   Upper,	   2008;	   McAndrews	   et	   al,	   2008	   and	  Sarkar,	  2009).	  Since	  2008,	   the	  crisis	  worsened	   in	  economies	  worldwide	  after	  a	  series	   of	   remarkable	  market	   events	   e.g.	   failure	   of	   Bear	   Stearns	   in	  March	   2008	  and	  bankruptcy	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	   in	  September,	  2008,	   the	  BoE,	   the	  ECB	  and	  the	   Fed	   stepped	   in	   further	   to	   stimulate	   national	   economies	   by	   introducing	  quantitative	   easing47.	   The	   interests	   of	   studies	   then	   shift	   to	   how	   quantitative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	   We	   have	   identified	   in	   the	   Chapter	   2	   that	   the	   policies	   ran	   by	   the	   ECB	   do	   not	   fit	   the	   definition	   of	  quantitative	  easing	  perfectly,	  but	  the	  implementation	  of	  LTROs	  have	  intensified	  since	  August	  2008.	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easing	   influences	   long	   term	   economic	   indicators	   e.g.	   inflation,	   GDP,	   and	  government	   bond	   yields	   (Martin	   and	   Milas	   (2013)	   provide	   a	   comprehensive	  survey	  of	   literatures	   in	   the	   field).	   Indeed,	  quantitative	  easing	  aims	  primarily	   to	  bypass	  the	  money	  market	  and	  transit	  (monetary	  intervention)	  through	  portfolio	  rebalancing,	   liquidity	   and	  policy	   signaling	   channels	   to	   intermediately	   influence	  asset	  prices	   changing	   the	   total	  wealth	   and	   cost	  of	  borrowing	   and	  ultimately	   to	  work	  on	  output	  and	  inflation	  (see	  Figure	  2.10	  for	  the	  transmission	  mechanism	  of	  quantitative	   easing).	   Changing	   of	   cost	   of	   borrowing	   (after	   changing	   of	   asset	  prices)	  likely	  impacts	  on	  the	  money	  market	  rates	  on	  the	  short	  end.	  The	  possible	  impact	   on	   money	   market	   rates	   is	   also	   worth	   studying	   because	   the	   spreads	  between	   them	   are	   measures	   of	   risk	   components,	   which	   are	   one	   of	   the	   key	  drivers	  of	  the	  crisis.	  
	  In	   this	   chapter,	  we	   focus	   on	   credit	   risks	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   contained	   in	   the	  interbank	   markets	   in	   the	   UK,	   the	   US	   and	   the	   EMU	   by	   investigating	   the	  relationship	   between	   these	   components	   in	   the	   interbank	   rates	   and	   how	   the	  relationship	   developed	   during	   the	   crisis.	   Moreover,	   the	   effect	   of	   QE	   on	   these	  relationships	  is	  also	  investigated.	  The	  results	  show	  that	  the	  credit	  risk	  premium	  played	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  widening	  spread	  of	  risk	  premium	  in	  the	  UK’s	  interbank	  market	   before	   the	   operation	   of	   QE	   and	   credit	   risk	   also	   caused	   the	   increase	   in	  liquidity	  premium	  whereas	  the	  relationship	  reversed	  during	  the	  operation	  of	  QE.	  Moreover,	  we	   find	   evidence	   that	  QE	   successfully	   reduced	   liquidity	   premia	   and	  ultimately,	   indirectly,	   reduced	   credit	   risk	   premium.	   In	   the	   EMU,	   the	   causality	  remains	   throughout	   from	   credit	   risk	   to	   liquidity	   premia.	   Long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	  CDS	  had	  greater	  effect	  on	  widening	  liquidity	  premia	  so	  it	  is	  tempting	  to	  conclude	  that	  the	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  was	  the	  main	  driver	  for	  the	  widening	  Euribor-­‐OIS	  spread.	  The	  ECB’s	  OMO	  and	  CBPP	  reduced	  the	  liquidity	  spread	  significantly,	  but	  it	   proved	   hard	   for	   such	   operations	   to	   decrease	   credit	   risk	   because	   there	   is	   no	  causality	   from	   liquidity	   component	   to	   credit	   risk	   spread.	   In	   the	   US,	   both	   the	  long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   contributed	   to	   the	  widening	   of	   risk	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premium	   and	   there	   is	   dual	   causality	   between	   the	   two	   premia	   throughout	   the	  sample	   period.	   The	   US	   LSAP	   has	   reduced	   both	   long-­‐term	   credit	   and	   liquidity	  premia	  significantly.	   	  
	  The	   remainder	   of	   the	   chapter	   consists	   of	   three	   sections.	   The	   first	   section,	   5.1,	  describes	   the	   variables	   and	   unit	   root	   test	   results.	   The	   second	   section,	   5.2,	  discusses	   the	   empirical	   results	   of	   cointegration	   and	   the	   VECM.	   Finally,	   section	  5.3	  compares	  the	  results	  and	  summarizes	  findings	  in	  the	  chapter.	  	  
5.1 Basic Statistics and Unit Root Results	  
 Tables	   5.1	   and	   5.2	   summarize	   the	   period	   of	   data,	   and	   variables	   and	   their	  abbreviations,	  respectively.	  Broadly,	  the	  study	  looks	  at	  three	  periods,	  pre-­‐crisis,	  crisis	  and	  post-­‐crisis.	  The	  definition	  of	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period	  follows	  same	  criteria	  for	  the	  three	  markets	  i.e.	  finish	  one	  day	  before	  the	  widely	  recognized	  beginning	  date	  of	   the	   crisis.	  During	   the	   crisis	  period,	  we	   test	   the	   relationships	   separately	  for	  pre-­‐QE	  (‘pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis’)	  operation	  and	  QE	  operation48.	  For	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US,	  the	   boundary	   of	   pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	   and	   QE	   periods	   is	   set	   according	   to	   the	  announcement	   date	   of	   operation	   of	   QE,	   which	   we	   believe	   fairly	   reflects	   the	  market	  movement	  in	  respect	  to	  policies.	  The	  split	  of	  pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	  and	  QE	  period	  in	   the	   EMU	   sample	   poses	   a	   problem.	  We	   define	   the	   pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	   period	   from	  August	   09,	   2007	   to	   September	   12,	   2008	   when	   Lehman	   Brothers	   filed	   for	  bankruptcy	  because	   the	  data	   for	   the	   liquidity	   ratio	  seems	   to	   indicate	   that	  after	  the	  market	   event,	   the	   ECB	   stepped	   in	  more	   determined	   than	   before.	   	   The	   QE	  period	  therefore	  runs	  from	  September	  15,	  2008	  to	  May	  06,	  2010,	  which	  date	  is	  also	  the	  end	  date	  of	  data	  of	  the	  EMU.	  Due	  to	  the	  sovereign	  crisis,	  the	  spreads	  in	  EMU	  did	  not	  settle	  in	  our	  sample	  period	  so	  there	  is	  no	  post-­‐crisis	  period	  for	  the	  EMU	  estimation.	  Also,	   the	  operation	  of	  ECS	  has	  not	   stopped	  during	   the	   sample	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	   Again,	  here	  QE	  is	  just	  the	  name	  of	  the	  label,	  as	  stated	  before.	  The	  definition	  of	  period	  fully	  considers	  the	  development	  of	  operation	  of	  policies	  in	  each	  sample.	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  49	   Press	  release	  August	  10,	  2010	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20100810a.htm#fn1	  50	   Press	  release	  November	  03,	  2010	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20101103a.htm	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Table	  5.1	  Summary	  of	  Period	  of	  Estimation	  
	  
 	    	  
Whole	  
Period	  
Pre-­‐Crisis	   Crisis	   Post-­‐Crisis	   Pre-­‐QE	   QE	  
UK	   B	   1/1/04	   1/1/04	   9/8/07	   25/6/10	   9/8/07	   19/2/09	  
	  
E	   30/9/10	   8/8/07	   24/6/10	   30/9/10	   18/2/09	   24/6/10	  	  
EMU	   B	   2/1/04	   2/1/04	   9/8/07	   NA	   9/8/07	   15/8/08	  
	  
E	   6/5/10	   8/8/07	   6/5/10	   NA	   12/8/08	   6/5/10	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
US	   B	   1/1/04	   1/1/04	   9/8/08	   31/3/10	   9/8/07	   25/11/08	  
	  
E	   9/8/10	   8/8/07	   30/3/10	   9/9/10	   24/11/08	   30/3/10	  
 	    	    	    	    	    	    	    	  B:	  Beginning	  E:	  End;	  QE	  represents	  intervention	  period	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  EMU	  and	  the	  US.	  In	  the	  EMU,	  the	  period	  QE	  refers	  to	  the	  period	  of	  enhanced	  credit	  support.	  	  
Table	  5.2	  Summary	  of	  Variable	  and	  Abbreviation51	  
	  	   Liquidity	  Risk	   Short-­‐term	  Credit	  Risk	   Long-­‐term	  Credit	  Risk	   QE	  Measurement	  
UK&US	  
Repo	  –	  OIS	   LIBOR	  –	  Repo	   	   5-­‐year	  Interbank	  CDS	  Index	  
Accumulated	  QE	  Amount	  /	  Total	  Bank	  Assets	  (RMO)	   (LMR)	   (CDS)	   (Ratio)	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  
EMU	  	  	  
Repo	  –	  OIS	   Euribor	  –	  Repo	   5-­‐year	  Interbank	  CDS	  Index	  
(OMO52	   +	  CBPP)	  /	  Total	  Bank	  Assets	  (RMO)	   (EMR)	   (CDS)	   (Ratio)	  OMO:	  Open	  Market	  Operation;	  CBPP:	  Covered	  Bond	  Purchase	  Programme	   	  Maturity	  of	  Euribor,	  LIBOR	  OIS	  and	  Repo,	  respectively,	  is	  three	  month.	  LIBOR	  represents	  LIBOR	  (£)	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  LIBOR	  ($)	  in	  the	  US.	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  the	  OIS	  and	  repo	  for	  the	  UK	  and	  US	  samples.	  	  In	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  section,	  we	  first	  present	  and	  discuss	  the	  basic	  statistics	  of	  these	  variables	   including	  mean,	   skewness	   and	   kurtosis,	   and	   standard	   deviation,	   and	  then	  move	  to	  correlation.	  Then,	  we	  present	  unit	  root	  test	  results	  as	  evidence	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	   The	  explanation	  of	  variables	  in	  Table	  5.2	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Chapter	  4.3.	  52	   Open	  Market	  Operation	  (OMO)	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the	  selection	  of	  econometric	  model.	  	  
5.1.1	  Basic	  Statistics	  
	  This	  sub-­‐section	   looks	  at	  basic	  descriptive	  statistics	  and	  plots	  of	  variables.	  The	  discussion	   starts	  with	   the	  UK	   sample	   followed	  by	   the	  EMU	   sample	   and	   the	  US	  sample.	   Unless	   otherwise	   stated	   in	   the	   following	   paragraphs,	   the	   chapter	  proceeds	  in	  this	  order.	  Moreover,	  the	  spreads	  used	  in	  this	  research	  are	  in	  basis	  points	   in	  the	  three	  data	  sets,	  but	  we	  changed	  the	  EMU	  sample	  to	  percentage	   in	  the	   regression	   for	   easier	   interpretation	   of	   the	   coefficients.	   The	   change	   is	   only	  made	   in	   the	   regression	   section	   for	   the	   EMU	   sample	   and	   it	   does	   not	   apply	   to	  descriptive	  statistics	  and	  correlation.	  	  
Table	  5.3	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  of	  Variables53	  
	  
 	   UK	   EMU	  
 	   LMR	   RMO	   CDS	   Ratio	   EMR	   	   RMO	   CDS	   Ratio	  
	   Pre	  Crisis	   	  Mean	   14.7	   -­‐2.51	   11.09	    	   6.52	   -­‐0.93	   11.6	   27.8	  
Std.dev	   1.51	   1.74	   3.75	    	   1.03	   1	   3.76	   1.18	  
	   Skewness	   0.29	   -­‐0.83	   2.19	    	   0.65	   0.19	   1.53	   -­‐0.63	  
	   Kurtosis	   4.5	   14.01	   15.57	    	   5.15	   9.17	   8.22	   3.35	  
Jarque-­‐Bera	   94.53	   4548.7	   6502.5	    	   247.31	   1497.39	   1433.67	   66.07	  
Probability	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	    	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	  	   Pre	  QE	  Crisis	  Mean	   94.27	   9.75	   88.9	    	   62.88	   0.31	   67.01	   23.58	  
Std.dev	   49.41	   10.55	   37.83	    	   13.88	   2.55	   28.86	   2.2	  
	   Skewness	   1.14	   1.2	   0.2	    	   -­‐0.36	   -­‐0.05	   0.57	   1.24	  
	   Kurtosis	   3.35	   6.46	   2.21	    	   2.83	   5.46	   3.15	   5.56	  
Jarque-­‐Bera	   82.91	   276.58	   12.34	    	   6.37	   71.88	   15.49	   150.99	  
Probability	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	    	   [0.04]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	  	   Crisis	  QE	  Mean	   36.97	   12.69	   118.19	   0.02	   64.2	   2.56	   107.48	   26.21	  
Std.dev	   35.15	   6.96	   37.61	   0.01	   44.17	   3.89	   25.08	   2.7	  
	   Skewness	   1.22	   1.32	   0.91	   -­‐0.93	   1.3	   0.69	   0.83	   -­‐1.32	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	   For	  the	  time	  period	  of	  each	  sample,	  please	  refer	  to	  Table	  5.1	  in	  Chapter	  5.	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   Kurtosis	   3.32	   3.58	   2.73	   2.48	   3.57	   3.84	   3.38	   4.69	  
Jarque-­‐Bera	   85.85	   102.98	   47.97	   52.83	   127.04	   46.76	   51.74	   175.61	  
Probability	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	  
	   	  Post	  Crisis	  Mean	   18.14	   7.95	   115.02	   0.03	    	   	   	   	  Std.dev	   0.61	   0.45	   15.21	   0	    	   	   	   	  	   Skewness	   0.32	   -­‐0.59	   0.9	   -­‐0.04	    	   	   	   	  	   Kurtosis	   2.12	   4.26	   2.93	   1.75	    	   	   	   	  Jarque-­‐Bera	   3.39	   8.62	   9.27	   4.48	    	   	   	   	  Probability	   [0.18	  ]	   [0.01]	   	   [0.01]	   	   [0.11]	   	    	    	    	    	  
	  
	   US	  	   LMR	   RMO	   CDS	   Ratio	  	   Pre	  Crisis	  Mean	   0.22	   -­‐11.32	   11.6	   6.5	  
Std.dev	   0.05	   8.44	   3.76	   0.05	  
	   Skewness	   0.04	   1.17	   1.53	   -­‐1.18	  
	   Kurtosis	   4.29	   5.51	   8.2	   3.35	  
Jarque-­‐Bera	   65.42	   461.08	   1424.51	   36.71	  
Probability	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	  	   Pre	  QE	  Crisis	  Mean	   1.14	   -­‐20.92	   74.97	   4.73	  
Std.dev	   0.64	   22.86	   33.38	   1.12	  
	   Skewness	   2.45	   -­‐1.26	   0.43	   0.14	  
	   Kurtosis	   9.61	   6.73	   2.56	   1.24	  
Jarque-­‐Bera	   954.39	   285.22	   13	   44.46	  
Probability	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	  	   QE	  Crisis	  Mean	   0.55	   -­‐4.03	   106.11	   4.89	  
Std.dev	   0.44	   5.64	   25.47	   1.03	  
	   Skewness	   1.13	   1.26	   0.95	   -­‐0.38	  
	   Kurtosis	   3.56	   4.92	   3.65	   1.4	  
Jarque-­‐Bera	   78.8	   146.97	   59.05	   45.57	  
Probability	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	   [0.00]	  	   Post	  Crisis	  Mean	   0.31	   -­‐6.78	   126.05	   5.86	  
Std.dev	   0.08	   2.82	   26.96	   0.02	  
	   Skewness	   -­‐0.58	   -­‐0.36	   0.06	   -­‐0.36	  
	   Kurtosis	   1.79	   3.01	   2.21	   2.02	  
Jarque-­‐Bera	   10.95	   2	   2.53	   5.78	  
Probability	   [0.00]	   [0.37]	   [0.28]	   [0.06]	  	  
	   133	  
In	   the	  UK,	  during	   the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period,	   the	  variables	  LMR,	  CDS	  and	  RMO	  were	  stable	   and	   calm	   representing	   the	   reduced	  macroeconomic	   volatility	   during	   the	  ‘great	  moderation’	  period.	  Both	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risks	  (LMR	  and	  CDS,	  respectively)	   remained	   low.	   Liquidity	   premia	   (RMO)	   wandered	   around	   zero	  depicting	   ample	   liquidity	   in	   the	   interbank	   market	   and	   favourable	   trading	  environment.	  The	   low	  standard	  deviations	  given	  in	  Table	  5.3	  of	  these	  variables	  imply	  low	  volatility	  of	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  risks	  in	  the	  period.	   	  	  Turning	   first	   to	   the	   UK	   and	   Figure	   5.4a,	   it	   can	   be	   seen	   that	   after	   the	   financial	  crisis	  was	  triggered,	  both	  credit	  risks	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  grew	  dramatically	  and	  wandered	  with	  an	  upward	  trend.	  Prior	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  QE,	  the	  three	  variables	  kept	  increasing	  even	  after	  a	  series	  of	  liquidity	  provisions	  (see	  Chapter	  2	  for	  more	  detail),	   possibly	   implying	   that	   credit	   risk	  premia	   caused	  by	  uncertainty	  played	  more	  important	  role	  in	  the	  interbank	  market	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  those	  liquidity	  provisions	  that	  are	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  2	  aimed	  to	  fulfill	  the	  lender-­‐of-­‐last-­‐resort	  function	  of	  BoE	  so	  they	  did	  not	  directly	  deal	  with	  uncertainties	   that	   were	   raised	   by	   difficulties	   of	   asset	   valuation.	   Particularly,	  around	   half	   year	   before	   the	   collapse	   of	   Northern	   Rock	   and	   Lehman	   Brothers,	  short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   spread	   LMR	   dropped	   considerably.	   This	   does	   not	  necessarily	  mean	  a	  decrease	  of	  credit	  risk	  because	  the	  decline	  of	  LMR	  can	  be	  a	  result	  of	  increase	  on	  repo	  rate	  reflecting	  market	  demand	  for	  secured	  repo	  used	  under	   repo	   agreement	   transaction.	   The	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   measure	   CDS	  increased	   rapidly	   during	   the	   period	   reflecting	   negative	   market	   expectation	   of	  banks’	  ability	  to	  meet	  their	  debt	  obligation.	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Figure	  5.4	  Plot	  of	  Variables	  in	  Basis	  Point	  
	  
a. UK	  (January	  01,	  2004	  –	  September	  30,	  2010)	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c. US	  (January	  01,	  2004	  –	  August	  09,	  2010)	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RMO	  did	  not	  go	  back	  to	  its	  pre-­‐crisis	  level.	  This	  might	  reveal	  banks’	  cautiousness	  about	  the	  market	  and	  economy	  so	  they	  may	  have	  run	  tighter	  criteria	  in	  making	  lending	  decisions	  and	  this	  can	  result	  in	  less	  liquidity	  in	  the	  market.	   	  	  CDS	  spread	   fell	   significantly	  during	   the	  QE	  period	  but	  still	   remained	  at	  a	  much	  higher	   level	   compared	   with	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period.	   Interestingly	   to	   note,	   the	  long-­‐term	  credit	  spread	  (CDS)	  stayed	  close	  to	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  LMR	  during	  pre-­‐crisis	   and	   pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	   periods,	   but	   they	   started	   to	   depart	   because	   LMR	  dropped	  significantly	  more	  than	  CDS.	  This	  shift	  seems	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  QE.	  QE	   is	  a	   temporary	  monetary	  policy	   tool	  and	   the	   facilities	  under	  QE	  aim	  to	  have	  a	  short-­‐term	  effect	   rather	   than	  achieving	  a	   long-­‐term	  goal.	  The	  short-­‐term	  effect	   is	  mainly	  on	  the	   improvement	  of	   liquidity	   in	   the	  market.	  This	  may	  reduce	  the	  credit	  risk	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  inability	  to	  borrow	  (see	  Bank	  of	  England,	  2007,	  p498),	  but	   it	  would	  have	   little	   impact	  on	  reducing	  the	  risk	  of	  default	  that	  relates	  to	  other	  factors	  e.g.	  capital	  adequacy	  or	  composition	  of	  assets.	  In	   other	   words,	   QE	   facilities	   are	   designed	   to	   produce	   a	   buffer	   for	   financially	  sound	   banks	   to	   survive	   during	   the	   crisis,	   but	   banks	   have	   to	   adapt	   their	   own	  strategies	  to	  correct	  the	  bugs	  in	  their	  business	  models	  in	  order	  to	  perform	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  Therefore,	  QE	  would	  possibly	  reduce	  some	  default	  concerns	  raised	  by	  temporary	   shortage	   of	   liquidity	   for	   banks,	   but	   not	   eliminate	   probability	   of	  default	  raised	  on	  the	  long-­‐run	  elements.	  That	  is,	  sound	  banks	  remain	  sound.	  	  During	  the	  post	  crisis	  period,	  the	  short-­‐term	  credit	  spread	  LMR	  nearly	  dropped	  back	   to	   its	   pre-­‐crisis	   level	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   RMO	   stayed	   low	   and	   stable	  despite	  still	  being	  twice	  its	  level	  in	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period	  and	  stayed	  close	  to	  LMR.	  This	  could	  mean	  that	  banks	  may	  have	  started	  to	  consider	  liquidity	  factors	  more	  seriously	  in	  their	  asset	  valuation	  models.	  The	  CDS	  rate	  remained	  at	  an	  elevated	  level	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  period	  and	   then	   increased	  suddenly,	  also	  showing	  greater	  volatility.	  	  
	   137	  
Turning	   to	   the	   descriptive	   statistics	   for	   the	   UK	   in	   Table	   5.3,	   we	   see	   that	   the	  means	   of	   the	   spreads	   have	   risen	   considerably	   since	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period,	  indicating	  generally	  elevated	  levels	  of	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  during	  the	  pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	  period.	  The	  standard	  deviation	  of	   the	  spreads	  also	  shows	  sharply	  the	   increased	   uncertainties	   and	   greater	   instability	   in	   the	   interbank	   market.	  Skewness	  measures	  asymmetry	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  a	  variable	  around	  its	  mean.	  The	  positive	  value	  of	  skewness	  shows	  that	  the	  distributions	  of	  the	  variables	  have	  a	  long	  right	  tail.	  This	  is	  not	  so	  for	  RMO	  whose	  small	  negative	  skewness	  shows	  a	  longer	  left	  tail.	  This	  means	  that	  for	  RMO	  the	  mass	  of	  the	  distribution	  is	  towards	  the	   right	   –	   at	   the	   higher	   values	   of	   RMO.	   This	  might	   explain	   that	   liquidity	  was	  hardly	  a	  problem	  before	  the	  crisis	  and	  that	  market	  participants	  tended	  to	  be	  very	  optimistic	  about	  market	  conditions.	  Kurtosis	   is	  a	  measure	  of	  peakedness	  of	   the	  distribution	  of	  a	  variable.	  The	  values	  of	  kurtosis	   show	   that	  each	  variable	  has	  a	  distribution	   that	   is	   peaked	   relative	   to	   the	   normal	   distribution	   in	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	  period	  and	  in	  the	  pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	  period	  except	  variable	  CDS,	  which	  has	  a	  slightly	  smaller	   kurtosis.	   Finally,	   Jarque-­‐Bera	   statistics	   also	   suggest	   non-­‐normality	   of	  these	  variables	  in	  the	  three	  periods.	  	  The	  mean	   values	   of	   LMR	  dropped	   after	   the	   crisis	  QE	  period,	   but	   the	  means	   of	  CDS	  and	  RMO	  increased	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  The	  standard	  deviation	  of	  LMR	  and	   RMO	   fell	   dramatically	   during	   the	   post-­‐crisis	   period,	   indicating	   that	   the	  interbank	  market	  had	  started	  to	  settle.	  	  During	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  period,	  firstly,	  the	  mean	  (18.14	  basis	  points)	  of	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  LMR	  is	  very	  close	  to	  its	  pre-­‐crisis	  mean	  (14.70	  basis	  points)	  confirming	  the	  contribution	  of	  asset	  purchases	  to	  removing	  credit	  risk	  that	  had	  been	  caused	  by	  uncertainty	  of	  asset	  valuation.	  The	  Jarque	  Bera	  test	  statistics	  do	  not	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  normality	  for	  LMR,	  but	  they	  do	  so	  for	  RMO	  and	  CDS.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  Figure	  5.4a,	  the	  mean	  of	  liquidity	  premia	  (7.95	  basis	  points)	  is	  much	   higher	   than	   its	   pre-­‐crisis	  mean	   (-­‐2.51)	   despite	   the	   standard	   deviation	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being	  much	  smaller	   (0.45).	  This	  seems	   to	   imply	   that	   liquidity	  conditions	   in	   the	  interbank	   market	   were	   quite	   settled	   after	   the	   interventions	   by	   the	   BoE.	   The	  raised	  mean	  of	  liquidity	  premia	  might	  reflect	  the	  change	  of	  banks’	  awareness	  of	  risk.	  	  We	  turn	  now	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  risk	  premia	  in	  the	  EMU	  sample.	  During	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period,	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  measurements,	  EMR	  and	  CDS,	  respectively	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   RMO	   performed	   very	   similar	   to	   the	   UK’s	  market.	  The	  level	  of	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  is	  smaller	  than	  in	  the	  UK	  whereas	  the	  mean	  of	   long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	   is	  about	   the	  same	   in	  both	  markets.	  The	  standard	  deviations	  for	  the	  corresponding	  variables	  are	  close,	  as	  well,	  indicating	  a	  similar	  trading	  environment	  in	  the	  two	  markets.	  The	  size	  of	  OMO	  in	  proportion	  to	  total	  bank	  assets	  is	  27.80	  percent	  in	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period,	  on	  average.	   	  	  On	   August	   09,	   2007,	   the	   ECB	   reported	   a	   liquidity	   shortage	   worldwide	   using	  Euribor	   data	   (European	   Central	   Bank,	   Financial	   Crisis	   Timeline,	   09/08/2007).	  From	  August	  09	  to	  August	  14,	   the	  ECB	  injected	  €335	  billion	   into	  the	   interbank	  market	   to	  ensure	   the	  orderly	   functioning	  of	  money	  markets	   (European	  Central	  Bank,	  Press	  Release,	  14/08/2007).	  Then,	  a	  series	  of	   liquidity	  interventions	  was	  carried	   out	   during	   the	   crisis	   period.	   Furthermore,	   RMO	   varied	   positive	   and	  negative	  over	  the	  whole	  sample	  period	  so	  that	  on	  average	  RMO	  is	  close	  to	  zero.	  Since	   it	   is	   the	  absolute	  size	  of	   the	  spread	   that	  measures	   the	  degree	  of	   liquidity	  risk,	  a	  better	  measure	  of	  the	  average	  may	  be	  the	  absolute	  mean,	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  0.01	  during	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period.	  Moreover,	  the	  relatively	  calm	  RMO	  spread	  may	  show	   that	   the	  main	   issue	   in	   the	   EMU	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   credit	   default	   rather	   than	  short-­‐term	  liquidity	  problems.	  In	  the	  pre-­‐QE	  period,	  the	  spread	  of	  EMR	  and	  CDS	  increased	  dramatically.	  The	  mean	  of	  EMR	   increased	  by	  nearly	   ten	   times	   in	   the	  crisis	  pre-­‐QE	  period	  compared	  with	  pre-­‐crisis	  period.	  The	  mean	  of	  CDS	  increased	  about	  six	  times.	  Interestingly,	  the	  Ratio	  showed	  a	  slight	  downward	  trend	  in	  the	  period.	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During	   the	   crisis	   QE	   period,	   with	   the	   crisis	   intensifying	   after	   the	   collapse	   of	  Lehman	   Brothers,	   on	   October	   08,	   2008,	   the	   ECB	   decided	   on	   taking	  unconventional	   liquidity	   measures	   to	   banks	   as	   well	   as	   commitment	   to	   meet	  banks’	   liquidity	   request	   subject	   to	   collaterals	  with	   sufficient	   quality	   (European	  Central	   Bank,	   Press	   Release,	   08/10/2008).	   In	   this	   period,	   the	   variables	   show	  some	   divergence	   from	   those	   of	   the	   UK	   market.	   The	   mean	   of	   all	   variables	  increased	  compared	  with	  the	  pre-­‐QE	  period	  in	  the	  EMU	  and	  variables	  showed	  an	  upward	   trend.	   The	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	  measure	  CDS	   reached	   its	   peak	   at	   this	  period	   in	  the	  EMU	  whereas	   it	  continuously	  reduced	   in	  the	  UK.	   In	  the	  middle	  of	  the	   period,	   CDS	   started	   to	   drop	   but	   the	  mean	  was	   still	   double	   its	   value	   in	   the	  pre-­‐QE	  period.	  It	  also	  showed	  signs	  of	   increasing	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  the	  sample	  period.	   Short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   did	   not	   decrease	   from	   the	   pre-­‐QE	   period	   but	  increased	   slightly.	  Moreover,	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   seemed	   to	   settle	   at	   a	   level	  that	  was	  much	  higher	  than	  its	  pre-­‐crisis	  period	  i.e.	  64.20	  basis	  points	  versus	  6.52	  basis	  points	  whereas	   it	  went	  back	  quite	  closely	   to	   its	  pre-­‐crisis	   level	   in	   the	  UK.	  The	   standard	   deviation	   increased	   significantly	   implying	   market	   instability	  whereas	  we	  observed	  a	  decline	  of	   standard	  deviation	   in	   the	  UK	  sample	  during	  the	  period.	  The	  Ratio	  increased	  slightly	  as	  expected.	  The	  spikes	  in	  the	  figure	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  maintenance	  period	  of	  OMO.	   	  	  In	  the	  EMU,	  the	  variable	  ‘Ratio’	  has	  values	  for	  the	  whole	  sample	  period	  because	  of	   the	   way	   it	   is	   computed	   (see	   Table	   5.2).	   A	   large	   proportion	   of	   EMU’s	   ECS	  scheme	   was	   carried	   out	   through	   LTROs	   in	   different	   maturities	   under	   OMO.	  Therefore,	  prior	   to	   the	  operation	  of	  CBPP	   in	   the	  QE	  period	   in	   the	  EMU	  sample,	  ‘Ratio’	  is	  the	  proportion	  of	  OMO	  to	  total	  bank	  assets.	  Its	  pre-­‐crisis	  values	  provide	  a	  benchmark	  for	  the	  size	  of	  ECB’s	  OMO	  in	  relation	  to	  bank	  assets.	   	  	  Turning	  to	  the	  result	  of	  the	  US,	  before	  the	  crisis	  hit,	  in	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  the	  UK	  and	   the	   EMU,	   all	   variables	   stayed	   low	  with	   small	   fluctuation.	   Particularly,	   the	  short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	   LMR	   wandered	   very	   close	   to	   zero	   and	   the	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liquidity	   risk	   premium	   RMO	   was	   below	   zero	   on	   average.	   This	   shows	   the	  favourable	  market	  trading	  conditions	  in	  the	  US	  money	  market	  prior	  to	  the	  crisis.	  	  Despite	  the	  Fed	  voting	  to	  maintain	  the	  bank	  base	  rate	  at	  5.25	  percent	  on	  August	  7,	   2007	   (a	   day	   before	   the	   widely	   recognized	   start	   date	   of	   the	   crisis),	   they	  announced	   on	   August	   10,	   2007	   that	   banks	   may	   experience	   unusual	   funding	  needs	   due	   to	   dislocations	   in	   money	   and	   credit	   market	   and	   they	   will	   always	  provide	   liquidity	  as	  necessary	  to	  promote	  trading54.	   In	  Figure	  5.4c,	   the	  obvious	  signal	   is	   the	   sudden	   increase	   in	   the	   long-­‐term	  credit	   risk	  premium	  proxy,	  CDS.	  The	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  did	  not	  increase	  as	  dramatically	  as	  they	  did	   in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  EMU,	  but	  we	  can	  still	  observe	  the	  rise	   in	  the	  two	  variables.	   This	   phenomenon	  might	   indicate	   that	   the	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   and	  illiquidity	   are	   not	   the	  main	   drivers	   in	   the	   crisis.	  Market	   participants	   in	   the	  US	  market	   are	   likely	   to	   consider	   the	   long-­‐term	   credit	   worthiness	   of	   their	  counterparties	  when	   they	  make	   their	   lending	  decisions.	   This	   is	   also	   consistent	  with	   the	  regression	  result	  shown	   in	   the	   later	  part	  e.g.	   the	   long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	   appears	   to	   have	  more	   significant	   influence	   on	   the	   liquidity	   premium	  compared	  with	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium.	  	  Moreover,	   a	   series	   of	   immediate	   responses	   to	   ease	  market	   liquidity	   conditions	  and	  to	  provide	  liquidity	  directly	  and	  quantitatively	  may	  have	  also	  pushed	  down	  the	   liquidity	   premium	   in	   the	  US	  money	  market	   although	  RMO	  became	   volatile	  during	  the	  period.	  For	  example,	  eight	  days	  after	  the	  crisis	  hit,	  August	  17,	  2007,	  the	  Fed	  reduced	  fifty	  basis	  points	  of	  the	  primary	  credit	  rate	  making	  it	  only	  fifty	  basis	  points	  higher	  than	  the	  bank	  base	  rate	   i.e.	  5.75	  percent.	  On	  September	  18,	  2007,	  the	  Fed	  reduced	  the	  bank	  base	  rate	  by	  fifty	  basis	  points	  to	  4.75	  percent	  as	  well	   as	   another	   fifty	   basis	   point	   reduction	   on	   the	   primary	   credit	   rate.	   On	  December	  12,	  2007,	  the	  first	  (in	  our	  sample)	  unconventional	  liquidity	  provision	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	   Reference	  from	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  St.	  Louis	  website.	  The	  financial	  crisis:	  A	  timeline	  of	  events	  and	  policy	  actions.	  http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline	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TAF	  was	  launched	  to	  provide	  massive	  liquidity	  to	  the	  US	  banking	  system	  (There	  are	  another	  two	  bank	  base	  rate	  cuts	  before	  the	  launch	  of	  TAF,	  twenty-­‐five	  basis	  points	  on	  October	  31,	  2007	  and	  twenty-­‐five	  basis	  points	  on	  December	  11,	  2007).	   	  	  On	  November	  25,	  2008,	   the	  Fed	   revealed	   their	   intention	   to	  purchase	  a	   total	  of	  $600bn	   market	   securities	   -­‐	   $500bn	   was	   used	   to	   purchase	   mortgaged	   backed	  securities.	   On	  March	   18,	   2009,	   the	   Fed	   announced	   a	   further	   $1.15tn	   purchase,	  $850bn	  for	  agency	  debt	  and	  $300bn	  for	   longer-­‐dated	  government	  bonds.	  From	  Figure	   5.4c,	   the	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	   CDS	   reacts	   to	   the	   measures	  positively.	   CDS	   fell	   significantly	   during	   the	   period	   of	   QE,	   especially	   after	   the	  announcement	   of	   further	   purchases.	   The	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	   LMR	  also	  fell.	  The	  liquidity	  premium	  RMO	  narrowed	  and	  flattened	  indicating	  a	  lower	  standard	  deviation.	  	  By	   the	   end	   of	  March	   2010,	   the	   Fed	   has	   used	   up	   the	   total	   $1.65bn	   budget.	   On	  March	  16,	  2010,	  the	  Fed	  revealed	  their	  confidence	  in	  the	  economic	  recovery	  by	  stating	  that	  ‘although	  the	  pace	  of	  economic	  recovery	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  moderate	  for	  a	   time,	   the	  Committee	  anticipates	  a	  gradual	   return	   to	  higher	   levels	  of	   resource	  utilization	  in	  a	  context	  of	  price	  stability’55	   (The	  Federal	  Reserve,	  Press	  Release,	  March	   16,	   2010).	   This	   ends	   the	   first	   round	   of	   QE	   presumably	   indicating	   an	  improved	   market	   condition.	   In	   Figure	   5.4c,	   both	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   and	  liquidity	   premia	   have	   dropped	   and	   formed	   smoothed	   curves,	   respectively,	   but	  the	  CDS	  remained	  elevated.	  This	   is	   the	  same	  as	   in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  EMU.	  Also,	   it	  fits	  the	  intention	  of	  QE	  –	  to	  provide	  liquidity	  to	  economies	  directly.	  	  Moving	   to	   the	  descriptive	  statistics	   in	  Table	  5.3,	   the	  statistics	   for	   the	  US	   firmly	  confirm	   the	   information	   revealed	   by	   the	   plot	   of	   variables.	   The	   mean	   and	  standard	   deviation	   of	   LMR,	   RMO	   and	   CDS	   are	   low,	   respectively	   during	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	   Press	  release	  March	  16,	  2010	  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20100316a.htm	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pre-­‐crisis	  period	  whereas	  the	  values	  increased	  dramatically	  during	  the	  period	  of	  crisis	  prior	  to	  QE,	  especially	  for	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  RMO	  and	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	   premium	   CDS.	   The	   standard	   deviation	   and	   mean	   of	   RMO	   is	   8.44	   for	   the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period	  and	  it	  increased	  to	  22.86	  during	  the	  period	  of	  crisis	  before	  the	  unconventional	   quantitative	   intervention	   showing	   the	   strong	   demand	   for	  liquidity	   and	   the	   shortage	   of	   liquidity	   in	   the	   money	   market.	   The	   mean	   and	  standard	   deviation	   of	   CDS	   is	   11.6	   and	   3.76	   during	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period,	  respectively	  and	  they	  increased	  to	  74.97	  and	  33.38,	  respectively,	  since	  the	  onset	  of	   the	  crisis.	  This	  confirms	   that	  uncertainty	  of	  valuation	  and	  value	  of	  assets	  on	  banks’	  balance	  sheet	  has	  triggered	  the	  concern	  of	  credit	  worthiness	   in	  the	   long	  run.	   The	  mean	   and	   standard	   deviation	   of	   LMR	   increases	   slightly	   implying	   that	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  may	  not	  be	  the	  main	  concern	  from	  market	  participants.	  	  During	   the	   period	   of	   QE	   intervention,	   the	   liquidity	   effect	   has	   been	   apparently	  reflected	  in	  the	  value	  of	  standard	  deviation	  of	  RMO	  –	  it	  dropped	  to	  5.64,	  which	  is	  smaller	   than	   the	   value	   during	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period.	   This	   reveals	   that	   the	   large	  amount	   of	   purchase	   of	   longer-­‐dated	   securities	   swaps	   for	   an	   ample	   liquidity	   in	  the	  money	  market	  pushing	  down	   the	   liquidity	  premium	   in	   the	   risk	  premium.56	  However,	  although	  we	  observe	  a	  downward	  shift	  of	  CDS	  during	  the	  period	  of	  QE	  intervention,	   the	   mean	   of	   CDS	   increases	   during	   the	   period,	   but	   standard	  deviation	   falls.	   This	   might	   explain	   that	   banks	   become	   clearer	   on	   the	  identification	  of	  the	  creditworthiness	  of	  counterparties	  i.e.	  the	  QE	  eliminates	  the	  probability	  of	  default	  that	  is	  triggered	  by	  the	  illiquidity.	  Therefore,	  the	  standard	  deviation	   of	   CDS	   drops.	   The	   high	   value	   of	   the	   mean	   then	   shows	   the	   high	  probability	   of	   default	   in	   the	   long	   term	   with	   little	   influence	   from	   the	   liquidity	  position.	   Therefore,	   it	   indicates	   the	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   concern	   in	   the	   US	  money	  market.	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  56	   The	  ample	  liquidity	  indeed	  pushed	  down	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  but	  if	  the	  liquidity	  has	  been	  converted	  into	  credit	  that	  ultimately	  benefit	  the	  economy	  is	  another	  issue.	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Looking	  at	  the	  post	  crisis	  period,	  the	  statistics	  do	  not	  vary	  too	  much	  from	  their	  QE	  period	  value	  except	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  RMO	  –	  it	  decreases	  to	  2.82	  i.e.	  about	  a	  50	  per	  cent	  decrease	   from	   its	  value	  during	   the	  QE	  period.	  This	   further	  proves	  the	  ample	  liquidity	  in	  the	  money	  market.	  	  Overall,	   the	   basic	   statistics	   of	   variables	   in	   the	   UK	   depicted	   the	   relationship	   as	  expected	   according	   to	  market	   events,	   but	   they	   showed	   some	  ambiguity	  during	  the	   crisis-­‐QE	   period	   in	   the	   EMU.	   Presumably,	   these	   risk	   measures	   should	  decrease	  during	  the	  operation	  of	  intervention	  but	  they	  tended	  to	  increase	  in	  the	  EMU	   sample.	   This	   might	   result	   from	   a	   lagged	   effect.	   In	   the	   US	   sample,	   the	  statistics	  shows	  comparability	  with	  the	  UK	  result,	  but	  the	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	   LMR	   seems	   not	   to	   have	   much	   impact	   (on	   the	   risk	   premium)	   in	   the	  crisis	  in	  the	  US.	  In	  the	  next	  sub-­‐section,	  the	  correlation	  table	  will	  shed	  more	  light	  on	  these	  relationships.	  
	  
5.1.2	  Correlation	  between	  Variables	  
	  Correlation	   is	   a	   numerical	   measure	   of	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   patterns	   in	   one	  variable	  and	  another	  variable	  correspond.	  The	  squared	  correlation	  measures	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  variability	   in	  the	  variable	  that	   is	  explained	  by	  the	  variance	  in	  the	  other	  variable	  density.	  But,	  correlation	  does	  not	  necessarily	  identify	  causality.	  The	  correlation	  between	  two	  variables	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  correlation	  when	  they	  reverse	  their	  places.	  To	  establish	  causality	  in	  our	  study,	  we	  need	  to	  employ	  the	  econometric	   models	   whose	   results	   are	   presented	   in	   section	   5.2.	   In	   this	  sub-­‐section,	  we	  look	  at	  the	  pairwise	  correlation	  between	  variables.	  	  In	  the	  UK,	  during	  the	  pre-­‐crisis	  period,	  the	  correlation	  between	  credit	  risks	  and	  liquidity	   premia	  was	   quite	   low	   especially	   between	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   LMR	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  RMO	  i.e.	   the	  correlation	  is	  only	  -­‐0.08.	  This	   low	  correlation	  may	  represent	  the	  great	  moderation	  period	  when	  liquidity	  was	  never	  an	  issue	  in	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the	  banking	   system	   in	   the	   short	   run.	  The	   short-­‐term	  and	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	  were	  positively	  related	  indicating	  a	  trading	  day	  yielded	  high	  LMR	  spread	  tend	  to	  have	   high	   CDS	   figure	   vice	   versa,	   despite	   the	   figure	  was	   quite	   low	   at	   0.30.	   The	  variables,	   CDS	   and	  RMO	  had	   a	   higher	   positive	   relationship	   at	   0.36.	   This	  might	  reveal	  that	  liquidity	  premia	  tend	  to	  be	  higher	  in	  the	  interbank	  market	  for	  banks	  with	  greater	  default	  probability	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  During	  the	  crisis	  period,	  the	  correlation	  in	  the	  UK	  increased	  rapidly	  and	  showed	  significant	   changes	   in	   the	   relationship	   between	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   and	  liquidity	  premia.	  Prior	  to	  the	  QE	  period,	  the	  correlation	  between	  RMO,	  and	  short-­‐	  and	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risks	   was	   positive	   at	   0.58	   and	   0.65,	   respectively.	   Both	  figures	  were	  significantly	  greater	  than	  their	  pre-­‐crisis	  value.	  Thirty-­‐four	  percent	  (forty-­‐two	  percent)	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  LMR	  (CDS)	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  variance	  in	  RMO,	  and	  vice	  versa.57	   This	  most	  likely	  reveals	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  default	  of	  banks	   who	   faced	   greater	   liquidity	   problems	   tended	   to	   be	   particularly	   higher	  during	   crisis	   period,	   and	   vice	   versa58	   –	   we	   need	   more	   evidence	   to	   find	   the	  precise	   causality.	   Moreover,	   the	   greater	   correlation	   between	   short-­‐	   and	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  showed	  stronger	  connection	  between	  credit	  risks	  in	  short	  and	  long	  terms.	   	  	  During	   the	   QE	   period,	   the	   correlation	   further	   increased	   compared	   with	  pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	   period.	   The	   correlation	   between	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   and	  liquidity	  premia	  was	  nearly	  perfectly	  positive	  at	  0.91,	  showing	  an	  extremely	  high	  tendency	  for	  banks	  with	  liquidity	  problem	  to	  tend	  to	  default	  in	  the	  short	  run.	  The	  market’s	   perception	   of	   high	   default	   risk	   due	   to	   low	   quality	   assets	   and	  asymmetric	   information	   leads	   to	   a	   liquidity	   shortage	   in	   the	   system	   because	  banks	  may	   tend	   to	   hoard	   cash.	   This	   would	   reflect	   the	   urgency	   for	   the	   BoE	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	   0.58  ×  0.58 = 0.3364 = 34%	   is	  for	  LMR	  and	  RMO.	   0.65  ×  0.65 = 42%	   is	  for	  CDS	  and	  RMO.	  58	   As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  paragraph,	  correlation	  does	  not	  reveal	  causality.	  Therefore,	  we	  have	  estimated	  causality	  in	  the	  econometric	  model.	  To	  avoid	  repeating,	  the	  phase	  ‘vice	  versa’	  is	  not	  added	  while	  discussing	  correlation	  relationship.	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intervene	  in	  the	  market	  in	  a	  stronger	  way	  i.e.	  asset	  purchase.	  If	  it	  was	  the	  case,	  1)	  the	   correlation	   between	   Ratio,	   and	   LMR	   and	   RMO,	   respectively	   should	   be	  negative;	  2)	  the	  variable	  Ratio	  should	  weaken	  the	  correlation	  between	  LMR	  and	  RMO.	  The	  latter	  cannot	  be	  revealed	  by	  the	  correlation	  in	  this	  section	  and	  it	  will	  be	   examined	   in	   the	   empirical	   result	   section.	   For	   the	   former,	   the	   correlations	  indeed	   showed	   near-­‐perfect	   negative	   relations	   (-­‐0.97	   and	   -­‐0.93)	   for	   the	   two	  pairs	  of	   variables,	   respectively.	  Moreover,	   the	   correlation	  between	  Ratio59	   and	  CDS	  also	  showed	  large	  negative	  relation,	  -­‐0.71.	  This	  provided	  the	  evidence	  that	  QE	   effectively	   reduced	   credit	   risks	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   during	   its	   operation	  period.	   	  	  
Table	  5.5	  Correlations	  between	  Variables	  
	  
Variable	   UK	   EMU	   US	  
 	   Pre-­‐Crisis	  
 	   LMR	   CDS	    	   EMR	   CDS	   Ratio	   LMR	   CDS	   Ratio	  
RMO	   -­‐0.08	   0.36	    	   -­‐0.35	   0.25	   -­‐0.11	   -­‐0.89	   -­‐0.49	   0.76	  
CDS	   0.3	   1	    	   -­‐0.3	   1	   -­‐0.34	   0.76	   1	   -­‐0.79	  
Ratio	    	    	    	   0.19	   -­‐0.34	   1	   -­‐0.87	   -­‐0.79	   1	  
 	   Crisis	  
Pre-­‐QE	   LMR	   CDS	    	   EMR	   CDS	   Ratio	   LMR	   CDS	   Ratio	  
RMO	   0.58	   0.65	    	   -­‐0.1	   0.22	   -­‐0.25	   -­‐0.17	   0.09	   -­‐0.4	  
CDS	   0.55	   1	    	   -­‐0.16	   1	   -­‐0.53	   0.44	   1	   -­‐0.65	  
Ratio	  
	   	  
 	   -­‐0.01	   -­‐0.53	   1	   -­‐0.31	   -­‐0.65	   1	  
QE	   LMR	   CDS	   Ratio	   EMR	   CDS	   Ratio	   LMR	   CDS	   Ratio	  
RMO	   0.91	   0.71	   -­‐0.93	   0.49	   0.62	   -­‐0.35	   0.69	   0.71	   -­‐0.78	  
CDS	   0.78	   1	   -­‐0.71	   0.48	   1	   -­‐0.23	   0.73	   1	   -­‐0.83	  
Ratio	   -­‐0.97	   -­‐0.71	   1	   0.08	   -­‐0.23	   1	   -­‐0.92	   -­‐0.83	   1	  
Post-­‐Crisis	  
 	   LMR	   CDS	    	  
NA	  
LMR	   CDS	   Ratio	  
RMO	   -­‐0.39	   -­‐0.16	    	   0.52	   0	   0.58	  
CDS	   0.73	   1	    	   0.7	   1	   0.6	  
Ratio	    	    	    	   0.95	   0.6	   1	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	   The	  definition	  of	  Ratio	  is	  explained	  in	  Chapter	  4.3.	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In	  the	  post-­‐crisis	  period,	  the	  variable	  Ratio	  was	  dropped	  because	  the	  study	  does	  not	   look	   at	   persistence	   of	   QE’s	   effect	   on	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   premia.	   The	  correlations	  between	  both	  credit	  risks,	  respectively	  and	  RMO	  were	  negative	  and	  quite	  small.	  For	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk,	  the	  figure	  did	  increase	  compared	  with	  its	  pre-­‐crisis	   level	   but	   not	   significant.	   It	   suggested	   a	   weak	   negative	   tendency	  between	  credit	  risks	  and	  liquidity	  premia.	  The	  correlation	  between	  CDS	  and	  LMR	  stayed	  at	  their	  crisis	  level	  closely.	  Overall,	  these	  post-­‐crisis	  correlations	  seemed	  to	   tell	   that	   QE	   reduced	   and	   reversed	   the	   connection	   between	   credit	   risks	   and	  liquidity	  premia.	  	  In	  the	  EMU,	  the	  correlations	  were	  quite	  consistent	  across	  the	  three	  periods	  but	  they	   revealed	   different	   information	   compared	   with	   the	   UK	   market.	   Firstly,	  during	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period,	   the	   correlation	   between	   both	   credit	   risks	   and	  liquidity	   premia	   were	   very	   low,	   respectively	   and	   the	   correlation	   between	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  EMR	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  was	  negative	  as	  they	  were	  in	  the	  UK	  sample.	  But,	  CDS	  had	  a	  negative	  correlation	  with	  EMR	  although	  it	  was	  small.	  As	  expected,	   correlations	  between	  Ratio,	   and	  RMO	  and	  CDS,	   respectively,	  were	  negative	   indicating	   that	   conventional	   liquidity	  operations	  worked	   satisfactorily	  in	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period.	   Secondly,	   during	   the	   pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	   period,	   the	  correlations	   indicate	   that	   conventional	   open	   market	   operations	   worked	  satisfactorily	   in	  the	  crisis.	  The	  correlations	  between	  Ratio	  and	  both	  credit	  risks	  and	   liquidity	   premia	  were	   negative	   and	   the	   values	  were	   bigger	   than	  pre-­‐crisis	  period	  although	  the	  absolute	  value	  of	  correlations	  is	  not	  high,	  but	  they	  are	  more	  than	  twice	  for	  RMO	  versus	  Ratio	  and	  almost	  twice	  for	  CDS	  and	  Ratio	  compared	  with	  the	  earlier	  period.	  This	  implied	  that	  the	  crisis	  magnified	  the	  dependence	  of	  the	  interbank	  market	  on	  OMO.	  However,	  it	  was	  very	  interesting	  to	  notice	  that	  the	  correlation	   between	   the	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	   and	  Ratio	   dropped	   to	  -­‐0.01,	  virtually	  no	  correlation.	  Finally,	  during	  the	  crisis	  QE	  period,	  OMO	  included	  weekly	   LTROs	  with	   longer	  maturities	   as	  well	   as	   CBPP.	   	   Correlations	   between	  variables	  increased	  in	  the	  period	  apart	  from	  the	  relation	  between	  CDS	  and	  Ratio.	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The	  correlation	  between	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  changed	  to	  positive	   compared	  with	   the	   last	   two	  periods,	  which	  was	  comparable	   to	   the	  UK	  market.	  Despite	  the	  increased	  absolute	  amount	  and	  negative	  sign	  on	  correlations	  between	   Ratio	   and	   credit	   risks	   and	   liquidity	   premia,	   the	   statistics	   shows	  evidence	   that	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   ECS	   scheme	   had	   a	   significant	   impact	   on	  improving	  liquidity	  in	  the	  Euribor	  market.	   	  	  In	   the	   US	   sample,	   the	   variable	   Ratio	   has	   a	   tight	   negative	   correlation	   between	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	  premia	  variables,	  respectively.	  This	  initially	  confirms	  the	  effectiveness	   of	   the	   Fed’s	   LSAP	   in	   reducing	   the	   borrowing	   costs	   in	   the	  money	  market	   by	   reducing	   liquidity	   and	   credit	   risk	   premia.	   However,	   the	   correlation	  statistics	  show	  a	  different	  picture	  compared	  with	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  EMU	  samples	  during	  pre-­‐crisis	  and	  crisis	  pre-­‐QE	  periods,	  respectively.	  Firstly,	  before	  the	  onset	  of	   the	   crisis,	   the	   liquidity	   and	   credit	   risk	   premia	   have	   a	   closely	   negative	  relationship,	  but	   the	   long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  CDS	  has	  a	  positive	  relation	  between	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  RMO	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  EMU	  samples.	  Secondly,	  the	  correlations	  between	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	  premia	   loosened	  significantly	  during	  the	  crisis	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  intervention	  of	  QE,	  but	  the	  relation	  became	  tighter	   in	   the	  UK	  sample	  and	  maintained	   (with	   little	  drop)	   in	   the	  EMU	  sample.	  During	   the	   post	   crisis	   period,	   the	   correlations	   remain	   positive,	   but	   the	   value	  between	   CDS	   and	   RMO	   becomes	   zero	   implying	   the	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	  premium	  takes	  the	  major	  role	  in	  the	  liquidity	  premium.	   	  	  To	   summarize,	   the	   correlations	   between	   variables	   in	   the	  UK	   generally	   showed	  supportive	   evidence	   of	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   QE	   in	   reducing	   credit	   risks	   and	  liquidity	  premia	  as	  well	  as	  boosting	  the	  correlation	  between	  them.	  Moreover,	  the	  correlation	  between	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  and	   liquidity	  premia	   increased	  after	  the	  crisis	  possibly	  reflecting	  banks’	  revaluation	  of	  their	  risk	  assessment	  models.	  In	  the	  EMU,	  the	  impact	  of	  OMO	  on	  both	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  increased	  slightly	   with	   weekly	   unconventional	   longer-­‐term	   LTROs,	   but	   the	   correlations	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between	   credit	   risks	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   were	   persistently	   high.	   The	   low	  correlation	  between	  EMR	  and	  Ratio	  in	  the	  three	  periods	  indicates	  that	  there	  was	  only	  a	  weak	  tendency	  for	  Ratio	  to	  reduce	  EMR.	  For	  both	  samples,	  the	  correlation	  between	   long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  and	   liquidity	  premia	  was	  magnified	  by	   the	  crisis	  and	   the	   effect	   seemed	   to	  be	  quite	  persistent.	   In	   the	  US	   sample,	   the	   correlation	  between	  Ratio	  and	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	  premia	  primarily	  confirms	  the	  impact	  of	  LSAP	  on	  reducing	  the	  borrowing	  costs.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  correlation	  statistics	  provide	  the	  ground	  for	  empirical	  estimations	  to	  focus	  on	   	  	  
! The	  causality	  between	  credit	  risks	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  
! The	  ability	  of	  QE	  to	  influence	  these	  variables	  
! Whether	  QE	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  changing	  the	  relationships	  between	  variables,	   	  and	  if	  so,	  the	  magnitude	  of	  its	  effect.	  	  The	  following	  sub-­‐section	  represents	  unit	  root	  tests	  for	  evidence	  of	  selection	  of	  econometric	  models.	  	  
5.1.3	  Unit	  Root	  Test	  Result	  
	  This	   study	   adopts	   the	   augmented	   Dickey-­‐Fuller	   test	   (see	   Chapter	   4.6.1)	   to	  examine	  the	  stationarity	  of	  variables	   in	  order	  to	  avoid	  spurious	  regressions.	  As	  saw	   in	   the	   Figure	   5.4,	   spreads	   tended	   to	   wander	   up	   and	   down	   with	   no	  discernable	   pattern	   across	   the	   whole	   sample	   period.	   However,	   the	   spreads	  wandered	   with	   an	   obvious	   upward	   trend	   during	   the	   pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	   period	   and	  downward	  trend	  during	  the	  QE	  period.	  	  These	   features	   are	   likely	   to	   suggest	   that	   these	   spreads	   are	   random	   walk	  variables;	  especially	  they	  showed	  the	  features	  of	  random	  walk	  with	  drift	  during	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crisis	  period	  (positive	  drift	  during	  pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	  period	  and	  negative	  drift	  during	  QE	   period).	   According	   to	  ADF	   testing	   procedure	   suggested	   by	  Hill	   et	   al	   (2008,	  p336),	  the	  selection	  of	  testing	  equation	  is	  based	  on	  visual	  inspection	  of	  plots	  in	  Figure	   5.4a	   and	   Figure	   5.4b.	   Table	   5.6	   shows	   the	   results	   of	   the	   ADF	   tests	   in	  different	  sub-­‐periods	  and	  Table	  5.7	  summarizes	  the	  results.	  	  Turning	  first	  to	  discuss	  the	  results	  for	  the	  UK,	  we	  see	  that	  the	  results	  are	  nearly	  the	  same	  for	  variables	  in	  different	  sub-­‐periods	  for	  the	  three	  samples,	  except	  for	  the	  variable	  Ratio	  and	  RMO.	   In	   the	  UK,	  Ratio	  was	  expected	   to	  have	  a	  unit	   root	  due	   to	   the	   progressive	   expansion	   in	   size	   of	   QE.	   However,	   in	   the	   EMU,	   the	   QE	  measure	  was	  stationary	  across	  the	  sub-­‐period.	  Noticeably,	  the	  immense	  easing	  of	  monetary	   policy	   in	   the	   UK	   during	   the	   crisis	   period	   had	   a	   larger	   effect	   on	   the	  liquidity	   component	  because	  RMO	  became	  stationary	   for	   the	  post-­‐crisis	  period	  whereas	  the	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  remained	  volatile.	  In	  the	  US	  sample,	  RMO	  was	  stationary	  during	  crisis	  prior	  to	  LSAP	  and	  shows	  unit	  root	  during	  the	  period	  of	  LSAP.	  This	  result	  is	  not	  unexpected	  as	  the	  massive	  liquidity	  provision	  may	  have	  come	  as	  a	  stochastic	  shock	  on	  the	  spreads.	   	  	  Based	   on	   the	   unit	   root	   test	   results,	   this	   section	   investigates	   the	   pairwise	  relationships	   between	   credit	   risks	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   as	   well	   as	   impact	   on	  these	  relations	  from	  liquidity	  provisions	  by	  the	  BoE,	  the	  ECB	  and	  the	  Fed	  during	  the	  crisis	  and	  how	  BoE’s	  and	  the	  Fed’s	  QEs	  may	  have	  changed	  the	  relationship.	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RMO -3.87 [0.00] -2.25 [0.46] -2.30 [0.43] -3.50 [0.01] 
LMR -3.10 [0.03] -2.95 [0.15] -0.82 [0.96] -2.07 [0.26] 
CDS -1.45 [0.56] -3.56 [0.04] -1.71 [0.75] -2.78 [0.07] 
Ratio NA NA -2.49 [0.33] NA 
Results are based on automatic selection AIC with maxlag = 10060 
 
EMU 
RMO -8.17 [0.00] -1.53 [0.52] -2.67 [0.08] 
NA 
EMR -3.55 [0.01] -2.49 [0.33] -2.69 [0.24] 
CDS -0.76 [0.83] -1.88 [0.66] -3.19 [0.09] 
Ratio -4.29 [0.00] -7.31 [0.00] -5.43 [0.00] 
Results are based on automatic selection SIC with maxlag=21 


















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	   The	  different	  lag	  length	  is	  because	  that	  variables	  in	  the	  UK	  sample	  tend	  to	  suffer	  serial	  correlation	  so	  the	  lag	  length	  is	  increased.	  
	   151	  
Table	  5.7	  Summary	  of	  ADF	  Unit	  Root	  Test	  Result	  
	  
	  
 	   Pre-­‐Crisis	   Crisis	  Pre-­‐QE	   Crisis	  QE	   Post-­‐Crisis	  
UK	  
RMO	   Stationary	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	   Stationary	  
LMR	   Stationary	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	  
CDS	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root61	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	  
Ratio	   NA	   NA	   Unit	  Root	   NA	  
EMU	  
RMO	   Stationary	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	   NA	  EMR	   Stationary	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	  
CDS	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	  
Ratio	   Stationary	   Stationary	   Stationary	  
US	  
RMO	   Unit	  Root	   Stationary	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	  
LMR	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	  
CDS	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	  
Ratio	   Stationary	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	   Unit	  Root	  	  	  
5.2 Estimation Results62 	  According	   to	   the	   analysis	   of	   basic	   statistics	   and	   unit	   root	   results,	   a	   different	  approach	   is	   applied	   to	   the	   two	   samples.	   For	   the	   UK	   sample,	   a	   Banerjee	   et	   al	  (1998)	  single	  equation	  ECM	  is	  employed	  firstly	  (see	  Equation	  33	  in	  Section	  4.5.2)	  because	   variables	   during	   crisis	   period	   are	   all	   I	   (1)	   variables.	   To	   cope	   with	  potential	   endogeneity	   in	   the	   spread	   regressions,	   a	   VECM	   (see	   Equation	   36	   in	  Section	  4.5.2)	   is	  estimated	  and	  Engle	  and	  Granger	   (1987)	  procedure	   is	  used	   to	  obtain	  cointegrating	  vectors.	  For	  the	  EMU	  sample,	  the	  same	  procedure	  is	  used	  as	  for	   the	   UK	   sample	   during	   crisis	   pre-­‐QE	   period.	   In	   the	   QE	   period,	   we	   first	   run	  Johansen	  cointegration	  test	  to	  find	  cointegrating	  relation	  between	  variables	  then	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	   The	  ADF	  statistics	  reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  unit	  root	  at	  4%,	  which	  is	  just	  around	  the	  boundary	  5%.	  However,	  from	  the	  plot	  of	  CDS	  for	  the	  crisis	  pre-­‐QE	  period,	  it	  showed	  evident	  feature	  of	  non-­‐stationarity.	  Therefore,	  we	  conclude	  CDS	  has	  unit	  root	  during	  the	  period.	  62	   We	  report	  Durbin-­‐Watson	  test	  results	  for	  serial	  correlation	  in	  the	  work,	  but	  the	  LM	  test	  has	  also	  been	  carried	  out	  and	  the	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  DW	  test.	  We	  report	  DW	  test	  statistics	  because	  it	  is	  simple	  and	  easy	  for	  readers	  to	  interpret.	  The	  DW	  statistic	  is	  also	  used	  as	  a	  general	  misspecification	  test	  and	  is	  widely	  applied	  in	  studies	  using	  daily	  data.	  Given	  the	  no.	  of	  observations	  and	  large	  degree	  of	  freedom,	  serial	  correlation	  of	  residuals	  is	  not	  a	  big	  problem	  for	  our	  study.	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estimate	   the	   VECM	   including	   QE	   variable	   Ratio.	   When	   the	   cointegration	   tests	  suggests	  that	  there	   is	  only	  one	  cointegrating	  vector,	  we	  estimate	  an	  ECM	  ARDL	  model	   which	   can	   be	   used	   to	   interpret	   the	   long-­‐run	   coefficients	   and	   make	  inferences	   about	   causality.	   This	   more	   lengthy	   procedure	   is	   used	   because	   the	  variable	   Ratio	   is	   stationary.	   ARDL	   ECM	   is	   also	   carried	   out.	   The	   reason	   is	   that	  Ratio	  is	  an	  I	  (0)	  variable	  during	  the	  period	  and	  the	  critical	  t-­‐values	  may	  not	  allow	  for	  adding	  additional	  I	  (0)	  variables	  in	  the	  Banerjee	  test	  for	  cointegration.	  During	  the	  crisis	  pre-­‐QE	  period	  in	  the	  US	  sample,	  we	  have	  the	  same	  issue	  as	  in	  the	  EMU	  sample	  during	  the	  QE	  period.	  Here,	  RMO	  is	  I(0)	  whereas	  other	  variables	  are	  I(1)	  variables	  so	  we	  adopt	  the	  same	  approach	  as	  in	  the	  EMU	  sample.	  	  Moreover,	   recall	   the	   theoretical	   framework	   in	   Section	   4.2.	   The	   credit	   and	  liquidity	   components	   are	   extracted	   from	   risk	   premium.	   In	   the	   research,	   the	  interest	   is	   on	   risk	   premium	   in	   money	   market.	   The	   credit	   risk	   measure	   that	  should	   be	   focused	   is	   really	   the	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	  measure,	   LMR	   in	   the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	  and	  EMR	  in	  the	  EMU.	  Indeed,	   from	  the	  Figure	  5.4,	  the	  plots	  showed	  the	   pattern	   that	   CDS	   spread	  moved	   away	   from	   LMR/EMR	   and	   RMO	   since	   the	  beginning	  of	  the	  crisis.	  Moreover,	  since	  the	  credit	  default	  swap	  is	  widely	  used	  to	  measure	   credit	   risk,	   it	   may	   be	   worth	   looking	   at	   its	   possible	   impact	   on	   the	  relationship	   as	   a	   long	   run	   factor.	   Therefore,	   the	   study	   reports	   both	   the	  relationship	  between	  liquidity	  and	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premia	  and	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium.	  	  In	   the	   remainder	   of	   this	   section,	   we	   first	   report	   results	   for	   the	   ECM	   during	  pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	  period	  followed	  by	  crisis-­‐QE	  period,	  for	  the	  UK,	  the	  EMU	  and	  the	  US.	  Then,	  the	  result	  for	  the	  VECM	  is	  presented.	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5.2.1	  Result	  of	  Single	  Equation	  Error	  Correction	  Models	   	  
	  
Liquidity	  and	  C	  redit	  Risks	  prior	  to	  QE	  during	  the	  crisis	  period	  This	   sub-­‐section	   investigates	   the	   relationship	   between	   credit	   and	   liquidity	  premia	  during	  the	  pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	  period	  for	  the	  UK,	  the	  EMU	  and	  the	  US.	  Equation	  1-­‐4	  in	  Table	  5.8a	  depicts	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  spreads	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  equations	   are	   for	   the	   EMU.	   Only	   the	   values	   of	   the	   error	   correction	   term	   are	  reported.	  Panel	  A	  contains	  equations	  concerning	  only	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  and	  Panel	   B	   includes	   both	   short-­‐	   and	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risks.	   Table	   5.8b	   represents	  how	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	  premia	  influence	  each	  other	  in	  the	  US	  sample.	  	  
The	  UK	  Sample	  In	  the	  UK,	  equation	  1	  shows	  the	  error	  correction	  term	  on	  liquidity	  premium	  RMO.	  The	   coefficient,	   -­‐0.109,	   is	   significant	   at	  5%	   level	   indicating	  RMO	  error	   corrects	  and	   there	   is	   a	   long-­‐run	   relationship	   between	   liquidity	   (RMO)	   and	   short-­‐term	  credit	  premia	   (LMR).	   Ignoring	   the	   short-­‐run	  dynamic	   lags,	   equation	  1	   in	  Table	  5.8a	  can	  be	  written	  as	   	     0 =   −0.109  𝑅𝑀𝑂 + 0.014  𝐿𝑀𝑅	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.006)	   	   	   	   	   (0.006)63	  	  and	  can	  be	  re-­‐arranged	  to	  obtain	  the	  long-­‐run	  relation	   	  … 37)  𝑅𝑀𝑂 =   0.0140.109   𝐿𝑀𝑅 = 0.1284  𝐿𝑀𝑅64	  	  It	   suggests	   that	   an	   increase	   in	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   causes	   a	  widening	   of	   the	  liquidity	  premium	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	   Standard	  errors	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  ().	  It	  applies	  in	  the	  following	  thesis.	  64 	   The	   long-­‐run	   coefficients	   are	   obtained	   by	   re-­‐arranging	   the	   estimated	   regression.	   The	  re-­‐arragned	  long-­‐run	  coefficients	  are	  not	  estimatable	  because	  it	  will	  change	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  error	  correction	  model.	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Table	  5.8a	  Liquidity	  and	  Credit	  Risk	  before	  the	  Intervention	  
	  
	   Panel	  A	   	   Panel	  B	  
	   	   	   UK	   	   	  	   Eqn	  1	   Eqn	  2	   	   Eqn	  3	   Eqn	  4	  
Variables	   ΔRMO	   ΔLMR	   	   ΔRMO	   ΔLMR	  
RMOt-­‐1	   -­‐0.109∗   [-­‐3.30]	   0.037	  [0.98]	   	   -­‐0.152∗   [-­‐3.88]	   -­‐0.028	  [-­‐0.63]	  LMRt-­‐1	   0.014	  [2.18]	   -­‐0.015	  [-­‐2.01]	   	   0.011	  [1.60]	   -­‐0.017	  [-­‐2.24]	  CDSt-­‐1	   	   	   	   0.021	  [2.02]	   0.026	  [2.32]	  Adj-­‐R2	   0.25	   0.06	   	   0.25	   0.08	  Durbin-­‐Watson	   2.15	   2.00	   	   2.14	   2.00	  No.	  of	  Observation	  387	  
	   	   	   EMU	   	   	  	   Eqn	  5	   Eqn	  6	   	   Eqn	  7	   Eqn	  8	  
Variables	   ΔRMO	   ΔEMR	   	   ΔRMO	   ΔEMR	  
RMOt-­‐1	   -­‐0.206∗∗  [-­‐3.88]	   -­‐0.028	  [-­‐0.59]	   	   -­‐0.215∗∗  [-­‐3.95]	   -­‐0.045	  [-­‐0.90]	  EMRt-­‐1	   -­‐0.005	  [-­‐0.55]	   -­‐0.018	  [-­‐2.36]	   	   -­‐0.003	  [-­‐0.31]	   -­‐0.014	  [-­‐1.72]	  
CDSt-­‐1	   	   	   	   0.006	  [1.34]	   0.005	  [1.42]	  Adj-­‐R2	   0.31	   0.22	   	   0.32	   0.22	  Durbin-­‐Watson	   2.07	   2.03	   	   2.08	   2.05	  No.	  of	  observation	  284	  All	   equations	   include	   an	   intercept	   and	   short-­‐run	  dynamics	   up	   to	   lag	   two.	  Only	   the	   coefficients	   of	   the	   error	   correction	  terms	  with	   t-­‐values	   in	   squared	  brackets	  are	   reported.	  The	   superscript	   *	   and	   **	   indicates	   significance	  of	   single-­‐equation	  ECM	  test	  at	  5%	  and	  1%	  level,	  respectively,	  according	  to	  Banerjee	  et	  al.	  (1998,	  Table	  1).	   	  	  Overall,	   the	   UK’s	   result	   suggests	   that	   in	   the	   interbank	  market,	   the	   credit	   risks	  (contained	   in	   the	   risk	   premium)	   drove	   up	   the	   other	   component,	   liquidity	  premium	  during	   the	   crisis	   pre-­‐QE	  period.	   This	   supports	   the	   findings	   of	   Taylor	  and	  Williams	  (2009)	  that	  the	  main	  driver	  of	  the	  widened	  spread	  between	  LIBOR	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and	  OIS	  was	  the	  large	  credit	  risk	  premium	  required	  by	  the	  banks	  to	  lend.	  	  
The	  EMU	  Sample	  Turning	  to	  the	  EMU	  sample,	   the	   liquidity	  premia	  RMO	  error	  corrects	  shown	  by	  equations	  5	  and	  7	  in	  the	  Table	  5.8awhereas	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  EMR	  does	  not.	  The	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  derived	  from	  equation	  5	  is	  	   … 39)  𝑅𝑀𝑂 =     −0.005 0.206𝐸𝑀𝑅 = −  0.0243  𝐸𝑀𝑅	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.009)	  (0.053)	  	  The	   long-­‐run	   relationship	   with	   the	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	   CDS	   from	  equation	  7	  is	   	  	   𝑅𝑀𝑂 =     −0.003 0.215𝐸𝑀𝑅 +   0.006 0.215𝐶𝐷𝑆	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.010)	  (0.054)	   	   	   	   	   (0.004)	  (0.054)	  … 40)  𝑅𝑀𝑂 =   −0.0140  𝐸𝑀𝑅 + 0.0279  𝐶𝐷𝑆	  	  The	  long-­‐run	  coefficient	  on	  EMR	  is	  negative	  in	  both	  Equations	  39)	  and	  40).	  This	  is	   hardly	   explained	   by	   the	   theory.	   However,	   the	   t-­‐values	   on	   the	   coefficients	   of	  EMRs	  respectively	  are	  very	  small	  possibly	  suggesting	  little	  relationship	  between	  the	  spreads.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  correlation	  between	  the	  two	  variables	  as	  discussed	   above.	   CDS	   representing	   long-­‐term	   default	   risk	   formed	   positive	  relationship	  between	   liquidity	  premium	  in	  the	   long	  run.	  The	  higher	  probability	  for	  banks	  to	  default	  on	  their	  debt	  causes	  a	  widening	  of	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  	  
	  
The	  US	  Sample	  In	   the	   light	   of	   the	   unit	   root	   results,	   an	   ARDL	   model	   that	   only	   contains	   the	  stationary	   variables	   and	   the	   single	   equation	   ECM	   are	   both	   applied	   to	   the	   US	  sample	   for	   the	   crisis	  period	  before	   the	  US	  QE.	  The	  disadvantage	  of	  ARDL	   is	   its	  lack	  of	  long	  run	  information	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  variable,	   RMO,	   and	   credit	   risk	   premia,	   LMR	   and	   CDS.	   Although	   the	   single	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Table	  5.8b	  Liquidity	  and	  Credit	  Risk	  before	  the	  Intervention	  –	  US	  
	  
	   Panel	  A	   	   Panel	  B	  
	   	   	   ARDL	   	   	  	   Eqn	  9	   Eqn	  10	   	   Eqn	  11	   Eqn	  12	  
Variables	   RMO	   RMO	   	   ΔCDS	   ΔLMR	  
RMOt-­‐1	   1.089***  [9.39]	   0.640***	  [5.29]	   	   0.121***	  [3.32]	   0.012***	  [9.83]	  
RMOt-­‐2	   -­‐0.123	  [-­‐1.05]	   0.157	  [1.33]	   	   -­‐0.034	  [-­‐0.95]	   -­‐0.002	  [-­‐1.40]	  
ΔLMRt-­‐1	   20.682**	  [2.00]	   	   	   	   0.247**	  [2.11]	  
ΔLMRt-­‐2	   -­‐3.465	  [-­‐1.11]	   	   	   	   -­‐0.021	  [-­‐0.48]	  
ΔCDSt-­‐1	   	   0.284**	  [2.35]	   	   0.132	  [1.69]	   	  
ΔCDSt-­‐2	   	   -­‐0.259	  [-­‐1.14]	   	   -­‐0.126**	  [-­‐2.20]	   	  
	   Adj-­‐R2	   0.92	   0.56	   	   0.06	   0.83	  Durbin-­‐Watson	   2.02	   1.97	   	   2.00	   2.04	  All	  equations	  are	  ARDL	  (2,	  2).	  
	   ECM	   	   ARDL	  ECM	  	   Eqn	  13	   Eqn	  14	   	   Eqn	  15	   Eqn	  16	  
Variables	   ΔLMR	   ΔCDS	   	   ΔLMR	   ΔCDS	  
LMRt-­‐1	   -­‐0.053  [-­‐1.52]	   -­‐0.813	  [-­‐0.73]	   	   -­‐0.042  [-­‐1.37]	   -­‐0.709	  [-­‐0.63]	  
CDSt-­‐1	   0.001	  [2.56]	   -­‐0.014	  [-­‐0.96]	   	   0.001	  [1.71]	   -­‐0.017	  [-­‐1.14]	  
RMOt-­‐1	   	   	   	   0.005**	  [2.66]	   0.038	  [0.57]	  
RMOt-­‐2	   	   	   	   -­‐0.003	  [-­‐1.35]	   -­‐0.008	  [-­‐0.12]	  Adj-­‐R2	   0.10	   0.09	   	   0.16	   0.09	  Durbin-­‐Watson	   1.99	   2.02	   	   2.04	   2.01	  No.	  of	  observations	  337	  All	  equations	  include	  an	  intercept	  and	  short-­‐run	  dynamics	  up	  to	  lag	  two.	  HAC	  adjusted	  t-­‐statistics	  are	  reported	  in	  square	  bracket.	  For	  ECM-­‐ARDL,	  only	  the	  coefficients	  of	  the	  error	  correction	  terms	  with	  t-­‐values	  in	  squared	  brackets	  are	  reported.	  The	  superscript	  *,	  **	  and	  ***	  indicate	  significance	  of	  single-­‐equation	  ECM	  test	  at	  10%,	  5%	  and	  1%	  level	  respectively.	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Liquidity	  and	  credit	  risks	  during	  QE	  Looking	  at	  the	  QE	  period65,	  our	  aims	  are	  1)	  to	  see	  how	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  spreads	  changed	  during	  QE	  operations;	  2)	   to	   see	  whether	   the	  QE	  measure,	  Ratio,	  narrowed	  any	  of	  the	  spreads	  as	  suggested	  by	  the	  correlation	  statistics;	  3)	  to	  see	  whether	  Ratio	  changed	  the	  relationship	  between	  credit	  risks	  and	  liquidity	  premia.	   	  	  Moreover,	  we	  include	  another	  two	  variables	  in	  this	  sub-­‐section,	  Ratio	  and	  Trend.	  Ratio	  variable	  is	  used	  as	  the	  proxy	  for	  the	  QE	  operations.	  As	  noted	  in	  Table	  5.2,	  the	  Ratio	  variable	  for	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US	  samples,	  respectively,	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  accumulated	  amount	  of	  purchase	  of	  QE	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  total	  bank	  assets.	  And,	  the	  Ratio	  variable	  for	  the	  EMU	  sample,	  it	  is	  calculated	  as	  the	  amount	  of	  liquidity	  that	  had	  been	  provided	  under	  Open	  Market	  Operation	  (OMO)	  and	  Covered	  Bond	  Purchase	  Programme	  (CBPP)	  with	  respect	  to	  total	  banks	  assets.	  The	  way	  that	  we	  construct	  the	  Ratio	  allows	  us	  to	  say	  by	  how	  much	  percentage	  liquidity	  to	  credit	  risk	  change	  in	  response	  to	  a	  one	  percent	  change	  in	  the	  Ratio.	  In	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US,	  the	  purchases	  of	  assets	  through	  QE	  have	  been	  kept	  on	  central	  banks’	  balance	  sheets,	   respectively,	   so	   that	   when	   accumulate	   the	   amount	   of	   QE	   we	   create	   a	  trend.	   Therefore,	   we	   include	   the	   variable	   Trend	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   US	   samples,	  respectively.	   In	   the	   EMU	   sample,	   the	   ECB	   run	   LTROs	   that	   are	   longer-­‐term	  refinancing	   operations,	   so	   it	   doesn’t	   have	   the	   accumulated	   effect	   because	   the	  liquidity	   provided	   under	   LTROs	   is	   recycled	   when	   the	   repurchase	   agreements	  mature	   and	   is	   repaid.	   Therefore,	   we	   exclude	   variable	   Trend	   from	   the	   EMU	  sample.	  
	  
The	  UK	  Sample	  In	   the	  UK	   sample,	   the	   estimation	   followed	   the	   same	  procedure	   as	   in	   the	   crisis	  pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis.	  Due	  to	  the	  different	  methodology	  in	  the	  two	  samples	  in	  this	  period,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	   Precisely,	  this	  period	  is	  post-­‐Lehman	  Brother	  period	  in	  the	  EMU	  because	  ECB	  stepped	  into	  the	  market	  more	  determined	  than	  in	  the	  previous	  period.	  QE	  is	  a	  phase	  to	  denote	  intervention	  period	  in	  the	  two	  samples	  in	  general.	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the	   results	   were	   reported	   in	   separate	   tables	   and	   begin	   with	   the	   UK	   sample.	  Equations	  17	   to	  20	   in	  Table	  5.9	   represent	   the	   relationship	  between	  credit	   risk	  and	   liquidity	   premia	   during	   QE	   period	   in	   the	   UK.	   By	   contrast	   to	   the	   pre-­‐QE	  period,	   the	   coefficients	   of	   error	   correction	   terms	   on	   LMR	   in	   equation	   18	   and	  equation	  20	  show	  significance	  at	  10%	  and	  5%	  level	  of	  confidence.	  This	  indicates	  the	   reversed	   causality	   from	   credit	   risks	   to	   liquidity	   premia	   in	   the	   period.	   The	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  derived	  from	  equation	  18	  in	  Table	  5.9	  is	   	  	   … 41)  𝐿𝑀𝑅 =   0.047 0.013𝑅𝑀𝑂 = 3.6154  𝑅𝑀𝑂	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.019)	  (0.004)	  	  The	   increased	   value	   of	   coefficient	   on	  RMO	   in	  Equation	  41)	   compared	  with	   the	  coefficient	  on	  LMR	  in	  Equation	  37)	  reflects	  the	  augmented	  dependency	  between	  the	  two	  spreads	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  reversed	  causality.	  The	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  derived	   from	   equation	   20	   in	   Table	   5.9	   does	   not	   change	   the	   causality	   but	   the	  reduced	  coefficient	  on	  RMO	  tells	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  RMO	  on	  LMR	  is	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  measure,	  CDS.	  	  Equations	  21	  to	  28	  in	  Table	  5.10	  estimate	  the	  effect	  of	  QE	  on	  narrowing	  and/or	  changing	   the	   credit	   and	   liquidity	   components	   in	   the	   interbank	   market.	   The	  coefficient	   on	   Ratio	   in	   equation	   21	   indicates	   that	   the	   interventions	   reduce	   the	  liquidity	   spread	   by	   8.4	   basis	   points66 	   for	   Gilt	   purchase	   equivalent	   to	   one	  percentage	   point	   of	   banks’	   asset	   value.	   The	   insignificance	   of	   coefficients	   in	  equation	  22	  suggests	  that	  the	  operation	  of	  QE	  did	  not	  have	  any	  direct	  effect	  on	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium.	  That	  is,	   if	  QE	  reduced	  the	  spread	  of	  LIBOR	  and	  OIS,	   it	   was	   done	   through	   reducing	   liquidity	   premia.	   Moreover,	   the	   causality	  between	  liquidity	  premia	  and	  credit	  risks	  as	  in	  equation	  18	  and	  20	  in	  Table	  5.9	  indicates	  the	  reduction	  of	  liquidity	  premia	  would	  pass	  to	  credit	  risk	  premia	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	   The	  figure	  is	  calculated	  as	   !.!"#!.!!" = 8.4.	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a	  time	  lag	  of	  a	  day.	  	  
Table	  5.9	  Liquidity	  and	  Credit	  Risk	  Premia	  during	  the	  Period	  of	  QE	  –	  UK	   	  
	  	   Panel	  A	   	   Panel	  B	  
	   Eqn	  17	   Eqn	  18	   	   Eqn	  19	   Eqn	  20	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Table	  5.10	  How	  the	  QE	  Lowers	  Liquidity	  and	  Credit	  Risk	  Premia	  –	  UK	   	  
	  
	  	   Panel	  A	   	   Panel	  B	  
	   Eqn	  21	   Eqn	  22	   Eqn	  23	   	   	   Eqn	  24	   	   Eqn	  25	   Eqn	  26	   Eqn	  27	   	   	   Eqn	  28	  
Variables	   ΔRMO	   ΔLMR	   ΔRatio	   ΔRatio	   	   ΔRMO	   ΔLMR	   ΔRatio	   ΔRatio	  RMOt-­‐1	   -­‐0.114**	  [-­‐3.88]	   	  	   -­‐0.0001	  [-­‐0.27]	   	   	   -­‐0.107*	  [-­‐3.73]	   	  	   -­‐0.0001	  [-­‐0.34]	   	  LMRt-­‐1	   	  	   -­‐0.009	  [-­‐0.91]	   	   -­‐0.0006	  [-­‐5.01]	   	   	  	   -­‐0.009	  [-­‐0.93]	   	   -­‐0.0006	  [-­‐4.73]	  Ratiot-­‐1	   -­‐0.958	  [-­‐3.10]	   -­‐0.324	  [-­‐0.70]	   -­‐0.0010	  [0.28]	   -­‐.0250***	  [-­‐4.39]	   	   -­‐0.981	  [-­‐1.97]	   -­‐0.389	  [-­‐0.76]	   -­‐0.0019	  [-­‐0.34]	   -­‐0.0228*	  [-­‐3.64]	  Trend	   0.002	  [1.22]	   0.003	  [1.61]	   -­‐.00009	  [-­‐4.06]	   -­‐.00003	  [-­‐1.10]	   	   0.003	  [0.95]	   0.004	  [1.39]	   -­‐.00007	  [-­‐2.01]	   -­‐.00004	  [-­‐1.16]	  CDSt-­‐1	   	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.001	  [-­‐0.28]	   -­‐0.001	  [-­‐0.26]	   -­‐.00003	  [-­‐0.51]	   .00002	  [0.40]	  Adj-­‐R2	   0.06	   0.16	   0.23	   0.25	   	   0.06	   0.16	   0.23	   0.27	  D-­‐W	   2.02	   2.02	   2.01	   2.00	   	   2.02	   2.03	   2.01	   2.01	  No.	  of	  Observation	  332	  All	   equations	   include	   an	   intercept	   and	   short-­‐run	  dynamics	   up	   to	   lag	   two.	  Only	   the	   coefficients	   of	   the	   error	   correction	  terms	  with	  t-­‐values	  in	  squared	  brackets	  are	  reported.	  The	  superscript	  *,	  **	  and	  ***	  indicate	  significance	  of	  single-­‐equation	  ECM	  test	  at	  10%,	  5%	  and	  1%	  level	  respectively.	  
	  Furthermore,	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  relevant	  coefficients	  of	  the	  error	  correction	  terms	   drops	   to	   the	   10%	   level	   when	   estimations	   include	   CDS	   as	   in	   Panel	   B	   in	  Table	  5.10.	  The	  estimated	  coefficients	  and	  associated	  t-­‐statistics	  of	  CDS	  are	  small	  although	   inclusion	   of	   CDS	   as	   a	   regressor	   does	   not	   alter	   much	   the	   other	  coefficients.	  Thus	  the	  drop	  in	  significance	  level	  is	  more	  likely	  due	  to	  addition	  of	  an	  irrelevant	  variable,	  rather	  than	  vital	  information	  conveyed	  by	  CDS.	  This	  is	  an	  important	   issue,	   since	  CDS	   is	   frequently	  used	   in	   the	   literature	   as	   a	  measure	  of	  credit	   risk	   in	   the	   decomposition	   of	   the	   LIBOR-­‐OIS	   spread.	   Essentially,	   it	   is	   the	  narrowing	  of	  the	  liquidity	  spread	  that	  reduces	  the	  credit	  spread	  in	  the	  long	  run	  and	   CDS	   does	   not	   play	   any	   significant	   role	   in	   the	   process.	   Also,	   here,	   it	   is	   the	  central	  bank’s	  intervention	  rather	  than	  CDS	  that	  triggers	  the	  fall	  in	  the	  liquidity	  spread.	   Furthermore,	   equation	   22	   indicates	   that	   LMR	   and	   CDS	   are	   driven	   by	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different	   stochastic	   trends	   and	   cannot	   be	   exchanged	   against	   each	   other	   in	   the	  determination	  of	  the	  risk	  premia.	  To	  sum	  up,	  decomposing	  the	  LIBOR-­‐OIS	  spread	  into	   its	   credit	   risk	   component	   and	   approximating	   the	   latter	   with	   CDS	  may	   be	  inappropriate,	  particularly	  during	  the	  period	  with	  central	  bank	  intervention.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5.11	  The	  Likely	  Chain	  of	  Causality	  between	  Variables	  during	  QE	  
	  
	  	  So	  far	  we	  discussed	  the	  estimation	  results	  from	  UK	  sample.	  The	  next	  sub-­‐section	  shows	   the	   estimation	   results	   from	   the	   EMU	   sample.	   Since	   the	   intervention	  measure	  in	  the	  EMU	  sample	  is	  an	  I(0)	  variable,	  the	  Banerjee	  single	  equation	  ECM	  model	  cannot	  be	  applied	  when	  we	  estimate	  how	  the	  ECB’s	  intervention	  changed	  the	  relationship	  between	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  components.	  Therefore,	  firstly,	  the	  Johansen	   cointegrating	   test	   is	   used	   to	   find	   the	   possible	   cointegrating	   relation	  between	  I(1)	  variable.	  Secondly,	  we	  run	  an	  ARDL	  ECM	  with	  HAC-­‐adjusted	  error	  inclusive	   intervention	   measure.	   Alternatively,	   Ratio	   is	   included	   as	   a	   variable	  outside	  the	  cointegration	  space	  when	  estimating	  the	  VECM	  that	  is	  constructed	  by	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EMR	  and	  RMO	  and	  testing	  for	  cointegration	  because	  the	  Johansen	  cointegration	  test	   suggests	   that	   there	   is	   one	   cointegrating	   relation	   existing	   between	   the	  spreads.	   Moreover,	   An	   ARDL	   ECM	   is	   applied	   when	   testing	   the	   relationship	  between	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  premia.	   	  	  
Table	  5.12	  Critical	  Values	  of	  the	  t-­‐ratio	  Single-­‐equation	  ECM	  Test	  
	  	   Size	  T	   0.01	   0.05	   0.10	   0.25	  25	   -­‐	  4.12	   -­‐	  3.35	   -­‐	  2.95	   -­‐	  2.36	  50	   -­‐	  3.94	   -­‐	  3.28	   -­‐	  2.93	   -­‐	  2.38	  100	   -­‐	  3.92	   -­‐	  3.27	   -­‐	  2.94	   -­‐	  2.40	  500	   -­‐	  3.82	   -­‐	  3.23	   -­‐	  2.90	   -­‐	  2.40	  
∞	   -­‐	  3.78	   -­‐	  3.19	   -­‐	  2.89	   -­‐	  2.41	  
With	  constant	  and	  one	  independent	  variable	   	  Source:	  adapted	  from	  Banerjee	  et	  al	  (1998),	  p	  276	  	  
The	  EMU	  Sample	  The	  unit	   root	   tests	   in	   the	  EMU	   sample	   suggest	   that	  Ratio	   is	   stationary	   i.e.	   I(0)	  variable	   whereas	   others	   are	   I(1)	   variables.	   Therefore,	   firstly,	   the	   estimation	  considered	   finding	   a	   cointegrating	   vector	   between	   credit	   risks	   and	   liquidity	  premia	  using	  the	  Johansen	  approach.	  Secondly,	  we	  ran	  an	  ECM-­‐ARDL	  estimation	  including	  the	  Ratio	  variable	  if	  a	  cointegrating	  vector	  found	  in	  the	  first	  procedure.	   	  The	  relationship	  between	  EMR	  and	  RMO	  during	  the	  QE	  period	  is	  shown	  in	  Table	  5.13.	  Unlike	   the	  pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	  period,	   the	  relationship	  between	  credit	   risks	  and	  liquidity	   premia	   became	   positive	   and	   the	   causality	   transits	   from	   credit	   risk	   to	  liquidity	   premia.	   As	   suggested	   by	   equation	   29	   in	   Table	   5.13,	   the	   long-­‐run	  coefficient	  on	  EMR	  is	  0.006.	  The	  interesting	  finding	  is	  from	  equation	  31	  when	  we	  include	  CDS	  into	  the	  regression.	  The	  error	  correction	  term	  is	  still	  significant	  at	  5%	  level	  supporting	  the	  conclusion	  from	  equation	  29.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  coefficient	  on	  CDS	  is	  also	  significant	  at	  1%	  level	  and	  the	  value	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  coefficient	  on	  EMR.	  The	  long-­‐run	  equation	  is	  obtained	  as	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… 42)  𝑅𝑀𝑂 = 0.004 0.253   𝐸𝑀𝑅 + 0.024 0.253   𝐶𝐷𝑆	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.003)	  (0.055)	   	   	   	   	   (0.007)	  (0.055)	  	  
Table	  5.13	  Liquidity	  an	  Credit	  Risk	  during	  the	  Period	  of	  QE	  –	  EMU	  Sample	  
	  	   Panel	  A	   	   Panel	  B	  
	   Eqn	  29	   Eqn	  30	   	   Eqn	  31	   Eqn	  32	  
Variables	   ΔRMO	   ΔEMR	   	   ΔRMO	   ΔEMR	  RMOt-­‐1	   -­‐0.149∗  [-­‐3.44]	   0.097	  [2.71]	   	   -­‐0.253∗∗	  [-­‐4.56]	   0.128	  [2.85]	  EMRt-­‐1	   0.006	  [1.91]	   -­‐0.006  [-­‐2.33]	   	   0.004	  [1.33]	   -­‐0.006  [-­‐2.38]	  CDSt-­‐1	   	   	   	   0.024∗  [3.37]	   -­‐0.004	  [-­‐0.79]	  	   Adj-­‐R2	   0.33	   0.54	   	   0.35	   0.57	  Durbin-­‐Watson	   	   2.08	   2.09	   	   2.04	   2.09	  No.	  of	  observations	  428	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Table	  5.14	  How	  the	  Intervention	  of	  ECB	  Lowers	  Liquidity	  and	  Credit	  Risks	  	   	   Panel	  A	   	   Panel	  B	  
	   Eqn	  33	   Eqn	  34	   	   Eqn	  35	   Eqn	  36	  
Variables	   ΔRMO	   ΔEMR	   	   ΔRMO	   ΔEMR	  RMOt-­‐1	   -­‐0.253***	  [-­‐3.97]	   0.033	  [0.71]	   	   -­‐0.337**	  [-­‐3.61]	   0.075	  [1.54]	  EMRt-­‐1	   0.012	  [2.75]	   -­‐0.003	  [-­‐0.59]	   	   0.010	  [2.41]	   -­‐0.003	  [-­‐1.02]	  Ratiot-­‐1	   -­‐0.175**	  [-­‐3.42]	   -­‐0.105	  [-­‐1.78]	   	   -­‐0.165**	  [-­‐3.42]	   -­‐0.095	  [-­‐2.04]	  Ratiot-­‐2	   -­‐0.082	  [1.70]	   -­‐0.036	  [-­‐0.96]	   	   -­‐0.075	  [-­‐1.57]	   -­‐0.034	  [-­‐0.72]	  CDSt-­‐1	   	   	   	   0.021	  [2.15]	   -­‐0.005	  [-­‐0.96]	  Adj-­‐R2	   0.36	   0.54	   	   0.37	   0.58	  D-­‐W	   2.07	   2.10	   	   2.04	   2.09	  No.	  of	  observations	  428	  
All	  equations	  include	  an	  intercept	  and	  short-­‐run	  dynamics	  up	  to	  lag	  two.	  The	  coefficients	  of	  the	  error	  correction	  terms	  are	  reported	   with	   HAC	   adjusted	   t-­‐values	   in	   square	   brackets.	   The	   superscripts	   *,	   **	   and	   ***	   indicate	   significance	   of	  single-­‐equation	  ECM	  test	  at	  10%,	  5%	  and	  1%	  level	  respectively.	  	  There	   is	   no	   obvious	   deterministic	   trend	   in	   the	   EMU	   sample,	   so	   we	   did	   not	  present	   the	   results	   that	   contain	   trend	   property.	   	   In	   equation	   33,	   the	   ECB	  intervention	  measure,	   Ratio,	   significantly	   reduces	   liquidity	   premia	   by	   69	   basis	  points67	   with	  one-­‐day	  lag	  for	  the	  total	  easing	  amount	  of	  OMO	  and	  CBPP	  to	  one	  percent	   of	   banks’	   asset	   value.	   On	   the	   second	   day,	   the	   effect	   weakens	   and	  becomes	   insignificant.	   In	   equation	   35,	   a	   similar	   response	   is	   revealed	   but	   the	  amount	  of	  response	  is	  much	  smaller	  because	  of	  the	  inclusion	  of	  CDS	  as	  noticed	  a	  few	  times	  in	  the	  UK	  sample.	  The	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  does	  not	  error	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	   The	  sample	  of	  EMU	  is	  in	  percentage	  because	  it	  would	  be	  too	  small	  for	  RMO	  spreads	  to	  adapt	  basis	  point.	  The	  figure	  of	  response	  is	  calculated	  as	   !!.!"#!.!"# = 0.69	   in	  unit	  of	  percentage	  which	  is	  equivalent	  to	  69	  basis	  points.	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correct	   and	   the	   Ratio	   does	   not	   reduce	   the	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	  significantly.	  	  Therefore,	  the	  results	  for	  the	  EMU	  so	  far	  suggest	  that	  the	  ECB’s	  OMO	  and	  CBPP	  operations	  reduced	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  drastically	  and	  significantly,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  established	  long-­‐run	  causality	  from	  liquidity	  to	  the	  credit	  component.	  This	  may	  well	  explain	  the	  stubborn	  EMR	  spread	  particularly	  (the	  spread	  of	  CDS	  was	  also	  elevated	  but	  it	  represents	  the	  long-­‐run	  default	  risk	  so	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  reflect	  policies	  with	  short-­‐term	  focus	  to	  a	  lesser	  degree)	  since	  the	  onset	  of	  crisis	  in	  the	  EMU.	  The	  policy	  of	  the	  ECB	  mainly	   focuses	  on	   liquidity	  aspects	  so	  the	  effect	  on	  credit	   risk	   should	   be	   quite	   limited	   if	   it	   cannot	   be	   passed	   from	   the	   liquidity	  component.	  The	  risk	  of	  default	  may	  be	  from	  two	  causes,	   the	   liquidity	   issue	  and	  other	  bank-­‐specific	   factors68.	   If	   the	   increased	  EMR	  and	  CDS	   spreads	  have	  been	  mainly	  led	  by	  illiquidity,	  we	  should	  observe	  a	  positive	  causality	  from	  liquidity	  to	  credit	  component,	  but	  we	  do	  not,	  and	  the	  measures	  of	  credit	  risk	  should	  fall	  back	  to	  their	  pre-­‐crisis	  level	  as	  RMO	  did,	  but	  they	  do	  not.	  This	  likely	  implies	  that	  the	  increased	   credit	   risk	   in	   the	   EMU	   may	   not	   be	   mainly	   driven	   by	   the	   liquidity	  condition;	   instead,	   capital	   adequacy	   or	   other	   factors	   that	   related	   to	   banks’	  financial	   healthiness	   may	   be	   considered	   and	   be	   worth	   investigating.	  Mortimer-­‐Lee	  (2012)	  suspects	  that	  the	  ECB	  might	  intend	  to	  help	  banks	  cover	  up	  a	   more	   chronic	   shortage	   of	   capital	   with	   liquidity	   and	   make	   an	   easier	   bank	  capital-­‐adjustment	  process.	  	  Moreover,	   if	   the	  spread	  between	  Repo	  and	  OIS	   is	  reduced,	   leaving	  Euribor	  rate	  unchanged,	  this	  will	  widen	  the	  spread	  between	  Euribor	  and	  Repo.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  Figure	  5.4b,	  EMR	  shifted	  downwards	  during	  the	  intervention	  period	  although	  it	  remained	   elevated	   compared	   with	   RMO.	   This	   possibly	   implies	   that	   the	   ECB’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  68	   Such	  as	  capital	  adequacy	  and	  maturity	  mismatch.	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intervention	  ultimately	  reduced	  Euribor	  more	  quickly	  than	  it	  reduced	  Repo	  rate	  and	  the	  reduction	  was	  largely	  contributed	  by	  the	  decrease	  of	  liquidity	  premia.	   	  
	  
Table	  5.15.	  ECB’s	  Response	  to	  Change	  of	  Credit	  and	  Liquidity	  Risk	  	  	   Eqn	  37	   Eqn	  38	   Eqn	  39	  
Variables	   Ratio	   Ratio	   Ratio	  DRMO	   -­‐0.054	   	  [-­‐0.88]	   	   	  DRMOt-­‐1	   0.038  [1.00]	   	   	  DRMOt-­‐2	   0.036	  [0.77]	     	   	  DEMR	   	   0.075	  [2.15]	   	  DEMRt-­‐1	   	   0.004  [0.12]	   	  DEMRt-­‐2	   	   -­‐0.009	  [-­‐0.17]	   	  Ratiot-­‐1	   0.392  [5.64]	   0.402	  [5.66]	   0.395	  [5.54]	  	  Ratiot-­‐2	   0.262	  [7.61]	   0.265	  [7.46]	   0.253	  [6.95]	  Ratiot-­‐3	   0.139	  [2.38]	   0.152	  [3.07]	   0.142	  [2.47]	  DCDS	   	   	   0.007	  [0.48]	  DCDSt-­‐1	   	   	   0.020	  [1.32]	  DCDSt-­‐2	   	   	   -­‐0.010	  [-­‐0.78]	  Adj-­‐R2	   0.49	   0.49	   0.49	  Durbin-­‐Watson	   	   2.02	   2.03	   2.03	  No.	  of	  observations	  428	  
All	   equations	   are	   ARDL	   (3,	   2)	   model.	   HAC	   adjusted	   t-­‐values	   in	   square	   brackets.	   Coefficients	   on	   Ratio	   start	   to	   be	  insignificant	  since	  lag	  length	  4.	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Since	   the	   variable	   Ratio	   is	   stationary,	   to	   find	   out	   how	   ECB’s	   monetary	   policy	  responded	   to	   change	   of	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   component,	   we	   use	   the	  Autoregressive	  Distributed	  Lag	  model	  (ARDL).	  The	  disadvantage	  is	  that	  there	  is	  no	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  available	  for	  our	  case.	  The	  results	  are	  reported	  in	  Table	  5.15.	   There	   is	   weak	   evidence	   (see	   equation	   38	   in	   Table	   5.15)	   that	   the	   ECB	  reacted	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium.	   Ratio	   is	   mostly	   an	  autoregressive	  process.	  The	  amount	  of	  OMO	  and	  CBPP	  in	  relation	  to	  total	  banks’	  assets	  influences	  ECB’s	  response	  for	  up	  to	  3	  days.	  	  
	   	   Figure	  5.16	  Summary	  of	  Result	  during	  the	  QE	  Period	  –	  EMU	   	  
	  
	  	  Figure	  5.16	  summarizes	  the	  finding	  of	  the	  EMU	  sample	  during	  the	  QE	  period.	  The	  increased	  risk	  premium	  resulted	  from	  a	  rise	  in	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  premia.	  The	   increased	   credit	   risk	   caused	  he	  ECB’s	   response	  –	   applying	  unconventional	  monetary	  operation.	  Those	  operations	  directly	  reduced	  liquidity	  premia	  leaving	  credit	   risk	   spreads	   elevated.	   There	   is	   a	   possible	   weak	   link	   between	   liquidity	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component	  and	  credit	   risk	  because	  of	   the	  character	  of	   the	   instruments	  used	   in	  the	  measures,	   so	   the	   spread	   of	   EMR	   showed	   a	   downward	   shift	   during	   the	   QE	  period.	  
	  
The	  US	  Sample	  Since	  all	  variables	  are	  I(1)	  variables,	  we	  used	  the	  Banerjee	  single	  equation	  ECM	  to	   test	   for	   cointegration	   and	   long-­‐run	   causality.	   The	   relationships	   between	   the	  liquidity	  premium	  RMO	  and	  the	  credit	  risk	  premia	  LMR	  and	  CDS,	  respectively	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  5.17.	   	  	  During	   the	   QE	   period,	   both	   RMO	   and	   CDS	   error	   correct	   in	   the	   long	   run.	   One	  cointegration	   relationship	   is	   captured	   –	   the	   liquidity	   premium	   RMO	   is	  cointegrated	  with	   the	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	   CDS	   and	   the	   causality	   is	  dual	   (see	   equation	   42	   and	   44	   in	   Table	   5.17).	   	   The	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	  premium	  LMR	  does	  not	  error	  correct	  and	  there	  is	  no	  causality	  between	  LMR	  and	  the	  other	   variables,	  which	   is	   a	   remarkable	  difference	   compared	  with	   the	   crisis	  pre-­‐QE	   period.	   This	   confirms	   that	   both	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   have	  contributed	  to	  the	  increase	  of	  the	  risk	  premium	  in	  the	  money	  market	  because	  of	  the	   dual	   causality,	   but	   the	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	   has	   had	   significant	  impact	   compared	   with	   the	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium.	   The	   long	   run	  relationship	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  equation	  42	  as	   	   	  	   0 =   −0.259𝑅𝑀𝑂 + 0.40𝐶𝐷𝑆	  … 43)  𝑅𝑀𝑂 =   0.40 0.259𝐶𝐷𝑆 = 1.544  𝐶𝐷𝑆	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.132)	  (0.079)	  	  Equation	  43	  tells	  us	  that	  CDS	  has	  a	  significant	  positive	  impact	  on	  RMO	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  One	  basis	  point	  increase	  of	  (a	  bank)	  CDS	  premium	  is	  likely	  to	  push	  up	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  for	  borrowing	  for	  the	  bank	  by	  1.5	  basis	  points.	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The	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  from	  equation	  44	  can	  be	  written	  as	  	   0 = 0.323𝑅𝑀𝑂 − 0.073𝐶𝐷𝑆	  … 44)  𝐶𝐷𝑆 =   0.323 0.073𝑅𝑀𝑂 =   4.425𝑅𝑀𝑂	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.100)	  (0.22)	  	  
Table	  5.17	  Liquidity	  and	  Credit	  Risk	  Premia	  during	  the	  Period	  of	  QE	  –	  US	  
	  	   	   	   Panel	  A	   	   	   	   Panel	  B	  
	   Eqn	  40	   Eqn	  41	   Eqn	  42	   	   Eqn	  43	   	   Eqn	  44	   Eqn	  45	   Eqn	  46	   	   	  
Variables	   ΔRMO	   ΔLMR	   ΔRMO	   ΔRMO	   	   ΔCDS	   ΔCDS	   ΔCDS	  RMOt-­‐1	   0.036  [0.87]	   0.001	  [2.19]	   -­‐0.259**	  [-­‐3.27]	   -­‐0.023	  [-­‐0.59]	   	   0.323**	  [3.24]	   	   0.278	  [2.29]	  LMRt-­‐1	   -­‐1.064	  [-­‐1.75]	   -­‐0.017	  [-­‐2.10]	   	   -­‐0.493	  [-­‐0.63]	   	   	   3.059*  [2.98]	   1.529	  [1.28]	  CDSt-­‐1	   	   	   0.040*	  [3.04]	   0.004	  [0.53]	   	   -­‐0.073**	  [-­‐3.37]	   -­‐0.062	  [-­‐2.76]	   -­‐0.085**	  [-­‐3.55]	  Adj-­‐R2	   0.73	   0.76	   0.12	   0.71	   	   0.08	   0.06	   0.09	  D-­‐W	   2.09	   1.95	   1.98	   1.87	   	   2.00	   2.00	   2.03	  No.	  of	  Observation	  350	  All	  equations	   include	  an	   intercept	  and	  short-­‐run	  dynamics	  up	   to	   lag	   two.	  Only	   the	  coefficients	  of	   the	  error	  correction	   terms	  with	   HAC	   adjusted	   t-­‐values	   in	   squared	   brackets	   are	   reported.	   The	   superscript	   *,	   **	   and	   ***	   indicate	   significance	   of	  single-­‐equation	  ECM	  test	  at	  10%,	  5%	  and	  1%	  level	  respectively.	  
	  Equation	  44	  reveals	  that	  the	   impact	   from	  RMO	  to	  CDS	  in	  the	   long	  run	  is	  bigger	  (i.e.	  a	  4.3	  basis	  point	   increase	  on	  CDS	  with	  every	  basis	  point	   increase	  on	  RMO)	  than	   the	   influence	   from	   CDS	   to	   RMO	   as	   shown	   in	   the	   Equation	   43).	   The	   dual	  causality	   between	   CDS	   and	   RMO	   magnifies	   the	   impact	   on	   the	   risk	   premium	  (LIBOR	   –	   OIS).	   One	   basis	   point	   increase	   on	   CDS	   pushes	   up	   RMO	   by	   1.5	   basis	  points	  and	  the	  1.5	  basis	  point	  increase	  on	  RMO	  in	  turn	  increases	  CDS	  by	  another	  4.43	  basis	  points.	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Table	  5.18	  How	  QE	  Changes	  Liquidity	  and	  Credit	  Risk	  Premia	  –	  US	   	  
	  
	  	   Panel	  A	   	   Panel	  B	  
	   Eqn	  47	   Eqn	  48	   Eqn	  49	   	   	   Eqn	  50	   	   Eqn	  51	   Eqn	  52	   Eqn	  53	   	   	  
Variables	   ΔRMO	   ΔLMR	   ΔRMO	   ΔRMO	   	   ΔCDS	   ΔCDS	   ΔCDS	  RMOt-­‐1	   -­‐0.348***	  [-­‐5.15]	   	  	   -­‐0.050	  [-­‐1.69]	   -­‐0.370***	  [-­‐5.19]	   	   	   	  	   0.235	  [2.07]	  LMRt-­‐1	   	  	   -­‐0.042	  [-­‐1.32]	   -­‐1.465	  [-­‐1.12]	   	   	   	  	   0.640	  [0.27]	   	  Ratiot-­‐1	   -­‐1.346*	  [-­‐3.05]	   -­‐0.012	  [-­‐1.02]	   -­‐0.651	  [-­‐1.31]	   -­‐0.840	  [-­‐2.14]	   	   -­‐2.742**	  [-­‐3.28]	   -­‐2.563	  [-­‐2.27]	   -­‐2.235	  [-­‐2.68]	  Trend	   0.002	  [-­‐0.387]	   -­‐0.000	  [-­‐0.97]	   -­‐0.000	  [-­‐0.04]	   -­‐0.004	  [-­‐1.02]	   	   0.008	  [1.33]	   0.009	  [1.41]	   0.011	  [1.70]	  CDSt-­‐1	   	   	   	   0.019	  [1.42]	   	   -­‐0.092**	  [-­‐3.31]	   -­‐0.091**	  [-­‐3.28]	   -­‐0.104**	  [-­‐3.65]	  
Adj-­‐R2	   0.15	   0.08	   0.71	   0.16	   	   0.07	   0.06	   0.08	  D-­‐W	   1.99	   2.05	   1.87	   2.00	   	   2.00	   2.00	   2.00	  	   Panel	  C	   	   Panel	  D	  	   Eqn	  54	   Eqn	  55	   Eqn	  56	   	   Eqn	  57	   	   Eqn	  58	   Eqn	  59	   Eqn	  60	   	   	  
Variables	   ΔRatio	   ΔRatio	   ΔRatio	   ΔRatio	   	   ΔRMO	   ΔLMR	   ΔCDS	  RMOt-­‐1	   -­‐0.0000	  [-­‐1.05]	   	   	   -­‐0.000	  [-­‐1.05]	   	   -­‐0.048	  [-­‐1.33]	   0.001	  [2.23]	   0.266	  [2.26]	  LMRt-­‐1	   	   -­‐0.003	  [-­‐2.14]	   	   -­‐0.003	  [-­‐2.04]	   	   -­‐1.527	  [-­‐1.16]	   -­‐0.013	  [-­‐1.48]	   0.751	  [0.38]	  Ratiot-­‐1	   -­‐0.0004	  [-­‐0.72]	   -­‐0.001	  [-­‐1.42]	   -­‐0.0002	  [-­‐0.29]	   -­‐0.001	  [-­‐1.20]	   	   -­‐0.717	  [-­‐1.51]	   0.002	  [1.66]	   -­‐2.005	  [-­‐2.00]	  Trend	   0.0000	  [-­‐0.25]	   -­‐0.000	  [-­‐1.02]	   -­‐0.000	  [-­‐0.18]	   -­‐0.000	  [-­‐1.17]	   	   0.0001	  [0.11]	   -­‐0.000	  [-­‐0.22]	   0.012	  [1.69]	  CDSt-­‐1	   	   	   0.0000	  [0.03]	   0.000	  [0.28]	   	   -­‐0.002	  [-­‐0.20]	   -­‐0.000	  [-­‐0.04]	   -­‐0.107**	  [-­‐3.70]	  
Adj-­‐R2	   0.88	   0.88	   0.88	   0.88	   	   0.71	   0.76	   0.08	  D-­‐W	   2.00	   2.00	   2.01	   2.01	   	   1.87	   1.94	   2.02	  No.	  of	  Observations	  350	  All	   equations	   include	   an	   intercept	   and	   short-­‐run	  dynamics	   up	   to	   lag	   two.	  Only	   the	   coefficients	   of	   the	   error	   correction	  
terms	  with	  t-­‐values	  in	  squared	  brackets	  are	  reported.	  The	  superscript	  *,	  **	  and	  ***	  indicate	  significance	  of	  single-­‐equation	  
ECM	  test	  at	  10%,	  5%	  and	  1%	  level	  respectively.	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In	  equation	  51,	  the	  result	  shows	  the	  significant	  error	  correction	  of	  CDS	  and	  the	  long-­‐run	  relationship	  between	  CDS	  and	  Ratio.	  The	  long-­‐run	  relation	  equation	  is	  derived	  as	   	  	   … 46)  𝐶𝐷𝑆 =   −2.742 0.092𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 = −29.804  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (0.836)	  (0.028)	  	  Compared	  with	  Equation	  45,	  the	  effect	  of	  Ratio	  on	  reducing	  CDS	  is	  much	  bigger	  than	   reducing	   RMO.	   Together	  with	   Equation	   44	   they	  may	   imply	   that	   CDS,	   the	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium,	  is	  the	  main	  driver	  that	  widened	  the	  risk	  premium	  in	  the	  US	  money	  market.	  Due	  to	  the	  causality	  from	  liquidity	  premium	  to	  CDS,	  the	  Fed’s	   LSAP	   has	   reduced	   the	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	   dramatically	   and	  significantly.	   	  	  Moving	   to	  Panel	  C	   in	  Table	  5.18,	   the	  variable	  Ratio	  does	  not	   error	   correct	   and	  does	  not	  respond	  to	  changes	  in	  other	  variables.	  Therefore,	  the	  diagram	  in	  Figure	  5.19	  summarizes	  the	  result	  in	  the	  US	  sample	  during	  the	  period	  of	  QE.	  	  To	  summarize	  the	  US	  sample,	  prior	  to	  the	  intervention	  of	  QE,	  RMO	  is	  stationary	  and	   LMR	   and	   CDS	   are	   nonstationary.	   In	   the	   short-­‐run	   dynamic	   relation,	   both	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  risk	  premia	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  increased	  risk	   premium	   in	   the	  US	  money	  market	   and	   they	  have	  dual	   causality.	   Since	   the	  onset	  of	  LSAP,	  both	   liquidity	  and	   long-­‐term	  credit	   risk	  premia	  have	  decreased.	  The	   operation	   of	   LSAP	   has	   significantly	   reduced	   the	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	  premium,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  causality	  from	  credit	  or	  liquidity	  risk	  premia	  to	  Ratio	  i.e.	  the	  change	  of	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  risk	  premia	  do	  not	  cause	  changes	  in	  the	  Ratio	  variable.	   The	   dual	   causality	   still	   holds	   between	   long-­‐term	   credit	   and	   liquidity	  risk	   premia.	   Moreover,	   there	   is	   no	   significant	   evidence	   confirming	   the	  relationship	  between	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  and	  Ratio	  does	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not	   significantly	   reduce	   the	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium.	   This	   is	   different	  from	  our	  findings	  for	  the	  EMU.	  	  In	   the	   next	   subsection,	   the	   VECM	   results	   are	   reported.	   The	   VECM	   is	   used	   to	  address	   the	   potential	   problems	   that	   might	   be	   produced	   by	   endogeneity.	   The	  discussion	   is	   organized	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   market	   sample	   to	   provide	   a	  comprehensive	  summary	  of	  what	  the	  estimations	  have	  found	  so	  far	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5.2.2	  VECM	  Results	   	  	  The	   single	   equation	   ECM	   analysis	   in	   the	   previous	   section	   ignored	   the	   issue	   of	  endogeneity	   and	   assumed	   that	   the	   critical	   values	   provided	   by	   Banerjee	   et	   al.	  (1998)	  would	  hold	  despite	  presence	  of	  heteroscedasticity	  in	  financial	  time	  series.	  This	  section	  therefore	  estimates	  the	  VECM	  described	  by	  Equation	  36	  in	  Chapter	  4	  using	  OLS	  and	  reports	  the	  t-­‐statistics	  that	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  heteroscedasticity	  and	  autocorrelation.	  Lag	  of	  differences	  up	  to	  2	  is	  used	  for	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole;	   additional	   lags	  are	  added	   to	   individual	  variables	  until	   their	  residuals	   pass	   the	   Ljung-­‐Box	   test	   for	   serial	   correlation.	   The	   required	  cointegrating	   vectors	   (Et-­‐1)	   are	   obtained	   using	   Engle	   and	   Granger	   (1987)	  procedure.	   	  	  
The	  UK	  Sample	  Our	   discussion	   starts	   with	   the	   pre-­‐QE-­‐crisis	   period.	   Table	   5.20	   reports	   the	  estimation	   results	   for	   the	  VECM	  of	   liquidity	  and	  credit	   risks.	  E1	   is	   the	   residual	  obtained	   by	   regressing	   RMO	   on	   a	   constant	   and	   LMR.	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   HAC	  
t-­‐statistics,	  White’s	  heteroscedasticity	  consistent	  t-­‐statistics	  are	  also	  reported.	   	  	  The	  HAC	  t-­‐statistics	  find	  no	  error	  correction	  for	  either	  component	  of	  the	  LIBOR	  spread.	   However,	   Johansen’s	   trace	   and	   max-­‐eigenvalue	   tests	   indicate	   the	  presence	  of	  a	  cointegrating	  vector	  and	  hence	  there	  must	  be	  error	  correction	  at	  work.	   White’s	   t-­‐statistic	   suggests	   significant	   error	   correction	   for	   RMO.	   As	  Ljung-­‐Box	  test	  indicate	  absence	  of	  serial	  correlation	  in	  the	  residuals,	  we	  take	  this	  as	  evidence	  for	  the	  claim	  that	  credit	  risk	  is	  the	  long	  run	  forcing	  variable	  and	  RMO	  error	  corrects	  in	  response	  to	  any	  disequilibrium	  in	  the	  system.	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Moving	   to	   the	   QE	   period,	   with	   inclusion	   of	   Ratio,	   there	   are	   three	   long-­‐run	  relationships	  found	  by	  ECM	  analysis:	  	   … 47)  𝑅𝑀𝑂! =   𝑎! +   𝑎!𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜! +   𝑎!𝑡 + 𝐸1!	  … 48)  𝐿𝑀𝑅! =   𝑏! +   𝑏!𝑅𝑀𝑂! + 𝐸2!	  … 49)  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜! =    𝑐! +   𝑐!𝐿𝑀𝑅! +   𝑐!𝑡 + 𝐸3!	  	  where	  Equations	  47	  and	  49	  were	  obtained	  when	   including	  Ratio,	  and	  Equation	  48	   was	   got	   without	   Ratio.	   The	   residuals	   Ei	   are	   obtained	   as	   mentioned	   in	   the	  endnote	  of	  Table	  5.20.	  So,	  in	  terms	  of	  VECM,	  the	  following	  error	  correction	  term	  can	  be	  formed:	  	  
…50)	   .	  	  
Table	  5.20	  The	  relationship	  between	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	  before	  QE	   	  
	  	   Eqn	  61	   Eqn	  62	  	   ΔRMO	   ΔLMR	  E1t-­‐1	   -­‐0.062	  (-­‐2.15*)	  [-­‐1.47]	  
0.025	  (0.72)	  [0.61]	  Adj-­‐R2	   0.33	   0.05	  Durbin-­‐Watson	   2.03	   2.00	  Ljung-­‐Box	  test:	  Q(10)	  
	   p-­‐value	  
	  7.75	  0.65	  
	  6.83	  0.74	  White’s	  heteroscedasticity	   consistent	  and	  HAC	   t-­‐statistics	  are	   reported	   in	   round	  and	  square	  brackets	   respectively.	  The	  residual	  E1	  is	  obtained	  from	  the	  static	  OLS	  regression:	  RMO	  =	  –1.903	  +	  0.124LMR	  +	  E1.	  The	  lag	  length	  of	  the	  VECM	  is	  2,	  with	  additional	  lag	  up	  to	  3	  for	  ΔRMO	  in	  Eqn	  65.	  	  
1 1 1 1
'
1 2 1 1
1 3 1 1
0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0
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⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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In	   general	   α	   may	   not	   be	   diagonal;	   it	   is	   simply	   a	   description	   of	   the	   error	  corrections	  established	  by	  the	  single	  equation	  ECM	  analyses.	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see	  that	  in	  Equation	  50	  there	  are	  two	  cointegrating	  vectors,	  which	  is	  confirmed	  by	  Johansen’s	  trace	  and	  max-­‐eigenvalue	  tests.	  By	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  any	  row	  of	   	   can	  be	  obtained	  from	  linear	  combination	  of	  the	  other	  two	  rows,	  we	  have	  	   =	   1.	   Based	   on	   the	   coefficients	   obtained	   from	   the	   single	   equation	   ECM	  analyses	  (eqn	  18	  in	  Table	  5.9	  and	  Eqn	  21	  and	  24	  in	  Table	  5.10),	  we	  have	   =	  0.7369.	   For	   the	  VECM	  as	  described	   in	  Equation	  36	   in	  Chapter	  4,	  E1	   and	  E3	   are	  used	   because	   the	   correlation	   between	   them	   is	   low,	   at	   -­‐0.08.70	   By	   virtue	   of	  Equation	  50),	  the	  error	  correction	  term	  in	  Equation	  37	  takes	  the	  form:	  	  
…51)	   .	  
	  A	   large	   and	   positive	  E1t-­‐1	  implies	   a	   high	   RMO	   value	   at	   time	   t-­‐1,	   which	   in	   turn	  implies	  LMR	  would	  tend	  to	  error	  correct	  upwards	  in	  the	  next	  time	  period.	  This	  implies	   a	   positive	   .	   The	   estimated	   VECMs	   are	   reported	   in	   Table	   5.21.	   The	  results	  broadly	  confirm	  the	  above	  analysis	  culminated	  in	  Equation	  51,	  and	  thus	  confirm	  the	  single	  equation	  ECM	  results.	   	  	  To	  summarize	  both	  ECM	  and	  VECM	  findings	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  relationship	  between	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  spreads	  depends	  crucially	  on	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  central	  bank.	  Before	  the	  massive	   liquidity	  provision,	  credit	  risk	  was	  the	  main	  driver	  of	  the	  interbank	  spread.	  Angelini	  et	  al.	  (2010),	  who	  examined	  interbank	  spreads	  in	  the	   pre-­‐intervention	   period	   and	   also	   found	   that	   credit	   risk	   drives	   the	   LIBOR	  spread,	   support	   our	   results.	   They	   attribute	   the	   role	   of	   credit	   risk	   as	   the	  main	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	   𝑎! =    !.!"#!.!"# = 3.62;	   𝑏! =   !!.!"#!.!!" = −8.40;	   𝑐! =   !!.!!!"!.!"# =   −0.024	  70	   The	  other	  two	  correlations	  are	  -­‐0.83	  (between	  E1	  and	  E2)	  and	  -­‐0.43	  (between	  E2	  and	  E3).	  
β ʹ′
1 1 1a b c
1 1 1a b c
1211 1
1 1






















−⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
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driver	   of	   the	   interbank	   spread	   to	   the	   rise	   in	   risk	   aversion	   rather	   than	   the	  quantity	  of	  risk.	  Angelini	  et	  al.	   therefore	  support	  the	  claim	  made	  by	  Taylor	  and	  Williams	  (2008,	  2009)	  that	  liquidity	  injections	  will	  be	  ineffective	  in	  reducing	  the	  interbank	  spread.	  
	  
Table	  5.21	  The	  Effect	  of	  QE	  on	  Liquidity	  and	  Credit	  Risk	  Premia	  -­‐	  UK	  
	  	   Eqn	  63	   Eqn	  64	   Eqn	  65	  	   ΔRMO	   ΔLMR	   ΔRatio	  E1t-­‐1	   -­‐0.094	  (-­‐2.58)	   0.080	  (2.17)	   0.0002	  (0.50)	  E3t-­‐1	   -­‐0.763	  (-­‐1.16)	   -­‐0.042	  (-­‐0.14)	   -­‐0.016	  (-­‐3.29)	  Trend	   0.000	  (0.19)	   0.002	  (1.99)	   -­‐0.0000	  (-­‐2.99)	  Adj-­‐R2	   0.08	   0.39	   0.58	  D-­‐W	   2.03	   2.03	   1.99	  Ljung-­‐Box	  test:	  Q(10)	  
p-­‐value	  
	  14.2	  0.16	  
	  8.84	  0.55	  
	  4.69	  0.91	  HAC	  t-­‐statistics	  are	  reported	  brackets.	  The	  residuals	  E1	  and	  E3	  are	  obtained	  respectively	  from	  the	  static	  OLS	  regression:	  RMO	  =	  0.166	  –	  8.635Ratio	  +	  0.0215Trend	  +	  E1	  and	  Ratio	  =	  –2.096	  –	  0.0189LMR	  +	  0.00343Trend	  +	  E3.	  The	  lag	  length	  of	  the	  VECM	  is	  2,	  with	  additional	  lags	  up	  to	  6	  and	  11	  for	  ΔLMR	  and	  ΔRatio	  in	  Eqn	  68	  respectively.	   	  	  Since	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  BoE,	  however,	  all	  spreads	  have	  been	  falling.	  Joyce	  et	  
al.	  (2010)	  find	  that	  QE	  lowered	  gilt	  yields	  and	  suggest	  that	  its	  impact	  should	  also	  be	  felt	  across	  a	  range	  of	  assets.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  claim	  made	  by	  Angelini	  et	  al.	  and	  Taylor	   and	   Williams,	   we	   find	   this	   effect	   at	   the	   short	   end	   of	   the	   yield	   curve:	  central	  bank’s	  asset	  purchases	  (Ratio)	  reduces	  the	  liquidity	  spread	  (RMO),	  which	  in	  turn	  lowers	  the	  credit	  spread	  (LMR).	   	  
	  
The	  EMU	  Sample	  In	   the	   EMU	   sample,	   we	   found	   that	   credit	   risks	   cause	   changes	   in	   liquidity	  component	   in	   all	   sub-­‐period.	   Table	   5.22	   reports	   results	   obtained	   using	   VECM.	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The	  Johansen	  cointegrating	  test	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  one	  cointegrating	  relation	  exiting	   between	   pairs	   of	   variables.	   Moreover,	   the	   previous	   ECM	   result	   clearly	  shows	  that	  the	  long-­‐run	  credit	  risk	  measure	  CDS	  explains	  liquidity	  variable	  RMO	  better	  than	  the	  short-­‐run	  credit	  risk	  proxy,	  so	  equation	  68	  in	  Table	  5.22	  is	  also	  carried	   out.	   Both	  White’s	   and	  HAC	   statistics	   find	   error	   correction	   for	   liquidity	  component	  (see	  equation	  66	  and	  equation	  68),	  but	  EMR	  does	  not	  error	  correct	  indicating	   the	  causality	   is	   from	  EMR	  to	  RMO	   i.e.	  EMR	  explains	  RMO.	  Moreover,	  CDS	  does	  not	  error	  correct	  (tested	  using	  VECM,	  but	  result	  is	  not	  reported	  since	  it	  is	  just	  a	  prudent	  estimation)	  so	  RMO	  does	  not	  cause	  CDS	  in	  the	  long	  run	  either.	  The	  Ljung-­‐Box	  test	  shows	  no	  serial	  correlation	  in	  the	  residuals.	  Therefore,	  both	  EMR	  and	  CDS	  force	  the	  increase	  of	  risk	  premium	  spread	  in	  the	  long	  run	  and	  RMO	  adjusts	  to	  deviation	  from	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  system.	  
	  
Table	  5.22	  The	  Relationship	  between	  Liquidity	  and	  Credit	  Risks	  Prior	  to	  QE	  
	  	   Eqn	  66	   Eqn	  67	   Eqn	  68	  	   ΔRMO	   ΔEMR	   ΔRMO	  E4t-­‐1	   -­‐0.083	  (-­‐2.05*)	  [-­‐1.94*]	  
0.073	  (1.62)	  [1.62]	  
	  
E5t-­‐1	   	   	   -­‐0.093	  (-­‐2.27*)	  [-­‐2.04*]	  Adj-­‐R2	   0.37	   0.20	   0.37	  Durbin-­‐Watson	   2.06	   1.98	   2.06	  Ljung-­‐Box	  test:	  Q(10)	  
	   p-­‐value	  
	  11.21	  0.34	  
	  8.59	  0.57	  
	  11.02	  0.36	  White’s	  heteroscedasticity	   consistent	  and	  HAC	   t-­‐statistics	  are	   reported	   in	   round	  and	  square	  brackets	   respectively.	  The	  residual	  E4	  is	  obtained	  from	  the	  cointegrating	  vector	  regression:	  RMO	  =	  0.015	  –	  0.019	  EMR	  +	  E4.	   	   E5	  is	  obtained	  from	  the	  static	  OLS:	  RMO	  =	  -­‐0.010	  +	  0.019	  CDS	  +	  E5.	  The	  lag	  length	  of	  the	  VECM	  is	  2,	  with	  additional	  lag	  up	  to	  5	  for	  ΔRMO	  and	  ΔEMR.	  Superscript	  *	  indicates	  5%	  significance	  level.	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During	   the	   intervention	   period,	   apart	   from	   what	   we	   investigate	   in	  pre-­‐intervention	  period,	  the	  interest	  is	  also	  in	  how	  the	  ECB’s	  intervention	  would	  alter	   the	   relationship	   between	   credit	   and	   liquidity	   risks.	   The	   intervention	  measure	  Ratio	  is	  an	  I(0)	  variable	  as	  we	  have	  mentioned	  before,	  so	  based	  on	  the	  Johansen	   cointegrating	   results,	   Ratio	   is	   entered	   as	   a	   variable	   outside	   the	  cointegration	  space	  in	  the	  VECM.	   	  	  
Table	   5.23	   The	   Effect	   of	   ECB’s	   Intervention	   on	   Liquidity	   and	   Credit	   Risk	  
Premia	  
	  	   Eqn	  69	   Eqn	  70	   Eqn	  71	   Eqn	  72	  	   ΔRMO	   ΔEMR	   ΔRMO	   ΔCDS	  E6t-­‐1	   -­‐0.253	  [-­‐5.22]	   0.006	  [0.16]	   	   	  E7t-­‐1	   	   	   -­‐0.190	  [-­‐3.22]	   -­‐0.144	  [-­‐0.90]	  Ratiot-­‐1	   -­‐0.195	  [-­‐3.39]	   -­‐0.127	  [-­‐2.65]	   -­‐0.123	  [-­‐2.08]	   -­‐0.208	  [-­‐1.29]	  Ratiot-­‐2	   -­‐0.089	  [-­‐1.51]	   -­‐0.046	  [-­‐0.94]	   0.009	  [0.02]	   -­‐0.057	  [-­‐0.33]	  Adj-­‐R2	   0.35	   0.35	   0.38	   0.38	  LM	  Test:	  	   𝜒!(10)	  
	   p-­‐value	  
	  7.39	  0.12	  
	  7.39	  0.12	  
	  8.05	  0.09	  
	  8.05	  0.09	  
[]	  reports	  t-­‐statistics.	  The	  long	  run	  relationship	  from	  VECM:	  E6	  =	  RMO	  –	  0.047	  EMR	  +	  0.005	  and	  E7	  =	  RMO	  –	  0.084	  CDS	  +	  0.065.	  Residuals	  in	  all	  the	  equations,	  respectively,	  suffer	  heteroscedasticity.	   	  	  The	   results	   in	   Table	   5.23	   suffer	   from	   heteroscedasticity,	   but	   they	   form	   the	  similar	   results	   as	   suggested	   by	   ARDL-­‐ECM,	  which	   allowed	  HAC	   adjustment.	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  previous	  findings,	  equation	  70	  reveals	  that	  Ratio	  reduces	  EMR	  in	  the	  short	  run.	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To	  summarize,	  credit	  risk,	  especially	  the	  long-­‐run	  credit	  risk	  played	  a	  significant	  role	   in	   widening	   the	   risk	   premium	   spread	   through	   an	   increase	   of	   liquidity	  premia.	  The	  ECB’s	  additional	  and	  unconventional	  liquidity	  provision	  under	  OMO	  together	   with	   CBPP	   (although	   the	   amount	   was	   relevant	   small)	   successfully	  reduced	   liquidity	   premia.	   The	   evidence	   is	   found	   that	   those	  provisions	   reduced	  short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   but	   only	   at	   slow	   and	   small	   amount	   because	   there	   is	  established	  causality	  from	  liquidity	  component	  to	  credit	  risk.	  	  
The	  US	  Sample	  As	  noted	  previously,	  the	  liquidity	  risk	  premium	  variable	  RMO	  is	  an	  I(0)	  variable	  during	   the	  crisis	  period	  prior	   to	  QE	   in	   the	  US	  sample.	  This	  makes	   it	  difficult	   to	  obtain	  a	  long	  run	  relationship	  between	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	  premia.	  Neither	  the	  Banerjee	  ECM	  nor	  ARDL	  ECM	  could	  find	  a	  cointegrating	  relation	  between	  the	  variables.	  However,	  the	  Johansen	  cointegration	  test	  suggests	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  cointegrating	  relation	  between	  LMR	  and	  CDS.	  Therefore,	  we	  run	  a	  VECM	  on	  LMR	  and	  CDS,	  and	  include	  RMO	  as	  an	  exogenous	  variable.	  The	  result	  is	  represented	  in	  Table	  5.24.	  	  Prior	   to	   the	   operation	   of	   LSAP,	  we	   find	   that	   there	   is	   no	   cointegration	   relation	  existing	   between	   LMR	   and	   CDS	   so	  we	   cannot	   obtain	   the	   long	   run	   relationship	  between	   variables	   in	   the	   single	   equation	   ECM	   test.	   In	   the	   VECM	   regression,	  equation	   77	   in	   Table	   5.24	   shows	   that	   LMR	   error	   corrects	   and	   is	   cointegrated	  with	  CDS	  with	   inclusion	  of	  RMO	  as	  an	  exogenous	  variable	   in	   the	   long	   run.	  The	  equation	   78	   shows	   that	   the	   causality	   runs	   from	   CDS	   to	   LMR.	   The	   long-­‐run	  relationship	  derived	  from	  equation	  77	  can	  be	  written	  as	   	  	   … 52)  𝐿𝑀𝑅 = 0.005  𝐶𝐷𝑆 + 0.047  𝑅𝑀𝑂71	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	   0.005	  =	   !!.!"#  ×  !!.!!"!.!"# ;	  0.047	  =	   !.!!"!!.!!"!.!"# 	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Table	  5.24	  Liquidity	  and	  Credit	  Risk	  Premia	  Prior	  to	  QE	  
	  	   Eqn	  77	   Eqn	  78	  	   ΔLMR	   ΔCDS	  
E8t-­‐1	   -­‐0.043**	  [-­‐2.48]	   -­‐1.27	  [-­‐1.96]	  
RMOt-­‐1	   0.005	  [3.57]	   0.063	  [1.14]	  
RMOt-­‐2	   -­‐0.003	  [-­‐1.85]	   -­‐0.020	  [-­‐0.35]	  
Adj-­‐R2	   0.13	   0.06	  
LM	  Test:	  
	   𝝌𝟐(4)	  
	   p-­‐value	  
	  6.73	  0.15	  
	  6.73	  0.15	  
[]	  reports	  t-­‐statistics.	  The	  long	  run	  relationship	  from	  VECM:	  E8	  =	  LMR	  –	  0.005	  CDS	  –	  0.768.	  Residuals	  in	  all	  the	  equations	  suffer	  heteroscedasticity.	   	  	  Equation	  52	  tells	  us	  that	  both	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  have	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  the	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premia,	  but	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  has	  bigger	  effect.	   	  	  During	   the	   period	   of	   QE,	   The	   single	   equation	   ECM	   found	   two	   cointegrating	  relations,	  RMO	  and	  Ratio,	  and	  CDS	  and	  Ratio	  and	  the	  Johansen	  cointegration	  test	  also	  suggest	  the	  same.	  Moreover,	  the	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  LMR	  does	  not	   appear	   to	   have	   a	   relation	  with	   the	   liquidity	   premium	   RMO	   and	   long-­‐term	  credit	   risk	   premium	   CDS.	   The	   Fed’s	   LSAP	   proxy	   Ratio	   does	   not	   respond	   to	  changes	   in	   credit	   and	   liquidity	   risk	   premia.	   Since	   the	   VECM	   captures	   the	  cointegration	   between	   LMR	   and	   CDS	   for	   the	   period	   prior	   to	   the	   crisis,	   we	  therefore	  test	  three	  VECMs	  at	  this	  point,	  RMO	  and	  Ratio,	  CDS	  and	  Ratio	  and	  LMR	  and	  Ratio.	  The	  result	  is	  represented	  in	  Table	  5.25.	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Table	  5.25	  The	  Effect	  of	  QE	  on	  Liquidity	  and	  Credit	  Risk	  Premia	  –	  US	  
	  	   Eqn	  79	   Eqn	  80	   Eqn	  81	   Eqn	  82	   Eqn	  83	   Eqn	  84	  	   ΔRMO	   ΔRatio	   ΔCDS	   ΔRatio	   ΔLMR	   ΔRatio	  
E9t-­‐1	   -­‐0.347***	  [-­‐7.68]	   -­‐0.000	  [-­‐0.98]	   	   	   	   	  
E10t-­‐1	   	   	   -­‐0.087**	  [-­‐4.42]	   -­‐0.000	  [-­‐0.10]	   	  	   	  	  
E11t-­‐1	   	   	   	   	   -­‐0.040**	  [-­‐3.78]	   -­‐0.002	  [-­‐1.48]	  
Adj-­‐R2	   0.15	   0.15	   0.08	   0.08	   0.09	   0.09	  
LM	  Test:	  
	   𝝌𝟐(4)	  
	   p-­‐value	  
	  6.11	  [0.19]	  
	  6.11	  [0.19]	  
	  1.88	  0.76	  
	  1.88	  0.76	  
	  5.25	  0.26	  
	  5.25	  0.26	  
[]	  reports	  t-­‐statistics.	  The	  long	  run	  relationship	  from	  VECM:	  E9	  =	  RMO	  +	  4.353	  Ratio	  –	  17.281,	  E10	  =	  CDS	  +	  21.99	  Ratio	  –	  213.80	  and	  E11	  =	  LMR	  +	  0.368	  Ratio	  –	  2.341.	  No	  heteroskedasticity	  on	  residuals	  from	  eqn	  81	  and	  eqn	  82.	  	  The	   VECM	   result	   in	   Table	   5.25	   confirms	   the	   previous	   findings.	   In	   addition,	  equation	  83	  finds	  that	  LMR	  error	  corrects	  and	  is	  cointegrated	  with	  Ratio	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  The	  residuals	  obtained	  suffer	  from	  heteroscedasticity,	  so	  the	  t-­‐statistics	  may	  be	  over	  optimistic.	  The	  OLS	  VECM	  is	  also	  tested	  in	  order	  to	  be	  prudent	  and	  unfortunately,	  the	  t-­‐statistic	  on	  the	  error	  term	  drops	  to	  -­‐1.24	  with	  HAC	  adjusted	  for	  heteroscedasiticy.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  to	  establish	  a	  relationship	  between	  LMR	  and	  Ratio.	  Also,	  there	  is	  still	  no	  causality	  captured	  from	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  to	  Ratio	   i.e.	  changes	  on	  credit	  risks	  and	   liquidity	  premia	  are	  unlikely	  to	  cause	  changes	  in	  Ratio.	   	  	  To	   conclude,	   prior	   to	   the	   operation	   of	   LSAP,	   both	   credit	   risks	   and	   liquidity	  premia	   have	   contributed	   to	   the	   increased	   risk	   premium	   because	   of	   the	  established	   causality	   between	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   premia	   and	  short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium.	   Since	   the	   operation	   of	   LSAP,	   the	   causality	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between	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  and	  liquidity	  premia	  has	  gone.	  Also,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  for	  the	  relationship	  between	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  and	  other	  variables.	  It	  seems	  likely	  that	  the	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  becomes	  less	  important	  since	   the	   operation	   of	   LSAP.	   It	   is	   possible	   because	   given	   liquidity	   is	   readily	  available,	  banks	  with	  sound	  capital	  adequacy	  and	  asset	  structure	  are	   less	   likely	  to	   default	   in	   the	   short	   run	   and	   capital	   adequacy	   and	   asset	   composition	   are	  long-­‐term	  measurements	  for	  banks’	  soundness.	  Moreover,	  the	  results	  show	  that	  Ratio	  has	   significantly	   reduced	   liquidity	  and	   long-­‐term	  credit	   risk	  premia.	  This	  finding	  confirms	  that	  LSAP	  fulfills	  its	  intermediate	  purpose	  to	  reduce	  borrowing	  costs.	  	  
5.3 Comparison 
 This	   chapter	   investigates	   the	   relationship	   between	   liquidity	   and	   credit	  components	   in	   the	   risk	   premium	   spread	   and	   how	   the	   central	   banks’	  interventions	  alter	  the	  relationship	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  EMU	  and	  the	  US,	  respectively.	  A	   similar	   econometrics	   approach	   is	   applied	   in	   each	   case	   with	   variations	  reflecting	  the	  features	  of	  variables	  in	  each	  sample.	  The	  results	  obtained	  are	  very	  comparable.	   Firstly,	   credit	   risk	   is	   found	   to	  be	   the	  main	  driver	  of	   the	   interbank	  spread	   before	   those	   liquidity	   provisions.	   The	   causality	   between	   liquidity	   and	  credit	  components	  proves	  to	  be	  from	  credit	  risk	  spread	  to	  liquidity	  premia	  in	  the	  crisis	   period	   except	   the	   causality	   was	   reversed	   during	   QE	   period	   without	  operations	  of	  QE	  in	  the	  UK.	  In	  the	  US,	  there	  is	  dual	  causality	  between	  long-­‐term	  credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   premia.	  Moreover,	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk,	   CDS,	   showed	  significant	  influence	  on	  risk	  premia	  in	  the	  EMU	  and	  the	  US	  samples	  whereas	  CDS	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  an	  irrelevant	  variable	  in	  the	  UK.	   	  	  Secondly,	   the	   interventions	   successfully	   reduced	   risk	   premia	   in	   the	   three	  samples.	   In	   the	   UK,	   the	   reduction	   of	   the	   credit	   risk	   premium	   depends	   on	   the	  causality	  from	  risk	  premia	  during	  the	  crisis	  QE	  period.	  In	  the	  EMU,	  one	  equation	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Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusion 	  The	  sudden	  and	  persistent	  widening	  of	  LIBOR	  (EURIBOR)	  –	  OIS	  spreads	  at	   the	  beginning	   of	   the	   recent	   financial	   crisis	   broke	   the	   traditional	   interest-­‐rate	  transmission	  mechanism	  of	  monetary	  policy,	  so	  central	  banks	  (the	  BoE,	  the	  ECB	  and	  the	  Fed)	  appeared	  to	  lose	  their	  power	  to	  influence	  market	  interest	  rates	  and,	  ultimately,	   their	   targets	   for	   inflation	   and	   GDP.	   Under	   the	   circumstances,	   the	  central	  banks	  resorted	  to	  unconventional	  monetary	  policy	  tools	  such	  as	  liquidity	  provisions	   and	   quantitative	   easing	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   US,	   and	   longer-­‐term	  refinancing	  operations	  and	  small-­‐scale	  operations	  in	  the	  covered	  bond	  purchase	  programmes	  in	  the	  EMU	  since	  late	  2007.	  We	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  the	  ECB	  has	  limited	  ability	  to	  operate	  in	  the	  secondary	  market	  to	  purchase	  government	  bond	  primarily	  because	  it	  is	  a	  monetary	  union	  and	  the	  purchase	  of	  government	  bonds	  may	  induce	  moral	  hazard	  among	  certain	  member	  governments,	  so	  its	  main	  focus	  has	   been	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   malfunctioning	   money	   market	   in	   the	   EMU	   by	  offering	   fixed-­‐rate	   full	   allotment	   liquidity	   at	   longer-­‐term	   e.g.	   twelve-­‐month	  refinancing	  operations.	  In	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  US,	  after	  a	  series	  of	  liquidity	  provision	  to	  banking	  system,	  the	  BoE	  and	  the	  Fed	  started	  quantitative	  easing	  in	  early	  2009	  and	   late	   2008,	   respectively.	   One	   of	   the	   advantages	   of	   quantitative	   easing	  compared	  with	  the	  traditional	  interest-­‐rate	  regime	  is	  the	  different	  transmission	  mechanism.	   The	   operation	   of	   QE	   aims	   to	   bypass	   the	   money	   market,	   passing	  instead	   through	   portfolio	   rebalancing,	   liquidity	   and	   signal	   channels	   to	  intermediately	   influence	   asset	   prices	   and	   change	   total	   wealth	   and	   borrowing	  costs.	   	  	  In	  the	  previous	  chapters,	  given	  the	  context,	  we	  have	  discussed	  three	  objectives	  of	  the	  research	  1)	  the	  factors	  that	  drove	  up	  the	  money	  market	  risk	  premium	  spread;	  2)	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  central	  banks’	  (the	  BoE,	  the	  ECB	  and	  the	  Fed)	  large-­‐scale	  liquidity	  provisions	  in	  reducing	  the	  spread;	  3)	  the	  changing	  relationship	  between	  liquidity	   and	   credit	   risk	   premia	   during	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   unconventional	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policies.	  As	  mentioned	  before,	  the	  intermediate	  target	  of	  quantitative	  easing	  is	  to	  change	   (more	   precisely,	   to	   reduce)	   the	   borrowing	   cost.	   The	   money	   market	  interest	  rates	  provide	  benchmarks	  to	  other	  lending	  rates	  in	  financial	  markets,	  so	  a	  well-­‐founded	  study	  of	  how	  risk	  premia	  have	  been	  changed	  by	  the	  operations	  of	  quantitative	  easing	  offers	  the	  basis	   for	  assessing	  the	  effectiveness	  of	   these	  new	  policy	  instruments.	   	  	  In	  the	  study,	  we	  have	  looked	  at	  the	  behaviour	  of	  risk	  premia	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  EMU	  and	  the	  USA	  by	  decomposing	  it	   into	  credit	  and	  liquidity	  risk	  premia.	  Compared	  with	  literatures	  that	  have	  estimated	  the	  effect	  of	  central	  banks’	  interventions	  on	  interest	  rate	  spreads,	  our	  study	  has	  used	  a	  variable	  which	  we	  called	  ‘Ratio’	  –	  the	  accumulated	  QE	  amount	  divided	  by	  total	  bank	  assets	  (accumulated	  open	  market	  operations,	   which	   include	   LTROs,	   and	   covered	   bond	   purchase	   over	   total	   bank	  asset,	  for	  the	  EMU)	  instead	  of	  a	  dummy	  variable	  which	  has	  been	  the	  approach	  of	  earlier	   studies.	   This	   measurement	   can	   provide	   information	   on	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  the	  risk	  premia	  has	  been	  reduced	  by	  a	  one-­‐unit	  increase	  in	  the	  monetary	  base.	   	  	  In	  the	  estimation,	  the	  first	  research	  question	  –	  the	  factors	  that	  drove	  up	  the	  risk	  premia	  spreads	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  EMU	  and	  the	  US,	  has	  been	  studied	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  sub	  period	  of	  the	  crisis,	  pre-­‐QE..	  We	  can	  conclude	  that	  both	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	  premia	  have	   contributed	   to	   the	  widening	   risk	  premia	   in	   each	  of	   the	   three	  money	  markets	  because	  of	  the	  causality	  between	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	  premia,	  but	  credit	  risk	  premia	  played	  a	  more	  important	  role	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  EMU	  due	  to	   the	   single	   causality.	   In	   the	  UK,	   the	   causality	   runs	   from	  short-­‐	   and	   long-­‐term	  credit	   risk	   premium	   to	   liquidity	   premium	   i.e.	   one	   basis	   point	   increase	   of	  short-­‐term	  (long-­‐term)	  credit	  risk	  premium	  has	  increased	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  by	  0.13	  basis	  points	  (0.14	  basis	  points)	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reverse	  causality.	  In	  the	  EMU,	   it	   is	  slightly	  different	   in	   that	   the	   long-­‐term	  credit	   risk	  premium,	  CDS,	  has	  played	  a	  more	  important	  role	  in	  increasing	  the	  liquidity	  premium.	  The	  causality	  
	   189	  
runs	   from	   the	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	   to	   liquidity	   premium.	   One	   basis	  point	   increase	   in	   the	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium	   increased	   the	   liquidity	  premium	  by	  0.03	  basis	  points.	  As	  same	  as	  the	  UK	  sample,	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  has	  not	  passed	  the	  increase	  to	  the	  credit	  risk	  premia.	  In	  the	  US,	  the	  situation	  is	  different	  from	  the	  UK	  and	  the	  EMU	  because	  the	  liquidity	  premium	  variable	  is	  I(0)	  and	   the	   two	   credit	   risk	   premia	   are	   not	   cointegrated,	   so	   we	   cannot	   obtain	   the	  long-­‐run	   relationship.	   In	   the	   short	   run	   dynamic	   ARDL	   model,	   the	   causality	  between	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	  premia	  is	  dual.	  Both	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	   premia	   have	   significantly	   increased	   liquidity	   premium,	   but	   the	   short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  has	  shown	  a	  bigger	  effect	  i.e.	  20.68	  basis	  points	  against	  0.28	  basis	  points.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  one	  basis	  point	  increase	  in	  liquidity	  premium	  has	  increased	   the	   short-­‐	   and	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premia	   by	   0.01	   and	   0.12	   basis	  points,	  respectively.	  	  The	  second	  and	  the	  third	  research	  questions	  have	  been	  studied	  in	  the	  period	  of	  operation	  of	  QE	  (LTROs).	  Firstly,	  the	  results	  have	  confirmed	  that	  the	  operations	  of	  QE	  significantly	   reduced	  both	   liquidity	  and	  credit	   risk	  premia	   in	   the	  UK	  and	  the	  US.	  That	  is,	  the	  QE	  has	  fulfilled	  its	  objective	  of	  reducing	  the	  cost	  of	  borrowing	  in	   the	   UK	   and	   the	   US,	   respectively.	   In	   the	   EMU,	   although	   the	   operations	   have	  responded	   to	   the	   change	   of	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium,	   the	   LTROs	  significantly	   reduced	   the	   liquidity	  premium	  and	   it	  has	  not	  directly	   reduced	   the	  credit	  risk	  premia	  due	  to	   the	   lack	  of	  causality	   from	  liquidity	  premium	  to	  credit	  risk	  premia	  i.e.	  the	  causality	  remained	  as	  it	  was	  before	  the	  operation	  of	  LTROs.	  The	  missing	  causality	  from	  liquidity	  premia	  to	  credit	  risk	  may	  also	  imply	  that	  the	  increased	   credit	   risk	   in	   the	  EMU	  may	  not	   relate	   to	   liquidity	   aspect.	   This	  might	  provide	  some	  evidence	  for	  the	  suspicions	  of	  Mortimer-­‐Lee	  (2012)	  regarding	  the	  intention	   of	   LTROs	   because	   low	   capital	   adequacy	   can	   lead	   to	   default	   under	  severe	  market	  condition.	  Secondly,	  in	  the	  UK,	  the	  causality	  between	  liquidity	  and	  credit	   risk	   premia	   has	   been	   reversed.	   The	   causality	   now	   runs	   from	   a	   liquidity	  premium	  to	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium.	  The	  variable	  Ratio	  has	  responded	  to	  the	  change	  of	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium.	  And,	   it	  has	  reduced	  the	   liquidity	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premium	   directly.	   Relying	   on	   the	   reversed	   causality,	   the	   variable	   Ratio	   has	  reduced	  the	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  indirectly.	  The	  long-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium,	  CDS	  has	  no	  significant	  role	  since	  the	  onset	  of	  QE.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  US,	  the	  causality	   remains	   dual,	   but	   the	   long-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   premium,	   CDS,	   has	   taken	  over	  the	  role	  of	  short-­‐term	  credit	  risk	  premium	  to	  have	  bigger	  effect	  on	  the	  risk	  premium	  spread.	  The	  difference	   from	   the	  UK	  and	   the	  EMU	   is	   that	   the	   variable	  Ratio	  has	  neither	  responded	  to	  the	  liquidity	  nor	  the	  credit	  risk	  premia.	   	   	  	  Despite	   the	   interesting	   findings	   in	   the	   study,	   there	   are	   some	   limitations	   that	  constrain	  the	  results.	  Firstly,	  we	  use	  three-­‐month	  LIBOR	  (EURIBOR)	  to	  calculate	  the	   short-­‐term	   credit	   risk	   and	   liquidity	   premia.	   LIBOR	   (EURIBOR)	   is	   not	   a	  transaction-­‐based	   rate.	   The	   participant	   banks	   have	   the	   incentive	   to	  under/over-­‐report	   their	   willing	   lending	   rate	   in	   the	   survey	   that	   is	   used	   to	  calculate	  LIBOR	  rate.	  This	  is	  known	  as	  LIBOR	  misreporting.	  We	  discuss	  the	  issue	  in	   Appendix	   3.	   Secondly,	   banks	   operating	   in	   the	   interbank	   market	   are	   big	  multinational	  banks.	  They	  can	  get	  access	  of	  funds	  from	  the	  UK,	  the	  EMU	  or	  the	  US,	  in	  our	  case.	  Therefore,	  this	  creates	  the	  issue	  of	  international	  spillover	  effects.	  By	  solely	   looking	   at	   each	  market,	  we	   ignore	   the	   possible	   effect	   of	   operations	   that	  have	   been	   run	   by	   other	   central	   banks.	   If	   the	   effect	   is	   big,	   our	   result	   may	   be	  influenced.	  Finally,	  the	  Enhanced	  Credit	  Support	  run	  by	  the	  ECB	  contains	  a	  set	  of	  tools,	  as	  we	  have	  pointed	  out	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  and	  the	  LTROs	  and	  CBPP	  are	  part	  of	  the	  set.	  For	  example,	  the	  fixed-­‐rate	  allotment	  procedure	  ran	  together	  with	  LTROs	  is	   not	   separately	  measured	   and	   considered	   in	   our	   study.	   The	   effect	   is	  merged	  into	  the	  Ratio	  variable.	   	  	  Overall,	  our	  results	  show	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  conclusion	  that	  both	  liquidity	  and	  credit	  risk	  premia	  were	  the	  drivers	  of	  the	  widening	  LIBOR	  –	  OIS	  spreads	  in	  the	  UK,	   the	   EMU	   and	   the	  US.	  QE	   significantly	   reduced	   liquidity	   and	   credit	   risk	  premia	   in	   the	  UK	  and	   the	  US,	   so	  we	  can	  conclude	   that	  QE	  successfully	  reduced	  the	  cost	  of	  borrowing.	   In	  the	  EMU,	  the	  operation	  of	  LTROs	  and	  CBPP	  (although	  the	   amount	   is	   very	   small	   compared	  with	   LTROs)	   is	   proved	   to	   reduce	   liquidity	  premium	  and	  so	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  premium.	  The	  evidence	  is	  less	  convincing	  that	  the	   LTROs	   and	   CBPP	   have	   restored	   the	   functioning	   of	   money	   markets	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Appendices 
	  
Appendix	  1	  Banks	  Bidding	  in	  LIBOR	  (£	  and	  $)	  and	  in	  Euribor	  
	  	  
LIBOR	  Sterling	  Panel	   LIBOR	  USD	  Panel	  Abbey	  National	  plc	   Bank	  of	  America	  Bank	  of	  Tokyo-­‐Mitsubishi	  UFJ	   Bank	  of	  Tokyo-­‐Mitsubishi	  UFJ	  Barclays	  Bank	  plc	   Barclays	  Bank	  plc	  BNP	  Paribas	   BNP	  Paribas	  Citibank	  NA	   Citibank	  NA	  Credit	  Agricole	  CIB	   Credit	  Agricole	  CIB	  Deutsche	  Bank	  AG	   Credit	  Suisse	  HSBC	   Deutsche	  Bank	  AG	  JP	  Morgan	  Chase	   HSBC	  Lloyds	  Banking	  Group	   JP	  Morgan	  Chase	  Mizuho	  Corporate	  Bank	   Lloyds	  Banking	  Group	  Rabobank	   Rabobank	  Royal	  Bank	  of	  Canada	   Royal	  Bank	  of	  Canada	  The	  RBS	  Group	   Société	  Générale	  Société	  Générale	   SMBC	  UBS	  AG	   Norinchukin	  Bank	  	   The	  RBS	  Group	  	   UBS	  AG	  	  
Euribor	  Euro	  Panel	  
Country	   Bank	  Belgium	   Belfius,	  KBC	  Finland	   Nordea,	  Pohjola	  France	   Banque	   Postale,	   BNP	   Paribas,	   HSBC	   France,	   Natixis,	   Credit	   Agricole	  s.a.,	  Credit	  Industriel	  et	  Commercial	  CIC,	  Société	  Générale	  Germany	   Deutsche	  Bank,	  Commerzbank,	  DZ	  Bank	  Greece	   National	  Bank	  of	  Greece	  Ireland	   Bank	  of	  Ireland	  Italy	   Intesa	  Sanpaolo,	  Monte	  dei	  Paschi	  di	  Siena,	  UniCredit,	  UBI	  Banca	  Luxembourg	   Banque	  et	  Caisse	  d’Epargne	  de	  I’Etat	  Netherlands	   ING	  Bank	  Portugal	   Caixa	  Geral	  De	  Depositos	   	  Spain	   Banco	  Bilbao	  Vizcaya	  Argentaria,	  Banco	  Santander	  Central	  Hispano,	  CECABANK,	  Caixabank	  S.A.	  Other	  EU	  banks	   Barclays	  Capital,	  Den	  Danske	  Bank	  International	  banks	   London	   Branch	   of	   JP	   Morgan	   Chase	   Bank	   N.A.,	   Bank	   of	   Tokyo	  Mitsubishi	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Appendix	  2	  Banerjee	  Single-­‐Equation	  ECM	  Critical	  Value	  	  	  With	  constant	   Size	  
T	   0.01	   0.05	   0.10	   0.25	  25	   -­‐4.12	   -­‐3.35	   -­‐2.95	   -­‐2.36	  50	   -­‐3.94	   -­‐3.28	   -­‐2.93	   -­‐2.38	  100	   -­‐3.92	   -­‐3.27	   -­‐2.94	   -­‐2.40	  500	   -­‐3.82	   -­‐3.23	   -­‐2.90	   -­‐2.40	  >	  500	   -­‐3.78	   -­‐3.19	   -­‐2.89	   -­‐2.41	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Appendix	  3:	  The	  Issue	  of	  LIBOR	  Misreporting	   	  
	  One	  of	  our	  measures	  for	  credit	  risks,	  the	  spread	  between	  LIBOR	  and	  Repo,	  might	  be	   criticized	   because	   of	   the	  misreporting	   problem	   associated	  with	   LIBOR	   rate.	  LIBOR	   is	   London	   Interbank	   Offered	   Rate	   so	   LIBOR	   rates	   are	   not	   transaction	  based	   data.	   They	   are	   calculated	   currently	   by	   Thomson	   Reuters	   from	   the	  responses	  of	  participant	  banks	  to	  the	  survey	  that	  enquires	  the	  interest	  rate	  and	  size	   if	   they	   would	   like	   to	   borrow	   at	   11	   am	   every	   trading	   day	   (Monticini	   and	  Thornton,	   2013).	   LIBOR	   currently	   reports	   for	   ten	   currencies	   with	   fifteen	  maturities.	  	  In	  fact,	  active	  discussions	  on	  how	  well	  LIBOR	  captured	  funding	  costs	  during	  the	  crisis	   began	  with	   the	   publication	   of	   the	  Wall	   Street	   Journal	   article	   on	  May	   29,	  2008.	  	   Banks	  participated	  in	  LIBOR	  bidding	  appeared	  to	  underreport	  LIBOR	  rate	  as	   a	   signal	   of	   financial	   soundness	   and	   make	   profits	   (Monticini	   and	   Thornton,	  2013).	  The	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  New	  York	   (FRBNY)	  Markets	  and	  Research	  and	   Statistics	   Groups	   (2008)	   in	   their	   proposal	   of	   enhancing	   the	   credibility	   of	  LIBOR	   point	   out	   the	   problem	   of	   incentive	   of	   misreporting	   and	   introduce	   the	  approach	   of	   random	   sampling	   from	   an	   extended	   panel	   to	   reduce	   the	   public	  exposure	  of	  biding	  statistics	  from	  participant	  banks	  so	  to	  eliminate	  the	  incentive	  of	  misreporting	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  signaling.	  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  (Press	  Release,	  20/07/2012)	   also	   stressed	   that	   the	   possibility	   of	   accidental	   or	   deliberate	  misreporting	  is	  likely	  associated	  with	  any	  system	  based	  on	  self-­‐reporting.	  	  Research	  on	  this	  issue	  concentrated	  on	  comparing	  LIBOR	  survey	  responses	  with	  other	  borrowing	  rates,	  notably	  bank	  bids	  at	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Term	  Auction	  Facility	  and	  term	  borrowing	  from	  Fedwire	  payments.	  Kuo	  et	  al	  (2012)	  found	  that	  LIBOR	  survey	  responses	  broadly	  track	  TAF	  and	  Fedwire	  data	  between	  2007	  and	  2009,	  but	  also	  that	  LIBOR	  lay	  below	  them	  at	  certain	  times.	  They	  discuss	  a	  range	  of	   factors	   that	   may	   account	   for	   the	   discrepancy	   and	   they	   conclude	   that	   while	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